Renowned for his work in stellar astronomy and relativity theory, Arthur Eddington became a major figure in British science in the interwar years, his public profile raised by his leadership of the 1919 eclipse expedition that was widely judged to have confirmed Einstein's general theory. Through the enormous success of his Gifford Lectures, published as The Nature of the Physical World, he also became something of a cultural phenomenon in Britain. At the heart of Eddington's campaign for a better public understanding of science was his conviction that the combination of quantum and relativity theories disposed of the mechanistic, deterministic universe of nineteenth-century physics, thereby removing an obstacle to the faith of those who, like himself, were deeply committed to the primacy of free will and to the reality of a spiritual life in which genuine religious experience was possible. The degree to which his life as a Quaker found expression in his life as a scientist is a question that has intrigued several recent commentators. Not until the appearance of Matthew Stanley's monograph, however, has an answer been given with such comprehensive authority. From an examination of crucial episodes in Eddington's life, we are shown how the values he imbibed from such Quaker modernizers as John William Graham, Rufus Jones and Silvanus Thompson interacted with his scientific values without compromising the integrity of either. For the atheists of his day, including Bertrand Russell, Eddington was an embarrassment and an annoyance because at the core of his being was the persona of the religious scientist.
In two respects, Stanley conceives his project as a contribution to the historiography of ‘science and religion’. Firstly, wisely rejecting the reification of those overblown terms, he offers a case study in specifics – the specifics of a Quaker's life in a specific science (astronomy), in a specific place (Cambridge) at a specific time (during and after the Great War). Secondly, he insists on the value of studying values if the priorities of a religious scientist are to be understood. This becomes particularly important for an understanding of Eddington because he actively resisted conventional ways of binding scientific and spiritual commitments. Unlike his sparring partner, James Jeans, he rejected a natural theology that purported to prove the validity of theistic beliefs from scientific conclusions: ‘I could no more ram religious conviction into an atheist than I could ram a joke into a Scotchman’ (cited on p. 202). Theological dogma was of no interest to him, nor was the exegesis of Scripture. Unlike many writers on ‘science and religion’ today, he was not preoccupied with models of divine activity in nature. As Stanley himself puts it, ‘the metaphysical questions of Creation, divine omnipotence, and the special creation of man had no impact’ (p. 239).
And yet the two most important aspects of Eddington's life were bound together by values that were common to both and surfaced in both. As a Quaker who firmly believed in the presence of an Inner Light, he placed a high value not only on the dominance of religious experience over doctrine but also on the exploratory character of both faith and science. In both there was a seeking. In neither was there finality. The parallel was explicit: ‘In science as in religion the truth shines ahead as a beacon showing us the path; we do not ask to attain it; it is better far that we be permitted to ask’ (cited on p. 210). According to Stanley, this emphasis on the provisionality and exploratory character of scientific modelling underpinned Eddington's dispute with Jeans over scientific methodology, especially in the context of Eddington's attempt to explore a simple relationship between the mass and luminosity of stars. This required him to renounce the deductive certainties of the mathematician for the instrumental utility of approximations. Eddington's distinctive combination of instrumentalism and idealism, in which the human mind created the laws routinely ascribed to ‘nature’, eventuated in a form of positivism that, far from aggressively excising spiritual realities from the world, created the preconditions of their necessity. Because, for Eddington, the sciences were restricted to the metrical, there was a large domain of the non-metrical, epitomized by direct knowledge of our conscious experience, in which the practical mystic could reside.
A striking feature of Stanley's reading concerns Eddington's sympathetic defence of Einstein's general theory. His point is that Quaker values of pacifism and internationalism made a real difference at a time when British scientists had been coopted for the war effort and were largely hostile to all things German. Consequently the much-vaunted internationalism of the 1919 expedition was not, at the time, the natural product of a universalism inherent within science itself, but actually required someone of Eddington's dedication, highly motivated to humanize the enemy and to repair the damage wrought by war. Stanley argues that, as an important pacifist opportunity, the expedition was seen by Eddington as both a religious and a scientific task. He had been interested to learn that Einstein was anti-Prussian. Finding a brilliant fellow pacifist in the German physics community was ‘just what was needed to restore internationalism to science’ (p. 97). During the war, Eddington had sought exemption from conscription. This had initially been secured on his behalf on the ground that his work at the Cambridge Observatory was of national importance. Disturbingly, he later found that this legally disqualified him from entering a plea of conscientious religious objection when he wished to show his solidarity with other Quakers. As Stanley wryly observes, it was as if the Government itself operated with categories that excluded the possibility of a deeply religious scientist.
Historians of physics and astronomy will welcome Stanley's survey of British responses to relativity. Space is given to Eddington's critics, philosophers as well as scientists. The central thesis of the book is persuasively argued: the fact that ontological claims drawn from theology no longer informed the content of physical theory emphatically does not mean that religious values ceased to have relevance to a life in science. For Eddington, scientific creativity itself bore witness to that divine spark in the human mind that pointed to the presence of a greater Mind.
