1. Introduction
Kant and Kierkegaard are two philosophers who are not usually bracketed together. Yet, for one commentator, Ronald Green, in his book Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt Footnote 1, a deep similarity between them is seen in the centrality both accord to the notion of freedom. Kierkegaard, for example, in one of his Journal entries, expresses a ‘passion’ for human freedom.Footnote 2 Freedom is for Kierkegaard also linked to a paradox that lies at the heart of thought. In Philosophical Fragment Kierkegaard writes about the ‘paradox of thought’: ‘the paradox is the passion of thought […] the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without the passion.’Footnote 3
I will argue in this paper that whereas Kant cannot offer an account of the origin of freedom, Kierkegaard can. Indeed, I will suggest both that Kierkegaard can offer a more phenomenologically persuasive account of freedom than that of Kant but also a picture that circumvents some of the difficulties there are in Kant's view. This is precisely, I will suggest, because Kierkegaard, unlike Kant, views the self as embodied and also as being part of a pre-existing natural world. The form that this embodiment takes, moreover, is akin to a phenomenological ‘lived’ body.
Green writes that for Kant ‘to say that we are rationally free to choose immorality does not explain why we should choose to do so, but it is just Kant's point that there can be no explaining this choice’.Footnote 4 He suggests that, for Kierkegaard, as well as Kant, ‘sin is inexplicable’. Kierkegaard, according to Green ‘insists that we cannot ‘explain’ actions based on freedom since they are neither logically nor causally necessary'Footnote 5. This seems to me, however, to be the precise point at which Kierkegaard disagrees with Kant. Firstly, Kierkegaard writes ‘to want to give a logical explanation of the coming of sin into the world is a stupidity that can only occur to people who are comically worried about finding an explanation’.Footnote 6 Kierkegaard does indeed agree with Kant that there can be no speculative comprehension – at least in the Kantian sense – of ‘this Christian problem’.Footnote 7 But, this does not mean that sin is inexplicable altogether for Kierkegaard.
I will suggest, in this paper, that there is a link between the difficulty Kant has explaining the origin of freedom Kant and the well-known problem there is in his thought, of showing how it is possible freely to do wrong. Secondly, I will argue that Kierkegaard's account can avoid the difficulties encountered by Kant. I will suggest, as noted above, that it can do this precisely because it is phenomenologically a more persuasive view than that of Kant and also because it is grounded in the natural world. There are, therefore, two distinct claims about nature in the paper. One sense of the natural is a speculative claim that I derive from Kierkegaard, to the effect that the natural world exists ‘outside’ the realm that is accessible to human cognition. The second is a naturalism that focuses on the ‘lived’ body.
I am predominantly concerned, in the paper, with acts of wrongdoing. I believe, although I recognise that this view is contested, that there is a spectrum from extreme cases of evil, to less harrowing cases. What is important for my argument, however, is not whether or not there is a distinction in kind between evil and more banal wrongdoing, but rather the possibility of holding someone responsible, for wrongdoing. I also believe that Haufniensis, the pseudonymous author of The Concept of Anxiety (CA) although he uses the word ‘sin’ and although he is clearly concerned with the Biblical notion, he is also interested in wrongdoing per se.
2. Kant and Free Will
Green notes that the Kierkegaard or Haufniensis of CA was steeped in Kant and particularly in a reading of Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason Alone. In this section, I will outline, and discuss, two readings of the relation between the free will and the moral law in Kant's thought. I will also, in this section of the paper, suggest that one reason why Kant experiences the difficulties he does, is because he has, for reasons to do with his Newtonianism, a limited conception of the natural world and of human nature. This limited view of nature – both human and non-human – makes it difficult for him to explain the origin of freedom and gives him an overly rational and formal view of human interaction.
It is no doubt the case that there are a number of ways of reading Kant's notion of freedomFootnote 8 and it is also true that many contemporary commentators argue that we can read him as a compatibilist about freedom and determinism.Footnote 9 But Kant himself clearly wanted to defend an incompatibilist and libertarian account of freedom. He believed that genuine freedom required no less than this. The incompatibilist account is his notion of ‘transcendental’ freedom. Kierkegaard follows Kant in this regard. Both believed, in other words, that the source of free norms must be outside the phenomenal world – for Kant the determinist world of Newtonian physics and for Kierkegaard the finite limited world of human interaction.
In the Critique of Practical Reason and in the Groundwork, Kant notes a link between freedom and the moral law. ‘The moral law’ he wrote ‘is a law of causality through freedom’.Footnote 10 The first reading I would like to mention of the relation between the free will and the moral law makes it out to be very strong indeed. A contemporary of Kant, Carl Schmid, suggests that, at least sometimes, Kant made the connection between these two so strong that he effectively became an ‘intelligible fatalist’.Footnote 11 The moral law causally determines the free will.Footnote 12 Kant's references to the ‘holy will’ suggest this reading. He intends the notion of the ‘holy will’ to be a description of the finite rational will insofar as it operates intelligibly. The self, therefore, viewed as intelligible agent, must be seen as perfectly moral. A serious consequence of this interpretation of Kant, however, is that immoral agents fail to be free. Recognising that this left him with the difficulty of explaining the freedom to do wrong, in his late work Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason Alone Kant concerns himself with the problem of freely doing wrong and he discusses the origin of evil.Footnote 13
It is important to note that the active purposive element, for Kant, in relation to this first interpretation of the relation between freedom and the moral law, is not nature but the moral law. Kant both believed that there are purposes in nature, at least nature as viewed by finite rational beings, and he was also convinced that purposes must be unscientific.Footnote 14 It was his strong conviction that the purposiveness of, for example, a blade of grass – the capacity of the grass to grow – could not be incorporated into the proper scientific Newtonian and mechanical notion of causation. Purposes can neither be specularised – made visible to the eye – nor can they be mechanically configured. Purposes cannot be seen. Yet Kant does not see this type of problem emerge with the idea that the moral law becomes an active causal force. This seems intuitively odd, since it is difficult to conceptualise a logical form – the moral law – as having powers or capacities. Even if there is a relation of entailment between the moral law and the free will, at least one of these must shape the self that acts. We cannot ‘see’ causal powers in nature and this vexes Kant but nor can we ‘see’ the operation of the will and this does not seem to concern him.
It is important to mention, although I do not have the space to discuss it here, that there is an alternative account, developed partly in Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason Alone Footnote 15, to the above ‘rational fatalist’ reading of all free actions. This is that some free actions, those that are wrong or evil, are freely undertaken but grounded in some other force – outside time and space – than the moral law .Footnote 16
But I would like now to discuss a third interpretation of the relation between freedom and the moral law. I choose to focus at slightly greater length on this reading since it is the one that is often adopted in the contemporary literature. According to this interpretation, as one commentator, Michalson, has put it, Kant hypothesises an inner self, a ‘disposition’ that ‘chooses’ on certain occasions, to subordinate, within a maxim, the moral law to some sensuous inclination.Footnote 17 So the account of freely doing wrong, then, involves this ‘disposition’ to choose a maxim; sometimes the will may choose a maxim that conflicts with the moral law.
In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant gives a number of possible readings, compatible with this interpretation, of what happens when a person does wrong. For example, he writes: ‘The ground of evil cannot lie in any object determining the power of choice through inclination, not in any natural impulses but only in a rule that the power of choice itself produces for the exercise of its freedom i.e. in a maxim’.Footnote 18
But what is this ‘rule’? He describes some ‘natural predispositions’ which can lead to good. But also there are predispositions to ‘merely mechanical self love’; dispositions to self- preservation; there is the desire for propagation and there is a ‘social drive’. Sometimes, moreover, Kant writes that the individual may be ‘frail’ in so far as he or she only indecisively incorporates the moral maxim. On yet other occasions, individuals place self- love above the moral law. On these various readings then, for Kant, desires would overpower the rational will.
There are a number of difficulties that have been pointed out, however, pertaining to this notion of a ‘disposition’ or Gesinnung. One is, as Michalson points out, ‘Kant is able to salvage a theory of freedom only by sealing it off from temporality’Footnote 19 and the free will is a ‘purely intelligible faculty not subject to the form of time, nor consequently to the condition of succession in time’.Footnote 20 Where, then, does the ‘disposition’ sit? Is it outside time as well or is it partly in time and partly outside? If it is outside time, how then can Kant make sense of moral change – moral conversion or simply a change of heart that occurs in sequential terms? In these circumstances, as Kant is aware ‘he could become a new man only by a kind of re-birth’.Footnote 21 Lewis White Beck has noted that if the soul, the rational self, is not subject to temporal conditions then it is difficult for us to make sense of the notion of endless progress.Footnote 22 There is also the point that the notion may commit Kant to two selves too many. The ‘disposition’ becomes a kind of third element which is neither phenomenal nor noumenal. There may then be three selves: the psychological phenomenal self, the noumenal ‘dispositional’ self, and thirdly the subject's choice of ‘disposition’ or ‘Gesinnung’. Alternatively, this ‘third self’ may be problematic in a different way. It may be a ‘blind spot’ that links the noumenal and the phenomenal.Footnote 23
It might be suggested that one can discuss Kant's notion of freedom whilst setting aside what seems to be an implausible metaphysic. Allen Wood, for example, notes that Kant distinguishes ‘metaphysical’ from ‘practical’ freedom. A ‘transcendentally free’ cause is a first cause, one that can be effective independently of any prior cause. Practical freedom, on the other hand, is the kind of freedom we attribute to ourselves as agents.Footnote 24 He suggests a ‘reconstruction’ of Kant that focuses on ‘practical’ freedom.Footnote 25 It is important to point out that whilst this account is clearly there in Kant's writings, one cannot easily remove altogether the metaphysical notion without denying a crucial component of Kant's theory of freedom – its libertarian aspect. In a Kantian framework, the only way one can hypothesise a genuinely free form of causation is by supposing that there is some other kind of self from the phenomenal one that operates according to some different and mysterious notion of causation.Footnote 26
Leaving this aside, Wood suggests that freedom is the capacity to act according to rational norms. He claims that, in acting freely, the agent is acting from a special kind of causality. A will acts not only according to laws but also ‘according to their representation’.Footnote 27 The law of a free cause must be one ‘it represents to itself’. The free self, on this reading, is a ‘disposition’ to choose some law or other and it might choose the moral law or something else. The law is one under which it considers its actions from a practical standpoint. Wood draws the analogy of a chess player: she moves the bishop in accordance with the rules of chess. The explanation of the action will be in terms of the agent's intentions. Freedom, on this view, would not be either causally – in some sense of cause – or descriptively related to the will; rather freedom would be some notion that may be inexplicable but that involves the ability to choose either to subordinate the moral law to something else or to follow the moral law. The rules of morality, then, operate rather like the rules of chess but they are rules that we must presuppose, like the rules of logic, in order to act rationally. Wood suggests, and O'NeillFootnote 28 makes a similar point, that we must presuppose freedom in representing ourselves as competent to decide between compatibilism and incompatibilism.
But there seem to me to be parallel difficulties with this revised notion. Take Wood's chess player analogy: the freedom to do wrong could be viewed, by analogy, either as failing properly to move one's bishop or as failing to play at all. It is difficult, though, to regard either of these actions as truly free in the sense in which the chess player who plays the bishop according to the rules is acting freely. When a chess player fails to move the bishop properly, the player is trying to move it correctly but failing. But it would involve some contorted thinking to describe Hitler's actions, for example, as involving him trying hard to follow the moral law but failing.Footnote 29 In fact, wrong doing, on the chess player analogy, would be simply failing to act properly within the rules of the game or failing to fall within the domain of chess – morality – at all, and so the action would not be imputable. Moreover, the explanation offered by several commentators seems to leave Kant open to the charge that he is using a sleight of hand, both suggesting that actions governed by sensuous inclination are fully determined, but also arguing that the will can choose to subordinate the moral law to sensuous inclination. To offer an analogy: if I simply smoke a cigarette I am acting from inclination but if I reflect on this and decide to subordinate the maxim that considers the consequences of smoking to my desire, then my action is free. To use Frankfurt's notion of first and second order desires: I might carefully consider the second order desire, but still act on my first order desire.Footnote 30 The difficulty though is that the two actions are the same. Kant sometimes speaks against himself, of freely taking sensuous motives as determinant of one's action. Moreover, and finally on this, Wood – and O'Neill – both make the point that we must presuppose our own freedom in representing ourselves as rational beings. But the fact that we must presuppose our freedom does not show that we are free.
Although there could be other ways in which Kant might show how the freedom to do wrong is compatible with his view of freedom, it is difficult for him to do so, given his view of nature and of human nature. Kant's view of nature is limited by his Newtonianism. For the latter, a position that Kant took up in his early writings as well as in the later, the quantity of matter remains always the same and every change has an external cause. For Newton as well as for Kant, nature is a determined system: a system consisting in a collection of substantial things, externally related to one another, through mechanical causation. For Kant, the categories shape the nature of matter as the sum of appearances. Kant's view of natural science has it deal with substantial bodies dependent upon external forces for change. Yet Newton himself found it difficult, within his framework, to account for the force of gravity.Footnote 31
Kant's view of mechanical nature shapes his perspective on the free self as a radically different kind of thing. The self, then, becomes a divided entity. It is divided between a phenomenal, desiring, natural thing determined by Newtonian causal principles and a rational and free being, shaped by the moral law. In his third Critique, Kant does consider some aspects of the natural world in a teleological fashion. For him, now, ‘man’ becomes the ultimate purpose in the world. ‘Man’ is a natural purpose although it is only that we judge reflectively that he is purposive. To judge that something is purposive is to make a ‘reflective judgment’.Footnote 32 Judgements of purposiveness don't constitute any objects. Kant writes:
Man is the only being on earth that has understanding and hence an ability to set himself limited purposes of his own choice, and in this respect he holds himself lord of nature; and if we regard nature as a teleological system then it is man's vocation to be the ultimate purpose of nature, but always subject to a condition; he must have the understanding and the will to give both nature and himself reference to a purpose that can be independent of nature, self sufficient and a final purpose.Footnote 33
Ultimately, then, there is something that transcends the natural and that grounds the actions of free beings. Kant is led partly because of his view of the natural, to see the origin of human evil as ‘inscrutable’ or irrational. I would now like to go on to discuss this.
In Religion, Kant argues that the story, in Scripture, of the origin of the first sin, involves a mistake. It presents as first in time, what ought to be logically first. Evil, in the end, for Kant, is innate. He writes, ‘the rational origin of this perversion of our will remains inscrutable to us’.Footnote 34 Since, apart from maxims, no determining ground can or ought to be adduced, we are led back endlessly in the series of subjective determining grounds, without ever being able to reach the ultimate ground. Our innermost wills are opaque to us.Footnote 35 Knowing myself always to posses the ability to subordinate reason to impulse, this casts a pall over all my future free choices. Kant rejects the following view: ‘The most inept is that which describes it as descending in an inheritance from our first parents.’Footnote 36
The Adam story, according to Kant, is ‘inept’. Why is this? There are at least three reasons:
1. Because the story is set up to take place in time whereas the free will is not in time.
2. Because it does not explain what it purports to explain. It simply presupposes it. If we can resist temptation then the story of Adam is no explanation of why we do wrong.
3. If, on the other hand, evil is exterior to humanity, then seduction is impossible to resist. God therefore punishes us for something that is beyond our control. This would be a classical determinist reading of the origin of evil.
The origin of evil, therefore, cannot be explained. In Scripture, the origin of evil is depicted as having a temporal beginning; this beginning being presented as a narrative, where what is its essence appears as becoming first in time. But, Kant writes, evil does not start from a propensity; rather it begins from a transgression of the moral law. Instead of following the moral law, man – or Adam in the Biblical story – looked about for another incentive. He then made it his maxim to follow the law of duty not as duty but with regard to other aims. He began to call into question the severity of the commandment which excludes the influence of all other incentives. For Kant, therefore, in those of us apart from Adam, sin originates from an innate wickedness in our nature. This notion of the ‘innate’ for him, if it is read in a quasi-logical fashion, simply means a given, something that cannot be explained.
3. Kierkegaard on Freedom and Evil in The Concept of Anxiety
Kant begins, in Enlightenment vein, with the link between freedom and the moral law. For him, freedom is freedom from domination by our passions; it is freedom to act in a way that controls passion. But this leaves him with two difficulties: it is difficult for him to ground evil and it is also difficult for him to show how the self is free when it does wrong. Kierkegaard, by contrast, begins by attempting to account for wrongdoing or evil.Footnote 37 Unlike Kant, he has a picture of the self as fundamentally a natural being like other natural objects. Kierkegaard, unlike Kant, then, I will suggest, can account for the freedom to do wrong partly because he has a view of the self as fundamentally a natural being immersed in a natural world that may pre-exist it. Kierkegaard's self is embodied and he is concerned with human inter-subjective experience.
Kierkegaard writes ‘Ethics begins with the actual’.Footnote 38 Human beings, for Kierkegaard are, by contrast to Kant: ‘a synthesis of the psyche and the body but also a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal […] It is the […] synthesis of the infinite and the finite.Footnote 39 This indeed, is very close to a claim of Schelling's to the effect that: ‘Spirit is therefore neither finite nor infinite […] but rather in it is the original unification of the finite in the infinite’.Footnote 40 Human beings, for Kierkegaard, are natural living beings, but with the capacity both to reflect on their natures and to take up and to be guided by some moral ideal. It is in this sense that they are infinite: they can reflect on the future and they can be guided by an ideal that transcends their finitude. Whereas Kant's moral self strives to be a perfectly rational thing, Kierkegaard's self is, by contrast, a finite, embodied being. This latter self, then, can choose not to take up a moral ideal.
Kierkegaard's self is shaped by inter-subjective experience but also, as I will argue in a moment, by the natural world outside that of inter- subjectivity. Kierkegaard was also critical of all notions of the self as ‘essentially’ thought. He believed, furthermore, that it is never possible to establish the truth of a view in the manner in which Descartes, for example, hoped for.Footnote 41 He wrote of Descartes: ‘if I am to emerge from doubt into freedom, then I must enter in doubt in freedom’.Footnote 42 In other words, for Kierkegaard, freedom cannot arise from thought but rather it must be presupposed in order for thought to be possible.
Although Kierkegaard often refers to the ‘singular individual’ and although he wants to bring the individual back into central focus after what he saw to be its overly derivative position in the work of Hegel and Schelling, he nonetheless did not wish to return to a Kantian view of the self as primarily a mind. Either/Or, for example, begins with the fact of birth, suggesting that the embodied finite natural being is of crucial significance for Kierkegaard.Footnote 43 In CA, Kierkegaard writes: ‘for ethics, the possibility of sin never occurs’ and ‘ethics and dogmatics became radically confused’.Footnote 44 There is no doubt that he has in mind here a critique of the Hegelian view that there are logical contradictions in reality. He is also sceptical of the view that the Hegelian Sittlichkeit expresses the norms of a particular society. This latter view attaches insufficient weight to the individual who has the capacity to choose his or her norms. But Kierkegaard is also concerned, throughout his works, although he is no doubt hugely influenced by Kant, to chastise Kantian ethics. He is, furthermore, sceptical about at least one of the Kantian notions of the self, for example in the following formulation from The Sickness unto Death (SUD): ‘the autonomous self is like a king without a country, actually ruling over nothing.’Footnote 45 Indeed, such a self is analogous to a fully determined self in so far as both are in despair. Perhaps he has in mind here not only the noumenal purely rational Kantian self, but also the self as ‘disposition’ as neither phenomenal nor noumenal. The wording from SUD of the self ‘striving to be itself’Footnote 46 suggests that it might be the latter Kierkegaard has in mind. Both Kantian notions deny the natural finitude of the self and its immersion in natural processes.
Kierkegaard, or Haufniensis, writes ‘one can see how illogical the movements must be in logic, since the negative is the evil, and how unethical they must be in ethics’.Footnote 47 He offers a critique of the Socratic notion of ‘sin’, which is at the same time a critique of Kant:
In pure ideality, where the actual individual person is not involved, the transition is necessary – after all, in the system everything takes place of necessity – or there is no difficulty at all connected with the transition from understanding to doing. This is the Greek mind […] And the secret of modern philosophy is essentially the same: cogito ergo sum, to think is to be […] In the world of actuality, however, where the individual person is involved, there is this tiny little transition from having understood to doing […].'Footnote 48
He writes further, ‘one of the symbolical books declares the impossibility of an explanation […] hereditary sin is so profound and detestable that it cannot be comprehended by human understanding’.Footnote 49 And continues, most likely with Kant in mind: ‘[T]his feeling assumes the role of an accuser, who with an almost feminine passion and with the fanaticism of a girl in love is now concerned only with making sinfulness and his own participation in it more and more detestable.’Footnote 50
There are two points Kierkegaard is making, then, in response to Kant. Firstly, the free will cannot be outside time because it would be unable to operate if it were so placed. If Adam is read as being wholly outside history then the story of course cannot explain what it purports to explain. It will have no connection with us limited natural finite beings. But secondly, although Kierkegaard accepts Kant's point that the notion of freedom of the will cannot be explained in either logical or mechanical causal terms, he would not accept the conclusion, that this means that it cannot be explained at all. Kant's difficulty in explaining the notion stems ultimately from his radical separation of the free will from the finite natural phenomenal being. It stems furthermore, I believe, in Kierkegaard's view, from Kant's restriction of nature to that which can be accessed by human phenomenal experience. Nature, for Kierkegaard, then, must be understood in two ways: firstly as human nature – natural inter-subjective embodied experience. But there is also a second sense of the notion, which I will move in a moment to describe.
Zupančič makes the point that Kant needs an infinitely existing body to be able to explain moral conversion and she refers to de Sade. But Kierkegaard suggestively implies that the two notions – an imaginary infinitely existing body and a perfectly rational will – stem from the same problematic assumptions: that the will and the body are radically separate. In Either/Or he describes Don Juan and the Kantian rational self as each embodying a form of determinism.Footnote 51 The Kantian self is shaped and determined by its autonomy and Don Juan by being pure body; pure sensuality. Freedom is, for Kant, separation of the autonomous free self from the pathological; from embodied desire, that is, from the phenomenal.
Adam is supposed, according to the Christian tradition and Kant also reads the story this way, to be the reason why everyone else does wrong. He brought sin into the world. However Kierkegaard writes that if we try to explain the story in the terms that speculative reason accepts ‘every attempt to explain Adam's significance for the race confuses everything’.Footnote 52
Kierkegaard asks: ‘Is the concept of hereditary sin identical with the concept of the first sin, Adam's sin, the fall of man?’Footnote 53 On this reading, the existence of Adam doesn't explain anything. If Adam is inside the history of finite limited beings, then his sin is just like the sin of everyone else. If, on the other hand, he is placed wholly outside history, then he has no relation to everyone else's sin precisely because he is placed outside this world. Adam's sin does not explain the sin of others if his sin is seen either as a first cause in a series of mechanical causes or as a certain kind of rational explanation for sin. However, Adam's sin explains the sin of others in a different way. In a criticism that is probably directed at Hegel but also at Kant, he writes: ‘Let mathematicians and astronomers save themselves if they can with infinitely disappearing minute magnitudes, but in life itself it does not help a man obtain his examination papers and much less explain spirit’.Footnote 54
Kierkegaard writes that the difficulty for the understanding is precisely this ‘that sin presupposes itself’.Footnote 55 Instead, Kierkegaard writes ‘by the first sin, sinfulness came into Adam’ Footnote 56; the position is the same, indeed, for every other human being. The concepts with which Kantian speculative reason deals belong in logic whilst the notion of sin lies in ethics. Innocence is a natural state of the natural being that may continue in existence. Innocence is ignorance. One can, according to Kierkegaard, no more give a psychological explanation of the fall than one can give a logical or a mechanical causal explanation. But one can offer another kind of causal account.
Kierkegaard's account, I believe, can be reconstructed to run as follows: in the biblical story, Adam, as a natural being, in a world of similarly constituted natural beings, existed. Adam, in other words, was part of a natural world that pre-existed the domain of the free and thinking being. Adam, at that point, was neither free nor not free. Adam had no awareness of the possibility of choice. Eve – in some way a derived person – came into being later. She, via the serpent, seduced Adam. At that point, Adam became aware, through sensuality, of good and evil. By the first sin, sinfulness, or the capacity to reflect on our passions and desires and to enact some and not others – in other words freedom – came into Adam. Adam may have existed alongside other natural objects with their powers and capacities. These natural objects possessed powers and capacities that were akin to our human conceptual apparatus but they were also different. The natural objects existing alongside Adam were not, in other words, purely inert mechanical things. Importantly, then, freedom ‘came into’ Adam through sexuality. Strictly, of course, it came first into Eve.
In Stages on Life's Way, Kierkegaard, through the mouthpiece now of Johannes the Seducer, speaks of woman. She, he writes, ‘pleases me just as she is’.Footnote 57 Woman is the most seductive thing, for Johannes, and yet he ‘speaks in praise of woman’.Footnote 58 Woman and the erotic, for Johannes, represent finitude and change. Woman is a ‘power weaker than his own and yet stronger’.Footnote 59 Finitude and change, in other words, are preferable to the pretence of autonomy and independence. The Gods, Johannes writes, created woman but they did not let her know how beautiful she was. They created her as an innocent being. She is like a ‘display fruit’. She is inviting and alluring precisely by being elusive. Woman, then, represents the natural, the finite, and the innocent. Yet Johannes does not have a picture of the natural as inert. Woman, for Johannes, represents a lived body that relates to others. But she also represents a lived body, after the emergence of freedom and with the awareness of sexuality, that emerges from a pre-existing nature that is itself living and active. In Stages, Johannes speaks of the Gods creating women. In The Concept of Anxiety, this metaphor is transformed into a natural process. Woman and man, as free beings, free to do right or wrong, evolved out of a purposive nature. Specifically, the awareness of freedom evolved out of a sexual capacity; the sexuality of a woman, of a being that has a body that can give birth.
The ‘sexual’ here resonates with Merleau -Ponty's notion of the ‘flesh’ as the ‘lived’ body. For Kant, the ‘flesh’ would no doubt have been ‘mere’ flesh. But, for Kierkegaard, the sexual or the ‘flesh’ both involves a relation to a human other and also an immersion in the non-human natural world. Merleau-Ponty's notion of the flesh has been criticised by YoungFootnote 60 and IrigarayFootnote 61 partly for failing to recognise sexual difference. Kierkegaard, however, through the mouthpieces of Johannes and Haufniensis, recognises the power of sexuality and birth in his metaphysic.
Adam's anxious capacity to act, then, is brought about through sensuality. Sensuality, for Kierkegaard, is a ‘most abstract’ idea expressed through music.Footnote 62 The sexual contains both spirit and sensuality. The link between the two notions of nature – human nature and the speculative notion, therefore – lies in sexuality. It is through the lived bodily experience of sexuality that freedom comes into being for finite beings like us. Freedom, for Kierkegaard, arises both out of a speculative nature that pre-exists the human and human conceptual capacities but it also stems not from thought but rather from a distinctly embodied human capacity.
For Kant, nature could not function as a causal ground of freedom for two reasons. Firstly, phenomenal nature is set up, as mechanical nature, in opposition to freedom. Secondly, for Kant, nature is co-extensive with the phenomenal experience of rational and finite beings. But, for Kierkegaard, nature can function as the causal ground of freedom for natural beings might both pre-exist, in a temporal sense and exist in a spatial sense outside the domain of limited and finite natural and rational beings. Adam and Eve too, to reiterate, may have been simply part of a pre-existing nature. Adam's existence in this fashion fits with a metaphysic that has nature operating as the ground of human action. An active nature, with powers and capacities, on this account, pre-exists human reflective capacity. Adam, then, on this reading, existed and acted but in blissful innocence of what he was doing. The reading I am offering of the Adam story fits with a Schellingian inspired influence on Kierkegaard. It is consistent with a picture according to which: ‘matter itself becomes, in some manner difficult to conceive, capable of participation in the form of the understanding’.Footnote 63 For Schelling ‘subjectivity arises in nature’.Footnote 64 In Ages of the World, Schelling writes ‘Necessity is before freedom’.Footnote 65 For Schelling, human beings are creatures derived from a pantheistic Absolute, which can be construed as God or Nature. But Schelling's Nature is a living nature; it is an active and dynamic nature; a picture that emphasises forces or powers in the natural world as opposed to inert substances. Kant himself, as noted earlier, outlines such a nature with his account of teleological causation. But, for him, such causes are not really in nature.
In innocence, for Kierkegaard, man is not qualified as spirit. Man is neither a beast nor an angel. He is neither animal nor is he rational. Kierkegaard – or rather the pseudonymous author Haufniensis – outlines how the state of innocence in the Garden of Eden is precisely that. There is no knowledge of good and evil. Adam cannot understand the prohibition. There is peace and repose. But what else is there? Nothing. Nothing has the effect of producing anxiety. Anxiety is ‘freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility’.Footnote 66 Anxiety in other words in a condition of freedom. The two go hand in hand. As a free being, man is both psychical and physical. The psyche and the physical body, then, are not separable.
When Kant writes, as he does in his work Conjectural Beginning of Human History about the origins of freedom, he prioritises, as one would expect, reason. Freedom comes about, according to him, from someone in the Garden seeing two fruits and choosing between fruits. But this version of the story presupposes the very thing it is setting out to explain – freedom – which is, no doubt, why Kant ultimately came to regard the origin of sin as inexplicable. For Kierkegaard, instead, the moment ‘spirit’ enters into Adam it must posit also – since the human is the synthesis of the psychic and the bodily – its antithesis in the sensual, and the most extreme form of the sensuous is the sexual. Adam was beguiled by Eve who was ‘more sensuous’ and therefore more anxious, than him. Without sin there is no sexuality; the moment Adam becomes man, he does so by becoming animal as well. The difference, on my reconstructed account of Kierkegaard, then, is that Adam existed, prior to the realisation of his freedom, as part of a dynamic nature, with its own powers and capacities. The awareness of his freedom evolved in him. Conceptual capacities, and specifically the capacity for freedom, therefore, evolved out of a nature that contained, in some sense, analogous conceptual powers to those Adam came to acquire.
It might be argued, however, in an objection to this account, that on Haufniensis' account as well, the capacity to choose must already have existed in Adam. After all, Adam knew about the prohibition. But the reading I am offering suggests that Adam was not, prior to the eating of the fruit, a fully free being. The prohibition, at that time, functioned as a limit on the extent of his world. A lion in the wild has limits on her world, but she does not have the capacity to choose evil. A fence in a zoo prevents the lion from roaming outside its cage, but this does not give her the freedom required to attribute responsibility for her actions. Adam, as Haufniensis reports, in the Garden, is neither beast nor angel. He is not quite like the lion nor is he a Kantian Holy Will. Importantly, though, and additionally, he is not yet free to make choices.
On a Kantian view, the burden of guilt becomes debilitating. Kant finds difficulty explaining free but wrong actions partly because of his over separation of the rational from the sensuous but also because of his restriction of nature to the phenomenal, mechanical nature experienced by finite and limited beings. He ends up, as we have seen, explaining ‘sin’ as innate in all of us and us constantly tempting us away from the moral law. For Kierkegaard, though, as free and finite rational beings, we are continually both rational and sensuous; we are free to choose to do good, in terms of the love that comes from sensuality but that can be generalised beyond this into the moral domain. Or we are free to choose the bad. For him, freedom is conceived partly as the spontaneous capacity of the natural and rational being but also as the shaping of this being by a norm that stems from an external nature. This external nature transcends the experience of this limited being but it is simultaneously simply part of the natural world. It ‘appears’ to the finite being through ‘revelation’.
The terms of the above explanation are not open to Kant. For him, any explanation will be either rational or mechanical causal or no explanation at all. Green suggests, as we have seen, that sin is inexplicable for both Kant and Kierkegaard. However, Kierkegaard, I am suggesting, has open to him a form of explanation that arises, if you like, from his recognition, that in some way, a human being is a paradox – a synthesis of two opposing notions. But this paradoxical nature of the human being does not suggest nonsense. Rather it suggests that explanations in ethics must take a different form from explanations in logic or in those domains of thinking that are governed by mechanical causation. If there is, as Grant's reading of Schelling implies, a naturalistic explanation of ideas as ‘a physical explanation of idealism’Footnote 67 there may be a natural grounding of the mind and of mental phenomena. This natural grounding cannot be a purely mechanical one, for such a ground would not have the capacity to give rise to human mental abilities. Although the myth of Adam is just this – a myth, it is a myth that provides an explanation for something, the origin of freedom, that otherwise remains inexplicable. My reading of Kierkegaard's explanation, then, fits with a deep form of metaphysical naturalism, which sees mental phenomena being grounded in a powers based and active nature.
The explanation for wrong doing, as well as for good behaviour, lies in the simple fact that human beings are natural beings with passions and desires but they also have the capacity to reflect on these. Freedom is a condition of being human and freedom involves the capacity to act in good or bad ways. It specifically arises, however, out of the awareness of sexuality. Adam and Eve, I am suggesting were embodied sexual beings in the Garden.
Kant sees freedom as arising rationally out of thought's capacities and out of an awareness of ‘the prohibition’. Freedom, according to Kierkegaard, though, is the ‘anxious possibility of being able’ crucially formed through sensuality. It may ultimately be grounded in a Being that, like Schelling's Absolute – or his Ungrund – contains the ground of both good and evil. As Schelling puts it in The Ages of the World, ‘necessity and freedom are in God’.Footnote 68 The ground of both good and evil may be nature, but crucially nature understood as being active and dynamic and as existing outside the limits of possible human experience. Nature, in this sense, cannot be made commensurate with the finite and knowable. There can be no empirical marks of this nature. Lawrence, writing about Schelling, describes the ‘unborn God’ the heart of pure freedom as ‘awakening the craving to be from the abyss of what absolutely is not’Footnote 69. Kierkegaard rewrites this, to my mind, in a phenomenologically more persuasive manner, but also in what is ultimately a more naturalistic vein, in terms of the story of Adam. Adam and Eve were ‘fleshy’ living beings both before the emergence of freedom as well as after this point. The craving ‘to be’ emerged from a capacity in Adam that he was not aware he had.
Kosch quotes Hume on miracles, which as she argued, inspired Kierkegaard, through his reading of Hamman. Hume writes: ‘So that upon the whole we may conclude that the Christian religion was not only at the first attended with miracles, but even to this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity. And whoever it moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person’.Footnote 70 Kierkegaard upholds this ‘miracle’ in our own person. For Kierkegaard, there is a continued miracle in his own person for the self is the ‘synthesis of the infinite the finite’.Footnote 71 But the whole of nature may be miraculous in similar, though not identical, ways. Natural objects are interlinked with one another as well as with human beings. Natural objects, moreover, have powers and capacities, as Kant himself spelt out so carefully in his discussion of teleological causation in relation to a tree, in the third Critique.
Arising out of this reading of Kierkegaard, is a further advantage over the Kantian theory of freedom and wrong doing, and that is the possibility of a form of wrong doing – like for example that of the suicide bomber – that may have nothing to do with the principle of self-interest. This is one respect in which I disagree with Kosch, who has, in some ways, inspired this text. She suggests that ‘sin’ is characterised ‘as selfishness’.Footnote 72 As Lawrence again puts it – on Schelling – ‘the pain and horror of being pushes spirit, already at its deepest and still unconscious levels, beyond the animal quest for feeding appetites’.Footnote 73
Overall, the attempt to provide a complete explanation for ethical notions, in the way that Kant sets out to do, is, Kierkegaard argues, bound to fail. Human beings have agency precisely in so far as they are not perfectly rational – determined by their reason – or determined by their desires. Rather they are a combination of the infinite in the finite.
In this paper I have outlined a couple of readings of the difficulty faced by Kant of explaining how it is possible freely to do wrong. I suggested that this is connected with the problem he has in accounting for the origin of freedom. I then moved to argue that Kant's difficulties stem partly from the limited notion of nature with which he operates. Kierkegaard, by contrast, can both offer and account of the origin of the freedom to do wrong and he has a view of freedom that crucially allows for the freedom to do wrong.
The account I have offered, deriving from my reading of Kierkegaard, rests on a picture of the human being that is, as many phenomenologists have argued, both a rational and an embodied thing – a lived body. But is also rests on a speculative naturalism that postulates a living and active nature existing outside the domain of limited and finite beings. Furthermore, the notion of nature presupposed by this account might be precisely what is required in order to make sense of both natural capacities and human conceptual powers as well.
