Larbi Sadiki's The Search for Arab Democracy requires a great deal from its readers. This is not only because the book takes up a perennially challenging area of political inquiry, but also because its arguments are indeterminate and its structure kaleidoscopic rather than linear. Such absence of closure and order is largely deliberate, a reflection of Sadiki's indebtedness to a poststructuralist understanding of democracy in terms of a “democratic ethos.” This approach takes democracy more as a commitment to perpetual disruption of those forces that concentrate power and establish political exclusion than as a system of governance or set of procedures to realize popular sovereignty. Although the subtitle of The Search for Arab Democracy promises an account of presumably democratic “discourses and counter-discourses,” the book is less a systematic analysis of arguments about democracy conventionally understood than an attempt to recuperate a legacy of cultural syncretism, intellectual crosspollination, and creative disruption of supposedly fixed truths and texts from Arab Muslim traditions and histories. Indeed, the book is an admirable attempt not only to advocate but also to enact the democratic ethos by constantly interrogating its own assumptions and categories, and it is only in these terms that Sadiki's rather odd, and in some cases counterintuitive, choices of thinkers and arguments make sense. (The extensive discussion of al-Farabi—hardly a thinker concerned with democracy however it is construed—as a “source of inspiration to contemporary Muslims to engage Democracy” [p. 390] is a case in point.)
Sadiki's interest in recuperating this history is ultimately guided by contemporary politics, for the book seeks to destabilize a series of oppositions that currently govern much of current scholarship, political practice, and geopolitical maneuverings between West and East, Orientalism and Occidentalism, reason and revelation, politics and religion, democracy and Islam. Sadiki is particularly concerned to undermine the opposition between Islam and democracy, a polarity reinforced by both Orientalists and some Islamists (what Sadiki calls “the rejectionists”). He does so not only by “defoundationalising” democracy through its transformation into an ethos released from entanglement with specifically Western experiences and shibboleths, but also by seeking an “Islamic ethos of anti-foundationalism, communication with difference and pluralisation within and without” (p. 396). Deriving an antifoundationalist ethos from a religion premised on the existence of a transcendent divinity who has bequeathed to humanity not only a moral code but an entire way of life might seem futile. Sadiki argues, however, that the “unity of God and the belief in God through holy scripture is the ultimate foundation…. [T]his is the non-negotiable element that is reproduced in any refigured religious foundationalism. But everything else is open. Under Islam, God alone is not looked upon as another site of power open for human contestability or contestation” (p. 77). These arguments inform his insistence on replacing the opposition between fixed ahistorical essences called Islam and Democracy with a multiplicity of historically contingent islams and democracies that at times intersect, crosspollinate, and even reinforce and refigure each other in unpredictable ways.
Sadiki is quite persuasive here, and his analysis is a welcome antidote to the current political purchase of Manichean views that divide the world into Islam versus the West, and then map this “civilizational” divide onto a distinction between antidemocratic and democratic forces. It is also a timely corrective to particularly anemic definitions of democracy in terms of largely “cosmetic” procedures—successive national elections, for example—that in many places in the Arab Middle East serve to shore up rather than pluralize and disperse state political power. Particularly illuminating in this connection are Sadiki's interviews with Islamist men and women from Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, the Renaissance Party of Tunisia, Jordan's Islamic Action Front, and Hasan al-Turabi's Islamic National Front in the years 1992–94. Perhaps the book's greatest contribution to current scholarship on both Islam and democracy is the rich and textured discussion of the interviews with the islāmiyyāt members of the four groups, which provides an invaluable window onto arguments of Islamist women that are all too often reduced to silent symbols of either victimization or moral virtue. If taken at face value, the activists quoted here debunk generalizations about a single antidemocratic stance by Islamists. Indeed, Sadiki argues that contemporary Islamists are profoundly engaged in a democratic project, understood both as an attempt to read democratic practice into Islamic sources and to uphold “their right to borrow what democracy and how much democracy as befits culture, history and local values” (p. 371; emphasis in the original).
Yet, taken as a whole, this valiant effort is not wholly successful. In the first instance, the book could have used substantial editing. Not only are there a surprising number of grammatical errors, typos, repetitions, and misplaced punctuation, but also the pervasive use of an awkward passive voice often makes it quite difficult to determine who is arguing what and when. Moreover, the dizzying array of disciplines, literatures, excurses, and thinkers Sadiki brings into the 400-page endeavor often results in unwieldy extended tangents that overwhelm rather than exemplify the democratic ethos he seeks to enact. Such space would have been better spent more carefully theorizing, clarifying, and substantiating several arguments and concepts central to the book. An example is “the West,” which is largely represented as coextensive with individualism and secularism, a somewhat odd characterization given, for example, the messianic tone of the current American administration and the often noted religiosity of the American public. Sadiki writes, “Since the ‘death of God’ in the West, liberal democracy has, more or less, assumed the role of a new religion, and the nation-state has become quasi transcendental. This ‘death’ has no analogue in the Middle East. Thus, the blurring of religion and politics is a fixture of politics in the Middle East” (p. 8). In a book explicitly committed to undermining all essentialisms and polarities, the Orientalist binary between a secular West and a Middle East in which religion and politics intertwine reappears. The repeated invocation of “liberal democracy” as if the terms are obviously consistent is also problematic given the efforts by both Euro-American and Muslim political theorists (such as Abdolkarim Soroush) to disentangle democracy from the history and premises of a liberalism that is inextricably associated with secularism and the rise of bourgeois capitalism. (Sadiki's inclusion of Thomas Hobbes as a democratic theorist is a case in point. Although Hobbes arguably figures among those thinkers crucial to the development of liberal political thought, he was no democrat.)
Finally, Sadiki claims several times that all this “contesting and rethinking provide a potentially coherent gestation that augurs well for good government” (p. 64). Although it is not at all clear that the increasing contestability of all certainties automatically bodes well for “good government,” the fact that there is no systematic argument about what “good government” entails makes such declarations difficult to assess, particularly given Sadiki's redefinition of democracy in terms of an ethos concerned with “a fluidity of power so that no single claimant or contestant, human actors or the ideas, truths and sets of knowledge from which they derive their hierarchical position in society, can monopolise power … ” (p. 65). Sadiki obviously cares about the need to vacate authoritarian rule in the Arab Middle East—hence, the arguments about the necessity of women's political participation and inclusion, for example, and the corrosive consequences of the alliance between “foreign powers” and authoritarian Arab regimes—but the connection between the infinite contestability he so values and the emergence of “good government” remains undertheorized. His portrayal of such gaps in the argument as a deliberate rejection of “the Anglo-American approach” (p. 375), which demands of scholars answers as well as questions, is not, unfortunately, much help.
