This volume is part of the famous Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series, under the general editorship of R. Sorabji who has recently announced the publication of the 100th volume. With this 91st volume, C. fills an important gap in the series: Alexander of Aphrodisias' De anima which was hitherto available to English readers only in an incomplete translation by A.P. Fotinis (1979). Not only does this publication fill a gap, but it also constitutes in itself a major contribution to the series as well as to studies on Alexander.
In accordance with the standard practice of this series, the volume contains an introduction and an English translation. It is completed by a commentary, a bibliography, an English–Greek glossary, a Greek–English index, which lists occurrences for both Parts 1 and 2, an index of passages cited and a subject index.
Alexander's treatise is not a commentary on Aristotle's De anima: Alexander certainly wrote a proper commentary that is only known through secondary accounts. But it is not an independent or, as it is sometimes called, a ‘personal’ work. As C. rightly points out, Alexander follows, develops or reinterprets Aristotle's argumentation. Alexander deals with the soul in general (form and matter), the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul. When writing his own treatise, he obviously bears in mind Aristotle's De anima. Of course, Alexander's treatise presents discrepancies with the organisation of Aristotle's De anima, which can probably be explained in reference to its controversial purpose. Furthermore, his interpretation of Aristotle's text is more implicit and far less formal than in a lemmatic commentary. None the less, one can hardly agree with C. when he writes that ‘a commentary seeks to elucidate a text; a treatise seeks to defend the truth’ (p. 2). The difference in Alexander's corpus between commentaries and treatises probably lies foremost in a difference between the audiences for whom each type of work is intended – for advanced students on one side and for a wider but educated public including philosophers from rival schools on the other. For Alexander, as he makes clear at the beginning of the treatise, Aristotle's philosophy is the truth (De anima 2.4–9; see also De mixtione 227.1–2 and De providentia 32 Ruland). So defending the truth and explaining Aristotle are one and the same.
C.'s introduction (pp. 1–22) deftly sets out the main points for the first half of Alexander's De anima. After a brief presentation of Alexander's life and works, a summary of the ‘Organisation and aims of the treatise’, the introduction is divided into eight parts following the course of the treatise and studies its principal themes: naturalism; form and matter; supervenience and emergentism; parts of the soul; perceiving; nourishing and reproducing oneself; perceptibles and error; seeing, light and colours. Understanding of Alexander's psychology has long been divided between materialism and mysticism: the first reading that comes from the Middle Ages is based on the beginning of the treatise which describes the soul as emerging from a bodily mixture and the second interpretation on some statements in the passages on the intellect. C. rightly rejects the materialist interpretation and, as in a previous article (‘Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern’, Philosophical Review 106 [1997], 309–63), he reads Alexander's psychology as holding an epiphenomenalism. Without doubt, this question and C.'s interpretation constitute the key points of the volume. Alexander describes how the soul appears ‘above’ an underlying mixture (epigignesthai, see e.g. De anima 24.23–8; 25.2–3). The particular mixture that constitutes the body is somehow its ‘principle’ (arkhê), thus ‘it is not possible to conceive of any activity of soul apart from a bodily change’ (12.21–2). But it does not follow from this that the soul can be reduced to a bodily state. As C. strongly emphasises, the Exegete himself ‘straightforwardly rejects reduction’ (p. 11; see also n. 40) and clear signs of this idea can be read in several passages (e.g. 24.18–23; 25.3–9). The soul is not only a reality of higher-level but also a causal power to perform defined activities which should not be identified with the particular harmony of the underlying blend. Therefore, Alexander's description of the emergence of the soul from a bodily mixture, which is the origin of the materialist interpretation, is not at odds with the ontological priority of form and the ‘essentialist’ position (which M. Rashed attributed to Alexander's ontology in Essentialisme. Alexandre d'Aphrodise entre logique, physique et cosmologie [2007]). C. reaches the nub of the matter and does full justice to Alexander's subtlety by convincingly noting that the ‘bottom-up account’ of the emergence of the soul does not clash with the ‘top-down approach’ of the priority of form as the very heart of substantiality (n. 90).
The translation is based on the text established by I. Bruns (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.1) and contains about 50 emendations of Bruns's text. It is not the first translation into a modern language: C. admits to have greatly benefited from the excellent Italian translation by P. Accattino and P. Donini and the French translation by R. Dufour and M. Bergeron. C.'s translation is, as far as a French reviewer can judge, remarkably clear and thorough and faces with courage the difficulty of Alexander's Greek: Alexander, says C., gives the same impression as if he were writing ‘in academic German’ (p. 23). Moreover, C. works hard to keep the reader on track through long arguments, breaking the sentences into shorter premises and numbering them according to the progression of the reasoning. The translation pays careful attention to philosophical terminology. The rendering of ‘teleiotês’ by ‘culmination’, for example, accurately captures the ontological meaning of this key word in Alexander's metaphysics, which indicates the actualisation of a form (though, as C. points out, it understates its ethical connotation, see n. 64). Concerning this word, one could argue there is one small inaccuracy in the ‘Note’ introducing the translation (p. 24): ‘culmination’ renders ‘teleiotês’ and not ‘teleiôsis’, elsewhere translated by ‘development’ (teleiôsis occurs only in 36.6; see Greek–English index, p. 213).
One could regret the publication in two separate volumes of one single treatise, especially in a division that does not fit with the logical structure of the treatise. But this book is much more than a translation. C. executes an admirable work in providing notes on each passage of Alexander's text and this continuous commentary covers more than a third of the volume. The notes indicate textual or interpretative problems and related texts by Plato, Aristotle, Alexander, other post-Hellenistic philosophers and even Descartes. C. also delves into the logical structure of Alexander's arguments (e.g. n. 237). The references to related texts are often, if not always, far more complete and more systematic than those of the Italian and French editions: for example concerning the prime matter (n. 26) or the light (nn. 375–6).
C. offers a valuable work that cannot but be praised. For those, especially students, who know little about the Exegete par excellence, this translation provides an ideal introduction. Specialists will find enlightening and inspiring suggestions to understand better Alexander's psychology. Given the quality of this volume, and as C. is one of the most eminent scholars on Aristotle's theory of intellect, the publication of the second part is even more eagerly awaited.
