This slim volume confirms the benefits of not rushing doctoral dissertations into print. Based on an LSE thesis of nearly a decade ago, it features five (seven, including introduction and conclusion) crisp and effective chapters—some already published separately—well integrated into a potent study of several interlaced topics: the “personhood” (or agency) of states, the influence of Pufendorf on the modern political tradition, the role of metaphor and analogy (the so-called emblematic world view) in that tradition's self-conceptualization, and the importance of concrete experience for prompting such explanatory comparisons. Along the way, it offers a brief narrative of “personhood” notions, evidence of Neo-Scholastic (Báñez, Molina, Suarez) resonances in overtly antischolastic thinkers (viz., Pufendorf), a challenge to hyper-Lockean readings of early American political thought, and the best exposition in English of Otto Gierke's Genossenschaftsrecht and its role in his interpretation of early modern statecraft. The chapters flow seamlessly, the writing is clear and efficient, and the use of both primary and secondary literatures is wide-ranging, informed, and apt.
The introduction begins with a historical review of “body politic” and “persona,” arriving at a contrast between Hobbes's merely representative (theatrical) and Pufendorf's supposedly more real, substantive, or agent-centered deployment of the latter notion. The latter characterization remains somewhat opaque, since Holland does not presume an independent metaphysics but refers only to Pufendorf's classificatory idiom of “moral entities.” That locution lacks thick ontological import and also has relatively little to do with morality (qua “ethics”), being rather a schematic for distinguishing “institutional facts arising from collective intentionality” (12, 93), or a classificatory rubric for organizing social life through practically important distinctions. Holland deems Hobbesian personhood—and similar, conventionalist (or positivist) readings of Pufendorf—as insufficiently real or serious, and thus incapable of elaborating kinds of responsible agency, including the persona function of the state. Yet this seems debatable, as it remains unclear how appeal to a disputable metaphysics (or to “intrinsicist” notions: 91n119) could improve the relative utility of substance metaphors and the accountable role-playing we do in so-called real life.
Chapter 1 describes the faculty psychology of Báñez, Molina, and Suarez, particularly their distinction of intellect and will, and the preservation of human freedom via the notion of divine “mediate [only] knowledge.” Such freedom was asserted against Lutheran and Calvinist notions of sinful “bondage” and employed in the Jesuit casuistry of the confessional. Holland also links casuistry to Renaissance humanism, particularly rhetoric, thereby elucidating its probabilist character and its “liberating” effect on the (always “insufficient”—pace Leibniz) practical use of reason in pursuit of its self-defined ends.
Chapter 2 shows how this scholastic psychology was adopted by some Lutheran writers, especially against Calvinist opponents, and traces it into Pufendorf's last work (Jus feciale divinum, 1695), which defends Lutheran “imputative … justification” (69) and covenantal (fetial) theology against Calvinist predestination. It is also sketched early on in each of Pufendorf's main works (not only On the Law of Nature and of Nations, 1672), elaborating the preconditions of moral and political responsibility. Holland sides here with what he calls a “theological” (81) interpretation of Pufendorf, to whom he attributes a Stoic-Christian (vs. Roman-law) notion of the person as an individual, free, and rational human being who stands “behind” (87) merely performative roles. This conception supposedly liberates humans from Hobbes's mere fictions and allows for real moral agency. Finally, Holland makes the essential shift on which the whole study rests: the “facultative constitution of the free person” (91) also delineates the “composite moral person of the state”—a moral entity—whose “will” (sovereign, king) and “intellect” (advisory council) operate much as in individual persons. It is important here that in both the individual and the collective instances, a certain use of reason must precede or accompany free agency or sovereign willing. To wit, since reason operates Jesuitically in both cases, in a casuist or probabilist manner (cf. plenior vs. sanior pars, in Pufendorf's discussion of majority decision-making), we can avoid both the Scylla of rational necessitation or sufficient reason and the Charybdis of arbitrary choice.
Next, in a move required by the book, though not in itself, Holland examines the facultative conditions of free and responsible agency within states—not particular polities but the mega-state of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE). This he characterizes as a “composite state or multiple kingdom” (99), comparing its moral personality to that of individual agents and states. Of course, that comparison lands him squarely in the fierce debate over the character of HRE which was both reflected in and exacerbated by Pufendorf's so-called Monzambano (1667). Here Holland takes what seems the unnecessary risk of asserting that Pufendorf thought of HRE (at least in the second edition, finished by the early 1690s) not as a “monstrous” but as a “regular” state (100—contra Monz. VI.9, etc.)! Holland knows that this verbal change was due to current political conditions requiring pacific relations with Austria (against France), but he thinks also that Pufendorf genuinely shifted in his assessment. In any case, this application fuses two meanings of “composite”: the HRE is externally “composed” (constituted) of many sovereign states, and internally or facultatively “composed” by having the imperial will conditioned by the rationality (advice, consent) of the estates. It is this relationship that Holland terms “constitutionalism” (92–95, 107, and passim), also in the sense of checks and balances (i.e., there is some play, or linguistic archeology, in these terms).
Regardless of whether Pufendorf would agree with this analysis, Holland needs it to proceed to chapter 3, which presents several additional contexts or “knowledge complexes” (21) where Pufendorf's ideas about the state played an important eighteenth-century role, and where the rational agency of the moral person of the state (still the HRE) was elaborated in terms of international relations. Here Holland compares Wolff's Bañezian (and Leibnizian) view of international relations culminating in an abstract civitas maxima with Vattel's positive or voluntary law of nations, and with Kant's supposed compromise between these positions. Of course, Kant famously moralized or “ethicized” the notion of “moral” personality, also in states—regarding Pufendorf and Vattel as “sorry comforters” (Perpetual Peace, 1795)—finally settling for (though Holland disputes the interpretation) a regime of “right” based on mutual coercion in a voluntary confederation (as in Pufendorf's notion of regular and irregular state systems—a different sort of “composition” not examined by Holland).
Chapter 4 contains a fascinating and substantially new account of the role Pufendorf's notion of a composite state played in pre-Revolutionary America, where the colonies’ relation to the British crown was explicitly compared to that of individual estates to the HR emperor (with Parliament viewed as simply another, competing estate), and where, besides Adams and Jefferson, various other theorists of revolution referred explicitly to Pufendorf's views. After the Revolution, Pufendorf helped shape Hamilton's and Madison's ideas in the Federalist Papers, albeit more indirectly through thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Reid.
Chapter 5 examines Gierke's influential account of Pufendorf, particularly his criticism of Pufendorf's absolutism—which Holland's analysis contravenes because Gierke supposedly overlooked the composite nature of Pufendorfian sovereignty. Chapter 6 summarizes the tale, but it also adds an elaboration of Quentin Skinner's suggestion that Pufendorf's theory of moral entities be connected to Renaissance philosophy of language. Rorty, Geertz, and Foucault also join the discussion, whose upshot is a reiteration of Hobbes's fictional and Pufendorf's moral notions of the state (the latter not being represented by or absorbed into the sovereign), and their insertion into varying “tropological network[s]” and “overarching system[s] of correspondences and analogies” (219).
The description—in the publisher's blurb—of Pufendorf's as “the single most influential theory of the modern state” is sure to invite challenge or, perhaps, to rankle zealots, but Holland provides plenty of substance on which to whet one's teeth, adding significantly to our understanding of Pufendorf's afterlife. While the background literature on Pufendorf, and the availability of his works, have grown much over the past thirty years, this is one of the first attempts to incorporate those gains into a rereading of the political tradition or canon, thereby rearranging some of the furniture in previous, especially Anglo-American accounts. For this reason alone it is to be welcomed, and imitated.
