In one common view of the U.S. Senate, the chamber is tied into knots by devious obstruction. Imagine Jimmy Stewart's “Mr. Smith” being replaced by a less savory character set on killing meaningful legislation. Indeed, many important books on the Senate filibuster have been published over the last several years. The steady emphasis on the filibuster might lead one to think that the minority party in the Senate has undue influence. Chris Den Hartog and Nathan Monroe want to move away from analyses of obstruction and negative agenda control. Instead, they ask how the minority and majority parties fare in the policymaking process.

Den Hartog and Monroe recognize that the policymaking constraints in the Senate are real—especially when one contrasts the majority party in the House to the majority party in the Senate. But the authors argue that a stronger minority position in the Senate (when compared to the House) does not mean that the minority party dominates the chamber. The majority party in the Senate is weaker than the majority party in the House, but that does not mean that the Senate's majority party is powerless. Policymaking does occur, and the presence of roadblocks and hurdles need not curtail all majority party influence over policymaking. The authors' discussion of scheduling is indicative of their general argument in this regard. They state that “too often … the fact that the majority cannot shape all scheduling decisions to its liking seems to lead to the conclusion that it is unable to shape any decisions to its liking” (p. 84; original emphasis).

Den Hartog and Monroe do not provide a wholesale refutation of the earlier literature on the Senate. Rather, they provide a refinement of our view of majority-party power with an eye toward policymaking. When, how, and to what extent does the majority party dominate the policymaking process? Anytime a party wants to pass legislation, there are consideration costs. These consideration costs are akin to opportunity costs. The authors posit that the majority party has lower consideration costs than the minority party. They contend that at every stage, whether in committee, during scheduling, or on the floor, the majority party is advantaged.

The variation in consideration costs makes it easier for the majority party to push proposals under a wider array of situations. Consideration costs create “no offer” zones (similar to gridlock regions). A minority member cannot make a counterproposal that benefits him or her, as well as the floor median. Better proposals for the minority member do exist but the considerations costs would overwhelm the policy gains. The majority party member, with lower consideration costs, proposes a bill just at the edge of the no-offer zone for the minority.

How do the authors show higher consideration costs for the minority party and greater majority party influence over policymaking? They look at various hurdles in the legislative process. They rely on a body of results, not separate findings. No particular test or illustrative example is meant to be definitive; rather, the body of results is. They look at tabling motions, motions to proceed, and points of order. For instance, points of order kill most amendments—but points of order against minority amendments are particularly effective. For this reviewer, the results on roll call rates were most convincing and clotures least convincing, but the larger point is that the overall body of results is impressive. The majority party possesses procedural advantages that the minority does not. Finally, the authors successfully pair procedural and policy votes, finding that final-passage votes skew in favor of the majority party.

The book is not without shortcomings—although some of them come with the territory. That is, the authors suffer a similar fate to that of other legislative scholars. To wit, there are many theories of legislatures that are difficult to distinguish from one another with available data. For instance, we cannot always distinguish the difference between movement of the chamber median and movement of the party median. Theoretically, these are crucial distinctions, but those legislators' preferences often march in lockstep. Distinguishing among the costly consideration, the median voter, and the pivotal legislator in models is not easy. Given the aforementioned difficulty, I would have liked to see more discussion of consideration costs. In particular, need these costs be fixed? A strong majority party ought to be able to alter the consideration costs for others. Certainly, we have seen the majority discuss holds, as well as other filibuster reforms. Do committee ratios or funding ratios affect minority consideration costs? The authors show that a party switch is important, but what about other shifts in funding ratios or committee ratios when the majority party does not shift? How fine-tuned are these consideration costs that are at the foundation of the authors' work?

Den Hartog and Monroe also make a puzzling claim about the inherent viability of minority bills. They want to argue that the minority would not proffer bills that go nowhere. Casual observation suggests that legislators do worry about position taking, and we should expect the minority to have greater relative rewards from position taking simply because of the fact that the majority party has lower consideration costs than the minority. The playing field is level when position taking, not when legislating.

My final criticism is that the authors undersell the connection between their empirical results and their “big picture” claims. As already noted, their model does not hinge on any particular empirical evaluation. Instead, the empirical results provide a broad view of the Senate operations consistent with majority party influence over policymaking. They could have emphasized that their results are particularly strong given the way they evaluate various hurdles along the agenda-setting and policymaking path. The majority party can maintain its influence advantage by controlling different hurdles for different minority proposals. The authors discuss each hurdle separately, which might undercut the appearances of majority party influence over agenda setting.

To illustrate this point, suppose there are three legislative proposals from the minority party and three distinct hurdles at distinct stages in the policymaking process. The majority party need not be advantaged at every stage. If the three minority proposals fail to surmount different hurdles, then majority party influence over policymaking is intact, even if some of the hurdles appear to be ineffective. Consider the three minority bills that failed to clear distinct hurdles. When looking at the first hurdle, suppose only one of the three bills failed and two passed. When looking at the second hurdle, suppose one of the remaining two bills failed and one passed. At the last hurdle, suppose the remaining minority proposal fails. What is the effectiveness of those first two hurdles? They appear to have limited effect, killing one in three or one in two minority proposals. Taken as a whole, however, each of the three bills fails and majority party influence is preserved. I believe that the overall results are stronger than the authors themselves suggest.

Den Hartog and Monroe have produced a compelling reappraisal of policymaking and majority party influence in the U.S. Senate. The strength of the book lies in the authors' willingness to develop a simple model that is then tested in various ways. I end with a brief note pertaining to the manner in which the authors began. They started Agenda Setting in the U.S. Senate with a refreshingly frank introduction, highlighting the hurdles in the academic process. In that introduction, they exhibit a keen appreciation for the review process. They seem to “want to get it right,” and I think they did.