The dead donor rule (DDR) states that donors must be dead before vital organs can be procured from their bodies for the purpose of transplantation.Footnote 1 Death is declared when there is irreversible cessation of all brain or all circulatory functions. The DDR is intended to ensure that severely compromised patients deemed potential donors are not killed for the sake of their organs. In this way, it protects transplant teams from the charge of murder and promotes public trust in the transplant system. A number of physicians and ethicists have questioned the DDR and proposed an alternative model of deceased organ donation based on patient autonomy and nonmaleficence.Footnote 2 It is not the timing or declaration of death that matters morally in this type of organ donation. Rather, what matters is that potential donors consent to donation and that they be protected from harm. This position rejects the conviction that whether donors are harmed depends on when death is declared and that procuring organs before this declaration always harms them.
The timing of death has been one of the most vexed questions in solid organ donation. It has been especially controversial in donation after circulatory death (DCD), in which individuals who do not meet a neurological criterion of whole-brain death can be organ donors. Because of the time involved in executing them, DCD protocols may result in warm ischemia of organs and failed organ recovery for transplantation. Procuring organs sooner than what is allowed in these protocols could reduce the incidence of ischemia and result in a greater number of transplantable organs. Organ procurement must be done in a way that protects donors from harm. Contrary to what some have claimed, however, the DDR does not ensure this protection. Indeed, the waiting time required by the DDR can harm patients by causing ischemia and defeating their interest in donating viable organs. Violating the DDR by carrying out earlier organ procurement from consenting donors can benefit them by realizing their intention to donate and can benefit transplant recipients by ensuring good graft survival. The likelihood of these effects would be increased by not adhering to a specific time when death can be declared.
I discuss controversies over the timing and determination of death and explain why they are not morally significant to the question of harm in organ donation. Then I define different senses of “harm” and “benefit.” I describe the respects in which potential organ donors may be harmed and how they and transplant recipients can benefit from organ procurement before a declaration of death by established neurological or circulatory criteria. I present one neurological condition in which patients are permanently unconscious but not imminently dying and argue that organs may be procured from them. More controversially, I argue that there may be cases in which organ procurement is permissible from patients who are neither permanently unconscious nor imminently dying. In these conditions, the crucial moral issues are whether they consented to donation at an earlier time, whether they have irreversible conditions with no hope of meaningful recovery, and whether they have the capacity for consciousness enabling them to experience pain and suffering during organ procurement. What matters morally in organ donation is not death but the conditions surrounding procurement and whether they accord with the donor’s interests.
Timing and the Determination of Death
In 1968, an ad hoc committee at the Harvard Medical School published guidelines for the management of patients with severe brain injuries who were comatose, showed no signs of recovery, and were being kept alive by mechanical ventilation. The committee defined death as the irreversible cessation of all brain functions, including those of the brain stem.Footnote 3 Individuals who meet this definition of death may be suitable organ donors. Others have sustained severe brain injuries and have irreversible neurological damage but retain some brain functions. Some of these patients may be organ donors as well. DCD includes these patients and involves organ procurement after death defined as the permanent cessation of cardiocirculatory functions. The implementation of DCD protocols in the last 18 years has expanded the pool of organs by including donors who do not meet the neurological whole-brain criterion of death.
There are controlled and uncontrolled DCD protocols.Footnote 4 The first type usually involves ventilator-dependent patients with severe brain injuries but some remaining brain functions. A mutual decision between critical care physicians and the patient’s family is made to remove ventilation because the patient’s condition is considered irreversible and death is expected. Organs are then removed from the patient for transplantation. If the patient has not consented to donation and his or her wishes are not known, then the family or an appropriate surrogate may consent to donate the patient’s organs. The protocols are “controlled” in the sense that the patient’s death is foreseen, and separate decisions to remove life support and procure organs are made on this basis. In some controlled DCD protocols, organs are cooled in situ immediately following a declaration of death. In others, catheters are inserted into the patient’s body after the removal of life support but before a declaration of death. Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) is then initiated to keep organs perfused and viable for transplantation. Uncontrolled DCD protocols involve patients who suffer unexpected cardiac arrest and are brought to hospital emergency rooms. A decision is made not to attempt resuscitation, and physicians usually declare the patient dead after five minutes in the absence of circulatory functions. Cardiac massage and often ventilation are restarted, followed by in situ cooling and ECMO. Not all of these cases involve the same interventions, and patients would not necessarily receive mechanical ventilation prior to a declaration of death. Family members are asked to consent to organ donation, and the patient’s organs are removed for transplantation if they consent. This process is “uncontrolled” in the sense that the patient’s death may be expected (predictable) but unplanned.
The Society of Critical Care Medicine has recommended that physicians wait at least two minutes and at most five minutes after asystole before declaring death.Footnote 5 The purpose is to allow enough time for the possibility of autoresuscitation following asystole. This may occur with or without CPR attempts. But how long is long enough before declaring death? There has been disagreement about the meaning of “permanent” or “irreversible” regarding cessation of cardiac and circulatory functions. When these functions permanently cease may depend on decisions to provide or withhold CPR or epinephrine, because both interventions may restore cardiac and circulatory activity. James Bernat notes that, in the absence of interventions, permanent cessation of circulatory functions leads to irreversible cessation of these functions and is sufficient for a declaration of death consistent with the DDR. For Bernat, the requirement of irreversibility is not that circulatory function cannot be restored, only that it will not be restored.Footnote 6 But this implies that whether circulatory and neurological functions are restored depends on decisions by emergency and critical care physicians to intervene or not intervene in the respects I have described. It presents a problem, particularly for uncontrolled DCD protocols, which may involve organ procurement from individuals who might have had a complete recovery with resuscitation. Bernat claims that controlled DCD is in accordance with the 1981 U.S. Uniform Determination of Death Act and accepted medical standards and thus does not violate the DDR. Yet if the possibility of restoring circulatory function is contingent on medical decisions to administer or withhold CPR, epinephrine, or other interventions, then factors external to circulatory function can influence the timing and determination of death. This suggests that the criterion of death would depend on these medical decisions. A patient would satisfy the circulatory criterion of death only if no efforts at resuscitation were initiated. This underscores the main problem with declaring death in uncontrolled DCD protocols.
The use of ECMO to keep organs perfused confounds the neurological criterion of whole-brain death. By allowing reperfusion of the brain, ECMO may restore brain functions and demonstrate that what was judged to be irreversible cessation of these functions was not irreversible after all. Bernat and coauthors explain: “By allowing reperfusion of the brain and thereby preventing brain destruction, it [ECMO] interrupts the otherwise inevitable progression from permanent loss of circulation and respiration to irreversible loss. Restoring brain circulation also raises the possibility of retaining donor consciousness and the consequent potential for suffering.”Footnote 7 Reperfusion of the brain could be avoided by inserting an aortic occlusion balloon catheter. Yet this shows that the determination that one has permanently or irreversibly lost the neurological capacity for consciousness is not a matter of brain function alone but can be influenced by decisions by physicians about whether to intervene in ways that can affect brain function.
The last sentence of the passage from Bernat and coauthors goes to the core of the question of whether the potential donor can be harmed. This question does not depend on whether death is declared at five or two minutes after asystole, or when all brain functions cease. Instead, it depends on whether the potential donor retains the capacity for meaningful recovery following a brain injury or cardiac arrest and the capacity for consciousness necessary to experience pain and suffering during procurement. If an individual who has consented to donation lacks these capacities, then he or she cannot be harmed by organ procurement prior to a declaration of death. As the ECMO example of brain reperfusion illustrates, the capacity for conscious awareness may be enabled or precluded by medical interventions and thus is not based on brain or circulatory functions alone.
Some have argued that whole-brain and circulatory criteria of death should be replaced by a neocortical criterion of death.Footnote 8 On this criterion, a person dies when all integrated functions of the cerebral cortex permanently cease, even if subcortical brain and cardiac functions continue. Yet if what matters is protecting the potential donor from harm, and this depends on the capacity for conscious awareness necessary to experience pain and suffering, then the crucial neurological issue is not permanent cessation of all neocortical functions but only the functions necessary to sustain awareness during procurement. If a potential donor has some cortical functions but not enough to sustain the capacity for pain and suffering, then he or she may be beyond harm despite failing to meet a neocortical criterion of death. Some vegetative patients, who by definition lack conscious awareness, may retain residual metabolic activity in isolated cortical networks despite widespread atrophy in the neocortex.Footnote 9 The neocortical criterion also fails to appreciate the extent to which projections from the brain stem ascending reticular activating system and the thalamus to the cortex sustain the cortical functions necessary for awareness. Redefining death as permanent or irreversible cessation of neocortical functions does not provide a more satisfactory account of when a potential donor can be harmed, because death is not what determines the capacity for harm.
Interests, Benefits, and Harms
Individuals who have consented to donation and have an irreversible condition without the prospect of meaningful recovery can be harmed in two respects. First, they can be harmed if they experience pain and suffering from organ procurement. This depends on the capacity for conscious awareness, which in turn depends on the integration of certain cortical and subcortical brain activity. Even if patients have the capacity to experience pain, anesthesia or analgesics can prevent them from actually experiencing pain during organ procurement. Second, they may be harmed if their intention to donate is not realized. This would occur if their organs became ischemic from physicians waiting too long to declare death and procure them for transplantation.
A person benefits from an action when it satisfies an interest he or she has in some state of affairs. A person is harmed by an action when it defeats or thwarts an interest.Footnote 10 I have suggested that there are both experiential and nonexperiential harms. As the name implies, experiential harms refer to states of affairs that one can experience. We all have an interest in avoiding pain and suffering, and being exposed to procedures that cause pain and suffering defeats this interest and therefore harms us experientially. Some of our interests are in states of affairs that extend beyond our conscious awareness. These interests can survive the persons who had them, and the defeat of such an interest is a nonexperiential harm. The satisfaction of a surviving interest can benefit us nonexperientially after we have died. In organ donation and transplantation, individuals who have consented to donation can benefit nonexperientially from the realization of their intention to donate in successful procurement and a successful transplant. Transplant recipients benefit experientially from an extension of and improvement in the quality of their lives. Donors can be harmed experientially if they feel pain and suffer during organ procurement, because it defeats their interest in not having this experience. Potential donors with irreversible conditions and no prospect of meaningful recovery may also be harmed nonexperientially, not by dying as a result of organ procurement but because their intention to donate cannot be realized due to organ ischemia. Potential transplant recipients can be harmed experientially if ischemia damaging the donor’s organs means that they will not receive a transplant, or that the graft they receive will not survive long after transplantation. By waiting too long to declare death by whole-brain or circulatory criteria, critical care and transplant teams may unwittingly fail to discharge their obligations of nonmaleficence and beneficence to potential organ donors and organ recipients.
David Rodriguez-Arias, Maxwell Smith, and Neil Lazar ask: “Under which conditions would it be morally acceptable to procure vital organs from dying patients?”Footnote 11 They respond by saying that: “Ultimately, what is important for the protection and respect of potential donors is not to have a death certificate signed, but rather to be certain that they are beyond suffering and to guarantee that their autonomy is respected. The DDR hardly serves these morally necessary purposes. Rather, it might be pulling our attention from them.”Footnote 12 While I generally agree with these claims, I would add under “respect of potential donors” the promotion of the realization of their intention to donate, which may involve rejecting the required waiting period specified by DCD protocols. These protocols do not necessarily promote this goal and may interfere with it. Respect for donor autonomy implies respect for the donor’s intention to donate. But this does not always imply the realization of the intention in actual donation, because the donor’s organs may not be transplantable. Rodriguez-Arias, Smith, and Lazar then ask: “If donors are beyond harm and had given appropriate consent for donation, would it really be necessary to call them dead?”Footnote 13 Their answer to this question is “not necessarily,” if one does not consider the distinction between killing and letting die to be morally significant. They restrict their claims to donors who are dying. But potential donors need not be imminently dying or permanently unconscious to be beyond harm.
The Moral Significance of Consciousness
Consciousness consists of two main components: arousal and awareness. Arousal (wakefulness) refers to a state or level of consciousness, whereas awareness refers to the content of consciousness, what one is conscious of. Arousal is generated and sustained by the ascending reticular activating system in the brain stem and projections from it to the thalamus. Awareness is generated and sustained by integrated activity in the cerebral cortex (neocortex) and projections to it from the ascending reticular activating system and thalamus. Although activity in the cortex is necessary for awareness, it is supported by the two subcortical structures just mentioned. Individuals in a vegetative state have arousal and normal sleep-wake cycles but no awareness of self or their surroundings. Many persistently vegetative patients become permanently vegetative 3 months after an anoxic injury or 12 months after a traumatic brain injury. Beyond this point, there is no probability of recovering any degree of awareness. Although both persistent and permanent vegetative states involve arousal without awareness, unlike the second, the first may involve some residual activity in the projections from the reticular activating system and thalamus to the cortex. This may explain why not all persistently vegetative patients become permanently vegetative. Some may recover full consciousness and cognitive and physical functions. Others may progress to a minimally conscious state (MCS), in which they have some awareness of self and the immediate environment. They retain some degree of integrated but undersustained cortical activity. The MCS is a state of profound unresponsiveness despite intermittent evidence of awareness. Vegetative and minimally conscious patients are distinguished from those in a coma, which is a state of complete unresponsiveness without arousal or awareness. Results from one recent study of vegetative patients showed no improvement to awareness during a five-year observation period.Footnote 14 All of the patients either died or remained in the vegetative state. The same study also involved a number of minimally conscious patients, and none of them had recovery of consciousness and cognitive and physical functions to pre-injury levels. Although one must be careful not to overly generalize from this study, it raises the following question: could patients with no capacity, or a diminished capacity, for awareness be organ donors despite the fact that they are neither imminently dying nor permanently unconscious?
Franklin Miller, Robert Truog, and Dan Brock agree with Rodriguez-Arias, Smith, and Lazar in rejecting the dead donor rule and arguing that organ donation should be permissible from those who are imminently dying or permanently unconscious.Footnote 15 As the disjunction “or” suggests, these are not necessarily coextensive groups. A patient in a permanent vegetative state or coma may be permanently unconscious, with no hope of recovery, but not imminently dying. Some patients can live in these states for years. “Permanently unconscious” is ambiguous in that it may refer to arousal or awareness, and to a coma or a permanent vegetative state. Some patients may emerge from prolonged comas with many if not most or all physical and neurological capacities restored. But those who are correctly diagnosed as irreversibly comatose cannot be harmed, because they have irreversibly lost the neurological and psychological capacity to be experientially harmed.
It is unclear whether the authors just cited would include both comatose and permanently vegetative patients under the label “permanently unconscious,” because of the neurological ambiguity of this term. If “unconscious” means lack of awareness, and if awareness necessarily provides the neurological basis of pain and suffering, then only awareness and not arousal is morally significant with respect to whether a potential donor can be harmed. The capacity for conscious awareness is necessary for one to have experiential interests. Because persistent and permanently vegetative patients lack the capacity for awareness, they cannot have any experiential interests while they are in these states that could be defeated and result in harm to them. However, they may have expressed an interest in organ donation at an earlier time, and this nonexperiential interest could survive the loss of their capacity for awareness. Failure to respect this interest and procure organs before they become ischemic could harm them. If they failed to express an interest in or objection to organ donation at an earlier time, then it is unclear whether they would be harmed by procurement before they were declared dead, even if procurement resulted in death. Failure to express an objection to donation does not mean that one does not object to it. In these cases, it may not be clear whether patients would or would not be harmed by procurement. It would depend on their surviving interests, which may not be known. But they cannot be experientially harmed, because they have lost the neurological and psychological capacity to sustain interests, including an interest in continued life. Withdrawing life support and procuring their organs for transplantation would kill individuals who would not otherwise have died. But if they have permanently lost the capacity for consciousness and the capacity for pain and suffering, then they cannot be experientially harmed because they have permanently lost the neurological and psychological capacity to be harmed. They are beyond experiential harm despite the fact that they are not imminently dying.
Death may harm people if they have an interest in continuing to live. This may occur if life support is removed from patients with reversible neurological conditions who would have had meaningful recovery from brain injury. It may also occur if an individual likely to fully recover circulatory and neurological functions following cardiac arrest is not resuscitated. In addition, a person who is a vitalist with an interest in continued biological life that survives the permanent loss of consciousness could be harmed by the removal of life support even without the possibility of recovery. But the conditions that I have described indicate that an individual is not necessarily harmed when organs are procured for transplantation before a declaration of death or when the individual is not dying. What can also harm an individual with an irreversible condition who has consented to organ donation is waiting too long for a declaration of death. This may affect the viability of organs and defeat one’s surviving interest in donating with a view to successful transplantation.
One imaging study has shown that permanently vegetative patients have significantly diminished activity in the pain matrix consisting of the thalamus and projections from it to regions of the cerebral cortex. They appear to lack the capacity to experience pain and suffering.Footnote 16 If they lack this capacity, if they consented to organ donation at an earlier time, and if their lack of awareness means that they lack the capacity to have an interest in continued life, then removing life support and in turn their organs would not harm them. This action could benefit these donors nonexperientially by realizing a surviving interest in donating their organs. However, a patient may not have formally expressed an interest in donating at an earlier time. In that case, a family member could give proxy consent to donate the person’s organs. Even if one questioned the claim that this action could benefit the donor, it would not harm him if he had expressed a wish to donate at an earlier time and if he had permanently lost the capacity for awareness. The imaging study of the vegetative patients shows that it is possible to demonstrate the absence of cortical activity correlating with the conscious capacity for pain and suffering while demonstrating the presence of some residual cortical activity. It suggests that something less than permanent cessation of neocortical activity grounds the neurological determination of whether a donor can be harmed. Patients who satisfy a neocortical criterion of death are beyond experiential harm. Yet one can permanently lose the capacity for awareness and be beyond this type of harm despite retaining some neocortical activity. So, replacing the whole-brain criterion of death with a neocortical criterion will not provide a more satisfactory answer to the question of experiential harm. This underscores the fact that death is not essential in making this determination.
The imaging study indicated that, unlike the case of the vegetative patients, for the MCS patients, the pain matrix was active, and some could feel pain and suffer. Equally significant is the aforementioned study that showed that none among a group of MCS patients had any meaningful recovery of consciousness and cognitive and physical functions to pre-injury levels. In light of these facts, if a minimally conscious patient indicated that he or she wanted to be an organ donor before his or her brain injury, if it could be known that the patient did not want to continue living, and if anesthesia could be given to prevent pain and suffering, then the patient would not be harmed by organ procurement that ended his or her life. This is controversial because the anesthesia would not only make the patient unable to feel pain during procurement but would also be the first step in a process that would kill him or her. This is another example of removing organs for transplantation before a declaration of death and thus a violation of the DDR and DCD protocols. It is also an example of organs being removed from individuals who are neither imminently dying nor permanently unconscious. Yet it is unclear how they could be harmed if the conditions I have described obtained, even if they retained some degree of consciousness when the decision to procure their organs was made.
Organ procurement before death could be described as a form of what Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu call organ donation euthanasia (ODE). Referring to patients who are conscious, they ask:
Why should surgeons have to wait until the patient has died as a result of withdrawal of advanced life support or even simple life-prolonging medical treatment? An alternative would be to anesthetize the patient and remove organs, including the heart and lungs. Brain death would follow removal of the heart. . . . If there were a careful and appropriate process for selection no patient would die who would not otherwise have died.Footnote 17
The last sentence of this passage implies that only patients who are imminently dying would be appropriate candidates for ODE. But many permanently unconscious patients are not imminently dying, and in the case of permanently vegetative and some MCS patients, one can question whether they would be harmed by organ procurement despite the fact that they would have continued living but for this action. They could be harmed nonexperientially if they did not consent to donation. Another respect in which they could be harmed would be if they adhered to a whole-brain or circulatory criterion of death and if their organs were removed before the permanent cessation of all neurological and circulatory functions. Still, their surviving interest in waiting until these functions permanently ceased before procurement would have to be weighed against their interest in donating, which could be defeated if their organs were not transplantable when death was declared. Wilkinson and Savulescu claim that ODE would increase patient autonomy and reduce the chance of donors suffering during the dying process. Furthermore, ODE would not necessarily defeat and could satisfy the interests of potential donors who would have continued living for some time.
Anesthesia in organ procurement has been discussed mainly with respect to the possibility of brain reperfusion from ECMO resulting in retention or restoration of donor consciousness. If insertion of the aortic occlusion balloon catheter failed to prevent reperfusion, then anesthesia could be given to donors to prevent pain and suffering during procurement. Commenting on how this might affect donors, Miller, Truog, and Brock state that “it is difficult to see how they can be harmed or wronged by vital organ donation with valid consent, provided that adequate anesthesia is maintained during organ extraction and treatment withdrawal.”Footnote 18 Although they do not explicitly state it, we can plausibly assume from this passage that the patients in question would be either imminently dying or permanently unconscious when ECMO was initiated. Anesthesia could be given for the same reason to patients who did not fall within these two categories but who met the conditions I have specified.
Critical care and transplant teams would likely refuse to perform this action because it would violate their obligation of nonmaleficence and their responsibility not to harm patients by killing them. It would make them legally liable for the action. Given their conditions and interests, however, the patients would not be harmed, and this could challenge the claim that the requirement of nonmaleficence would be violated. More precisely, although this requirement may be violated from the physicians’ perspective, it would not be violated from the perspective of the types of patients I have described. If one insisted that the action would harm the patient, then one would have to appeal to factors other than the timing of death, imminent death, or permanent unconsciousness to explain how it would cause harm.
All transplant policies and protocols require that decisions about withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment be separated from decisions about organ donation, procurement, and transplantation. This prevents a conflict of duty for critical care teams, whose primary duty is to provide appropriate care to critically ill patients, as well as for transplant teams, whose primary duty is to patients with organ failure who need a transplant. Separating these decisions and duties minimizes the risk of compromising the care of critically ill patients and prevents treating them instrumentally as nothing more than a source of transplantable organs. But there may be cases in which life-support ostensibly withdrawn from patients on grounds of futility would be withdrawn and quickly replaced by anticoagulant drugs such as heparin, by cooling solutions, or by ECMO to prepare the patient’s organs for transplantation. In permanently vegetative patients, for example, presumably artificial hydration and nutrition would be withdrawn because it merely prolonged the patient’s life without any benefit. Any discussion of organ donation would be treated as a separate issue and only after a decision to withdraw these life-sustaining interventions. Yet given the concern about ischemia and the prospect of nonviable organs, some families acting in accord with the patient’s wishes might request treatment withdrawal and the initiation of organ-preserving interventions to ensure organ viability. This would blur the distinction between end-of-life care and organ procurement. The distinction may not be so clear-cut in DCD protocols either. Plans to infuse cooling solutions in the patient’s body or initiate ECMO to keep organs perfused may be considered before deciding to withdraw life-sustaining care in controlled DCD or before deciding not to resuscitate in uncontrolled DCD. Blurring this distinction and not strictly separating discontinuation of life support and organ retrieval would not obviously put donors at any risk of harm.
Many will emphasize that organ procurement before a declaration of death would be killing. But organ procurement causing death is not necessarily harmful to an organ donor. A donor may be beyond experiential harm before the permanent cessation of all brain or circulatory functions if he or she lacks the neurological and psychological capacity to be harmed. Moreover, donors may be the subject of nonexperiential harm if ischemia defeats their interest in donating their organs. Some have proposed that potential donors could opt for an alternative criterion of death, such as the neocortical criterion, to influence decisions about withdrawing life-sustaining care and the timing of organ recovery.Footnote 19 But this would not resolve the main ethical issues. Respect for autonomy is not absolute, and critical care physicians and transplant surgeons would not be obligated to accede to a request for organ procurement before a declaration of death by whole-brain or circulatory criteria just because the donor, family, or surrogate had a different conception of death. It also misses the point that any harm in organ donation is not determined by when death occurs or is declared, regardless of whether one adopts a circulatory, whole-brain, or neocortical criterion of death. A donor may be beyond experiential harm before there is permanent cessation of all neocortical functions. Replacing one conception of death with another is not helpful in determining that an organ donor is or is not beyond harm, because death is not what matters in making this determination.
Conclusion
I have argued that whole-brain, circulatory, or neocortical criteria of death do not determine whether a potential donor is harmed by or benefits from organ donation. What matters is not that the donor is or is not dead, or when death is declared, but that the donor or a surrogate consents, that the donor has an irreversible condition with no hope of meaningful recovery, that procurement does not cause the donor to experience pain and suffering, and that the donor’s intention is realized in a successful transplant. These conditions are consistent with the principles of respect for patient autonomy and physician nonmaleficence. None of these conditions requires that donors be dead before organ procurement can proceed. Nor do they require that donors be permanently unconscious or imminently dying. Waiting until all neurological and circulatory functions have permanently ceased before removing organs may cause nonexperiential harm for the potential donor by causing ischemia, rendering his or her organs nonviable for transplantation. It could also harm potential transplant recipients by defeating their interest in receiving a transplant. We should reject the view that organ donors are beyond harm only after they have been declared dead and that they are harmed if organ procurement occurs before this time.
Some might ask why we should limit vital organ donation to those who are severely neurologically impaired. Why should we not permit competent individuals who autonomously conclude that their lives are no longer worth living to donate their organs? If they make a voluntary and rational decision, then it seems that procurement would not harm them. Although Wilkinson and Savulescu do not state this, some might claim that the idea of organ donation euthanasia would support this position. However, if an individual does not have an irreversible condition with no hope of meaningful recovery, then one can challenge the claim that the individual’s request to donate organs is voluntary and rational. It is usually the experience of an irreversible, hopeless condition that makes a person conclude that life is no longer worth living. Organ procurement from healthy individuals would not be acceptable because it would involve a very questionable interpretation of rationality, benefit, and harm. Even if these individuals were beyond harm, intensive care and transplant teams would not be obligated to perform this action just because an individual requested it.
The medical and legal implications of my philosophical argument may be too controversial to motivate a revision of existing whole-brain or circulatory criteria of death as requirements for deceased organ donation. Some might also question my position on the grounds that, even if it were morally justifiable, it would result in at most a modest increase in the number of transplantable organs. Nevertheless, my concern is not with exploring ways of expanding the donor pool but with the conditions under which potential organ donors may be harmed. I have presented principled reasons for questioning and rethinking established views on the relation between death and harm in organ donation.Footnote 20
