Can the Confucian tradition meaningfully contribute to the realization of political values such as liberty and equality—values traditionally associated with liberalism? Many contemporary scholars have argued in various ways that Confucianism and liberalism are compatible: some advocate for liberality grounded in Confucian principles (e.g., Joseph Chan and Roy Tseng); others read liberalism into Confucianism (e.g., Huang Yushun); and still others attempt to strike a balance between the two traditions (e.g., Bai Tongdong). However, in recent years, a number of scholars—particularly in mainland China, such as Chen Lai—have emphasized the tension between them, contending that values like freedom stand in opposition to Confucian ideals.
This is the context for Robert A. Carleo III’s Humane Liberality: A Confucian Proposal. After surveying the range of positions in the existing literature on the relationship between Confucianism and liberalism, Carleo advances the book’s central claim: that “Confucian liberality is commonly theorized in too liberalistic a manner and can do better through turning to humaneness as the grounds for affirming rights and liberties” (16). In chapter 1, he introduces a threefold standard for measuring liberality in philosophical traditions beyond the West: equality, freedom, and tolerance (or pluralism) (31). According to Carleo, Mencius highlights the fact that every individual possesses an equal “innate capacity for humane compassion” (34)—that is, the potential to cultivate the virtue of humaneness. This virtue requires “the state to regard and treat people with the same basic level of care” (39), thereby giving rise to humane government.
In chapters 2 through 4, Carleo demonstrates how Confucianism (particularly Mencius)—satisfies each of the three tenets of humane liberality. Regarding freedom, he contends that Confucian freedom is best understood as autonomous, relational, and harmonious (56), a conception exemplified by Confucius’s own moral attainment (57). On the question of equality, Carleo rejects interpretations that align Mencian equality with Kantian dignity, utopian visions (especially Kang Youwei’s Grand Union), or distributive justice. Instead, he argues that Mencian equality arises from the imperative that “people and government should develop and exhibit a basic level of humane care toward all people” (63). However, he also concedes that the humaneness in question evokes only “a basic degree of care for others” (81). As for pluralism, Carleo suggests that, although Mencius affirms a singular moral ideal, he does not demand metaphysical or religious uniformity, thereby allowing space for a form of pluralism (98).
Chapters 5 through 7 examine alternative strands within the Confucian tradition, including Zhu Xi (chapter 5), who diverged significantly from Mencius, and later thinkers who continued the Mencian line, such as Mou Zongsan (also chapter 5), Li Zehou (chapter 6), and Dai Zhen (chapter 7). Carleo categorizes these figures into two broad traditions: a “cosmic idealist” lineage, exemplified by Zhu Xi, and a “concrete humanist” tradition represented by Mencius, Mou, Li, and Dai. He critiques the privileging of metaphysical idealism within Neo-Confucianism—particularly Zhu Xi’s revisions to Mencian ethics—arguing that these developments are not necessarily improvements (117). Especially noteworthy is Carleo’s treatment of Dai Zhen and Li Zehou, whom he sees as advancing a humanist and emotionally grounded Confucian ethics through their shared emphasis on sheng sheng (the generation and regeneration of life). This, he argues, extends Mencian humaneness into a more developed and philosophical vision of humane liberality (137–39, 146–49).
Humane Liberality makes a valuable contribution to multiple fields. First, it offers a clear and concise overview of contemporary scholarship on the varied ways scholars have connected—or distinguished—Confucianism and liberalism, particularly with regard to freedom, equality, and pluralism. Second, Carleo’s most original contribution lies in his affective reading of Mencius. This interpretation not only provides a potential path for modernizing Mencian thought but also reconstructs two divergent strands in the development of Confucian philosophy since the Song dynasty, thereby offering a fresh perspective for reinterpreting that tradition. Third, though implicit, Carleo’s affect-oriented approach to Mencius creates space for new comparative dialogues. In addition to Kant and Hegel—commonly invoked by Mou Zongsan and his followers—Western philosophers who emphasize the role of emotion, particularly compassion, in social and political life (such as Rousseau and Adam Smith) may also serve as fruitful interlocutors in comparative studies with Confucian thought.
That said, the book is not without its limitations. Most notably, it lacks engagement with gender issues and the status of women in Mencian thought. While Carleo might contend that, for Mencius, compassion and the virtue of humaneness apply universally—including to women—this overlooks passages in the Mencius that explicitly prescribe gendered roles. Like many thinkers in traditional societies, Mencius emphasized the subordination of women to men, which creates a tension with Carleo’s attempt to align Mencian thought with modern values. For instance, Carleo asserts that the Confucian conception of freedom involves freedom of choice and relational autonomy (52). Yet Mencius maintains that, when a young woman marries, she must be careful not to displease her husband and that “to be properly obedient is the way of wives and concubines” (Mencius, 3B2). Carleo does not address how this prescribed obedience of women to their husbands can be reconciled with relational autonomy or how it permits women meaningful freedom of choice.
Moreover, while Carleo argues that humaneness can serve as a foundation for political equality, his chapter on equality does not address how this interpretation can be reconciled with passages in the Mencius that appear to contradict it. In his response to the followers of Xu Xing—a philosopher who advocated that rulers and subjects should engage equally in agriculture—Mencius famously (or infamously) declares that “those who labor with their minds govern others, while those who labor with their bodies are governed by others” (Mencius, 3A4), thereby drawing a sharp distinction between rulers and the ruled. In the same passage, Mencius grounds this distinction in human nature, asserting that “it is the nature of things to be unequal,” and warns that to “reduce them all to the same standard … must throw the world into confusion.” Such statements pose significant challenges to Carleo’s egalitarian reading of Mencius. Furthermore, in order to frame Mencius as an egalitarian, Carleo redefines political equality as merely the requirement that government and policymakers need to “consider the interests and sentiments of the people” (83). Accepting this definition would necessitate revising and diminishing the common standard by which we understand equality. This approach risks forcing our understanding of values in modern societies into the Procrustean bed of Mencius’s thought.
