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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
There are fundamentally two types of comparative studies. The first intends primarily to shed light on select cases; the second intends to generate theoretical or historical propositions through illustrative case studies. Machiavelli's Children is best understood and appreciated as belonging to the second genre. In the tradition of Barrington Moore, though challenging Moore's own structural argument, Richard Samuels has written an equally bold book that will attract, and justifiably so, considerable attention. Moore and many other contemporary comparative scholars have stressed the determinative role structures play in historical development; structures both constrain and capacitate historical action. Samuels, by way of contrast, seeks to privilege agency, and more particularly, the role of leadership. “We have seen how often leaders transcend options that seem thoroughly limited, and how leadership itself becomes the contingency that shifts the trajectory of historical change.” Great leaders are those who “stretch their constraints” by creatively deploying a repertoire of historical re-invention, inspiration, bullying, corruption, bricolage and, above all, Machiavellian virtuosity. The book's very title signals a profound indebtedness to Machiavelli whose analysis and very spirit pervade every page of Samuels' text.
Machiavelli's children, in fact, are those leaders in Japan and Italy whose choices enabled these two late developers to flourish despite less than favorable objective circumstances. Samuels's analysis pivots around decisions made by selectively paired Japanese and Italian leaders at comparable moments of political and economic modernization. Focusing on questions of identity, wealth, and power, Samuels relates how Japanese and Italian leaders confronted problems of state building, economic organization and legitimation. He provides readers with a conceptually rich, lively narrative that not only accounts for Japanese and Italian development separately, but also how experiences from one case inform and deepen an understanding of the other. Given the fact that Japan and Italy are often treated as exceptional Asian and European cases, Samuels's comparative attempt is both unprecedented and commendably daring. Beyond deep cultural differences, one confronts obvious asymmetries: the military in Japan, the Church in Italy, liberal hegemony in pre-Fascist Italy, its absence in Japan, to name a few. Still more striking, the genesis of distinctively fascist order in Italy, and the fact that Mussolini had no Japanese counterpart, no leader with whom he could be paired. Generally speaking, Samuels avoids forcing the particularities of the separate cases into an artificial comparative mold, but admirably demonstrates how such differences led to different choices and constructs by leaders in roughly comparable circumstances, how they seized distinctive opportunities and sorted through contingent alternatives.
In the final analysis, however, this book will be valued less for what the author has to say about Japan and Italy, than the theoretical and historical points he makes about human agency and the role of leadership. These will be savored both by seasoned scholars who will reflect upon their work in new ways, as well as students newly initiated into the complexities of comparative historical analysis. In this regard, the introductory and concluding chapters are absolute gems that can almost be disassociated from the Japanese and Italian cases which, appropriately read, serve less as rigorously controlled comparisons than as selective historical illustrations.
Read alternatively as a rigorous comparative history, Machiavelli's Children is not without flaws. Richard Samuels is a well-regarded authority on modern Japan who only learned Italian and began to conduct research on Italy in 1996. Mastering only one of the three selected historical periods (liberal Italy, Fascism, postwar Italy) in so short a period of time would have been a major accomplishment. In seeking to cover Italian history from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, Samuel's ambition tends to outrun his competence. While in most instances, certainly those most central to his analysis of selected leaders, Samuels is on firm ground and gets things right, he nevertheless commits surprising mistakes of fact (for example, misattributing the encyclical Non Expedit to the progressive Leo XIII rather than to the reactionary Pius IX) and offers occasional judgments which either have no empirical basis at all or are so misinformed that one wonders why they were not flagged by Italian specialists who read the manuscript before it went to print. Citing no sources, for example, he claims that Fascist attacks against newspapers, socialists clubs, and peasant leagues “endeared him [Mussolini] to industrialists” (p. 135) and that “industrialists employed the fascisti to bully unionists” (p. 164). Elsewhere, however, he cites a recent study on industrialists and Fascism that not only dismisses such folktales, but documents the industrialists' preoccupation that Fascist violence against workers might rekindle another wave of factory disruptions, after they had successfully defeated general strikes and factory occupations on their own, never asking nor receiving Fascist assistance. Most incredibly, Samuels credits Fascism with “the best economic performance in Italian history” (p. 166), at the time Mussolini made the fatal misstep of entering the war on the side of Nazi Germany. One can only wonder what set of indices or what authority Samuels had in mind, considering the long-standing consensus among Italian economic historians that Fascist policy (particularly ruralism, maintaining an artificially strong lira for reasons of prestige, and autarky) undercut economic performance. In any case, the Italian economy did far better during the first decade of the twentieth century and during the initial, residually liberal stage of Fascism (1922–1927) than during the thirties, when a fully articulated Fascist state was put in place.
One wonders also why such formidable Confindustria leaders as Gino Olivetti and Angelo Costa are never mentioned, given the relations the former had with Giolitti and Mussolini, and the latter had with De Gasperi, relations which in consecutive historical periods struck at the very heart of national economic policy. Confindustria, after all, was not merely the industrial peak association, it was the undisputed interlocutore primario. In the contemporary period, one also wonders why so much attention is devoted to the Lega Nord leader Umberto Bossi and so little to the Alleanza Nazionale leader Gianfranco Fini, who not only transformed a marginalized, former neo-fascist party into a major center-right one, but occupies the second most important position in the Italian government. Unlike Bossi, Fini remains one of the most popular politicians in Italy, and unlike the self-destructive Lega Nord, the Alleanza Nazionale might prove to be the most durable member of the ruling coalition.
These are the criticisms of an Italianist that may or may not be of great significance to nonspecialists. Just as Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy elicited harsh reactions from area specialists without seriously undercutting its comparative significance, the same might be said of Machiavelli's Children, very much a companion volume. In the best sense, this work is an important conversation between Barrington Moore and Richard Samuels on the nature of history and the comparative method; as such, it commands our respect.