Biosecurity in Putin's Russia is a meticulously researched and documented book inspired by a February 2012 article by Vladimir Putin, follow-up promises by his Defense Minister, and that year's US State Department compliance report on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) that suggested new American concerns with Russia's acceptance of its treaty obligations. Thus, the authors decided the time was ripe for exploring, through open sources and interviews, Russia's plans for developing biological weapons and integrating them into its military doctrine.

According to the authors, the Soviet legacy makes current Russian statements and actions on the promotion of certain life-sciences research and the development of even dual-use technologies of particular concern. The USSR had a biological weapons program prior to the BWC, and then despite becoming a state party to the convention, has been less than forthcoming about its past.

The analysis here is deeply troubling because, while circumspect in jumping to conclusions, the authors lay out an excellent case for the assertion that Russia is moving forward with integrating these restricted armaments into its arsenal and strategy. Zilinskas and Mauger carefully trace the debates about biological weapons systems and military doctrine, as well as related government steps (presidential decrees, funding decisions, foreign policy pronouncements, and relevant ministerial actions) to show that Russia has recently accelerated efforts to create greater expertise and capacity in biosecurity. While some of these activities are defensive in nature and others have civilian public health spinoffs, the government has also funded new programs with clear military applications. Certainly, several of these initiatives are part of a larger strategy, often associated with the Dmitrii Medvedev presidency, to enhance Russia's high tech sector and to reduce Russia's dependence on foreign technology, including pharmaceuticals and other important innovations in the life sciences. With the accelerated deterioration in Russian-US relations after the Maidan uprising in late 2013, however, the annexation of Ukraine, and western powers’ implementation of sanctions (some of which have hurt its biotech sector and basic research), Russia has embarked on a campaign to weaken the BWC and the norm against using those prohibited weapons. Citing American misbehavior, Russian officials and, in more sensational terms, its media have charged the US with efforts to undermine verification of and compliance with the BWC, spread terrible diseases around the world (Asian swine fever, Ebola, and Zika, 296–316), and open dangerous labs in other countries (like Georgia and Ukraine). These claims are extremely troubling, according to the authors, and could be consistent with a Russian decision to destroy global support for the BWC and the anti-biological weapons norm. The authors conclude by providing advice for reinvigorating and strengthening each.

This book is a monumental research effort. The attention to Russian sources of various kinds and the technical knowledge (regarding pathogens, life sciences, military applications, and the Russian bureaucratic process) is remarkable. Mere social scientists, however, need some additional definitions, tutorials, and signposts to follow the science, its significance, and the analysis more easily. In incorporating such changes, some organizational overhaul would also be necessary. For instance, Chapters 4–6 are on average about ninety pages long (including annexes) and contain more than 300 footnotes each. Readers would benefit from knowing prior to diving directly into the case information what the key factors are for understanding the activities of labs and scientists. Moreover, for the political scientist, this book suggests that the security dilemma prevails: American efforts undermining other arms control agreements and global institutions in the 2000s provoked a Russian decision to pursue biological weapons and weaken international law for its own protection. Or, perhaps, instead of seeing Russia as a reactive victim, its malevolent plans regarding biosecurity were lurking earlier and then were implemented as Russia rebuilt its power? In addition, questions emerge about the ways in which debates over defense policy reflect internal politics and battles over characterizing Russia's identity.

In a time when Russia has been charged with using chemical weapons against “disloyal” expats and “active measures” to subvert democracies, this book importantly draws attention to Russia's rogue behavior in another international arena. To counter these efforts at least in the BW realm, the authors suggest that other state parties must bolster the Convention and maintain it (and other) critical arms control treaties and multi-lateral efforts. Engaging in such actions will not only have relevance regarding weapons development but will help encourage other states and moderate Russians to maintain their faith in global institutions, the integrity of others’ commitments to the Convention, and the norm against using biological weapons.