Introduction
Joseph Elzéar Bernier's northern sovereignty claims purportedly on behalf of Canada have long been the subject of misunderstanding, thanks largely to Bernier's own determination to present himself as the man who secured the Arctic archipelago for his country. Numerous historians and journalists have echoed Bernier's version of the story: that the possible consequences of the Ottawa government's indifferent attitude were averted only by Bernier's flag-raisings and proclamations, most notably his famous sector claim of 1 July 1909 (for example, see Davies Reference Davies1927; Woollacott Reference Woollacott1928–1929; Fairley and Israel Reference Fairley and Israel1964; Dorion-Robitaille Reference Dorion-Robitaille1978; Saint-Pierre Reference Saint-Pierre and Barr2009). In fact, many government officials were dismayed by Bernier's unauthorised actions. To them, the true foundation of Canada's sovereignty was the 1880 transfer of British rights over the archipelago, and they were acutely aware that Bernier's proclamations might be taken as an implicit denial of the transfer's validity (Cavell Reference Cavell2010, Reference Cavell2011; Cavell and Noakes Reference Cavell and Noakes2010).
A recent article by historian Alan MacEachern, although it is presented as a fresh look at Bernier's Arctic claims, largely follows the well-established narrative, varied by the mention of an earlier sector claim made by Bernier on 12 August 1907, which the explorer was forbidden to publicise. According to MacEachern, by making his two sector claims Bernier was single-handedly introducing a new principle to international practice, a principle that the Canadian government would later endorse (albeit tentatively and perhaps without real conviction) by such actions as marking sector lines on official maps. MacEachern also argues that Bernier himself placed surprisingly little importance on his two claims. He states that after Bernier was forbidden to publicise his initial sector proclamation, he never referred to it again in correspondence with government officials, and that the explorer seldom described the 1909 proclamation as his major claim to fame. In MacEachern's view, neither Bernier nor the government grasped the full importance of what had been done (MacEachern Reference MacEachern2010: 43, 44, 45, 49, 58, 72, 73).
MacEachern, with whom I shared a few of my archival discoveries (including the 1907 claim) during correspondence in 2009, thus uses some of the facts discussed in my articles on Bernier to support very different views from those I have put forward. Unfortunately, he has limited his research at Library and Archives Canada to the Department of Marine and Fisheries files directly dealing with Bernier's expeditions. To gain a proper understanding of sovereignty issues in the early twentieth century, it is necessary to survey a very wide range of files from different departments. In two articles published in this journal, the first dealing with the 1907 and 1909 claims and the second with the broader questions of Canada's Arctic policy between 1896 and 1911, I have argued that interdepartmental conflicts limited Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier's options when it came to Arctic sovereignty, and that he was forced into seeming acceptance of Bernier's 1909 sector claim once a rival American claim had been made by Robert Peary. However, neither Laurier himself nor his successors Robert Borden, Arthur Meighen, and William Lyon Mackenzie King ever officially endorsed Bernier's poorly thought out version of the sector principle (Cavell Reference Cavell2010, Reference Cavell2011).
My continuing research has turned up additional, and even stronger, evidence that the officials to whom Prime Ministers Meighen and King entrusted sovereignty matters categorically rejected Bernier's claims as a basis either for Canadian sovereignty over the archipelago generally or for the sector principle as they understood it. These documents also show that in the years following his retirement, Bernier made strenuous efforts to secure public recognition for his 1909 claim, and that he may also have hoped to make his 1907 claim known to the public at last.
Three sector claims: 1907, 1909, 1925
It is certainly true that for many years after the initial newspaper coverage of his 1909 claim, Bernier said relatively little about it in public. Early in 1910 he received a stinging public rebuke from Prime Minister Laurier for having made an unauthorised statement on sovereignty matters (Canada, House of Commons 1910: 2711–2712). During Laurier's lifetime, Bernier could not hope to put forward his own version of events unchallenged. Then, within a few years of Laurier's death in 1919, Bernier was once again in government service as the captain of CGS Arctic on the annual Eastern Arctic Patrols. On his three earlier official voyages to the archipelago Bernier had been in sole command, but on the Eastern Arctic Patrols he was in charge of the ship only. The expedition commanders (John Davidson Craig in 1922 and 1923, Frank Henderson in 1924, and George Mackenzie in 1925) and their immediate superior in Ottawa, Oswald Sterling Finnie, were all thoroughly imbued with the idea that Canada's sovereignty must be proved by actual administration over the islands, not by mere flag-waving. Bernier apparently accepted this view, and, despite his advanced age, his remarkable energy and dedication to the Arctic cause made him a valued colleague.
The main purpose of the first few Eastern Arctic Patrols was to demonstrate Canada's sovereignty over Ellesmere and Devon Islands, an area where Canada's title could be based on British discoveries and the 1880 transfer. In 1925, however, it seemed that Norway might wish to claim the islands discovered by Otto Sverdrup on his 1898–1902 expedition. Bernier immediately reverted to his old way of thinking, and he attempted to persuade government officials to do the same.
In a letter to Finnie, Bernier recounted how in 1907 he had taken possession of the Sverdrup Islands by his proclamation on the Jones Sound coast of Ellesmere Island. Although he did not identify it explicitly as a sector claim, the assertion that he could take possession of such far-distant islands without actually visiting (let alone establishing occupation on) them certainly seems to imply some sort of sector principle. Bernier enthusiastically offered to ‘take’ the disputed islands again on his 1925 voyage (Bernier Reference Bernier1925). Finnie declined to consider any such action, instead focusing on regular sledge patrols to the islands by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police from their newly-established northern bases. But with seeming inconsistency, in June 1925 the minister of the interior, Charles Stewart, publicly asserted Canada's title to the entire northern sector between the 141st west meridian and Greenland, as far north as the pole (see Cavell and Noakes Reference Cavell and Noakes2010: 226–229, 234–235).
Bernier's publicity campaign and the government's response
Bernier retired from government service in the autumn of 1925, and he immediately embarked on a campaign of newspaper and magazine interviews combined with well-publicized lectures in various cities (for example, see Bernier Reference Bernier1927; Davies Reference Davies1927; Woollacott Reference Woollacott1928–1929; The Gazette (Montreal) 11 April 1928: 5; Edmonton Journal 14 April 1926: 1; Toronto Star 17 April 1926: 8, 27 May 1926: 3; The New York Times 16 October 1926: 16; The Chronicle-Telegraph (Quebec) 13 December 1929:1; Montreal Star 15 January 1930: 23. He also wrote to Prime Minister R.B. Bennett about his 1909 claim; see Bernier Reference Bernier1933). Bernier insisted that he had laid the foundation of Canada's northern sovereignty by his actions, particularly the 1909 sector claim, and sometimes he untruly added for good measure that he had planted the flag on various islands during the Eastern Arctic Patrols. Whether his own achievements were the subject of the press interviews or whether reporters sought his opinion on some other Arctic issue, Bernier always found a way to identify himself as the man who had added the Arctic to Canada. In 1928 Finnie noted with annoyance that ‘these remarks, which Captain Bernier persists in making from time to time in Public, could possibly prove detrimental to Canada's interest’ (Finnie Reference Finnie1928). On his next visit to Ottawa, Bernier received a verbal rebuke (Cory Reference Cory1928), but it had little effect.
The Sverdrup Islands question was settled in November 1930, when Norway formally recognised Canada's title to the entire archipelago. Immediately, Bernier wrote to the acting prime minister, Sir George Perley, with yet another report of his 1907 claim. ‘The Government decided to send me . . . in 1906–7 to the Arctic Islands,’ he recounted, ‘and it was during those years and 1908–9 that I took possession, for the Dominion of Canada, [of] the whole of the Arctic Archipelago, from 60 Meridien [sic] West to 141 degrees West, up to 90 degrees North.’ Bernier followed this statement with a detailed account, not of the famous 1909 sector proclamation, but of his 12 August 1907 claim. Again, Bernier asserted that he had taken possession of the Sverdrup Islands. He concluded: ‘I beg to put before you that on this date I done my duty, and since 1922 the Government has sent a boat to maintain possession for Canada, commanded by J.E. Bernier, until I was superannuated’ (Bernier Reference Bernier1930).
Clearly, what Bernier wanted was a polite official response thanking him for his past services, which he could then have used in his publicity campaign, with the implication that the government had always fully endorsed his actions. He may even have hoped that a favourable reply would permit him finally to cast off the secrecy imposed by Laurier with regard to the 1907 sector claim. However, the watchful Finnie ensured that the plan would fail. A memorandum which he prepared for the deputy minister of the interior, W.W. Cory, is perhaps the clearest statement of the government's stand on Bernier and his proclamations.
Finnie observed that Bernier (contrary to what the latter implied in his message) had had no authorisation from the government for his sweeping claims. Canada's title to most of the islands was based on the 1880 transfer, and no additional claims to them were necessary. Moreover, it was
nothing short of absurd to contend that a proclamation issued by Captain Bernier . . . when at [Jones] Sound, claiming the whole archipelago, could have any possible bearing on our titles to islands which were hundreds of miles distant as were the Sverdrup Islands. In fact, the considered view of the Governmental authorities best qualified to speak on such matters is that Captain Bernier's claiming of these islands for Canada threw a cloud on our titles.
Finnie noted that foreign challenges to Canada's sovereignty now appeared highly unlikely, but if the matter ever did come before an arbitral tribunal, undoubtedly ‘the argument would be used against us that if we considered our original titles good, why would we reclaim the area at a later date, as was unfortunately done by Captain Bernier purporting to act for our country’ (Finnie Reference Finnie1930). Finnie drafted a brief, non-committal acknowledgement of Bernier's letter; Bernier received no further response from anyone in the government. Three years later, when Bernier sought recognition from King George V, Finnie's associates in the civil service ensured there would be no statement from the king that Bernier could use to build his legend (Skelton Reference Skelton1933).
Conclusion
Finnie's vehement rejection of Bernier's sector claims as a possible basis for the Canadian title is of particular interest because he was a key member of the interdepartmental Northern Advisory Board, which had formulated the sector declaration made by Minister Stewart in 1925. With Finnie's agreement, the practice of placing sector lines on Canadian government maps had become standard (Cavell and Noakes Reference Cavell and Noakes2010: 220–222, 227, 234–235). In 1929, when Lester Pearson of the Department of External Affairs endorsed the sector principle as the best foundation for Canada's claim to the Sverdrup Islands, Finnie had given Pearson his wholehearted support (Finnie Reference Finnie1929; on the policy memorandum by Pearson, see Cavell and Noakes Reference Cavell and Noakes2010: 245–246). Why, then, did Finnie not welcome the record of Bernier's actions as proof that the Canadian sector claim was of long standing? How could he consider Bernier's pretensions ‘absurd’ while at the same time supporting Stewart's and Pearson's declarations of the sector principle?
The answer lies in the differences between the three voyages made by Bernier in the years from 1906 to 1911 and the later Eastern Arctic Patrols. Although Bernier had successfully asserted Canadian jurisdiction in 1906–1911 by enforcing whaling and customs regulations in the vicinity of Lancaster Sound and Baffin Island, there were then no plans either to establish permanent bases on the islands or to extend Bernier's seaborne patrols to the northern half of the archipelago. When it came to areas like the Sverdrup Islands, Bernier's version of the sector principle was merely a poor and highly questionable substitute for actual occupation.
In contrast, during the 1920s a total of six new permanent police posts were established on the eastern islands, and sledge patrols covered the entire archipelago, including the remote and uninhabited Sverdrup group. Accordingly, the sector claim put forward by Stewart in 1925 was intended to outline the area which Canada was then actively in the process of occupying. His declaration provided other nations with firm and clear notice of Canada's intentions. With the exception of Norway (which later withdrew its claim), no foreign government ever protested against these intentions, either publicly or through diplomatic channels. Under international law, such silence implied tacit consent.
Unfortunately, and in part because of Bernier's publicity campaign, the clarity of Stewart's message did not survive the passing of the years (for varied examples of the ensuing confusion, see Smith Reference Smith and Macdonald1966: 214–216, 222, 226; Zaslow Reference Zaslow1971: 261, 268, 280; Head and Trudeau Reference Head and Trudeau1995: 50–51; Coates and others Reference Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrison and Poelzer2008: 28–29). In later decades, even some Canadian officials mistakenly believed that the sector principle was nothing more than an attempt to dodge the requirement for effective occupation of a territory (for example, see Phillips Reference Phillips1945). It is hardly surprising, then, that many writers on international law have dismissed it as a possible basis for sovereignty. Contrary to what MacEachern and others believe, Bernier was a well-intentioned but deeply misguided public servant. His campaign of self-glorification obscured the strong foundation of the 1925 claim and the effectiveness of the Arctic policy devised by Finnie and his colleagues. Despite his many excellent qualities and his strong patriotism, Canadian writers who elevate Bernier and his claims are inadvertently doing a disservice to their country.
