These two books share an interest in the connections among work, family, and the status of women. Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth focus on the way that the increase in divorce and the entry of women into the workforce enhance women's equality. Kathi Weeks wants both work and the family to be radically transformed.
Adopting what they call an embedded bargaining model, Iversen and Rosenbluth examine the effects of macro-level, political, and economic conditions on the balance of power between husband and wife, and vice versa. Crucial to their argument is a distinction between investments in general skills and investments in specific skills. General skills are mobile; they can be transferred from one location or firm to another. Additionally, they allow for the sort of interruptions to one's career to which, for women, having children often leads. In contrast, specific skills are firm or location dependent. Here, the investment in household-specific skills is a noteworthy example and presents one clear factor for women's historical inequality: In the event of divorce, their household-specific skills are not transferable; moreover, these assets actively militate against remarriage since another man's children are not usually of interest to potential mates. For this reason, where a particular production technology favors a gendered division of labor—where, in other words, it is efficient for men to do the hard physical labor and for women to engage in domestic labor, as in agricultural and industrial societies—women will lack outside options and, hence, bargaining power within the family.
The case is different in postindustrial societies, however, because the service sector opens up the possibility of general skills employment that does not depend upon physical strength. This mode of employment is mobile and also allows for career interruptions. Women taking up these jobs also create “knock-on,” or secondary, effects. Their microchoices not only change the structure of bargaining power within their own families but can also affect the choices of other women who may also take up outside employment or, at the very least, profit from knowledge of its availability. The willingness to stay in bad marriages may decrease and divorce, with the consequent market for remarriage, may therefore increase, creating yet more outside options for women and strengthening their bargaining power.
Iversen and Rosenbluth argue that women are comparatively disadvantaged in countries with strong labor laws. In these countries, workers are protected from easy layoffs and are more likely to invest in firm-specific skills. Likewise, businesses are more likely to invest in their workers. Women, however, may be disadvantaged in hiring given the expectation that they will leave to raise children and thus waste the firm's investment. Although economies with larger public sectors such as Sweden's can compensate for investments in specific skills, less interventionist states are better for women than coordinated markets without public sectors such as Germany, since the former tend to structure production around fungible employment. The same reasoning applies to politics: Women politicians do better in countries where candidates are part of slates and are therefore as fungible as workers in economies favoring general skills. As Iversen and Rosenbluth write, “When jobs require uninterrupted tenures and long inflexible schedules, women are at a distinct disadvantage” (p. 158).
The authors draw two conclusions from their analysis. First, the trajectory of postindustrial societies is against patriarchal norms and toward women's equality. Second, because this trajectory depends upon investments in general skills that are made necessary by women's greater responsibility for child care, it is unlikely to be complete until “men … share the same burdens and joys of family work” (p. 169).
Weeks has a different perspective on family work; nor does she see women's entry into the waged workforce as an obvious boon. Rather, she is concerned with the way that paid and unpaid work has come to dominate all of us in both the amount of time we devote to it and the value we give to it. According to Weeks, we are a work society still in thrall to a Protestant ethic, according to which work is a measure of our worth and asceticism is our highest virtue. Women's presence in the workforce, which Iversen and Rosenbluth see as a challenge to patriarchy, appears in Weeks's account as a simple increase in the amount of work that women do. Outside work may allow for bargaining power within a marriage, but if this bargaining power leads to greater equality, it does so, she suggests, at the expense of freedom. As an alternative, she advocates removing work from the center of our lives.
Weeks takes her bearings from the Italian movement of autonomist Marxism. For autonomist Marxists, transforming capitalism is not a question of eliminating exploitative or alienated labor but, rather, one of refusing work in favor of new forms of organization. This refusal of work is not a complete refusal to work; it is a rejection of the moralism surrounding work, its definition as the mark of good citizenship, and our abstemious idea that we ought not want too much. Instead, the end of work signals “the enrichment of subjectivity, the expansion of need and the cultivation of an element or quality of desire that exceeds existing modes of satisfaction” (p. 103).
Weeks sees two paths to this vision: a guaranteed livable income for all and a 30-hour week. Each path functions as a demand, a perspective on present conditions, and a provocation. As a demand, the call for a basic livable income asks for income to be paid unconditionally to individuals, regardless of their participation in waged work or the traditional family and independently of any contribution they may make to their communities. As a perspective on the present, the call follows up on the feminist wages-for-housework campaign to expose the arbitrary nature of distinctions between paid work (e.g., housework when done by a nonhousehold member) and unpaid work (e.g., housework when done by a stay-at-home woman). However, whereas the wages-for-housework campaign reinforced the traditional gender division of labor and conceived of women as wives and mothers, the demand for a basic income supports individuals independently of both work and the family. Finally, as a provocation, it asks us to think of different antiascetic kinds of lives, ones that no longer revere work, thrift, or economic sacrifice.
In considering a 30-hour week, Weeks extends her interest beyond the usual rationale for a shorter workweek: that of balancing work and family life. She conceives of time invested in the family as itself largely unwaged work. Hence, she sees no reason to reduce the work week unless the reduction includes both waged and nonwaged work and reorganizes and redistributes work in general. Beyond the family, the demand for a 30-hour week makes time for community, polity, and pleasure, as well as time “to forge alternatives to the present ideals and conditions of work and family life” (p. 168). As a critical perspective on the present, the demand challenges the work ethic as well as the gendered character of household and caring work. As a provocation, the demand asks us to consider who we might be and what we might want beyond our working life.
Both Women, Work, and Politics and The Problem with Work might be criticized for overgeneralizing. Iversen and Rosenbluth say that women should invest in general skills since doing so allows them to interrupt their careers without sacrificing firm specific skills. Yet, coordinated market economies compensate for investments in specific skills with strong labor protections, unemployment insurance, and the like. While they might therefore discriminate against higher-skilled women to save firms the costs incurred if they interrupt their careers, will lower-skilled women not do well in these economies? After all, they avoid bias in hiring because the firm need not invest very much in training them; at the same time, they reap the benefits of secure employment. In this case, it may be that the general category of women obscures differences in the outlook for different groups of women.
Similarly, Weeks seems to assume that all work is oppressive. Yet, some of us are lucky enough to engage in creative and rewarding waged activities, precisely the kind of activities she suggests that people might engage in even if they received a guaranteed, livable basic income. Might we not then advocate restructuring as well as curtailing work? The problem, we might argue, is not only work but also a division of labor that relegates some individuals to menial work while permitting others exclusive access to more gratifying forms. Just as it seems important to differentiate between groups of women workers, it seems important to differentiate between types of waged work.
Despite these minor caveats, both of these books are immensely instructive and stimulating. Women, Work, and Politics is creative in its modeling and persuasive in its argument. The Problem with Work is inventive in the resources on which it draws and also persuasive in its argument. Taken together, they ask us to appreciate the opportunities that postindustrial societies have offered to some and to imagine the opportunities a postwork society might offer to us all.
