A new publication by Ishtiyaque Haji is always grounds for celebration. One knows to expect a dense and vigorously argued contribution from one of the leading philosophers of action. Reason’s Debt to Freedom is Haji at his best and well worth one’s time.
In this book, Haji argues that many of the things we value are conceptually tied to freedom. In particular, free will is necessary for practical reasoning of a certain sort, namely, our having objective reasons to perform some act. To develop this claim, Haji draws a distinction between pro tanto reasons—reasons that other reasons can override, and all-things-considered reasons—those reasons which cannot be overridden. He claims that having an objective reason is to recognize that something is intrinsically good or intrinsically desirable. Some pro tanto reasons implicated in practical deliberation are objective pro tanto reasons, that is, judgments that something is intrinsically of value and that the agent, therefore, has reason to do something that would fulfill, say a prudential or moral obligation, but only if this reason is not overridden by an all-things-considered reason. Freedom is implicated here because having objective pro tanto reasons requires that we have alternatives. No one can have a practical reason of this sort unless he or she can refrain from doing the thing in question.
To defend this claim, Haji invokes a principle he previously called Kant’s Law, which simply states that moral “ought” implies “can.” He argues that Kant’s Law entails that if one has objective reason to do x, one can do x. Given that the freedom requirements on obligation, wrong, and right are symmetric, it follows that in order to have reason not to x, it must be within your power to refrain from doing x in order for you to have objective reason not to do x. Hence, there is an alternative possibilities requirement on objective pro tanto reasons involving “ought” judgments, judgments of “wrong” and “right”, and many further normative judgments. It is here Haji finds reason’s debt to freedom.
The first half of the book is devoted to developing and defending this thesis. Chapter two offers the main arguments for the claim that there is an alternative possibilities requirement on objective pro tanto reasons. Chapter three proposes that both prudential and moral obligation necessarily require alternative possibilities because both of these kinds of obligations conceptually require individuals to have objective pro tanto reasons. In chapter four, we see that many judgments of intrinsic value share a necessary link with having objective pro tanto reasons, entailing that there is an alternative possibilities requirement on intrinsic value judgments. Chapter five concludes the first stage of Haji’s argument and extends this alternative possibilities requirement to many of the core moral sentiments such as forgiveness, indignation, and guilt.
The second half of the book takes up the implications of this argument for the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism. If Haji is correct that there is an alternative possibilities requirement on objective pro tanto reasons and is correct that reasons of this sort are necessarily implicated by many of our normative judgments including moral obligation, it follows that the truth of determinism may threaten many of our moral responsibility judgments and practices. Haji offers several arguments which, if successful, would establish that it is, in fact, the case that determinism threatens many of our normative appraisals.
While there are many avenues worth pursuing here, perhaps most worrisome is a novel argument against semi-compatibilists that threatens many of the leading compatibilist approaches to moral responsibility and free action including those adopted by Strawsonians, Mesh theorists, and reasons-responsiveness accounts of control.
Traditionally, incompatibilists have held that there is a strong alternative possibilities requirement on free action and moral responsibility. In other words, the alternative possibility requirement on moral responsibility is incompatible with the truth of determinism. Many compatibilists have argued that, while there is an alternative possibility requirement on moral responsibility/free action, the requirement is merely a weak alternatives one; that is, the alternatives in question are those that are consistent with determinism. Semi-compatibilists have been able to avoid this debate entirely by maintaining that even if determinism does eliminate alternative possibilities, our moral responsibility judgments do not require agents to have alternatives of any sort. But if obligation, intrinsic value, and even the moral sentiments implicated in moral responsibility judgments do entail an alternative possibilities requirement, most semi-compatibilist views become unsustainable. This is due to the fact that even though these views do not require an agent to be able to do otherwise to be appropriately judged morally responsible, they all share a commitment that obligation and intrinsic value are compatible with the truth of determinism. But one cannot consistently maintain, as Haji so eloquently points out, that obligation and intrinsic value do depend upon alternative possibilities and yet moral responsibility judgments do not require alternative possibilities.
Haji’s discussion will be of obvious importance to those working on free will and moral responsibility but I suspect this work will have broader appeal, particularly for those interested in practical reason, deontology, virtue ethics, and value theory. Reason’s Debt to Freedom is an important book that will force those working on free will and moral responsibility to pay closer attention to the role of practical reason. I look forward to the inevitable replies.
