This volume offers a collection of original essays on the Aristotelian, MacIntyrean political philosophy. In the past several decades Aristotle has been used as an important intellectual resource for present-day ethical, political theories. Those theories include virtue ethics, communitarianism, civic republicanism and the capabilities approach. The book highlights the former two approaches, addressing a wide range of issues of naturalism, economic thought, the good life, history and civic friendship. Some of the chapters build on A. MacIntyre's recent book, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity (2016).

Unlike the Cambridge School, the volume's method is not philological but philosophical. In its introduction the editors claim that ‘ancient philosophy would have no relevance if it had nothing to contribute to contemporary philosophical questions’ (p. 3). They aim to obtain fresh insights from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, while their treatments of the texts are not arbitrary but judicious. They are anxious to put Aristotle in present-day contexts, because only this approach keeps up the spirit of Aristotle, who understands that ethics should claim universality, even though in outline, and that natural justice holds valid for any societies at large.

Certainly, the MacIntyrean enquiry is concerned with differences in history and culture. Its proponents consider that ethical virtues are cultivated in communities in particular historical times. MacIntyre's communitarianism is criticised by the capabilities approach in that it cannot offer the universal standard of the good life, although the standard is necessary for us to address the problem of what international aid should be offered to developing countries. According to MacIntyre, however, Aristotelianism can vindicate itself beyond the original contexts when it is used in different contexts. In fact, a variety of Aristotelianism has been developed in Islamic societies, medieval ages, Renaissance Italian city-states, east Asian countries etc. At present, too, Aristotelians have responsibility for understanding Aristotle's implications in their own contexts.

In the first chapter MacIntyre clarifies this methodological merit. He prefers Thomas Aquinas's treatment of Aristotle. This is not his arbitrary choice, but he seeks to show how Aquinas finds thirteenth-century applications of Aristotle's conceptions of ethical values, thereby demonstrating that those conceptions ‘have so far withstood criticism from many standpoints in many times and places’ (p. 17). Aquinas is one piece of evidence for the significance of the volume's philosophical approach to classical texts. The charge of anachronism fails.

This volume also includes critics, as well as proponents, of the MacIntyrean enquiry. For example, C. Rapp criticises MacIntyre's community-relative conceptions of virtues. Although MacIntyre treats Aristotle as a model of the pre-modern manner of particularistic ethical thinking as opposed to the modern one that tries to find the universal foundation for morality, Rapp argues that Aristotle appeals to the notion of human nature that is independent of any particular community. Furthermore, while MacIntyre considers it necessary that we detach Aristotle's ethical theory from his metaphysical biology, Rapp refers to Nicomachean Ethics 1 to show how Aristotle's ethical concepts are not based on his controversial theorems about the soul as form, but on ‘the result of an agent's reflection on the potential and the limits of human agency’ (p. 133). The Aristotelian foundation of human nature for ethics is also doubted by A. Malakos, who stresses the tension between MacIntyre and B. Williams. From a Marxist perspective, P. Blackledge disapproves of the Aristotelian human nature in that it is reified as the static and timeless truth and argues that human nature is changeable according to the social and economic form of human relationship.

It would be very helpful if MacIntyre replied to these criticisms. His possible replies are implied, as mentioned, in his first chapter of the volume. For him, relativity in history and society is not contradictory to the possibly universal validity of Aristotelianism. As to the problem of the large-scale, centralised nation state and globalised market-oriented economy, MacIntyre stresses the importance of small-scale local communities in the forms of households, fishing crews, farming cooperatives and schools (see his The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, vol. 1 [2006], p. 39). One important Marxian insight is that ethical values correspond to the social and economic conditions. When ethical theorists criticise ethical norms, they must also consider the social and economic backgrounds for the norms, just as the Marxian feminism highlights the male-centred economic system for male-centred ethical values. For MacIntyre, being sociological is one requisite, not a contradiction, for ethical enquiry to formulate the universal standard.

For another topic, J. Dunne's chapter deserves attention. He refers to C. Taylor's distinction between the ‘field’ and the ‘forest’. The field symbolises the place in which people raise the issue of how it is best to live, beyond the question of what it is right to do. The forest transcends this issue and makes a radical self-transformation by responding to what can most fully inspire one's love – the supreme good that is irreducible to the good life as identified in the field. Aristotle is treated as a philosopher of the field. Dunne seeks to articulate the forest in a Christian manner, though Buddhism, Plato and S. Weil have also expressed it. In the forest vulnerability, dependence, receptivity, surrender, supplication and listening in silence are respected while in the field strength, mastery, prevailing, excelling and talking are honoured. The conception of the forest is intended to save those who fall off from the Aristotelian virtuous pathway. It also encourages us to recognise repentance, grace and mercy. Dunne draws our attention to the serious tension between the Aristotelian virtue ethics and the Christian belief.

This issue corresponds to the recent debate on the role of Pelagianism in the history of European political thought (see, for example, E. Nelson, The Theology of Liberalism [2019]). Pelagianism is influenced by Aristotle – recognised as a pagan by Augustine of Hippo – especially as regards the relation between the good life and good luck. In this view, grace is given only to those who merit it. Humans can flourish by their free will and effort, without the doctrine of original sin that makes effective transformation in the abilities of depraved human nature. Therefore, it is a current topic whether and how Aristotelians can reconcile the field with the forest. Again, MacIntyre is a good guide to addressing this problem with his attention to dependent rational animals.

This volume is a welcome addition to the literature on Aristotelian political theories. It relates the MacIntyrean views to various debates inside and outside of Aristotelian theories. MacIntyre allows diversity, criticism and dialogue, unlike the misunderstood view of communitarianism. This book embodies the spirit of such a criticism-oriented MacIntyrean community.