Using the word humanitarian to describe governance creates an uneasy juxtaposition. To be humanitarian, whether competent or misguided, requires making human welfare a priority. Governance, however pure its intentions, cannot function without making tradeoffs among competing priorities on multiple dimensions, some irrelevant or indeed inimical to humanitarian intent. Alan Lester and Fae Dussart have demonstrated how the apparent oxymoron of humanitarian governance developed in practice in several locales of the British Empire from 1815 to 1860. The result is an intriguing historical synthesis that illuminates how authorities formulated and implemented policies to limit the violence of settlers. They draw primarily on secondary sources, informed by theory and occasional immersion in primary sources, to reshape older interpretations into a coherent exposition of a more humane governance across the empire's far-flung outposts.
Lester and Dussart open their study with an introductory chapter leaning heavily on theory to lay out their interests, concerns, and ambitions. They then trace and interpret attempts to introduce what they call humanitarian governance across the empire in a story loosely tied together by the long careers of two colonial officials, George Arthur and George Grey. This biographical framework both makes their study more interesting and highlights continuities and changes.
After observing Arthur's efforts to promote fair treatment of slaves in British Honduras, Lester and Dussart follow him to Van Diemen's Land, where he tried to navigate humanely among settlers, convicts, and the Aborigines dispossessed by his own policies. Arthur reappears in London, intervening in discussions triggered by the 1837 report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Aboriginal Tribes (British Settlements). The report had the tangible effect of supporting Arthur's quest for protectors of the Aboriginal inhabitants of the rapidly expanding Port Phillips settlement in what became Australia's Victoria province. The simultaneous deployment of protectors in Australia and New Zealand and the mixed success of this enterprise is the core of the authors' original research. These protectors had expansive mandates that far exceeded their resources and the tolerance of settler societies. After recounting the demise of the protector system because of settler opposition, Lester and Dussart shift the focus to George Grey, who developed a new conception of humane governance focused on amalgamation, a concept more familiarly known as assimilation—a way to merge Aboriginal peoples into the dominant colonial culture. After putting these theories into practice with increasing enthusiasm as colonial governor of South Australia and then New Zealand, he received financial backing from the Colonial Office to undertake a more thoroughgoing amalgamation in the Cape Colony.
The final chapter briefly follows Arthur to India. The book departs from its previous focus on rapacious settlers to try, unsatisfyingly, to establish a new lineage for developmental colonialism beginning with Arthur in India and Grey in South Africa. The problem is that this subject is treated too briefly to bring to bear the kind of engagement, attention to previous scholarship, and willingness to embrace a multidimensional perspective that are such strengths in the rest of the book.
It is usual to identify the zenith of humanitarian ideological influence on colonial policy with the 1837 Parliamentary Select Committee report or shortly thereafter, with the appointment of the protectors. Conventionally, the Colonial Office largely set aside the report's idealistic recommendations and the protectors failed. Lester and Dussart argue that the protectors have had an undeserved judgment and that the report's influence on humane governance had a broader impact than is often assumed.
The study makes a notable contribution in rehabilitating the reputations of George Arthur and the early protectors through careful analysis of their motives and actions. Especially in their chapters on Australia and New Zealand, Lester and Dussart attend to indigenous voices where possible. Settlers vilified the protectors whether they succeeded or failed and undermined their support in high places. The authors closely examine the underlying reality of the protectors' actions to overturn the tendency of historians to repeat the settlers' slanders against them. Of course, the protectors' good intentions did not always translate to good outcomes. The first protector, George Robinson, was responsible for the near-genocidal failures of Flinders Island and Bruny Island. Before taking up his mainland responsibilities, he had already twice deluded himself, his superiors, and the supposed beneficiaries of his good works.
The book's methodology shares something in common with early Atlantic history, read forward into the nineteenth century and expanded to cover more of the global South. Atlantic historians can argue that humane governance predated the Select Committee and George Arthur. Yet the book's themes have a nineteenth-century particularity, in language, motivation, and the connections with the evolution of humanitarianism in the metropole. Like the authors, the key actors show no awareness of any such tradition predating the movement to abolish the slave trade.
This is a book of many strengths and few flaws. The writing has two distractions: frequent use of inverted commas of sometimes mysterious import and invocation of secondary source authors during the narration of events. More substantial is the eliding of the concepts of humaneness and humanitarianism. Although Lester and Dussart use humane as a synonym for humanitarian, the words carry different connotations relevant to their analysis. To be humane indicates kindness, mercy, or compassion, while being humanitarian implies an active effort to improve the conditions of life. Arthur and Grey appear as humane throughout, but only intermittently humanitarian. Another is a question not sufficiently addressed: whether justice was to be applied to all subjects of the crown, as in George Arthur's vision, or implemented as a differential right that did not apply to the indigenous people or slaves. This may be the only major question that Lester and Dussart do not fully examine.
