In her innovative and engaging work, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East, Stanford University historian Priya Satia argues that during World War I and in its immediate aftermath, the British government developed a covert empire in the Middle East “by creating a parallel state, entirely informal and in the hands of intelligence officers who held real executive power. This was a new form of imperial rule, invisible, barely existing on paper, designed for an increasingly anti-imperialist postwar world, both at home and abroad” (p. 7). The “spies in Arabia” who operated this empire, characterized by such individuals as T. E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell, were largely “Edwardians disillusioned by the direction of turn-of-the-century life” (p. 59). World War I, when it came, “seemed to them to fulfill all their artistic and spiritual cravings with real, world-historical action” (p. 59). What began as an exercise of self-legitimization on the part of the agents, however, quickly spiraled into the establishment of a brutal colonial regime whose surveillance practices and methods of coercion were dependent on a new system of air control that allowed the development of an “empire without occupation” (p. 262).
Satia's work is divided into two parts. The first, titled “War and Hope,” comprises five chapters and covers the establishment of the prewar intelligence community, the cultural characteristics of Edwardian agents, their first forays into the Middle East, and British intelligence in Arabia during World War I. The second, titled “Peace and Terror,” comprises four chapters and addresses the establishment of a covert empire in the Middle East following the close of the war, focusing principally on the use of air power to control new subject populations. In particular, Satia uses the methodologies of cultural history to assess the formation of British intelligence efforts and imperial expansion, holding that “the cultural formation of intelligence agents must lie at the heart of any effort to understand British intelligence-gathering in the Middle East” (p. 5). Throughout, her work demonstrates that “intelligence is a product of far more than a few professionals’ search for objective, if hidden, facts about another country. Its collation and interpretation occur in a far broader context than we have generally imagined . . . Information, its analysis, and its military and political fallout are culturally embedded phenomena” (p. 11).
Satia's approach is in many ways groundbreaking, her analysis provocative, and her argument well supported by a vast array of primary and secondary source material. Her notion of the importance of cultural imagination to the formation of the Edwardian agents’ worldview and conceptions of Arabia is quite brilliant. There is, however, a shortcoming in Satia's work that cannot be overlooked. There are currently two schools of thought emerging in the historiography of the British Empire that are, to a certain degree, engaged in a fresh campaign of the culture wars (although it must be made clear that not all empire historians, or even the majority, fit into one of these two schools). The first school is characterized by scholars such as Niall Ferguson (most prominently in Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power [New York: Basic Books, 2004]). It takes a relativist approach to the study of British imperialism, arguing that in a world in which empires will always exist, the question is not whether imperialism is inherently bad but rather which of the many empires has been the most acceptable or, at any rate, the least bad. It concludes in this regard that the British Empire, on balance and when contrasted with the other potentials for world leadership, has made a positive contribution to history. The second school is characterized by scholars such as Caroline Elkins (see Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya [New York: Owl Books, 2005]). It argues that empire and imperialism in all their forms are inherently evil, and thus their many manifestations will also lead naturally to evil consequences. This school maintains that the question is not how the British Empire compared relatively to other empires but rather in what ways it injured its subject peoples. In general, this school uses the first school as its foil (in particular choosing Ferguson as its straw man). Each school believes itself to be a beleaguered minority: the first sees itself as the sole voice of reason in an academy where political correctness has run amuck; the second sees itself as the sole voice of truth in an academy still dominated by the establishment elite.
Priya Satia is clearly a member of the second school, and it is her willingness to engage in this larger academic sword wielding—and the trend toward the polemical that this necessarily entails—which, to this reviewer, lessens the impact of her work. She reveals her hand early in the text, writing, “The crime was empire, air control merely its most technologically advanced instrument” (p. 11) and accusing Ferguson of “schizophrenically prais[ing] both the Pax Britannica and British imperialists’ willingness to use force unsqueamishly” (p. 343, n. 25). Although this reviewer disagrees with the author's decision to drift from her immediate topic and wage this larger war (with all the unnecessary bickering and vindictiveness that occurs between the two schools), it is safe to say that Satia's book is among the better works in her genre. Even for those who may ultimately oppose her conclusions (or, at least, her larger assumptions), Spies in Arabia deserves to be read and to be read carefully. It is an important book that should be on the shelves of all those interested in British imperialism, intelligence, or the use of violence by the state more generally. From this reviewer, it comes highly recommended.
