The relationship of the Mongols, creators of the largest contiguous empire in human history, and the West is one of the more popular topics in medieval studies, something which is manifest in the ever-growing number of academic publications on the subject. Naturally, the first appearance of the Mongol tümens under the command of Generals Jebe and Sübedei (Sübetei or Sübe'etei Ba'atur) in EuropeFootnote 2 was overshadowed by the subsequent Great Western Campaign of the Mongols (1236–42). Nevertheless, the first Mongol raid to the West was undoubtedly an event of global significance, as is evidenced by numerous reports from various historical sources in practically all the literary languages of sedentary Eurasia at the time—Latin, Greek, Arabic, Persian, Chinese, Russian, Armenian and Georgian.
When speaking about Europe as the ultimate strategic goal of the Mongol conquests in the West, something which was most likely first formulated in the early 1220s,Footnote 3 we do not know in what geopolitical terms this goal was phrased by Chinggis Khan (Genghis Khan, Chingiz Khan). The study of this important issue requires special research, going far beyond the scope of this paper. It is clear that the Mongols were primarily interested in the rich pastures of the plains of Eastern and Central Europe. They could have perceived these plains as a continuation of the Great Steppe that was for the most part already conquered by them.
The specific goals of the Mongols in the West can only be determined on the basis of later information. After the conquest, the Steppes of the Northern Black Sea Region and Alföld were probably supposed to come under the direct control of the Mongols. At the same time, the ultimatum letters from the Mongol rulers of the mid-thirteenth century to the German emperor Frederick II, the Hungarian and French kings, as well as Pope Innocent IV, known to us from the original documents or the reports of contemporaries, show that the conquerors conceptualised the West as part of the global empire that they were creating. Confident in their special mission to conquer the whole world, the Mongol emperors demanded voluntary submission from the most important secular and ecclesiastical rulers of the West, assigning to them an appropriate place in the structure of the new empire. As a rule, anyone who agreed to become a vassal of the Mongol emperor retained the power over their subjects upon condition of providing regular payment of tribute and fulfilling other duties and obligations.
In this article I argue that, contrary to popular belief, the raid of Jebe and Sübedei to the West was not merely a scouting mission necessary for the success of the future invasion. Having started as a manhunt to capture Muḥammad II Khwārazmshāh, this raid later—after news was received about the fugitive ruler's death—developed into a full-scale campaign of conquest. Each new victory boosted the confidence of the two most talented Mongol generals. Success in the clashes with the Georgian/Armenian troops gave rise to a daring plan of an aggressive campaign against the Alans, and then the Cumans, while the interference of Rus’ princes eventually extended the path of conquest up to Kiev.
At first glance, the campaign of Jebe and Sübedei looks like a spontaneous action provoked by the weakness of the Mongols’ opponents. However, we should not be misled by these initial impressions. Before long, the campaign had been completely reformatted and received a new, clearly prepared plan. Developed by Sübedei and approved by Chinggis Khan, this involved Prince Jochi, who was to become the operation's commander-in-chief and lead his own main forces to the West. The anticipated participation of Chinggis Khan's oldest son and heir was meant to transform the campaign into the largest Chinggisid-directed military event at the time, comparable in its scale to the later Great Western Campaign.
It is doubtful that during the first stage of their offensive against the West the plans of the Mongols went much further than conquering the steppe regions between the Volga and the Dnieper, belonging to the Cumans. Ostensibly, the Dnieper was for a certain time intended to become a new border of the Mongol Empire which would eventually expand into the West. In order to ensure their control over the river, the Mongols had to seize the main strongholds along it—cities, fortresses and crossings—with Kiev being the most important of those sites.
Aware of the long-standing hostility between the Rus’ and the Cumans, the leaders of the Mongols, initially through ambassadors, tried to undermine their new alliance by demonstrating peaceful intentions towards the Rus’ people. However, after their landmark victory in the Battle on the Kalka River, the conquerors came to believe in their exceptional strength and luck. Seeing the huge losses of the Rus’ and having killed the prince of Kiev along with other captive princes, the Mongols tried to seize Kiev in a surprise attack without waiting for the arrival of the main army led by Jochi. Due to a combination of the circumstances discussed below, Jochi did not fulfil his role in the campaign to the West, which ultimately led to its failure.
The Great Raid
The victorious raid of the two commanders Jebe and Sübedei in 1221–23, important in the history of the Mongol Empire and its conquests, is impressive to modern readers first of all due to its wide scale. Edward Gibbon called it an expedition “which had never been attempted and has never been repeated”.Footnote 4 In modern works, this expedition has been described as the “Great Raid” and is quite reasonably considered as one of the most successful military campaigns of the Middle Ages or even the whole of human history.Footnote 5 According to George Lane,
This epic cavalry mission of noyans Jebe and Sübedei is perhaps the greatest military reconnaissance trip of all time. It included not only intelligence gathering but conquest, massacres, and widespread pillaging in all the lands neighbouring the Caspian Sea and beyond. In Iran and the Caucasus, the terror unleashed by those two generals ensured fear-filled obedience for decades to come. Jebe and Sübedei's expedition of pursuit, terror, and reconnaissance represents the Mongols at their destructive peak, and thereafter their armies became, for those who fell under the shadow of their approach, both the invincible wrath of God and the emissaries of the biblical Gog and Magog [Revelations 20]. The Mongols wore their notoriety like a khil'at, a traditional brocade robe of honour.Footnote 6
The spectacular success of the Mongol expeditionary corps, which could be considered relatively modest in terms of their numbers and combat equipment, made a very strong impression on contemporaries and still makes one on later historians. Juvainī, an official in the court of the Mongol viceroy of southwest Asia, Arghun AqaFootnote 7, was partial to the Mongols and praised this achievement, seeing it as a manifestation of the will of the Almighty:
From the telling of this tale their might and prowess become manifest, nay the power of ‘And He is the Supreme over His servants’ [Koran, vi, 18] is verified and confirmed; for that from an army there should go forth a detachment and smite so many kingdoms and kings and sultans, having on all sides such foes and adversaries as no created being might resist or oppose.Footnote 8
Stunned by the incredible success of the offensive undertaken by the “westward Tatars”, the Arab historian and diplomat in the service of the Baghdad caliphs, Ibn al-AthīrFootnote 9, while hostile to the Mongols, expressed his doubts that the future generations would be able to believe his record of Jebe and Sübedei's victories since such a military feat was “unheard of in ancient or modern times”.Footnote 10 Al-Nasawī, the secretary and biographer of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn, the heir to Muḥammad II KhwārazmshāhFootnote 11, and a sworn enemy of the Mongols, wrote about Jebe and Sübedei's raid with terror and at the same time with vehement enthusiasm:
[People] witnessed such disasters that had not been heard of in the old centuries, during the time of the states that are now gone […] As soon as [the Mongol horde] entered upon any land, it plundered, and after seizing a city, destroyed it. Then, after such a round trip, it returned to its ruler through Khwārazm, unscathed and laden with spoils of war, having destroyed the country's arable land and its livestock crop and oppressing its population with the edge of their swords. And all this in less than two years!Footnote 12
It seems that the contemporaries were amazed not only at the swiftness and tactical ingenuity of the Mongols, but also at their unbridled cruelty and the unprecedented bloodiness of the battles won by them. According to a Franciscan monk calling himself C. de Bridia, combatants in the Jebe–Sübedei raid described that during the decisive battle of the Mongols against the joint forces of the Rus’ and the KipchakFootnote 13 at the Kalka River (31 May 1223) “blood ran on both sides up to the horses’ bridles, according to those who took part in this war”.Footnote 14
Incredible numbers of victims had been attributed to the Mongols by contemporary observers from their very first appearance in Europe. A large role in that was undoubtedly played by the stereotypes of medieval European historiography, reproducing old stories about nomadic armies and their unprecedented cruelty which had originated already by the time of the Hunnic invasion. The Mongols, however, seemed to have far surpassed their predecessors since they waged a type of war totally unfamiliar to the West which was terrifying in its consequences; that is, a war to destroy completely any enemy who dared to resist. Richard of San Germano, a notary of Emperor Frederick II, citing information from the Hungarian king, reported that the Mongols, whom he called the warriors of King David, killed 200,000 of the Rus’ and Plavts (Polovtsy) in one day.Footnote 15 Henry of Latvia, a German chronicler from Riga, who made his record just a few years after the Battle on the Kalka River, also registered the colossal losses of the Rus’ forces: about 50 kings and over 100,000 troops were killed in this unprecedented massacre.Footnote 16 The chronicler, shocked by the disaster that had befallen the Rus’, wrote that 10,000 Kievans alone were killed on the Kalka.Footnote 17
However, what constantly attracts attention to the Jebe and Sübedei campaign is its grandiose scale, as well as the energy and skill of the commanders. Assessing Sübedei's strategic talent, which reached its full potential during the Western raid undertaken together with and, apparently, under the leadership of the more experienced Jebe (although all the achievements of this expedition are often attributed to Sübedei alone), one researcher recently stated:
The feat he [Sübedei] accomplished in doing so is unparalleled in the annals of war. He overcame 13 states or tribes, fought 13 battles, and covered a distance of more than 13,000 km. He commanded forces of about 10,000 men and was confronted by enemy forces that in total outnumbered his own many times over.Footnote 18
After setting off on Chinggis Khan's orders to pursue Muḥammad II Khwārazmshāh and successfully fulfilling that order, Jebe and Sübedei continued to move to the north and northwest, leaving the main Mongol forces far behind. According to the Biography of Sübedei, included in the official history of the Yuan Dynasty (Yuán Shǐ)Footnote 19 (Chapter 121), it was the latter commander who proposed to continue the expedition, requesting and obtaining the permission to conquer the Kipchak from Chinggis Khan himself.Footnote 20 This initiative was fully consistent with the strategic plans of Chinggis Khan. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, the Hülegüids’ court historian and minister,Footnote 21 when sending Jebe and Sübedei in pursuit of Khwārazmshāh, Chinggis Khan ordered the invasion of the Kipchak steppe,Footnote 22 possibly thinking that the trail of the fugitive could lead them there. Whatever the case might have been, Jebe and Sübedei were ordered to conquer as much land as they could over several years.Footnote 23
Jebe and Sübedei's raid, which started as the pursuit of Khwārazmshāh (May 1220), turned into a large-scale military campaign, which at its final stage (end of 1221–3) brought the Mongol tümens to Europe for the first time. This first appearance of the Mongols in the West is usually regarded as a prelude to the campaign of conquest in Eastern and Central Europe undertaken a decade and a half later by the Mongol armies under overall command of Batu. It could be noted that the Western campaign of Jebe and Sübedei entered historical records with this ambiguous status which diminishes its significance; its goals were never clear. In what form was this campaign planned by Chinggis Khan and his generals, and to what extent were their plans implemented? These intriguing questions remain unanswered.
This article focuses mainly on the final stage of the described campaign, involving the implementation of Sübedei's aforementioned plan. The details of this plan can only be inferred from scarce, fragmentary or indirect data, though an analysis of the preparations, the development and the results of the campaign recorded in various sources which sometimes contradict each other help to shed light on it. The scope of relevant sources is limited, however, and their interpretation requires significant intellectual efforts in terms of overcoming linguistic and cultural barriers. New academic translations of medieval sources into modern languages do not completely solve these problems. Most of the sources now available are not historical documents in the currently understood sense. They are medieval literary works of various genres, and their authors did not have the aim of providing the present-day researcher with reliable information. Sometimes authors used fictional names and imagined facts, unaware of their errors; they were influenced by their political, dynastic and religious affiliations. Their heroes acted in accordance with the attitudes typical for their social and cultural environment; their plans and actions do not always make sense from our modern perspective.
The task of the researcher lies in overcoming these contradictions and reconstructing historical reality in such a way that it might correlate with its modern pragmatic understanding. This implies, for instance, the establishment of rational cause-and-effect relations between historical facts and events. The primary interest here will be the goals of the Mongol campaign in Eastern Europe and their correspondence to the actual results of the campaign. Hence, the article proceeds from the premise that only after identifying the goals of the campaign can it be possible to understand and evaluate its results and ultimately offer an improved interpretation of the campaign as a whole.
Reconnaissance or Conquest?
Previous research has offered different opinions on the issue in question. Discussing only the well-reasoned among them, Bertold Spuler believed that Chinggis Khan ordered Jebe and Sübedei to punish the Kipchak for supporting Khwārazmshāh. At the same time, their raid served another purpose—to consolidate the Mongol conquests in the Caucasus.Footnote 24 According to Ilya P. Petrushevsky, the raid of Jebe and Sübedei was part of Chinggis Khan's overall conquest strategy; the subjugation of Central Asia “was to be just the initial stage in the conquest of all of Western Asia and Eastern Europe”. The actions of the Mongolian advance corps “can be seen as preparation for a long-lasting conquest of the mentioned territories in the coming years”. In the absence of such a plan, this historian continues, Jebe and Sübedei's raid would have been meaningless. Besides, Chinggis Khan assigned the lands west of the Irtysh, the Aral Sea and the Amu Darya that had not yet been conquered as an ulus (appanage) to his eldest son Jochi and his descendants.Footnote 25
In more recent academic works, however, the prevailing view on the campaign of Jebe and Sübedei in Europe is that it was a reconnaissance trip or raid that had no other goals but gathering intelligence information necessary for planning a large-scale conquest in the future. This view in Western academic literature seems to have been first expressed by René Grousset and George Vernadsky.Footnote 26 But even a hundred years before this, the Russian orientalist Ilya N. Berezin already maintained that Sübedei's expedition, “despite the vast space travelled and the feats of bravery, was not much more than a reconnaissance trip”.Footnote 27 Today, a similar view is to some extent shared by most Western and Russian researchers.
The lack of agreement among the views of modern researchers is easy to explain since the true goals and plans of the Mongols were a well-kept secret, and any disclosure of them was severely punished. Therefore, even their contemporaries, vigilantly observing the military actions of the Mongols, were puzzled as to the reasons and goals of the fast and somewhat unexpected raid of the Mongols to the North Caucasus and the Sea of Azov, which did not seem to fit into their overall conquering strategy of the 1220s. For the same reason, the withdrawal of the Mongols from Hungary in 1242 still remains a mystery for researchers today. The intentional silence of Mongol leaders is very likely the reason behind many ongoing historical mysteries.
The invasion by the tümens of Jebe and Sübedei into the steppes of Eastern Europe was sometimes understood as the final episode in the Mongol conquest of the Khwārazmshāh Empire. As al-Nasawī wrote,
Kipchak tribes were connected with the house of Khwārazm Shāhs by friendship and love, as both in the old days and now they have only had children born to mothers proposed as wives and introduced to this house from [the house of] the Kipchak lords. Therefore, Chinggis Khan and his sons did everything they could to totally destroy the Kipchaks, as they were the backbone of the Khwārazm Shāhs’ force, the root of their glory and the basis for the numerousness of their troops.Footnote 28
Today most researchers believe that the military expedition led by Jebe and Sübedei was, first and foremost, of a scouting nature.Footnote 29 Their mobile corps was also supposedly tasked to destroy the remaining Kipchak/Polovtsy groups and then return back to Central Asia; fighting against the Rus’ princes or pursuing any large-scale military operations in the steppes between the Dnieper and the Volga was not part of Mongol plans at that time.Footnote 30
An attempt has been made recently to re-examine this version of the goals of Jebe and Sübedei's campaign. Stephen Pow cites several sources showing that the campaign's goal was not only to scout but also to conquer new territories. Evidence includes the biographies of Sübedei in the Yuán Shǐ which state that he subjugated the Kipchak during the campaign. In Rashīd al-Dīn's work too, we read that Sübedei and Jebe asked for permission to conquer as many countries as possible before returning. In the Secret History of Mongols, the westward expedition is mentioned within a series of campaigns of conquest ordered by Chinggis Khan. Juvainī's account of the events at Nīshāpūr—which took place at the first stage of the campaign, a year and a half before Jebe and Sübedei's corps crossed the Caucasus Mountain Range and invaded the Cumans’ steppes—makes the scouting theory even more doubtful: Jebe is documented explaining to the citizens their new role within the Mongol administration and handing over official documents that signified their submission to Chinggis Khan.Footnote 31
Contradictions in the sources
In contrast, the sources related to the pro-Mongolian tradition of history writing provide better reasons to believe that Chinggis Khan had large-scale plans for conquering the West. According to the Secret History of the Mongols, a Mongolian epic chronicle of the thirteenth century, after Transoxiana was conquered, the Great Khan ordered his most talented general to continue the campaign in the West as far as Kiev: “Further, he sent Sübe'etei Ba'atur northwards to campaign as far as the countries and peoples of these eleven tribes: Qanglin (Qangli or Kangars/Kankalis), Kibča'ut (Kipchak), Bajigit (Bashkirs), Orusut (Rus’), Majarat (Magyars), Asut (Alans), Sasut (Saxons of Transylvania), Serkesüt (Circassians), Kešimir (Kašmír (?)), Bolar (Volga Bulgars) and Kerel (Hungarians); and, making him cross the rivers Idil (Volga) and Jayaq (Ural) rich in waters, he sent Sübe'etei Ba'atur to campaign as far as the city of Kiwa Menkermen (Kiev)”.Footnote 32 This report is almost word-for-word repeated in the description of the Mongols’ Great Western Campaign:
Earlier on, Sübe'etei Ba'atur, campaigning against Meket (Magas is the capital of Alans), Menkermen Kevibe and other cities, had crossed the rivers Adil and Jayaq rich in waters, and had reached as far as the Qanglin, Kibča'ut, Bajigit, Orusut, Asut, Sesüt, Majar, Kesimir, Sergesüt, Buqar and Kerel peoples.Footnote 33
Historians usually consider that both reports are a somewhat confused reference to Jebe and Sübedei's campaign of 1221–3.Footnote 34 Yet, some ethnonyms and toponyms cited in the source seem to correspond to the historical sequence of the Great Western Campaign, the main goals of which were South Rus’ and the Hungarian kingdom. Therefore, Igor de Rachewiltz dated the cited reports that were recorded in the Secret History to the time of Ögödei's reign. In his view, this made sense since Sübedei's attack on Kiev and the war with the Hungarians had taken place only in 1240–2.Footnote 35 In what follows, this article seek to demonstrate that so far there have been insufficient grounds for drawing such a radical conclusion: the reports concerned must have combined historical information about both Western campaigns with the participation of Sübedei, which occurred under outwardly similar circumstances.
De Rachewiltz is likely correct that the Secret History in the main conflated the two campaigns, both involving Subutai, of 1222–4 and 1236–42. However, it is not simply a substitution that sees a description of the attacks of 1236–42 inserted into the timeframe of the 1223 invasion. Rather some details of the first invasion were also preserved in these two brief accounts. Particularly, it can be argued, the statement that Subutai campaigned as far as Kiev in the first campaign against the West in 1222–4 can actually be substantiated. Confusion could have resulted from the compilation of the Secret History in two parts—one written soon after Chinggis Khan's death and a second written after Ogedei's reign—as some historians argue.
Still, the question of the dating of the Secret History remains debatable. There are compelling reasons to believe that it reflects a post-Toluid takeover agenda.Footnote 36 Even if this work was compiled in the 1250s-60s and its author used earlier records or oral reports containing errors in the descriptions and dating of some events, it is important to note that at least the account of Sübedei advancing as far as Kiev during the first campaign against the West is not actually an error.
Regardless of the exact details, it cannot be excluded that Jebe and Sübedei's expedition was planned as a part of a larger campaign in which greater numbers of the Mongols under the command of prince Jochi, Chinggis Khan's eldest son, were to play the main part. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, immediately after Khwārazm was conquered, Chinggis Khan ordered that Jochi should continue the campaign to conquer the Kipchak steppes and Rus’. Jochi for some reason disobeyed his father, thus causing a falling out between the two:
Prior to that, Chinggis Khan had ordered Jochi to conquer the northern territories like Bular, Bashghurd, Rus, Circassia, the Qipchaq Steppe, and other areas. When he excused himself from that labour and returned to his own tents, Chinggis Khan was extremely angry and said, “I will subject him to the Yasa without seeing what was in his mind”.Footnote 37
Or “As [Jochi] had held back from this operation and returned to his own tents, Chingiz-Khan was extremely annoyed and said: ‘I will put him to death without seeing his face’.” (translated by Boyle).Footnote 38
Rashīd al-Dīn turned to that obscure episode again when writing about the preparation for the Mongols’ Great Western Campaign: “Chinggis Khan had earlier ordered Jochi to go with the army, take and bring under control all the lands to the north, from Ibir-Sibir, Bolad, the Qipchaq Steppe, Bashghurd, Rus, and Circassia to the Caspian Straits, which the Mongols call Temür Qahalqa, but Jochi had retired. When Ögödäi Qa'an was enthroned as emperor, he ordered Batu to take over”.Footnote 39 Rashīd al-Dīn apparently wanted to show that the new generation of the Mongolian rulers perceived the campaign to Europe, and particularly the conquest of Rus’, as the continuation of a cause started by Chinggis Khan. Therefore, Jochi's eldest son and successor, Batu, had to fulfil what his father could not.
Generally, the pro-Mongolian sources (that is, those written under Mongolian patronage) contain rather contradictory evidence of Jochi's role as a military leader. They seem to reflect not only the real contradictions in Jochi's activities but also the rivalry that would soon arise between the different branches of Chinggis Khan's descendants, particularly between the Jochid and Hülegüid branches, which became one of the main reasons for the Mongol Empire's collapse.Footnote 40 That rivalry was evident in various spheres, including historiography; in the attempts to rewrite the Mongol history of the time of great conquests in the interests of one or another political and dynastic faction.Footnote 41
In such a context, therefore, one might suspect Rashīd al-Dīn of an unscrupulous desire to falsify the facts for the benefit of the Hülegüids, imputing to Prince Jochi a failure to execute orders and a conflict with his father. However, his assertions are supported by other sources which were contemporary to the events described and unpartisan on the clash of interests of the Chinggisids’ rival clans.
Jochi's role within the military plans of Chinggis Khan
Regarding sources composed outside of Mongol auspices, it is necessary first to look at the evidence of Jūzjānī, court historian of the Sultan Nāsir al-Dīn Mahmūd of Delhi,Footnote 42 who reported that after Khwārazm was conquered, Jochi's army was to go further to the West—to the lands of the Volga Bulgars and Slavs. Jochi “captured Khwārazm, and marched forces into the country of Saksîn, Bulghār and Suklāb [=Slavs]”.Footnote 43 Furthermore, being equally hostile to all of Chinggis Khan's descendants except for those who, in his opinion, sympathised with Islam, the author confirmed that after the conquest of Khwārazm, conflict arose between Chinggis Khan and his eldest son Jochi. Not only had Jochi disobeyed his father but attempted to conspire against him. Exposed by his younger brother Chaghatai, Jochi experienced his father's anger to the full extent: “When the Chingiz Khan became aware of it, he dispatched his own confidential agents, so that they administered poison to Tüshî [=Jochi] and killed him”.Footnote 44
It seems that Jūzjānī felt some compassion for Jochi's fate in view of his supposed sympathy to Islam and the Muslims. This somewhat odd and unjustified attitude may have been related to the subsequent reputation of Jochi's sons, Batu, and especially Berke, who indeed converted to Islam and patronised the Muslims. Undoubtedly, Jūzjānī exaggerated Jochi's sympathies for the Muslim population of Kipchak steppes and Khwārazm. It is unbelievable that this Mongol prince rebelled against his father in an attempt to protect Muslims who were suffering from the excessive despotism of Chinggis Khan. However, there seems to be historical validity to the claim that Jochi's leisurely approach to conquering the West angered his father.Footnote 45
Turning to a second set of sources, Rashīd al-Dīn's information that Jochi, on Chinggis Khan's orders, was to be at the head of the conquest of the Kipchak steppes and Rus’ finds an unexpected confirmation in European reports. John of Plano Carpini, the papal legate to the Mongols, wrote about the victory of Jochi's army over the Cumans/Comans (as Western sources usually call the western Kipchaks who migrated between the Don and the Danube), emphasising Jochi's high status as a ruler:
One of his sons, named Tossu [Jochi], also called ‘khan’ which means ‘emperor’, he sent with the army against the Kumani [Cumans] whom he defeated after much fighting. After he defeated them Tossu returned to his own country.Footnote 46
The Franciscan ‘C. de Bridia’, who possibly accompanied Carpini and spent about a year in Batu's territory (1246–7), and who also used information from friar Benedict, another of Carpini's companions,Footnote 47 reported additional details:
The third army, however, which marched west with Chingis Khan's son Jochi Khan, conquered first the country called Terkemen, secondly the Bisermins, next the Kangits, and lastly invaded the country of Cuspcas or Comania. The Comanians, however, joined forces with the whole nation of the Russians and fought the Tartars near two small rivers, one called Каlkа and the other called Coniuzzu […], and were beaten by the Tartars.Footnote 48
The mention of the battle of the Kalka River against the Russians in this report suggests that Jebe and Sübedei's tümens were part of Jochi's army. Nonetheless, Jochi himself did not personally participate in the battle on Kalka and was hundreds of kilometres to the east of where it occurred.
Apparently, Jochi's early ulus had no local, written historiography.Footnote 49 Hence, Friar C. de Bridia's evidence fills that gap to a certain extent. He may have heard the above version of the campaign of 1221–3 in Batu's domain while waiting for the return of his companions from the trip to the great khan's headquarters, and then retold it to Carpini. In that way, Carpini and C. de Bridia conveyed—willingly or unwillingly—the version adopted among Jochi's descendants that it was Jochi who commanded Jebe and Sübedei's corps and headed the campaign to Eastern Europe (of course, only nominally).
Important evidence from an additional reliable source that is near contemporary with the events must also be considered. According to the Rus’ Tale of the Battle on the Kalka, which has come down to us as part of the Novgorod First Chronicle,Footnote 50 during the siege of the fortified camp of the Kievan Prince Mstislav Romanovich, built on the banks of the Kalka River, two Mongol commanders were present: their names are given as Tsegyrkan (Цьгырканъ) and Teshiukan (Тешюканъ).Footnote 51 Modern researchers sometimes mistakenly regard these as the names of unknown Mongolian middle-level commanders, subordinate to Jebe and Sübedei, who were left by them to besiege and capture the fortified camp of the Kievan Prince.Footnote 52 In fact, the Mongol commanders’ names transmitted by the Rus’ source are undoubtedly a corruption of the Turkic forms for Chinggis Khan (Tschingiz Khan) and Jochi Khan (Tushi Khan).Footnote 53 As already observed, Carpini likewise referred to Jochi as “Tossu”, a name which he heard from Rus’ and Kipchak informants. It is signficant, however, that these names were not identified at the time of writing by the author of the Tale as the names of the supreme rulers of the Mongols (in the Rus’ source they are represented as ordinary commanders), although these rulers were undoubtedly known to the Rus’ and their actions were carefully observed. Another early version of the Tale of the Battle on the Kalka, which came down to us as part of the Hypatian Chronicle,Footnote 54 ends with the following record:
And God, who waited for repentance from the Christians, turned [the Tatars (Mongols)] back to their Eastern land, and they waged war against Tangut and other lands. At that time their leader Chinggis Khan (Чаногизъ кано) was killed by the Tanguts. [In revenge the Tatars] deceived [the Tanguts] and [then] treacherously annihilated them. [Thus] they destroyed [many] other lands—[some] with their armies [but] most by treachery.Footnote 55
The record regarding Tsegyrkan and Teshiukan would seem to be authentic. Indeed, this is a rare occasion of the original record not being reinterpreted, rethought and revised when it was included in the chronicle, by later authors or editors. Such authentic information could only have come into the Rus’ chronicle from an eyewitness who survived the catastrophe, and, on this basis, it is trustworthy. More precisely, the original source of these names was, apparently, a Turkic-speaking Mongolian truce envoy who negotiated the surrender of the Kiev Prince. The scenario was undoubtedly like a ‘broken telephone’ game, with the names and the message being translated from Mongolian to Turkic and then to Russian. Consequently, some confusion was guaranteed. Part of the problem might have been that the ultimatum yarligh which the Rus’ defenders of the stockade received, written on behalf of Chinggis Khan and Jochi, was in Mongolian, and it had to be translated into Turkic on the spot during the negotiations before being translated again into Russian. It seems that the Turkic speaker accurately conveyed how Kipchaks pronounced the Mongol names. Remarkably, the Rus’ chroniclers later recorded these names for posterity just as they sounded in Kipchak Turkic of that time. Nevertheless, the Turkic speaker mentioned above seems to have had a poor command of Russian and failed or was reluctant to explain to the Rus’ princes that Tsegyrkan and Teshiukan were the names of the supreme Mongol rulers; thus, the Rus’ assumed that those were the names of the two voyvode (воеводы), that is the commanders of the actual tactical units, besieging the stockade of the prince of Kiev. Of course, Chinggis Khan and Jochi did not personally participate in the battle of Kalka and were not present. Consequently, the real commanders of the Mongol corps, who fought against the Russians at Kalka, perceived themselves as part of Chinggis Khan's army, led by Prince Jochi.
The Mongol tradition conveys interesting additional information about the fate of one of the senior Rus’ princes named Mstislav. The Yuán Shǐ (chapter 120) reports in the Biography of Ho-sz’-mai-li (a Muslim leader named Ishmael),Footnote 56 a participant in the raid of Jebe and Sübedei to Eastern Europe:
After this the Wa-lo-sz’ [=Russians] were defeated at T'ie-rh-shan [=the iron hill], and their king, Mi-dji-sze-la [=Mstislav], was taken prisoner. Dje-bo [=Jebe] ordered Ho-sz’-mai-li to convey this king to the emperor's [eldest] son, Dju-ch'i [=Jochi], where he was put to death.Footnote 57
The transfer of the main Rus’ captive to Juchi may indicate that this prince was indeed perceived by the Mongol generals as the supreme leader of an army fighting against the Rus’ and Polovtsy.
In addition, the capture of the “king Mi-dji-sze-la” as a result of the victory over the Rus’ in the battle near the iron hill, seems to correspond to the above report of the Rus’ Tale of the Battle on the Kalka, which refers to the capture by the Mongols of the Kiev prince Mstislav Romanovich, who built a fortified camp on a high hill on the Kalka River's bank. The fact that the Mongols remembered and described the Kiev army's stockade as the ‘iron hill’ might imply that it was strong and difficult to capture. Hence, treacherous surrender negotiations were attempted by the Mongol leadership. According to the Tale of the Battle on the Kalka, Voyevoda Ploskyna, who defected to the Mongols:
Having kissed the honourable Cross to Mstislav and to both the Knyazes not to kill them, but to let them go on ransom, lied, accursed one; he delivered them bound to the Tartars, and they took the stockade and slaughtered the people, and there they fell dead.Footnote 58
Perhaps the Biography of Ho-sz’-mai-li really has preserved unique information about the tragic fate of the grand prince Mstislav Romanovich of Kiev, unattested in other sources. If Jochi—Chinggis Khan's eldest son and one of his likely successors—really headed or was ordered to head the described campaign, that campaign assumes the importance of a fully imperial event. At any rate, it cannot be viewed as a local tactical operation; it was conceived in strategic terms as the first Western Campaign of the Mongols’, the start of a large-scale conquest across the areas between the Volga and the Dnieper.
This conclusion becomes even more plausible if we keep in mind that from the very beginning the expedition of Jebe and Sübedei, there was an expressed goal of expanding the empire to the West. According to Sübedei's biography in the Yuán Shǐ, when he had finished the pursuit of Muḥammad II Khwārazmshāh, the general asked Chinggis Khan's permission to subjugate the Kipchaks (at the end of 1220 or beginning of 1221).Footnote 59 It should also be recalled that, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, after Khwārazmshāh died, Chinggis Khan ordered Jebe and Sübedei (in response to their request) to conquer as many lands as they could before they returned to Mongolia.Footnote 60 Both the hostile and the pro-Mongolian sources indicate that Jebe and Sübedei appointed prefects in the cities under the Mongols’ rule, for instance in Hamadān where the residents later revolted because of severe taxation.Footnote 61 According to Juvainī, Jebe and Sübedei demonstrated to the people of Nīshāpūr a copy of an edict (yarligh) of Chinggis Khan from 1220, in which he claimed to have been given dominion over “all the face of the earth from the going up of the sun to its going down”.Footnote 62
Such phrasing, of course, is in line with later Mongols’ ultimatums and may seem anachronistic. However, another Western contemporary, the Hungarian Dominican Julian, who visited Volga Bulgaria and Rus’ in the second half of the 1230s, directly indicates that Chinggis Khan had first conceived of reducing the world in the wake of overthrowing the Khwārazmshāh:
Becoming more audacious thereafter and believing that he was stronger than anyone else on earth, he went against kingdoms, intending to reduce the whole world. Therefore, approaching the Cumans’ land, he defeated the Cumans and subdued their country.Footnote 63
As we see, Julian perceived the conquest of the Cumans as the start of the realisation of Chinggis Khan's new imperial strategy. We can agree with the conclusion reached by contemporary researchers that after the quick collapse of the Khwārazmian Empire in the face of the Mongol armies’ attacks, Chinggis Khan became convinced that he was destined to reduce the whole world and not only the Steppe.Footnote 64
Apparently, the plan of 1221–3 campaign was originally developed by Sübedei (no doubt with the participation or even under the leadership of Jebe) and then approved by Chinggis Khan. According to that plan, the tümens of Jebe and Sübedei were to go around the Caspian Sea from the south, cross over the Caucasus and enter the Kipchak Steppe. There they were to join the Mongols’ main forces under Jochi's command, which were to pass around the northern shore of the Caspian Sea north and force the crossing over the Ural river and the Volga.Footnote 65 A similar tactic—attacking the enemy territories simultaneously from different sides—had already been mastered by the Mongol strategists and can be repeatedly seen in the history of the Mongol conquests, including the invasion of Hungary in 1241 and the attack on the Song in 1258–9.
The memory of this outflanking manoeuvre made by the tümens of Jebe and Sübedei has been preserved in the Mongolian historical tradition. In the Secret History of the Mongols we read:
In the Year of the Hare [1219], Činggis Qa'an set out against the Sarta'ul people (the sedentary Muslim population of Central Asia) crossing the Alai [a mountain pass on the Altai Bas, on the way from the Eder to the Irtysh] […] He sent Jebe as vanguard. He sent Sübe'etei in support of Jebe and sent Toqucar in support of Sübe'etei. As he sent these three ahead he said, ‘Go round the outside, coming out at the other side of the Sultan [Muḥammad II Khwārazmshāh or his son Jalāl al-Dīn] and waiting for Us [sic] to arrive, attack him from your side.’ So saying he sent them forth. Jebe then went and, passing the cities of Qan Melik [the governor of Herat (Herāt), Malik Xān Amīn al-Mulk] without touching them, he bypassed them on the outside. Behind him, Sübe'etei bypassed them in the same manner without touching them.
Thus, when the main forces of the Khwārazmians approached Chinggis Khan's army, they were suddenly attacked by the Mongolian vanguard tümens which had successfully completed their outflanking manoeuvre: “At that moment, however, Jebe, Sübe'etei and Toqučar came in from behind Jalaldin Soltan (Jalāl al-Dīn) and Qan Melik, overcame them and utterly destroyed them”.Footnote 66
This record arguably combines two layers of historical information dating back to about the same time. The first is the recollections about the raid of Jebe and Sübedei's tümens that went around the Caspian Sea from the south in order to cross the Caucasus and attack the Polovtsy from the rear, while Jochi's army was to assault them from the east. The second is the information about the successful operations of the Chinggis Khan army against Jalāl al-Dīn, which led to the defeat of the latter on the banks of the Indus in November 1221.Footnote 67
It was probably for this reason that the corps of Jebe and Sübedei went over the Caucasus range in late 1221 only after the siege of Ürgench was finally completed at which point Jochi's main forces were free to undertake a new campaign. It is highly likely that the outflanking manoeuvre of Jebe and Sübedei's tümens had, indeed, been planned by Chinggis Khan and his generals with the aim of striking the enemy from the rear at the precise time when the main Mongolian forces would be attacking them from the front. This plan, typical of Mongol strategy, assigned the chief role to Prince Jochi who was to lead the main forces of the Mongols and command the entire operation.
It was precisely at this key point, however, that the Mongol plan suddenly failed. The situation that arose then was well described by Thomas T. Allsen:
Jochi, however, did not personally pursue his mission for long. After a perfunctory effort at carrying out his father's instructions, he began drifting eastward toward his main camp, or orda, on the Irtysh River. His leisurely approach to his commission to strike west and his preoccupation with hunting wild asses greatly angered his father; a complete break between the two was only averted by Jochi's premature death in 1227.Footnote 68
The Quriltai of 1223
A few years before his death, however, Jochi had a personal meeting with his father. This meeting, which turned out to be their last, took place presumably in the spring of 1223. This is the date at which scholars such as Vasily Barthold and Peter Jackson arrived (and with which I concur here), but it is not clearly dated in the sources and the date has to be inferred.Footnote 69 Most likely a meeting was after 11 April when the Taoist patriarch Changchun (Qiu Chuji) left Chinggis Khan's headquarters,Footnote 70 that is, on the eve of the decisive battle of Jebe and Sübedei's corps with the combined forces of the Rus’ and the Polovtsy at the Kalka.
According to Juvainī, Chinggis Khan himself summoned Jochi to this meeting (quriltai), in which the other sons of the khan also participated.Footnote 71 It seems that the supreme ruler of the Mongols attached a lot of importance to this meeting, as he postponed his return to Mongolia for several months for the sake of it. After completing the military operation in Khwārazm, the Mongol ruler needed to arrange for a successful end of his campaign in Europe. It would be hard to imagine that all this time Chinggis Khan and his sons had been unaware of or did not attach importance to the impending offensive against the Polovtsy and the Rus’ by the Mongolian advance corps operating between the Don and the Dnieper. The available evidence from the sources rather suggests the opposite.
The Biography of Ho-sz’-mai-li, a participant and prominent military leader in the raid, states that Chinggis Khan through his messenger urged Jebe to expedite his punitive campaign against the Kipchak (帝遣使趣哲伯疾馳以討欽察).Footnote 72 According to Rashīd al-Dīn, after informing the supreme ruler of the Mongols about the death of Khwārazmshāh and their plans to continue the conquest in the West, Jebe and Sübedei kept exchanging envoys with Chinggis Khan in order to discuss important news and deal with urgent matters: “no fewer than three or four hundred envoys” had been sent.Footnote 73 This record shows that Chinggis Khan was personally overseeing the Jebe-Sübedei expedition, practically in the mode of modern online communication, and thus regarded it as an extremely important military action.
I would argue that in the spring of 1223 Chinggis Khan gathered his sons on the bank of the Syr-Darya not only for the purposes of joint hunting as Juvainī claims. It would be more logical to assume that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the plan of the upcoming decisive battle of the western Mongolian army against the Rus’ and Polovtsy forces. Jochi was summoned to this meeting and participated in the discussion as Commander-in-chief of the western army. In any case, there is no information that Jochi had ever been replaced in this capacity by another person. Moreover, Jochi's arrival to meet Chinggis Khan in the spring of 1223 looks like an attempt to justify or make amends for having been too slow in following his father's original order. The following revealing detail, which is still undervalued by researchers, allows it to be understood as such. According to Juvainī, Jochi came to his father and brothers with many gifts, one of which is given particular prominence: “Among the presents which he brought were a thousand grey horses”.Footnote 74
Such gifts were traditional for the Mongols. Just a few years before the events described, Jebe Noyan, sensing the displeasure of Chinggis Khan who had suspected him of excessive greed for power, immediately came to meet his overlord, bringing as gifts a thousand dun horses with white mouths.Footnote 75 With this rather dramatic, unspoken gesture of loyalty, Jebe seems to have put Chinggis Khan's doubts to rest, since when the war with the Khwārazm Empire broke out in the same year, the general continued to occupy a leading operational role.Footnote 76 Jochi seems to have achieved a similar result: in any case, he continued to be the nominal leader of the Western campaign in which only the forces of Jebe and Sübedei really participated.
It is difficult to ascertain if Chinggis Khan and his son were aware during their meeting that a major battle was about to take place. Given that the Battle of the Kalka River, according to the generally accepted chronology, took place on the last day of May (or even June 16) in 1223,Footnote 77 and then taking into account the high speed at which the Mongol armies moved, Jochi theoretically had enough time to bring his main forces to join Jebe and Sübedei. At least that would be the case if, having received the earlier order to march to the west, Jochi indeed had brought his troops to combat readiness by the spring of 1223.
It seems that the Mongol generals fighting against the Polovtsy and the Rus’ up to the very last moment had hoped for the arrival of reinforcements from the east. The many days of the Mongol corps retreat before the numerically superior Rus’ and Polovtsy troops from the Dnieper to the east, almost up to the Don,Footnote 78 which preceded the battle on the Kalka River, probably did not have as its exclusive aim obtaining a good strategic position favourable for the Mongols to make a stand, as is usually assumed. This continuous retreat was unprecedented for the Mongols and lasted, according to various sources, from eight to twelve days. Covering a distance of about 200 kilometres, it was probably undertaken in order to join the main forces of Jochi who were supposed to come from the direction of the Volga and the Don.
Expectations were not realised, but this did not lead to the defeat of the Mongols. Due to the decisiveness, combat experience and skills of the Mongolian generals, as well as the superiority of the Mongolian troops in combat training, particularly archery, the corps of Jebe and Sübedei dealt a crushing defeat to their enemy. However, it cost the Mongols dearly. According to a plausible assumption made by Stephen Pow, the leading commander of the Mongols in this campaign, Jebe, was captured and killed during one of the first clashes with the Polovtsy on the bank of the Dnieper.Footnote 79
The details about the quriltai, which happened right before the Battle on the Kalka, are most fully represented in Juvainī's writings. Unlike Rashīd al-Dīn, he did not say a single word about the order to support the Jebe—Sübedei corps that Jochi refused to obey, provoking Chinggis Khan's anger. It seems that Juvainī intentionally avoided this awkward story. In the middle of the thirteenth century, in order not to endanger the reputation of Jochi and his descendants, allies of the Toluids whom Juvainī served, the historian preferred not to mention the military campaign of Jebe and Sübedei against the Polovtsy and the Rus’ at all. By not referencing the major victory of the Mongols in the Battle on the Kalka, Juvainī thereby dispensed with the necessity to explain the reasons behind the ultimate failure of the otherwise brilliantly conducted raid to the West. In contrast, in the midst of political rivalry between the Jochids and the Hülegüids half a century later, Rashīd al-Dīn, who served the latter, was extremely forthcoming in describing Jochi's refusal to obey Chinggis Khan's military order and blaming him for the failure of the 1221–3 Western campaign.
Here we see two extremes in depicting the same episodes by pro-Mongolian historians who approached them from different political positions: on the one hand, we note the obvious desire to keep silent, and, on the other, we observe the fulsome and negative depiction of Jochi's actions—the desire to make them look scandalous. In any event, both descriptions seem to have behind them an unpleasant and historical incident connected with Jochi and his controversial relationship with his father and brothers.
Based on the above points, it seems that in the spring of 1223 Chinggis Khan re-proposed or rather demanded that Jochi personally participate in the Western campaign. At the time, they did not know that Jebe and Sübedei would imminently defeat the huge Rus’-Polovtsian army on Kalka. Yet, Chinggis Khan already knew that the Polovtsians had united with the Rus’ and begun to pursue the Jebe-Sübedei's corps. This corps was in great danger and needed immediate assistance. Jochi was compelled to provide help since even earlier he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Western campaign. Most likely, Jochi accepted the order and was ready to immediately go west with his troops to help Sübedei. Nonetheless, the sensational news that Sübedei utterly defeated the Rus’ and Polovtsians with his own forces would have arrived shortly afterwards. In addition, Sübedei took Grand Prince Mstislav of Kiev prisoner and had him escorted to Jochi. After that, Jochi probably considered that his participation in the campaign was no longer necessary, since the Mongol generals won it without him. Thus, it seems Jochi was asked repeatedly to take part in the Western campaign – in circa 1221 and in the spring of 1223. A second demand was conveyed in person, Jochi being personally reminded of his obligations.
Even as this meeting took place, ironically, the most decisive battle of the campaign unfolded. Following Juvainī's text rigorously, we note that Jochi came to meet his father later than the other princes, when the headquarters of the great khan had been moved to the Qulan-bashi plain north of the Alexander Mountains where it remained for the whole summer of 1223.Footnote 80 By the time Jochi appeared here, there could have been no more than a few days left before the battle on the Kalka, or it might have already happened. Even in that case, however, the participation of Jochi's army in the Western campaign, as will be shown below, was still relevant.
The raid on Kiev
To address the lingering question of the ultimate goal of the 1221–3 campaign, the Secret History of Mongols, as already seen, claims that Chinggis Khan sent Sübedei to campaign as far as the city of Kiwa Menkermen, that is, Kiev.Footnote 81 However, the nature of this source requires systematic verification of the information that it contains. According to Ibn al-Athīr, after the victory on the Kalka, the Mongols continued their military operations against the Rus’: “The Tatars pursued them, killing, plundering and destroying the country, so that most of it became uninhabited”. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, “the Mongols went in pursuit [of the Russians]Footnote 82 and so destroyed their towns that most were empty of human beings”.Footnote 83 Information from a contemporary Rus’ source confirms and elaborates on these claims.
The Hypatian Chronicle, which contains, as mentioned above, one of the earlier versions of the Tale of the Battle on the Kalka, provides some information about this episode of importance: “After vanquishing the princes of Rus’ because of the sins committed by Christians, the Tatars moved on and reached [the city of] Novgorod Sviatopolchesky”.Footnote 84 George Perfecky mistakenly translates Новагородъ Святополчьскъ as Novgorod-Seversk (a town in the Chernigov land),Footnote 85 and this error has entered modern academic literature.Footnote 86 In fact, the chronicler undoubtedly means Novgorod Sviatopolchesky (or Sviatopolch on the Vitichev Hill), a small town in the south of Kiev land, located on the right bank of the Dnieper, about 60 km south of Kiev.Footnote 87 This important detail significantly changes the overall picture of the Mongol offensive. I would maintain that after the victory of the Kalka, the Mongols continued the campaign, heading northwest in the direction of Kiev, crossed over onto the Dnieper's western bank near Novgorod Sviatopolchesky and captured this town.
Historians usually sidestep the question of the purpose of this last westward advance of the Mongolian vanguard corps, which pushed almost as far as Kiev. At first glance, it might seem impossible to answer this question today. Nevertheless, the Russian chronicle cited above gives us some important information. When the Mongols (whom the Rus’ usually called the Tatars) approached the town of Novgorod Sviatopolchesky, a very strange episode occurred, upon which the chronicler did not comment:
The people of Rus’ were not aware of their treachery and came out to meet them with crosses in their hands, but the Tatars slaughtered all of them. And God, who waited for repentance from the Christians, turned [the Tatars] back to their Eastern land…Footnote 88
Peter Jackson was the first to note that the story described in the Russian chronicle was similar to the tactics earlier used by the Mongols against Christian peoples, particularly in the Caucasus.Footnote 89 When the first Mongol contingents had irrupted into Caucasian Albania, Armenia, and Georgia during the winter of 1220–1, they were met by the Armeno-Georgian armed forces under the leadership of the atabeq Iwanê Zak'arian (Mqargrdzeli). The latter suffered defeat on two occasions, in December 1220 and January 1221. Jebe and Sübedei's tümens carried the cross among their frontline troops. This ruse is referred to in Western scholarship in relation to King David's army and Prester John.Footnote 90 The Georgian queen Rusudan and the atabeq Iwanê must have been confused to see a cross in the hands of the invaders.
In his letter to Pope Honorius III, the atabeq Iwanê wrote that the Mongols had deliberately carried a cross in front of them to mislead the Georgians, posing as Christians, in order to attack them without giving them time to organise resistance: “… the Tatars invaded our land, carrying a cross in front of them; and thus, under the guise of [belonging to] the Christian religion, they deceived us and exterminated six thousands of us”.Footnote 91 The Georgian Queen Rusudan, who also wrote to the Pope, confirmed that the tactical cunning of the Mongols achieved its goal: “…we took no precautions against them because we believed them to be Christians”.Footnote 92 According to Kirakos Gandzakets'i, a thirteenth-century Armenian chronicler, false information had preceded the Mongols; they were Christians who carried a portable tent-church and a miracle-working cross and had come to avenge their fellow-Christians from the tyranny of the Muslims.Footnote 93
Even though the Hypatian Chronicle does not state directly that the Mongols, who almost reached Kiev itself, carried a cross in front of them or pretended to be Christians, there is little doubt that they used the same ploy in Rus’ that they had successfully used in Georgia only a few years before. This seems even more likely since the same Mongol tümens and leadership engaged both against Georgians and the Rus’. In addition, another Rus’ chronicle reports that before the battle on the Kalka, the Mongol commanders, through their envoys, conveyed to the Rus’ princes that they did not want a war with Rus’, since the Mongols were “sent by God” to punish the Polovtsy “for much evil” that they had done to the Rus’.Footnote 94 Indeed, only those who pretended to be Christians could speak like that. This manoeuvre was totally in tune with the tactics used by the Mongols in the Caucasus, when the Mongols, as we have seen, claimed to have come to avenge their fellow Christians suffering from the tyranny of the Muslims.
The Mongols often pretended to identify themselves with those whom they wished to separate from their immediate targets. They had told the Kipchak earlier that they were kindred “Turkic” nomads, unlike the Alans. Ibn al-Athīr reports that the tümens of Jebe and Sübedei, after crossing the Caucasus Mountains, faced the combined forces of the Alans and the Kipchak. Appealing to their shared ethnic origin, the Mongols managed to convince the Kipchak to abandon their allies. When the Alans, left alone to face the enemy, were defeated, the Mongols suddenly attacked the Kipchak, inflicting heavy losses on them.Footnote 95
Moreover, there could be another reason that the Mongols began to carry the cross as a tactic during this invasion. In the 1230s, Friar Julian noted that the cross was highly revered among the Christian people of the Caucasus such as the Alans, and that local people and foreigners could travel through the region without fear of attacks from Christians and pagans alike—even from enemies—so long as they carried a cross mounted on spear like a standard and raised high:
They hold the cross in such reverence that commoners, whether native or foreigners travelling through, who are unable to have a large escort with them, can move about in safety at all times among Christians and pagans alike, if they place a cross of any kind onto a spear like a standard and carry it, raised high.Footnote 96
The Mongols must have caught wind of this custom and used it effectively to disarm their foes through the entire region.
Novgorod Sviatopolchesky was not a random choice for the Mongolian attack. This small but well-fortified town occupied a strategically important position and was one of the key defence points on the way to Kiev.Footnote 97 Located on the western bank of the Dnieper like Kiev, Novgorod Sviatopolchesky protected a ford across this abundantly wide river that the nomads found difficult to cross. It was one of the Dnieper fords closest to the capital of Rus’, and the Kiev princes used it to move their troops quickly and conveniently across the largest river in Europe or alternatively sought to strengthen its defences appropriately to ensure a good defence for Kiev.Footnote 98
An analysis of records from Rus’ chronicles confirms that the ultimate goal of the Western campaign of the Mongols in 1223 became Kiev itself. We maintain that after the victory on the Kalka, the Mongols continued their campaign of conquest and now directed it against the Rus’. The character of the conquerors’ actions shows that their next goal was to secure a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper in the Kiev region, defend it until the arrival of the main Mongol forces, and then continue their assault on the capital of Southern Rus’. To achieve this goal, the Mongols needed to ensure a reliable ford across the Dnieper. Having learned—obviously from some Russian prisoners captured in the camp of the Kiev Prince Mstislav Romanovich—about a convenient Dnieper ford near Novgorod Sviatopolchesky, the Mongols immediately headed there. In order to wade through the well-guarded ford, the Mongols once again used their proven combat ploy: pretending to be Christians, they lulled the garrison troops stationed in Novgorod Sviatopolchesky from their vigilance, and then suddenly attacked and killed them.
It was undoubtedly very risky and even desperate tactical operation: in the sight of the Rus’ archers, the Mongols had to advance slowly in a chain, one after another, along the river ford, almost completely plunging into the waters of the Dnieper, holding crosses with their arms raised high or, what is more likely, leaning on long wooden staffs with large crosses attached on top, clearly visible from afar, as described by Friar Julian. This unusual picture apparently impressed the Rus’ people so much that they completely abandoned their vigilance. It is difficult to say whether the Rus’ defenders of Novgorod Sviatopolchesky had ever heard anything about the warriors of the mythical King David or whether they mistook the Mongols for the vanguard of the Rus’ Polovtsy troops returning from the Kalka. Perhaps moved by enthusiasm at the sight of fellow Christians arriving, the defenders of the town threw down their weapons and took up crosses with which they rushed towards their imaginary brothers in faith, joyfully greeting them. Apparently, covered by the vanguard, which consisted of soldiers holding up crosses and distracting the Rus’, the main part of the Mongol troops, with weapons and horses, crossed the river. The chronicler notes with bitterness that the Rus’ did not recognise the deception and easily succumbed to the simple trick of the Mongols; as a result of a sudden and very quick attack, all the Rus’ were killed (Не вѣдающим же руси льсти ихъ, исходяху противу имъ со кресты, они же избиша ихъ всих). The exact details being uncertain, the laconic account suggests that the confused Rus’ allowed the Mongols to easily cross the Dnieper, come ashore and take full control of the strategically important ford.
Had the Mongols been only interested in plundering Rus’ towns on the border with the steppe or gathering intelligence information about Kiev, the military operation described above would have been quite unjustified. Let us not forget that in 1239, when Prince Mengu (Möngke), who later became a khan, brought his troops to Kiev, he did nothing more than inspect its fortifications from the opposite bank of the Dnieper without even trying to ford the dangerous river.Footnote 99 The wide and deep Dnieper was indeed a significant obstacle for the Mongols. When in 1240 the main forces of the Mongol Empire under the command of Batu and Sübedei approached Kiev once again, they had to postpone their crossing of the Dnieper for several months (seemingly the Rus’ managed to protect the fords and crossings well), waiting for the onset of winter to freeze the river. Only when a solid ice cover formed did the Mongolian army move to the western bank.Footnote 100 After that, the fate of Kiev was sealed, and over the next few weeks the Mongols captured the whole of Southern Rus’, reaching the borders of Poland and Hungary.Footnote 101
It appears that the appearance of the Mongol troops on the western bank of the Dnieper in the summer of 1223 posed a serious threat to Kiev and caused panic among its inhabitants. This is evinced by a brief but very expressive record made by Ibn al-Athīr:
Many of the leading Rūs merchants and wealthy men gathered together, loaded up what they held precious and set out to cross the sea to the lands of Islam in several ships. When they drew near the harbour they were making for, one of their ships foundered and sank, although those on board were saved […] The rest of the ships arrived safely and their passengers told of this circumstance.Footnote 102
Mostly likely the people described here were the “leading Rūs merchants and wealthy men” who lived in Kiev, the largest and richest city in Russia. Frightened by the sudden appearance of the Mongols near the city walls, as well as the shocking news of the death of the Kiev Prince and the destruction of his entire army, the wealthiest citizens chose to flee, taking advantage of the last opportunity they had left. Aboard their merchant ships, facing the risk of being fired upon by Mongolian archers, they reached the mouth of the Dnieper, crossed the Black Sea and found refuge in the Sultanate of Rum.
Jochi's decision to excuse himself
Thus, the Mongol commanders carried out fully the order given by Chinggis Khan and brought their troops all the way to Kiev. Having waited in vain for Jochi's troops and thereby finally becoming certain that Jochi would not participate, Sübedei decided to stop the campaign, as he did not have sufficient forces to besiege and storm Kiev. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, heading “to the territory of the Rus”, Jebe and Sübedei “had promised Chinggis Khan to finish the job within three years, but it was accomplished in two and a half”.Footnote 103 Hence it could be argued that the early end of the campaign was caused by the impossibility of achieving its ultimate goal—the capture of Kiev and the Rus’ lands on the border with the Polovtsian steppe—resulting from Jochi's refusal to participate in the campaign.
A similar conclusion was first reached by Abraham Constantin Mouradgea d'Ohsson and supported by the afore-mentioned Ilya Berezin. Almost two centuries ago, these historians argued that the Mongol expedition to Europe, in accordance with Chinggis Khan's plan, was originally assigned to Jochi, but for unknown reasons the latter was reluctant to obey the order.Footnote 104 However, d'Ohsson and Berezin drew their conclusion on the basis of just one source—the History of the Mongols by Rasīd al-Dīn. Clearly, from the standpoint of current scholarship, information from only one source, especially the one created relatively late and reflecting political biases, is not enough to reach reliable historical conclusions. However, as this article has attempted to show, the status of Jochi as commander-in-chief of the Mongol tümens who fought on the Kalka is to a certain extent at least confirmed by several sources independent of each other and not related to the tradition of pro-Mongolian historical writing.
All the same, the question about the reasons behind Jochi's refusal to obey the order of his formidable father remains open. Just as in the time of d'Ohsson, we can now only guess, and only in a tentative fashion, as to the causes for the eldest Chinggisid prince's strange behaviour. The controversies between the supreme ruler of the Mongols and his eldest son in the last years of their lives were undoubtedly a secret of the Chinggis Khan family, which was later exploited by the rival groups of the Chinggisids in favour of their political interests. In the sources that are now available, this secret is hidden under several layers of silence and dissembling.
The persistent tradition, according to which the sons of Chinggis Khan quarrelled during the siege of Ürgench (Gurgānj), the capital of Khwārazm (1221),Footnote 105 suggests that while Jochi commanded the siege, its end result was that he lost his position as the clearly favoured heir apparent. Even in the historiography of the Toluids (Juvainī and the so-called Veritable Record of Chinggis Khan), whose political interests sometimes concurred with the Jochids’ interests, the only detail that we have is that after Ürgench was captured, Jochi withdrew in the Qara-Qum desert north of the Aral Sea. Sources either ignored his further actions or focused merely on his preoccupation with hunting,Footnote 106 implicitly leaving the conquest of the Kipchaks to generals like Sübedei.Footnote 107 Only Jūzjānī, who sympathised with the Jochids due to their inclination toward Muslims, reported that on returning to his pastures after the conquest of Urgench, Jochi continued to subdue the Kipchak people,Footnote 108 but this could only be the Eastern Kipchaks (=Qangli) living north of the Aral Sea.Footnote 109
None of the sources known to us contains information about Jochi's participation in any warfare to the west of the Volga, although his position as would-be ruler of the western regions of the expanding empire seems to have required such participation. The remainder of Sübedei's corps joined Jochi's army only on the way back from Europe after crossing the Volga and the Ural River.Footnote 110 For that reason, Sübedei's biographies in the Yuán Shǐ do not mention Jochi's participation in the operations against the Polovtsy and the Rus’.Footnote 111
Apparently, the lasting hostility and resentment between Jochi and his younger brothers, especially Chaghatai, which led to open conflict during the siege of Urgench, complicated the relationship between Jochi and his father. It is not inconceivable to assume that Jochi deliberately prolonged the siege of Urgench, avoiding a bloody assault and total destruction of the capital of Khwārazm because he saw himself as the future ruler of that prosperous city.Footnote 112 The enraged Chinggis Khan gave the command of the Mongol forces near Urgench to another son, Ögödäi, and began to show distrust towards Jochi, which certainly undermined the latter's political position and chances of succession to the supreme authority. Modern researchers believe that Jochi could have been deeply upset by the loss of his former status in the empire: “Jochi came to be depressed and discontent precisely after his father designated Ögödei as his successor. So when his father formally dispatched him to conquer the northern countries, he refused to obey”.Footnote 113
It can be assumed that Jochi expected his last meeting with his father and brothers in the spring of 1223 to be an opportunity not only to smooth over the disappointment caused by his delay in joining the Western campaign but also to overcome the disagreements with his brothers and regain his father's trust, thus restoring his former position in the empire. However, this does not seem to have happened. Jochi's depression grew worse, and his health continued to deteriorate. This would appear to be the main reason why Jochi, despite being urged repeatedly to follow his father's order, refused to go to the West with his troops. However, another possibility cannot be ruled out: having lost his former political status as the most likely successor to Chinggis Khan and the future ruler of the empire, Jochi, under various pretexts, avoided participating in the military actions of the empire. The Western campaign of 1221–3 would have been regarded as such. Instead, he focused entirely on managing his own ulus.
Rashīd al-Dīn reported that Jochi became seriously ill at the end of his life; his condition was so severe that he could no longer travel to meet with his father, and this disease caused his premature death.Footnote 114 Modern researchers have ventured to speculate that the fatal disease from which Jochi had been suffering could have been caused by his prolonged depression. It has been confirmed by modern medicine that psychological stress can cause a disorder of the endocrinal system and a decrease in the immunological functions of the human body, which in turn may lead to diseases of the digestive and cardiovascular systems, cancer, and so on: “If we think of the Mongolian way of life, for example to the habit of drinking too much, and we remember Jochi's long depression, it is quite possible he died from a tumour of the digestive system or from diseases the cardio-cerebral vessel system”.Footnote 115
Jochi's disease progressed rapidly, and he probably died in 1225—sooner than is usually thought.Footnote 116 Whatever the exact details, in the eyes of both the contemporaries and subsequent historians, Jochi's serious illness, which turned out to be fatal, was meant to explain why the eldest son and faithful associate of Chinggis Khan failed to obey his order to support Jebe and Sübedei's expedition and thereby undermined the possible brilliant outcome of one of the most promising Mongolian campaigns in the West.
Conclusions
Jebe and Sübedei's expedition, which had been initially planned as a part of a large-scale campaign against the West, was aimed at the conquest of the Kipchak/Polovtsy and the allied principalities of South Rus’. Its strategic value was eventually circumscribed, and instead it took the form of a local raid with obscure goals and dubious results. More specifically, the actual results of the campaign fell short of the original ambitious goals and soaring expectations of Chinggis Khan, which were further heightened after the brilliant victory of the Mongols in the Battle on the Kalka River. To justify at least partly such an expensive and, in essence, useless action (especially taking into account the colossal losses finally suffered by the Mongols in Volga Bulgaria),Footnote 117 the campaign came to be misrepresented as a scouting expedition or a punitive operation against the Kipchaks, the allies of the defeated Khwārazm Empire.
With respect to the Kipchaks, the expedition of Jebe and Sübedei similarly did not reach its goal either. Ibn al-Athīr reports that shortly after the departure of the Mongols, the Kipchaks returned to their territory and resumed their pre-existing international fur trade.Footnote 118 Obviously, this was made possible as a result of the defeat inflicted on the Mongols by the inhabitants of Volga Bulgaria at the end of 1223. The Hungarian Dominican Julian confirmed this fact by reporting that the Mongols in the first battle were defeated by the inhabitants of Magna HungariaFootnote 119; this could only happen in alliance with the Volga Bulgarians.Footnote 120
Thus, all Mongolian gains in the vast areas between the Volga and the Dnieper—from the North Caucasus and the Sea of Azov and almost up to Kiev itself—which were achieved through the brilliant victories of Jebe and Sübedei—ended up being completely lost. This was undoubtedly a heavy blow to Chinggis Khan's ambition. As a result, he had to adjust his overall conquering strategy substantially. This fact was noted by envoys from Song China who visited the Mongol governor in Northern China and Ögödei Khan's court in 1234 and 1237 respectively; according to their reports, Chinggis Khan had deliberately postponed further campaigns against the Kipchak until the Jurchen-Chin should have been overthrown.Footnote 121
Be that as it may, the Mongols were unable to impose their rule anywhere west of the Volga until they returned in overwhelming force in the later 1230s. Mobilisation of significant imperial forces for the Great Western Campaign and the assignment of Batu, one of the oldest sons of Jochi, and the elderly general Sübedei as commanders, thus, looks very much like a desire to take revenge for a major failure that befell the Mongols in the West a decade and a half earlier.
