Nigel Biggar's Aiming to Kill begins with a refreshing reassurance that the Christian tradition of moral thought can offer substantive resources for thinking about contemporary issues. His succinct first chapter surveys the reasons why Augustine, Aquinas and Barth agree in finding suicide an illicit act for Christians. This account notes some of their differences of approach in passing, but does not delve deeply into the implications of their working from rather different premises. The account of suicide is teamed with a shorter summary of the Just War tradition and its prohibition of taking innocent life, yielding the claim that the Christian tradition unconditionally prohibits suicide and the killing of innocents, and by inference, euthanasia. The seriousness with which the tradition is treated and the brevity of this survey are admirable, but this does tend to obscure the novelties which Biggar introduces in later chapters which are presented as a defence of the traditional view. Biggar rightly notes that this view has underlain Western morality and law since at least the Middle Ages, which shows up the novelty of its rejection by some of our contemporaries. By thus shifting the burden of proof, Biggar takes the position of the defence in the three ensuing chapters, which proceed in a helpful and direct claim-and-response format.
The first Christian argument under attack by defenders of euthanasia is the claim that human life is a gift or a loan which we have no right to damage or destroy. This involves Biggar in detailed and thoughtful (largely philosophical) discussion of the meaning of concepts like gift or loan, which he shows do make moral claims on us even when we are unhappy with them. This line of discussion inevitably moves into objections to the prohibition of euthanasia on grounds of theodicy and the role of bodies in human personhood, which Biggar properly indicates as misguided (the former) or quickly answers (the latter). Here he takes issue with Oliver O'Donovan's claim that even in cases of severe brain damage and irrecoverable coma we ought to explore humans in love and care as neighbours rather than looking for empirical criterion which let us off the hook for offering care. In his response Bigger introduces a distinction new to the tradition introduced in chapter 1, and which subverts its basic conclusions: because I am constituted both by my vocation and my capacity to enact it, under certain conditions I may lose the ability to act and therefore my personhood. This might happen, for instance, when someone suffers an irreparable lack of an upper brain. One suspects that Biggar rather too easily equates a medical diagnosis with a theological judgement that someone has lost their personhood understood as their capacity of ‘hearing and responding’. In a surprising inversion of the argument, he begins from the position that humans are constituted by relationship with the divine, and ends by saying that we ought to look to empirical criterion to determine whether this individual is capable of relationship. In so doing he reintroduces the precise hermeneutic of suspicion and empiricism that relational ontologies intend to overcome.
Chapter 3 defends the doctrine of double effect, which, in terms of euthanasia, has warranted an important guideline: that treatment of pain can cause foreseen but unintended death. The effect, as in Just War theory, is to allow the killing of the innocent, but only by using no more force than is necessary, and only in pursuit of a just cause, in this case pain relief. Here Biggar again goes beyond the tradition by agreeing with its critics that some killing of the innocent is not intrinsically bad. Here we see the result of his decision to sever biological and biographical life. In cases where biological life can no longer sustain biographical life, or unless the sheer enduring of pain has intrinsic value, Biggar concludes that there is no reason that such ‘patients should not intend their own deaths and doctors should not assist in their suicide or kill them’ (p. 101). Nowhere does Biggar discuss the fact that, on his definition, it is precisely the loss of the ability to intend anything which he names as the end of personhood, leaving us only with the clause, ‘there is no reason why doctors should not kill them’.
The last chapter defends the Christian claim that euthanasia should not be legalised because it creates a legal and cultural slippery slope. This chapter helpfully surveys the wide-ranging debate about the Dutch experiment to conclude that the evidence is strong that a slide from voluntary to involuntary euthanasia is well under way. Given the infinite elasticity of the legal definition of suffering, what began as a practice of allowing euthanasia in rare and medically definite cases of patients with severe physical pain not susceptible to relief has been increasingly applied to non-terminally ill patients on the grounds of much less objective criteria. He rightly points out that, empirically speaking, the problems faced by the liberalisation of euthanasia law parallel those of the liberalisation of abortion law. Biggar's basic conclusion is that in certain extreme cases euthanasia is morally permissible on Christian grounds, but given today's ideological and legal climate he does not see how the common good of justice for the weakest in society can be upheld if euthanasia law is liberalised.
Despite being unconvinced by Biggar's separation of biological and biographical human life, I found this a thoughtful treatment which is an excellent introduction to the Christian tradition of thought on this issue and to the contemporary discussion. Perhaps a reference to Christian thinking about martyrdom (in which life is subordinated to higher ends, and yet death is not courted) would have shed additional light on the conclusions gleaned in the discussion of killing in Just War. One might also have wished for a slightly more full-bodied treatment of the Christian tradition, and a more explicit account of Biggar's own assessment of this tradition. The impression one gets in the course of the book is that this is not forthcoming because Biggar, despite his claims to be simply defending the consensus in the tradition, has a rather eclectic theological position which, ironically, challenges its main point of agreement in judging suicide and the killing of the innocent (however disabled or unwell) to be always illicit.
