The Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the People's Republic of China (China), former adversaries that fought a bitter war half a century ago and maintained an icy relationship for the next four decades, normalized their relations in 1992 in what seemed like a quick, effortless rapprochement. Their normalization was remarkable not only because of their long history of enmity. Beijing also went to extraordinary lengths to make the move despite objections from Pyongyang, a longtime communist ally for which it went to war against the United States and the United Nations and whose relationship traditionally was characterized as a close and mutually beneficial one of “lips and teeth.”

So why did Seoul and Beijing embrace each other as new partners at this historical juncture? Jae Ho Chung offers a multilayered answer. On a strategic level, China adopted in 1982 a “confident independent” route of diplomacy, which freed the country from its preoccupation with Soviet and American threats, and enabled Beijing to see the Korea question less as a confrontation with the West and more as a problem between rival political forces in Korea. Seoul, in turn, began to appreciate the “constructive influence” that Beijing could wield over Pyongyang. The alignment of their strategic interests was furthered by the convergence of their economic interests. Seoul was searching for profitable markets that would sustain its export-led growth model around the same time that Beijing was looking to join the international market. When China's search for foreign capital and technology found an eager provider in Korea, the stage was set for rapprochement.

If Chung's treatment of the why question is somewhat schematic, he delves deeper into the question of how China and Korea normalized their relations, providing a fascinating, if anecdotal, account of the processes that led to the normalization, the negotiations held, and the individuals involved. He offers a liberal functionalist account that revolves mainly around “the crucial spillover effects of economic interdependence on political rapprochement” (p. 47). As trade and investments grew between China and Korea, the increase in economic exchanges also increased the contacts and communication between the two governments, gradually leading to the establishment of trade offices, trade agreements, investment agreements, and, ultimately, the opening of embassies in August 1992. In the process, President Roh Tae Woo played a key role, as did “Deng Xiaoping's personal approval and a broad consensus within the Politburo” (p. 57). Although the author stops short of making a definitive statement about Deng's role, Chung is perhaps at his best when he discusses the informal channels between Beijing and Seoul as well as the domestic and bureaucratic politics surrounding the normalization.

While Chung paints the big picture of the process leading up to the opening of the diplomatic relation, his functionalist explanation may be challenged. It is true that the two governments began their relationship on an economic front and gradually built it to a political one, as Chung argues, but one is left to wonder about the degree to which political considerations motivated Beijing and Seoul to choose such a route to normalization. After all, Seoul was engaged in fierce diplomatic competition with Pyongyang, whereby one's gain of a partner was the other's loss; Beijing was in a similar zero-sum game with Taipei. It is at least plausible that both Roh's and Deng's decisions were motivated by political considerations and that their choices of means reflected their concerns about their contemporary allies. Chung mentions this political dimension, to be fair, but stops short of giving as thorough a treatment as it deserves.

Even if Chung's discussion of the political dimensions of Sino-Korean normalization remains underdeveloped, he compensates for this in the last three chapters, which dissect the politics of the postnormalization period, especially the strategic dilemma that normalization has created for Korea. As China rises, as its relations with the United States become complex, and as Korea's alliance with the United States becomes strained, Seoul faces the difficult question of how to maintain amicable relationships with both the United States and China. Chung spins out a number of scenarios for the future of China and a number of options for Seoul to consider. While he goes well beyond the usual binary choices in his discussion, he ends it tentatively and inconclusively, only suggesting that “the ultimate answer is in the eyes of the beholder” (p. 111) and recommending “the choice of not making choices” (p. 119).

In this ambitious yet thin book, Chung provides a sweeping overview of the past, present, and future of the Sino-Korean relationship. The risks of attempting such a sweeping account are outweighed by the advantages that such a range serves in making the book accessible to the widest audience. The risks, nonetheless, leave their marks in the book.