The debate about the moral and the political conception of human rights has recently risen in prominence in legal and political philosophy. The traditional moral approach (often called a ‘naturalistic’ or ‘orthodox’ account) conceives of human rights as basic entitlements that people have simply in virtue of being human. The political approach, on the other hand, identifies human rights with those rights that are recognised as binding within a contemporary international and institutionalised practice. The distinction, however, often suffers from oversimplification because, among other reasons, neither approach can afford the luxury of being insensitive to current international human rights practice and of not trying to offer a critical or justifying account of the elements contained in that practice.
Both approaches share the assumption that there is such a thing as an international practice of human rights, the empirical existence of which is independent of whether one adopts the moral or the political conception of human rights. Because of this common ground, and even though specific authors aim to develop views that are meant to explain the role human rights play in international practice, the overall debate seems to have been more about the proper way of understanding the nature of human rights than about the nature of the rights that actually constitute current practice. This helps to explain why a plethora of persons who directly engage with the practice, such as lawyers, activists, sociologists, politicians, etc., can be oblivious to this debate and yet employ shared conceptual tools when trying to explain the nature of the practice.
The following pages overcome this view by showing that what differentiates the political conception from its moral counterpart can be helpful to comprehend international human rights practice. Since the political approach maintains that human rights are normative because they are part of a specific practice, they can be reinterpreted in light of models that try to make sense of normativity as practice, such as the Hartian model. Section one provides an overview of international human rights practice from the viewpoint of the political conception. Section two justifies the use of a heuristic model for understanding the practice in a fact-dependent context, specifically Hart’s rule of recognition. The third section applies the Hartian model to human rights practice. The fourth section describes how resorting to the Hartian model can help solve some of the challenges typically faced by the political conception. In the end, it should be clear that making sense of the different conceptions of human rights is relevant to making sense of human rights practice.
1. Human Rights Practice From the Viewpoint of the Political Conception
The political conception of human rights is committed to understanding the distinctive nature of human rights strictly in light of their role in modern international political practice. This role consists typically in limiting the actions of governments and setting standards of legitimacy. Such standards help the international community establish whether it must tolerate a government that conducts certain practices, and, if not, whether it may intervene by force or any other means necessary against a government that fails to prevent or engages in human rights violations.
Proponents of the political conception of human rights differ in their accounts of this role. Some maintain that human rights are necessary conditions of any system of social cooperation which apply strictly against states by providing justifying reasons for war and by setting limits on a government’s internal autonomy.Footnote 1 Others, while recognising that human rights claims are directed primarily at states, also recognise that they provide reasons for individuals, groups, and organisations of all sorts to engage in reform-oriented action.Footnote 2 Proponents of this view have different understandings of the extent of the reasons for interference provided by human rights. On the one hand, not all actions exceeding the limits of state legitimacy are sufficiently persuasive to justify robust intervention.Footnote 3 On the other hand, human rights are said to provide reasons not only for interference but also for the guidance of practical judgements about matters of international concern.Footnote 4 It is not surprising, then, that proponents of the political conception have different views of which rights belong on the list, ranging from minimalist sets of rights, to physical security,Footnote 5 to less demanding kinds of justification.Footnote 6
On the whole, proponents of the political conception agree on the epistemic dimension when it comes to human rights—that is, on the fact that the justification of human rights depends on normative practice at the international level to justify certain kinds of reactions, without the need to bring in substantive moral reasoning. In a nutshell, the political conception understands human rights as involving (i) a practice, (ii) normative requirements inherent in that practice, and (iii) the primary applicability of such normative requirements to states in (iv) matters of international concern. Human rights in this sense are normative requirements aimed at a specific group of addressees and whose content is determined by a generalised practice that occurs primarily at the international level.
Several consequences follow from this short description. First, human rights are empirically rather than morally grounded. The political approach does not endorse a necessary conceptual connection between morality and practice. No moral ground is required to determine that something about the practice is binding. This is the political conception’s most distinctive feature vis-à-vis the moral conception of human rights, since the latter supports the existence of a necessary conceptual connection between morality and practice and maintains that this connection is what ultimately justifies regarding the practice as normative.Footnote 7 This allows the moral conception to be sensitive to international human rights practice while also offering a morally critical account of the elements contained in that practice.Footnote 8
The political conception deals not with the idea of human rights per se, but with the idea of human rights inherent in a historically-situated global experience. In a practice theory, what generates norms is, first and foremost, the existence of a norm-recognising practice. The behavioural regularity of certain entities is itself the source of the normative requirements adopted in practice. Such norms exist when (i) the recognition that certain normative statements are binding is a matter of fact, and (ii) deviation from the content of these statements provides good grounds for criticism. If human rights are norms of this kind, they give reasons to conform with what the practice describes as binding, but only because they are social norms rather than because of the content of those norms. In other words, human rights arise from convergent social experiences; their content depends on what a group of agents do towards individual holders.
Second, the political conception views human rights mostly as normative requirements, with specific content applicable primarily to states. From such a non-morally-dependent viewpoint, the practice does not consist simply in right-holders claiming or enforcing their rights against states. At the international level, the practice’s human rights are primarily norms that are applicable to and enforceable by states, either unilaterally or in concert. Consequently, the actions of duty-bearers are more critical for assessing the practice’s effectiveness than the actual states of affairs affecting the right-holders.
Third, human rights for the political conception are chiefly efficacious norms. A non-practised practice is a contradiction in terms. They are a matter of fact. As facts, they are observable and can be subject to tests of pedigree. Such tests cannot consist simply in determining a general pattern of rule-following, however. Compliance with a practice inherent in a social norm is relevant to assessing the existence of the social norm only when it is not motivated by reasons external to the norm. For instance, I can engage in behaviour consonant with a normative practice without even knowing that the norm exists. In order to count as an element of efficacy, compliance needs to be accompanied and perhaps partially motivated by the awareness that specific actions or omissions are required. Since the motivations prompting governments to act or to refrain from acting are, in certain respects, not necessarily human rights norms, some additional element is wanting. What matters for assessing efficacy, then, is not mere compliance so much as recognition. Norms prove efficacious by being recognised by the members of the group who are developing the practice according to which certain behaviour is required. Compliance is one of the ways by which to assess recognition. Another, perhaps more effective, is the attachment of the practice to an institutionalised constellation of sanctions and sanction-applying mechanisms.Footnote 9
However, connecting sanction-applying mechanisms with interventions in foreign governments can be highly problematic. Interventions (or debates about interventions) in the affairs of other states justified by deviations from the practice can aspire to become sanction-applying facts. In the absence of an institutionalised sanction-applying global system, though, this connection is not immediately visible. It often seems to depend on the goodwill of those interested in appointing themselves as sanction-applying actors. The failure to establish this connection between ‘interventions justified by violations of the practice’ and ‘sanction-applying actions’ ends up giving grounds to some of the main criticisms levelled against human rights doctrines, such as the ambiguity of the claim to the universalism of human rights standards coupled with the colonialist-like imposition of such standards on diverse parts of the world.Footnote 10
This point of contention leads to a fourth consequence of the political conception of human rights—its emphasis on infringement. The criteria expressed in practice determine the normative status of responses to specific harms. Certain kinds of moral rights impose duties on governments and other agents—that is what makes them normatively relevant. But such a status can attract international concern only when those rights are recognised as triggering the normative justification of a response at the international level. According to this perspective, what matters for assessing practised human rights is not so much whether they are protected and respected, but what kinds of harms qualify as human rights violations.
In the end, this set of features is attributed to international human rights practice strictly by the political conception. Different conceptions of human rights lead to different understandings of the nature of the practice, even if the opposing conceptions accept piecemeal the importance of practice to any reasonable account of human rights.Footnote 11
2. The Need for a Heuristic Device—Hart’s Rule of Recognition
The political conception identifies specific traits in international human rights practice. The moral conception highlights different features of the same practice insofar as its idea of human rights is (necessarily) morally grounded. On this latter conception, the practice can be understood as a rights-based approach in which the normative emphasis consists in acting for the protection of individuals rather than in reacting to the violations of certain standards.
This discrepancy seems strange because practice is mainly a matter of fact. It is reasonable to expect that theorists would agree on the basic characteristics of the underlying social fact, whatever the conception of human rights adopted. After all, a practice is an empirical phenomenon. Why would different conceptions of human rights involve different understandings of practice? If the practice presents itself equally to theorists of the moral and the political conceptions, they should be able to explain and characterise such a practice on similar terms. As it turns out, they do not. Authors from both sides cannot agree on the purpose of the practice, on its actors and addressees, on its scope, or even on the number of practices.
From the viewpoint of the political conception, for which moral reasoning is not much help, the commitment to the thesis that human rights boil down to practice requires a further explanatory (heuristic) model. Some additional element is wanting in order to justify how certain practices can become normative primarily at the international level. The political conception lacks an instrument that contributes to understanding how a practice of recognising certain standards can be normative in the first place.
The political conception of human rights is then a normative practice theory. A practice theory states that certain practices are capable of generating norms. The behavioural regularity of specific entities is itself the source of the normative requirements adopted in practice. If the relevant social norm provides a reason to conform to the behaviour expressed in practice, it can only be because it is a convergent social practice, not because of the content of the norm. The normative content emerges from what the agents involved in the practice do.
What the political conception emphasises is that not all claims to human rights norms qualify as human rights. Only those rights expressed by a social norm—recognising the criteria in light of which international intervention in the affairs of states is justified—can be considered human rights. This is where the Hartian model can be useful to the political conception for understanding the practice. It contains an instance of recognition of criteria of binding force based on facts—the ‘rule of recognition’ (henceforth RoR).Footnote 12 Both instances, international human rights practice and Hart’s RoR, share the heterogeneity of their institutional requirements, the absence of any authoritative view about the grounds of their norms, the content-changing nature of their precepts, and the variety of actions that are left to the discretion of practitioners.Footnote 13 Understanding how the RoR operates in the Hartian model may then help to clarify a non-morally-grounded view of human rights practice.
It is important, nonetheless, to avoid identifying the normative elements of human rights practice exclusively with the legal nature of the practice. True, certain authors associated with the political conception describe their project as one of trying “to make sense of the practice, and especially of its international legal core, and to do so in a critical way”.Footnote 14 The human rights theorist would then be expected to reconstruct human rights as they exist in international legal doctrine and practice of human rights. Also, critics of the political conception often suggest that the focus on legal codification and institutionalisation, as well as on adjudication and litigation in courts, betrays the moral, aspirational character of human rights, limits their potential,Footnote 15 and makes their demands non-negotiable.Footnote 16 However, practice and legalisation do not have to be coincidental. Beitz, for instance, suggests that we should think of human rights as background norms rather than as legal rules, since their would-be legal status does not settle the reasons for acting on them and disagreement often arises about their basis, content, and application.Footnote 17 The task of the human rights theorist is then “to clarify the understanding (or understandings) of human rights with respect to its own aims and purposes”.Footnote 18 This includes the legal dimension of the practice but is not reduced to it.
A caveat should be issued here, however. Hart introduces his RoR in the context of stable legal systems encompassing organised sanction-applying institutions. As the ultimate instrument for explaining the chain of validity between the different norms of a legal system, it can hardly be applied to normative realms in which no such sanction-applying institutions exist, and no chain of validity obtains. That is why Hart maintains explicitly that the RoR is absent from Public International Law.Footnote 19 However, applying the Hartian model to international human rights practice does not commit us necessarily to any view regarding whether the RoR fits into the description of Public International Law. The model functions simply as a heuristic device for determining how the practice works, not as a theoretical explanation of the nature of the practice. Adopting the model in this operation does not commit us necessarily to following Hart’s dismissal of the RoR in Public International Law; nor to stating that he misapplied the RoR to the international context;Footnote 20 nor to claiming that the RoR did not apply to the Public International Law of his day but could apply today;Footnote 21 nor to rejecting that International Law can be a legal system even if it contains an RoR.Footnote 22 All that is required is the view that Hart’s RoR is a crucial element in a practice theory bearing strong resemblances with human rights practice as described by the political conception. As the following sections show, applying the RoR to human rights practice requires, for instance, the inclusion of practices that are outside the scope of Public International Law.
3. Applying a Hartian Model to International Human Rights Practice
Hart’s conceptual tools for describing legal practices are currently part of the shared vocabulary of legal theorists. The analysis contained in The Concept of Law captures plausible features of the authority of law in complex societies, such as systematicity, internal validity, and acceptance by subjects. His notion of the RoR plays a pivotal role in the process of understanding how these different features work.
Hart distinguishes between primary rules, which establish patterns of behaviour, and secondary rules, which are rules about rules. The RoR is the ultimate secondary rule insofar as it is the norm expressing the criteria in light of which other norms of the system are valid. It is usually left unstated and can be identified in the practice of recognition of primary rules performed by law-applying officials. The general practice of recognition can be the object of descriptive statements, concerning facts; but it can also give rise to normative statements which express the internal point of view.Footnote 23 Those who adopt the internal point of view take the content of the rules to impose obligations and to serve as the “basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment”.Footnote 24 The internal point of view shows that the contents of the practice are regarded as contents of rules insofar as they are accepted as standards of behaviour and as reasons to act in the ways required by them.
The RoR contains a set of characteristics that can be applied to international human rights practice when regarded from the viewpoint of the political conception. It is first and foremost a social norm, that is, a norm of which the binding force depends on the empirical social context. The social norm requires an actual practice by a group and the accuracy of normative statements about the practice made from the internal point of view. This is the first feature of the RoR that applies to the political conception of human rights. If international human rights practice is normative because certain agents recognise certain standards in certain circumstances as binding, the practice itself constitutes a social norm in this sense.
This claim carries two implications. First, much like the RoR, the standards of human rights practice exist and have the content they do because of—and only because of—specific social facts. Their existence and content are determined by the fact that members of a group adopt the internal point of view towards a certain behavioural regularity and use it to evaluate the validity of norms that fall within its purview. Second, the practice as a norm sets a group-wide standard. That is why it is a social norm. Members of this group do not regard it as an idiosyncratic or personal norm that others are not required to follow, but rather treat the standards it sets out as the official way to determine which norms are binding to all (in the sense of justifying a concerted reaction in cases of violations) and which are not. No other kinds of justifications or grounds (such as moral reasoning, for instance) need to be sought out to establish the binding force of the standards displayed in practice.
But the RoR has other features that explain the nature of human rights practice. For instance, it is an ultimate normative instance—that is, it derives its validity from no other rule, but only from the general social practice that reveals its acceptance by the relevant officials. Also, it is at the summit of a hierarchy that determines the order of precedence between various sources of law.Footnote 25 If the method of applying this heuristic device works, human rights are normative and binding at the international level solely because they are accepted as such. They do not exist by virtue of any other standard. Their existence is secured simply because of their acceptance and practice. The fact that they are recognised as being normative functions as a regress-stopper (concerning questions of validity and legitimate ruling) because their creation does not presuppose prior authoritative assistance. From the viewpoint of the political conception, human rights are neither self-evident axiological truths nor binding because of some external value. Rather, they are posited and recognised as reasons that justify considering certain agents (such as states) bound to certain behavioural regularities. They are not simply reasons—they are relevant reasons because they are posited. It is the fact that, for the political conception, they exist only as a result of recognition, of practice, and nothing else, that justifies the comparison with a practice theory of normativity such as Hart’s.
Since in the Hartian framework primary rules are not ultimate because they exist by virtue of the criteria inherent in the general practice of recognition rather than by a direct acceptance of their content, the RoR’s most salient property is that it is a secondary rule—a rule about other rules. Human rights practised at the international level then express reasons for action and reasons for norms. The RoR sets the standards in light of which other rules are valid. This is the sort of function that can be ascribed easily to international human rights practice. For the political conception, human rights violations provide reasons for interference in the affairs of other states not merely as punishment for breaking shared rules, but mostly as evidence that the exercise of state government is unlawful, since it is not consonant with the international norms establishing the basic criteria for norm-making at the domestic level. Regarded as a sort of secondary rule, international practice establishes human rights as normative sources of legitimate exercises of government. Respect for the human rights recognised in the practice functions as a conditio sine qua non for being treated as an equal member of the international arena.
However, despite being a rule about rules, the RoR is still a duty-imposing rule to its addressees rather than merely a norm of competence. In Hart’s framework, the RoR imposes a duty on legal officials to apply rules that bear specific characteristics, such as respect for the criteria of validity recognised from the internal point of view by the officials of the legal system. In this sense, international human rights practice can also be regarded as duty-imposing. The practice exists only if human rights are accepted by the participants of the international community as legitimate standards of conduct. Human rights exist then for members of the international community only if (i) the bulk of those members obeys primary norms which are valid because they respect the standards set out in international human rights practice; and (ii) decision-making bodies at the state, inter-state, or supra-state levels accept those standards inherent in the practice from the internal point of view. In such instances, international reactions to human rights violations are justified as sanction-applying reactions—the breach of shared duties embraced by several agents provides reasons for reacting negatively to such a breach. The absence of an effective sanction-applying structure at the international level does not overrule the duty-imposing nature of human rights. Rather, it merely shows that the violations of those duties are not met with appropriate systematic reactions.
Also, the RoR dispenses with moral justification when it comes to assessing whether it is binding or not. Moral justification is not conceptually necessary to ascertain whether there is a RoR or not. To establish the moral justification of the RoR, one must point to elements beyond the social practice. The existence of the RoR never gives anyone a moral reason to follow it. To establish the existence of a moral obligation to obey the RoR, one must justify the rule, as it were, from the outside, by using extra-legal principles of political morality. However, that is not what makes the RoR a rule in the first place, but rather the institutional practice of recognition of certain standards of legal validity as obligatory. The binding force of the rule derives from the empirical fact of recognition of standards from the internal point of view.
The RoR, though, is not immune to moral reasoning. Moral values may be incorporated into the RoR. But, in those instances, the moral standards are part of the RoR because they are inherent in the practice of recognition from an internal point of view. They produce contingent connections between morality and law. Hart’s theory of social rules is indeed conventional and does not require an external element playing a justificatory role. This does not entail, however, that norms in a legal system cannot be coextensive with certain moral norms that would bind practical reason in a society, just as long as the fact of recognition from the internal point of view calls for moral reasoning rather than the other way around.Footnote 26
In this light, no other characteristic of the RoR is more suitable to describe the political conception of human rights. The standards inherent in the practice can be expressions of certain kinds of moral reasoning. What is distinctive about the political conception is that such expressions are contingent on the practice rather than necessary. Much like the RoR, international human rights practice can incorporate moral standards justified by different conceptions of human nature, for instance. The strong exclusion of moral reasoning from arguments concerning human rights practice cannot be understood as a prohibition to argue morally about human rights—that is not what the political conception maintains. If it did, the political conception would be oblivious to some of the most important components of human rights arguments developed in the practice. What matters for the political conception is that any kind of moral reasoning can only enter the idea of human rights if, and only if, it is recognised as an essential element of the standards practised in the international arena. Moral versions of human rights are normative if they incorporate the content of the RoR, not the other way around.
Finally, duty-imposing rules are addressed to a specific class of agents. What distinguishes the RoR from primary rules in this aspect is the fact that the former applies only to officials, whereas the latter applies to citizens by and large. Ordinary citizens can follow the RoR in the sense that they can use it to ascertain what the law in their community is. But they do not follow the RoR in the sense of complying with its content because they are not, strictly speaking, its audience. Citizens are only under a duty to follow primary rules. Officials are required to follow secondary rules. The duty contained in the latter rules requires officials to evaluate the conduct of citizens according to the rules those citizens are obligated to follow.
Who are the officials in international human rights practice, given that no sanction-applying system seems to operate at a global level? According to the Hartian model, the answer to this question depends on the efficacy of secondary rules of adjudication—that is, rules determining who is authorised to apply and enforce norms validated by the RoR. In the context of human rights, any institutionalised structure of deliberation or adjudication that issues decisions necessarily bound by international human rights norms can be considered a member of the group engaged in the practice. The practice itself contains rules determining who can pass some form of judgement based on human rights norms.
This feature of the Hartian model expands human rights practice, since the international level is somehow meshed with the domestic level, thereby turning states themselves into addressees of the social norm of recognition. This mechanism leaves room for understanding the broad scope of the practice beyond the international level, a criticism often levelled against the political conception. The practice encompasses then any action performed as a result of a decision reached under the purview of the human rights generally recognised in international practice. This includes Public International Law in all its sources, foreign policy, and actions by international institutions or nongovernmental organisations. States are relevant agents here, but so too are international bodies such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, or regional judiciary bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African Court of Human and People’s Rights. But this broad scope also includes in the practice those normative realms that are binding because justified by the fact that they conform to international human rights practice. Whenever states or state legislatures or national courts issue a policy or a decision because they recognise from the internal point of view that they are bound to following international human rights norms, they engage in the practice even if their policies and decisions only extend so far as the domestic level.Footnote 27
The upshot is that the practice hardly unfolds in unison. Domestic officials tend to interpret human rights norms differently in consideration of the specificities of their local normative systems. This does not mean that the contents of the practice are impossible to identify. It only means that such contents arise heterogeneously from the operation of a complicated and multi-layered network of institutions. For instance, rights adjudication can be traced to such institutions as the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court, along with a plethora of other international ad hoc tribunals or regional tribunals that purport to solve cases in which human rights violations are at stake. Also, at the national level, rights-recognising jurisdictions are diverse, including constitutional courts, ordinary appellate courts, and administrative courts, which do not converge at a single-state apex. In such a decentred authority system, no last word is ever heard. Polyarchy requires both multi-levelness and plurality within levels, which features reinforce each other. Dialogue between courts and the search for common ground is not an echo of universalist aspirations of human rights. Instead, it is a structural inevitability of the interdependent authority of multiple decision-making sites based on human rights.
4. Dissolving Concerns About International Human Rights Practice
4.1. The challenge of heterogeneity
Political conceptions of human rights aspire to systematise existing international human rights practice without drawing on prior notions of human rights. The elements inherent in the practice are standards for various forms of international expressions of concern about how states treat people. The fact that different agents, such as states, NGOs, and other international organisations express different levels of concern does not override the international nature of the practice. Even if they produce effects on the domestic level, the standards apply primarily to states in matters of foreign policy.
But ‘primarily’ does not mean ‘exclusively’. Other agents besides states, such as international organisations or NGOs, can be said to participate in the general activity of recognising certain standards as human rights. Supporters of the political conception often admit that such participation is part of international human rights practice, albeit only secondarily. For instance, international juridical and quasi-juridical bodies applying human rights standards as jus cogens; and claims about human rights used as standards for the mobilisation of domestic legal, political, and social actors.Footnote 28 The participation of multiple agents with multiple claims about human rights is, in such instances, just another characteristic of the practice. Several actors can engage in the same practice at different levels.
This single practice view entails that disagreements about the nature of the practice are often conflicts between competing accounts of the practice. We need to clarify which activity involving human rights claims we are focusing on before disagreements about what counts as human rights practice make sense at all. An alternative view maintains not that the practice has a heterogeneous character but rather that different usages of human rights in different contexts by different actors are revealing of different practices. Such a “Broad View”Footnote 29 has important consequences for the political conception of human rights, since different practices can have competing accounts of human rights standards without being necessarily in direct contradiction. Different practices of human rights may, therefore, imply different forms of interference. Interference at the level of foreign policy does not have to be the same as interference at the level of domestic claims for policymaking. The Broad View maintains that there are several human rights practices and that international practice is only one of those practices. Rather than merely international, human rights practices have a universal scope. As long as institutional forms of powerFootnote 30 can be subjected to human rights claims, human rights practice can rightfully emerge.
However, the view that several human rights practices can coexist across different spheres of action does not leave much room for possible conflicts between practices, either when standards collide or when different modes of applying a shared standard are at odds. The Broad View does not require a meta-practice that purports to solve conflicts between practices but treats human rights as a context-sensitive term. The linguistic meaning of human rights does not vary across contexts, but the particular uses of rights shift from context to context.Footnote 31 This is problematic insofar as context-sensitivity does not seem to allow communication between practices. When NGOs denounce what they believe to be human rights violations perpetrated by a government X while the international community assures that the same government X offers no reasons for inter-state interference based on human rights violations, the Broad View seems to imply that they are talking past one another rather than actually disagreeing about human rights, since both NGOs and the international community may be using the expression ‘human rights violations’ to refer to different urgent threats. Practitioners engaged in human rights practices in different contexts, including the UN High Commissioner, the Justice of the African Court of Human and People’s Rights, the US Justice Department, the Canadian or Italian judge, activists in Amnesty International, domestic movements across Asia and Latin America, could then be appealing to different normative instances when they refer to ‘human rights’. This, however, contradicts the expectations of participants in debates about human rights that they are engaging in one single practice that allows them to communicate with all the other actors involved.
The Hartian model clarifies the challenges posed by the Broad View. Hart’s RoR contains multiple criteria for identifying the sources of law, which can conflict with each other. For instance, statutes enacted by a legislature can conflict with the constitution. While the RoR does not resolve all such conflicts, it establishes a general order of precedence that helps to produce a final adjudication in each particular case of conflict. The RoR, then, is not merely one rule, but rather a set of rules about which criteria (with some ranking criteria inter se) are recognised as appropriate by officials to solve possible conflicts between different normative claims.
The single practice theory can be understood in the same sense. There is no need to conceive of different claims concerning human rights across different spheres of action as constituting different normative practices. The same normative practice can be heterogeneous. One single human rights practice can encompass different criteria of validity by-and-large recognised from context to context. Different standards can apply to different instances, but they are all part of the same social norm. The practice oftentimes contains a multitude of standards determined by recognition and arranged in order of precedence that helps to resolve possible conflicts between human rights claims. The normative element ‘human right’ is not context-sensitive in the sense that it depends on the actual practice in which it is being formulated. Instead, its binding force derives from applying a specific context-generated criterion inherent in the general practice of human rights.
For example, when the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) condemns a state for violating the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment in cases of inadequate conditions of detention, the court engages in human rights practice, the justification of which is precisely interference in the affairs of states. The court rules a decision in the expectation that its rulings provide further justifications for sovereignty-interfering actions. According to the Broad View, this would contrast with the efforts of, say, activists in the Black Lives Matter movement fighting against racial discrimination in the US prison system, since their primary concern would not be to get the international community to interfere directly in the US government’s policies, but rather to signal injustices in the conditions of detention. The ECtHR and the Black Lives Matter activists would then be engaged in different practices. The Hartian model, however, shows that they are engaged in the same practice because both adopt the internal point of view of recognising as binding in international practice a human right to adequate conditions of detention. The formulation of the normative criterion and the context of its application differs from case to case. Still, they derive equally from the same practical source, even if they produce different kinds of consequences.
Regarded in this fashion, the Hartian model preserves the heterogeneous character of the single practice view and allows disagreement to take place between different sub-practices in the same normative realm.
4.2. Open-endedness and the ‘master list’
The claim that there is a single, albeit complex, human rights practice often mirrors the view that the primary task of a theory of human rights is to reconstruct the practice’s moral core and to derive a ‘master list’ of human rights from that core. This master list would then function as a critical standard to revise the practice. For members of the traditional moral conception of human rights, the master list can be relatively short because it contains only those rights which derive directly from the moral core, that is, one’s humanity. For this reason also, the contents of the master list are not particularly susceptible of alteration due to historical contingencies.
Context-dependent conceptions of human rights, however, cannot be oblivious to those rights which are already recognised as human rights in current practice. The practice expresses its own list of human rights. This list can be found, for instance, in the documents that comprise the so-called International Bill of Human Rights and which are most expressive of the practice, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and also in many other declarations and treaties within the UN system, some of them concerning special categories of rights (e.g. rights against slavery, against discrimination in education, in favour of equal pay for men and women, etc.), others concerning specific groups of people (e.g. stateless persons, refugees, women, children). The list also appears in regional documents, such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, or at the domestic level of states, especially in constitutional provisions. Since the practice evolves throughout time, the list of legal human rights expressed therein is not established once and for all but is susceptible to being more extensive and is therefore open-ended.
This does not entail that supporters of the political conception cannot search for a master list. They regard as human rights only those normative instances that provide sufficient justification for interference in the affairs of sovereign states. They then engage in the process of ascertaining which rights recognised in practice can indeed count as human rights. Such human rights can be used as critical devices vis-à-vis the remaining rights inherent in the list produced by the practice. For some authors, the list of human rights should be minimised as much as possible because interference in the affairs of sovereign states is strictly military. The list would encompass very few rights—those which protect life, liberty, and property, for instance.Footnote 32 For others, since interference can unfold by means other than military, the list of human rights covers different categories of rights: civil and political, economic and socio-cultural, environmental, etc.Footnote 33 Even though international legal human rights practice can be open-ended, the core list of human rights may still form a closed set to supporters of the political conception.
The Broad View has the advantage of not being restricted to a master list. Depending on the practice, different kinds of rights providing different kinds of justifications to different kinds of reactions by different kinds of actors can find their way into different lists. The search for a master list that reveals the moral unity underlying all human rights can then be regarded as chimerical.Footnote 34 This position allows the Broad View to endorse an idea of human rights that is more consonant with the multifaceted character of activities involving human rights claims. The search for a master list from the perspective of the political conception explains neither the importance of open-endedness in practice nor how to avoid theoretical disagreement about what constitutes actual reasons for interference in the affairs of states.
One does not have to embrace the Broad View, however, to understand how open-endedness can play a crucial role in a single practice theory. The Hartian model provides heuristic instruments for conceiving of a unitary social norm, the content of which can expand and vary throughout time. Since it concerns the recognition of other norms, this social norm establishes a set of criteria for their validity and asserts their binding character. Such criteria both govern and emerge from the critical deliberation of those whose task it is to give binding conclusions on the proper rules or normative reasons to apply in cases of dispute. Since it is a norm which depends on continuous practice and emergent custom, its contents can evolve and develop over time. They can express a number x of criteria ranked in order y at the moment z, and a number x’ of criteria ranked in order y’ at the moment z’. They can be grounded by different reasons for certain kinds of sanction-applying reactions at different times. And they can be controversial or unclear on some points inasmuch as they are not so on all. The RoR does not have to be treated as if it had a once-and-for-all, cut-and-dried quality. Its evolutionary character is what renders it an appropriate device for understanding the binding force of certain social practices.
In this light, international human rights practice is sufficiently constitutive of a normative list of human rights, while also being open-ended and independent of a master list. The evolutionary character of recognition can keep adding criteria to the content of the social norm being practised. Whenever a human right which did not exist previously is recognised in the list of current practices, or whenever the practice expands the conditions for which previously existing human rights are regarded as violated, the content of the social norm changes.Footnote 35 Each normative element included in the practice is a human right because it is included in the practice, whether or not it fits into the description of human rights expressed by any imagined master list.
Open-endedness, in this context, means that the social norm inherent in the practice is always susceptible to change. The gist is that the change in the practice’s content can be expansive or contracted. In the latter case, it makes sense to talk about criteria that rank above all others in such a way as to make the practice non-normative if they stop being recognised at all. The search for these criteria could boil down to a shortlist of basic human rights—not a master list of human rights per se, conceived of independently of practice, but rather a list of those human rights emerging from practice that seem fundamental, either at a substantive or at an empirical level, to other rights being included in the practice. If the practice’s list of human rights can be called a ‘master list’, not all rights rank equally. And for those that rank above the others, a new sub-list can be created. Not a ‘master list’, but a list of basic rights developed by a ‘master practice’.
4.3. What constitutes a violation of a content-changing practice?
The main problem with considering human rights practice as a social norm with an ever-changing quality is how to determine that the actual norm has been violated. According to the political conception, there is cause for interfering in the affairs of sovereign states whenever they violate human rights norms that are binding due to being recognised as such amidst a generalised normative practice. But suppose a state S is accused of systematically violating the human right R which is recognised as binding to all states in light of international human rights practice. This offers reasons for interfering in the affairs of S. State S, however, via its officials at the international and domestic levels, rather than claiming that it did not violate R, claims that any actions regarded as violations of R result from the protection of the human right R 1 , which should be given precedence vis-à-vis R. The most recent recognition of R 1 could then be considered an alteration in the content of the practice—that is, a change in the content of the social norm.
The case of Saudi Arabia with regard to gender equality in marriage provides a good illustration of this scenario. Saudi Arabia abstained from the General Assembly vote on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) supposedly due to objections to article 16, which declares that “men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry”, and also establishes the principles of consent to marriage and equal rights in marriage.Footnote 36 Despite several recent reforms granting additional rights to women, especially in 2019, Saudi Arabia still preserves the guardianship system today, according to which women require a male guardian’s permission to marry. Given the peremptory status of human rights norms recognised in international practice, which entails that they also apply to Saudi Arabia,Footnote 37 the guardianship system appears to be a violation of human rights. However, Saudi authorities maintain that the guardianship system is justified not by reasons of male superiority, but by freedom of religion and respect for the heritage of non-Western civilisations,Footnote 38 —that is to say, as a consequence of respecting other kinds of human rights. The Saudi argument is that, even though Saudi Arabia violates women’s rights to equality in marriage, it does so by complying with the relevant social norm with regard to the most important human right to freedom of religion and heritage, thereby overruling any reasons for international interference concerning women’s rights even after the 2019 reforms.
The Saudi argument poses a problem to the political conception. Would not such reasoning contradict the very purpose of having a binding normative practice? The Broad View meets this challenge by maintaining that state S could violate R in one kind of human rights practice, and yet not violate R at another kind of practice. This sort of answer is not very helpful, though. How can the same action by the same actor judged in light of the same normative instrument lead to opposing simultaneous (not alternative) liabilities? One possible answer by the Broad View could perhaps emphasise relevant compliance with a regional system of jus cogens that would provide exceptions to the more general global practice. But this hardly works in real life. When human rights activists claim for international intervention in state S, such as in the case of Saudi Arabia’s male guardianship system, their reasons are grounded in violations of R at the level of international human rights practice. The normative reasoning they engage in is the same that is to be used at the international level.
The Hartian model can reconcile the all-or-nothing binding character of a social norm with a content-changing practice. Suppose the RoR establishes criteria A, B, and C of validity, and a certain actor produces legislation that violates one or all of these criteria, but that is supposedly in accordance with a superior criterion D, which is thereby added to the RoR. If any officials intervene in human rights practice by recognising the binding force of D, a criterion which did not exist before in the RoR, a new normative element arises in the practice. Two sorts of rules then come face to face: the RoR encompassing criteria A, B, and C (RoRabc) and the RoR encompassing criterion D (RoRd).
There are two ways to overcome the conflict between RoRabc and RoRd. The first is by establishing that RoRd is an exception to RoRabc. This would amount to altering the original norm RoRabc to RoRabc˄d. However, an official participant in the practice of recognition cannot simply establish the existence of a new criterion in the social norm to which they are bound except if they are previously authorised to do it. Hart identified such authorisations as the result of applying what he called ‘rules of adjudication’.Footnote 39 The application of rules of adjudication to concrete cases has important consequences to the content of the RoR because it entails that the initial formulation of the RoR is not RoRabc but rather RoRabc˅∞p, where p stands for ‘any additional criterion which may be added to the RoR as a consequence of the generalised practice of criterion-recognition by officials’. The provision ∞p can be a way of interpreting open-endedness inside the very formulation of the RoR. Without it, either the RoR cannot be admitted to having a changing-content, or there is no way to state precisely when possible violations of such a rule occur.
An alternative way of harmonising RoRabc with RoRd is to consider that, by the time D emerges as a criterion accepted in social practice, a specific norm of conflicts predicting the addition of possible criteria to the practice is already binding. In this case, the RoR would encompass not only a duty to follow the by-and-large criteria A, B, and C, but also a duty to recognise or reject additional criteria such as D, E, F, etc. (RoRrr). The original version of the RoR would then be RoRabc˄rr.
In both instances, the RoR is dependent on how other attached provisions are successfully applied. Whether the RoR is formulated by RoRabc˅∞p or by RoRabc˄rr, the duty inherent in the rule depends on determining who the officials are and what they are doing in rule-following contexts from the internal point of view. The RoR, rather than a simple once-and-for-all rule functioning in an all-or-nothing fashion, is then an array or complex network of both duty-imposing and power-conferring norms.
In the case of state S violating R while claiming for the protection of R 1 , what matters to determine whether there is cause for interference in the affairs of S is to identify the actual content of the social norm concerning the recognition of human rights at the time of the relevant action. If international human rights practice only recognised R and included no special authorisation to officials of S to recognise new rights, then a violation of the normative practice took place. But if international human rights practice contained R 1 or left room for officials to begin recognising rights such as R 1 at any relevant time as elements of the practice, then no violation occurred. In a content-changing normative practice, cases need to be resolved by resorting to a snapshot of the norm at the relevant time.
Applied to the Saudi argument, one could hardly maintain that international human rights norms cease their peremptory status merely because of Saudi Arabia’s explicit abstention from approving the UDHR. The male guardianship system today follows from no recognised practice, adopted from the internal point of view, of attributing to Saudi authorities, whether governmental or judicial, the license to alter and reshape the elements of the international human rights practice. Failure to produce an adequate international response to the Saudi guardianship system is insufficient evidence of the existence of such a license in the contents of the rule of recognition, since it is simply an externally observed state of affairs rather than an internally accepted condition of the normative practice.
4.4. Are human rights too contingent on the way the world is organised?
One of the most common objections to the political conception of human rights is that it relies heavily on actual states of affairs. If the idea of human rights and the normativity it carries depends on conserving what is already empirically given philosophies of human rights are reduced to theorising ex post about social facts. Moral conceptions of human rights would then have a broader theoretical scope by reflecting about standards that could either provide a critical view of existing practices or suggest alternative ways of improving existent practices. According to this view, the political conception makes human rights excessively contingent on the way the world is organised,Footnote 40 which would reduce the potential of human rights discourses to being critical of actors at the international level.
In addition, fact-dependency complicates the task of determining what kinds of wrongs constitute human rights violations. Suppose state S engages in systematic practices of torturing a small group of persons. Yet, the current international order does not offer sufficiently reasonable conditions to justify interfering in the affairs of S—for instance, because even the mildest forms of intervention would produce more moral wrongs than non-intervention. A simplistic reading of the political conception would maintain that no human rights were violated in this case because there was no sufficient cause for interfering in the affairs of S. Suppose then that the international order changes in such a way as to offer conditions for interference by a coalition of other states. Does it make sense to say that the same group of persons had no human rights before and have now acquired human rights? They were continuously subjected to the same moral wrong perpetrated by the same actor at the international level. How can the same action be qualified by different normative terms in different moments of the same context?
The application of the Hartian model to human rights practice overcomes these difficulties. If international human rights practice is regarded as a social norm of recognition of certain standards, the fact on which human rights depend is not the actual set of conditions at the international level for reacting to certain wrongs, but rather the fact that specific actors recognise certain standards as binding at the international level. Only the standards inherent in the general practice can attribute to officials and states the duty to recognise and apply certain human rights. If a group of persons is tortured by state S, those persons’ status as right-holders does not change as a consequence of the international order justifying intervention. Instead, they are right-holders or not if state S is already bound, as a participant in the practice from which the social norm arises, to recognising the human right to not being tortured as a consequence of the standards determined in practice. In cases in which even the mildest forms of intervention can cause more moral wrongs than non-intervention, there is still reason for intervention because the practice of recognition establishes a human right, the violation of which should be met by sanction-applying reactions. However, that reason can be outweighed by other reasons for non-intervention, which necessarily follow from considerations about other human rights standards established by the practice of recognition that outrank the human right to not being tortured. All such standards are parts of the practice of recognition and are therefore different components of the social norm.
The RoR’s capacity for prescribing different criteria in a specific rank is both what allows for its evolutionary quality and what equips the practice with instruments of self-criticism. For Hart, the only restriction on the RoR is that it is a social norm. No further restrictions need to be placed on the kind of criteria that the rule sets out. Within this frame of reference, moral criteria can be prescribed by the RoR, provided that they are accepted and practised by officials from the internal point of view. Moral tests of legality are acceptable just in case these tests themselves have social pedigrees. As long as the criteria are set out in a rule that exists because underwritten by a social fact, they are binding regardless of their nature. Moral facts can provide reasons for validating other norms because social facts ultimately determine that they play such a role.
The claim that the political conception never leaves room to disregard the content of the practice whenever the idea of human rights diverges from a culture’s self-understanding, Footnote 41 albeit true, needs to be reinterpreted in light of the practice’s heterogeneous character. The claim is true because, for proponents of the political conception, no functional idea of human rights can diverge from practice since the former can only emerge from the latter. The notion that someone can claim human-rights-reasons to justify non-conformity to the standards inherent in the practice depends on the assumption that human rights are moral rights whose normative weight is not fact-sensitive. This conflicts with a fact-dependent conception of human rights. However, the same claim does not entail prima facie that certain elements in the practice cannot be disregarded in certain situations based on some kind of moral reasoning. If the practice incorporates moral facts that rank higher than other social facts when validating the actions of those subject to the social norm, then certain elements of the practice can provide moral reasons to disobey the standards emerging from such social facts. Since the practice is heterogeneous, and some of its components can be axiologically-charged and indeterminate, the practice itself is continuously open to self-criticism. The critique of practice does not oppose fact-insensitive moral reasoning to the normative empirical elements recognised in practice. Instead, it consists of a conflict between different elements of practice—a conflict that tests of pedigree often resolve in favour of certain kinds of moral reasoning.
5. Conclusion
The political conception of human rights strives to make sense of human rights strictly in consideration of their role in international practice, more specifically by describing how they can justify interventions against states that fail to prevent or engage in human rights violations. This conception of human rights is, therefore, normative and fact-dependent. Besides this, it does not seem to have much to say about what constitutes current international human rights practice. The argument presented here tries to overcome this gap by resorting to a heuristic device for explaining how normativity can be fact-dependent: Hart’s RoR. The characteristics of the RoR prove very useful to determine the characteristics of human rights practice from the viewpoint of the political conception. Also, they help to overcome some of the problems often faced by the political conception, such as whether there is only one practice or many, whether the notion of human rights becomes too contingent on the way the world is presently organised, how one can violate a content-changing practice, or how reliance on current states of affairs leaves room for criticism of the same states of affairs.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank João Cardoso Rosas, Charles Beitz, David Álvarez, Luís Pereira Coutinho, an anonymous reviewer of CJLJ, and audiences at the 10th Braga Meetings on Ethics and Political Philosophy for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. Funding for this research was made available by Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia (Portugal), Grant Number 2020.03633.CEECIND.
