Jean Thomas's important and ambitious book should be of interest to philosophers, legal theorists, lawyers, and activists alike. Thomas argues that just as individuals should be protected against the state by human and constitutional rights, so should they be protected against private actors. Thomas proposes a novel account of rights for the private sphere to show how this protection can be realized. The book covers a lot of ground and offers readers a tour through several important literatures—on the constitutionalization of private law, the nature of rights and human rights, and the contrast between special and general relationships, for example.
The book is motivated by a particular kind of case, in which individuals are harmed or injured by powerful private, often transnational corporations. Consider this short list of cases. “An employee is prevented from … using the bathroom on a long shift so that she is urinating into a plastic bag under her sewing machine” (241); detainees are subject to “torture, rape, intimidation” by foreign “private … contractors at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq” (9); villagers are left with “barely enough water to sustain themselves” owing to a foreign “company's diversion of large quantities of water” (9); a woman's heat is shut off by a “privately owned and operated corporation”—a “heavily regulated monopoly”—without “notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to pay any amounts found due” (220); “prospective domestic workers” are confined by “transnational recruitment agencies … at training facilities for months in overcrowded and unsanitary facilities where women have little or no access to health care, are deprived of adequate food and rest, and at times suffer physical and sexual abuse”; and child “agricultural workers” are deprived by employers of “adequate drinking water and sanitation facilities, with serious negative” health effects (9).
Activists and scholars are apt to “use human rights language to condemn” such harms or injuries; but “as a legal matter” human and constitutional rights obligate states, not private actors. So rights that directly obligate private parties are not a currently available remedy. The law does provide alternative tools with which to address such harms or injuries, but Thomas rejects them because, among other reasons, they fail to recognize the moral relevance of the exercise of some kinds of private power. She proposes instead a set of “new personal independence rights for the private sphere” (241). Thomas is concerned to explain what kind of thing such private rights are, what interests they protect, who is obligated by them, and how they might be implemented.
Thomas begins by exploring human and constitutional rights to extract a notion of the interests they protect and what she calls their relational structure, at the center of which is a particular kind of dependency. Holding that the rights theorist need not take sides in the debate between consequentialists and deontologists, Thomas argues that rights point to “a sphere of inviolability” which “can be viewed [both] according to the important value of the interests within it, [and] … as a boundary that is to be considered morally inviolate, a boundary that expresses the equal dignity of all persons” (104). Rights are addressed to the state because individuals are dependent on the state—she calls this the “relational context” (210). We are dependent on the state for our enjoyment of the goods that rights protect because “under conditions of the modern regulatory society, the state controls, through legislation and regulation, virtually all interests, including [the] vital ones on which we depend in the most fundamental sense” (210).
We can stand in this sort of relation to other agents as well; others can control the goods in which we have a vital interest. The “special scrutiny of action associated with fundamental rights ought to obtain among private actors where, and only where, one of these … [vital] interests is at stake and where the relational context … has the same structure as the one between individual and state” (19). That is, “the stringent obligations we impose on the state” should be extended to cases in which a private “party has sufficient control over another party's enjoyment of some good so that … it can be said that the second party depends to some sufficient extent on the first party for her enjoyment of that good. … The special protections of [personal independence rights] … will … apply … in those narrow circumstances” (211).
Thomas's account “does not exactly preserve the distinction between negative and positive [rights] because sometimes individuals will be required … to limit their use of their resources, or even expend resources, in respect of someone's right” (225). The important distinction is between substantive and procedural rights. So, for example, Thomas argues that Pepsi-Cola is obligated to take villagers' substantive right to water into account in the use of its property because the particular circumstances render the villagers dependent on Pepsi for water. Thomas's model suggests that the employer must provide employees with functioning restrooms because the particular circumstances render employees dependent on the company for the ability to relieve themselves in hygienic facilities. This is because the relevant good is not produced by the addressee of the right—water is not produced by Pepsi and restrooms are not produced by the employer (225).
When a vital good is produced by a rights-addressee, however—Thomas discusses a manufacturer of AIDS drugs—Thomas's account suggests that the relevant right is merely procedural. HIV and AIDS sufferers do not have a substantive right to receive relevant medicines from companies that produce them; such companies do not have an obligation to provide medicines to those in need. If a company refuses to provide medicines, or to provide them at prices those in need can afford, “to protect the expectations and autonomy of the depending party, procedural obligations in respect of such decisions and actions to remove the good from the depending party could be imposed” (225).
Thomas doesn't mention that what a company does to satisfy its procedural obligations won't do much good for someone dying of AIDS—it won't treat the disease or remedy the poverty that makes the disease fatal. But she is at pains to explain that this limitation is a strength of her model (237). It allows Thomas to avoid the implication that the fact of someone's need for a vital good plus the ability of someone else to provide that good equals a legal right to it and a legal obligation to provide it. On Thomas's view, an account of human and constitutional rights for the private sphere that suggests this is an unwieldy nonstarter. To be sure, a scheme of legal rights of this extensive kind—if somehow enforced by courts—could remediate some distributional injustices. But distributive justice is not the aim of the new personal independence rights. Thomas begins the book with a quote from Locke identifying the state as a kind of lion against which protection is necessary; she argues that there are other lions from which we need protection. She situates this protection in tort; and while tort does aim at remediation of a sort, it does not aim at remediation of distributive injustices (though it might have some salutary effects in that direction).
