We begin this reply by addressing some of the broader questions about the goal of our ‘political theory of animals’—what it is we’re trying to achieve—before turning to some of the commentators’ more focused questions and challenges, particularly about regulating reproduction.
It might be helpful to briefly restate one of the central gaps in existing animal rights theories (hereafter ART) that we hope to remedy. A point of consensus that all defenders of animal rights share is that the history of human-animal relations is one of domination and exploitation. Throughout history, and around the world, humans have exercised power over animals in ways that subordinate animal interests to human interests, sacrificing animals to serve human purposes. The goal of the animal advocacy movement is to stop this domination and exploitation.
But how do we stop it? For many defenders of ART, there is a single, simple answer: we stop exercising power over animals. The goal is not to exercise power more responsibly or more justly, but to renounce power entirely. We simply “let them be”, leaving animals to live freely on their own, following their natural inclinations.Footnote 1
This assumption runs deep in traditional animal rights theory—in Zoopolis, we quote several examples from leading ART theorists (Francione, Regan, Dunayer, etc.). It is prevalent, we suggest, because these theorists do not believe that power will ever be exercised justly, given the enormous self-interest humans have in animal exploitation, and the minimal capacity of animals to resist. Because animals are vulnerable to human power, humans will inevitably exercise domination in order to further our own interests. If there is no possibility of power over animals being exercised justly, the only route to justice must be to renounce power.
The central premise of our book is that this answer is hopelessly inadequate. It is quite literally a fantasy, one in a long line of fantasies of a world without power. It fails even the most minimal test of empirical feasibility: there is no possible world in which animals are not constantly being affected (for better or worse) by us. Humans will inevitably be making decisions which affect animals’ mobility (on land, sea and air), their food and water supplies, the risks they face, and so on.
But it also fails the test of moral adequacy. It ignores the fact that we have acquired moral responsibilities towards particular groups of animals due to our own past actions, including responsibilities to attend to needs that have arisen through domestication or through human-induced changes to habitat. Our previous actions have made some animals vulnerable to new types of harm and risk. To simply let them be, at this point in history, is to wash our hands of moral responsibilities we have inherited.
So the first step in any plausible theory of animal rights is to renounce the fantasy of a world without power, and to think carefully about how the exercise of power can be rendered just. This is the central question of political theory. From its origins, political theory has been preoccupied with the question of whether—and—how it can be legitimate for some to exercise power over others, and how relations of power can be held accountable to norms of justice. Political theory offers us a rich palette of concepts to address this challenge, including the ideas of citizenship, sovereignty and denizenship we draw upon in Zoopolis. Each of these offers ways of making the exercise of power accountable to, and responsive to, the interests of the governed.
Already, even before we get to the details, we can ask whether this is a mistake. Dinesh Wadiwel says we’ve already made a mistake, because we still assume that it is humans who get “to decide”. Our first reaction is ‘yes, precisely’. We need to get away from the fantasy that we can avoid exerting power over animals. There is no possible world in which we are not exerting power over domesticated animals (and other humans!) with whom we live in a shared society.
In our view, the relevant question is not whether there is policing of natural behaviour—all social life depends upon the exercise of power and the policing of natural behaviour—but whether this power is exercised justly, in ways that give equal consideration to the interests of all members of society, and in ways that accord all members an equal opportunity to flourish. In today’s society, almost all of our social rules with respect to animals are highly unjust: we prohibit and regulate any animal activity that we find remotely inconvenient or unattractive, while ignoring the many ways our activities inconvenience or discomfort animals. The current rules are, in no sense, equally committed to the mutual flourishing of all members of society. But the response to this, we argue, cannot be to renounce any attempt to regulate behaviour in ways that enable cooperation and mutual flourishing.
Wadiwel slants the issue by using the language of “dominion” and “prerogative” (he suggests we endorse “the human prerogative to decide”, and that we fail to contest the idea that “man has dominion over the animals whether we like it or not”), and thereby implies that we assert some natural right to govern animals. In other work, Wadiwel links this claim to “dominion” as resting in a prepolitical individual right to dominate animals in private, which is a continuing spoil of war.Footnote 2 But this is not our view, in either the human or animal case. We have no dominion or prerogative to rule over our neighbours, co-citizens, or distant strangers—no one has the natural right to rule over others. This is the bedrock of liberalism. Of course, liberalism has historically only applied this to humans, not animals, but we extend this to animals. Just as we have no natural dominion over our human neighbours, so too we lack natural dominion over our animal neighbours. This is what it means to extend liberal theories of sovereignty and citizenship to animals: we are extending theories that are based precisely on the repudiation of any idea of pre-political rights of dominion. Therefore, in both the human and animal case, the exercise of power always stands in need of justification, and our project is precisely to ask what we know—what can we learn—about the various ways of holding power accountable.Footnote 3
So that is our response to worries about the very project of extending political theory to animals. But, of course, we don’t just extend any old political theory; we extend a quite particular conception of political community—namely, a conception of liberal-democratic nation-states. And so here another potential objection arises, advanced by Laura Janara: why take the liberal nation-state as our model? Our model of co-citizenship for domesticated animals (henceforth DAs) is tied to a historically specific conception of political order—namely, an order defined by territorially-bounded states, each of which derives its legitimacy from ideas of popular sovereignty and/or national self-determination. According to this conception, the world is composed of ‘peoples’ who inhabit different territories. They have the right to govern themselves and their territory, and the nation-state is the vehicle by which peoples enact these rights of self-government. This conception of the nation-state emerged first in Europe, but with decolonization has now essentially replicated itself around the world.
Our model takes this system of territorially-bounded nation-states as our starting point. Indeed, in its most schematic form, one could say that we simply insist that DAs be recognized as members of ‘the people’ in whose name nation-states govern, while wild animals should be seen as exercising citizenship within their own territorial sovereignty (and liminal animals occupying a space in-between). This extension of liberal citizenship to DAs is radical in one sense—since no existing state has adopted it or even contemplated it—but in another sense can be seen as conceptually conservative. Why stick with this tired, old model of political order? Why not the use the rights of animals as an opportunity to explore entirely new models, which conceive of us as “commoners of the Earth as commons,” rather than as citizens of nation-states? (Other alternative models might include “Habermasian postnationalism, Marxist internationalism, Anarchist confederalism, world-government theories, and anti-racist no-border activism”).Footnote 4 As Janara notes, there is no reason to believe that history has ended with the emergence of liberal nation-states, and indeed good reason to believe that this model will be unable to meet the challenges of the future (or to remedy the violence and injustices of its past).
We certainly welcome efforts by other theorists to develop alternative models of citizenship based instead on “commoners of the commons”. Indeed, one of our aims is to inspire people to develop such alternative political theories of animal rights.Footnote 5 We need to get a broader range of theories on the table, to test their relative strengths and weaknesses. (It would be very interesting to see how, for example, anarchist confederalists might deal with cat reproduction, or how cats and birds might co-exist as commoners of the commons.)
But let us just make two comments. First, even if one thinks that there are better alternatives to the framework of liberal nationhood, this is no way diminishes the duty of justice to include animals within that framework here and now. Our argument is that, through domestication, we have made DAs members of our society, and justice requires recognizing that membership and according membership rights. We have a duty to remedy this injustice—this failure to recognize membership—even if we think there are better ways of organizing society and politics in the future. Animals should not have to wait for this future political order in order to have their claims of justice met.
This is clear enough in the human case: even if we think there are better alternatives to liberal nationhood, we still think it is essential to include long-time residents within our current schemes of national citizenship. (And so too, historically, with women and racial minorities). No one would say we shouldn’t worry about the injustice of excluding second-generation Turks from German citizenship because, after all, citizenship in a liberal-democratic nation-state is just a passing phase of world history. Just as gays, women, and minorities do not have to wait for a new eco-cosmopolitan order, or the demise of global capitalism, so there’s no reason why DAs should have to wait. We owe them justice now, within the “existing social context”, and that means, for the foreseeable future, justice within liberal nation-states.
Second, and more speculatively, we would argue that liberal-democratic nationhood has important virtues not only for humans, but also, and perhaps even more so, for animals. Both humans and animals, we suspect, are better served if they are conceived of as citizens and sovereigns of bounded territories rather than as “commoners of the Earth as commons”.
Everything depends on the details of the alternative, and Janara’s short commentary isn’t intended to provide that sort of detail. But one way of interpreting this contrast between bounded citizens and “commoners of the commons” is to connect it to different views about the relationship between interests in territory and interests in mobility. Defenders of liberal nationhood argue that humans have valid interests in maintaining territorially-bounded communities built around shared national identities and cultures, interests that are protected by schemes of liberal nationhood that regulate borders and membership.Footnote 6 Cosmopolitan critics argue that attempts to assert collective claims to territory are untenable, in part because they wrongly restrict more fundamental interests in individual mobility. For cosmopolitans, individuals have the right to move freely across the global commons, in part because no one has the right to exclude them: no individual or group can claim exclusive possession of territory.
Avery Kolers calls this “terrestrial cosmopolitanism”, and distinguishes it from views (like ours) that rest instead on a “right to place”. The latter idea, on Kolers’ helpful definition, is not “an equal right to the whole world, but an equal right, individual or collective, to possess a particular place—possibly, but not necessarily, the place where you happen to find yourself”.Footnote 7
It is not clear whether Janara would endorse terrestrial cosmopolitanism, but despite her statement that she is not endorsing “a cosmopolitan political order”, cosmopolitanism in some form seems implicit in the idea that we are all “commoners of the commons”, and in her critique of ideas of bounded citizenship. On a natural reading, to be a commoner of the commons is precisely to assert that the whole Earth belongs to all of us, with no one group laying special claim to a bounded territory.
This contrast between terrestrial cosmopolitans and right-to-place theorists is one of the fundamental dividing lines in contemporary political philosophy. On the one hand, we have interests as individuals in unhindered mobility, including the right to move out of our existing community and move into the territory of another community—an interest that can only be satisfied if we prevent communities from restricting in-migration. On the other hand, we have interests, as members of bounded communities, in being able to effectively govern ourselves and pursue our shared way of life on our territories—an interest that can only be satisfied if bounded communities are able to regulate entry into their territory. For cosmopolitans, the interest in individual mobility trumps the interest in collective autonomy, such that universal rights to individual mobility trump collective claims to territory. We disagree.
We cannot hope to resolve such a fundamental debate in this short reply, but let us just state that we find terrestrial cosmopolitanism dubious in the human case, and totally implausible in the animal case. In the human case, we have elsewhere discussed why humans have legitimate interests in forming bounded political communities with recognized sovereignty rights over themselves and their territories, including rights to regulate mobility into the territory.Footnote 8 Some of the gravest injustices historically have been tied up with denial of these rights to sovereignty and rights to place—e.g., European invasion and settler colonization of the Americas. It’s important to remember that these actions were often justified precisely by appeal to terrestrial cosmopolitanism.Footnote 9 The interests that Europeans had in gaining access to indigenous peoples’ territory were granted weight by theories of terrestrial cosmopolitanism, exacerbated by prejudice about the value of the indigenous ways of life that were radically disrupted by European settlement. Terrestrial cosmopolitanism does, theoretically, give weight to the interests of the original inhabitants, but without recognition of an antecedent right to place, these interests are all-too-easily trumped by the interests of larger or stronger groups seeking new territories for their pleasure or profit.
It is precisely to avoid complicity with this sort of imperialism that many cosmopolitans today disavow terrestrial cosmopolitanism in favour of newer ideas of ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’. According to theories of rooted cosmopolitanism, while the interests of all people matter morally, no matter where they live, we must include amongst these interests the importance of membership in bounded communities which exercise control over themselves and their territories. Moral cosmopolitanism, in other words, does not require terrestrial cosmopolitanism, but is consistent with—and indeed best served by—recognizing rights to bounded territory and to autonomy.Footnote 10
There is much more to be said about this choice between terrestrial and rooted cosmopolitanism in the human case, but in our view, the argument is even clearer in the case of animals. If terrestrial cosmopolitanism has been an accomplice of injustice in the human case, it is an absolute catastrophe for most animals.
Under cosmopolitanism, wild animals gain individual rights to universal mobility (including into areas of human settlement) but lose collective rights to keep others out of their own territories (including human settlers). This is a very bad trade-off for most wild animals. Giving humans a prima facie right to move into the habitat of wild animals and to benefit from its resources is a disaster for wild animals who flee human encroachment and try to live independently of humans and human settlement insofar as they are able.Footnote 11
This loss of secure territorial rights is not offset by the increased individual mobility they gain. For a Spanish hogfish living on the Belize barrier reef, or a swift fox adapted to the ecological niche of Saskatchewan’s short grass prairie, a right to a universal commons is meaningless: their lives and well-being are intimately tied up with very specific ecological niches. What they need is a right to place that pre-empts human encroachment.
Janara suggests that conceptions of humans and wild animals as “kin”, found in many indigenous cultures, might offer an alternative to secure territorial rights. There is much we can learn from indigenous ideas about respect for, and reciprocity with, wild animals. Indeed, our Zoopolis model of respectful state-to-state relations with wild animal nations assumes that reciprocal and mutually beneficial relations with wild animal communities are possible and desirable. But while indigenous conceptions of animals as kin are vastly preferable to the idea of animals as commodities, they have not protected wild animals from violence, exploitation and, in some cases, habitat destruction by indigenous societies.Footnote 12 Ideas of kinship call us to respectful and sustainable reciprocal relationship, but they do not grant to wild animals the crucial right to say, ‘No, we will not interact on your terms.’
In Zoopolis we defend just such a collective right to territory for wild animal communities. We argue that this right imposes not just an end to all direct forms of human violence against animals, but also immediate and drastic curbs on human expansion—no further extension of human development, road building and resource extraction into wild animal territory; an end to human pollution and other cross-border impacts (including effects of climate change) on wild animal territories; no further growth of human population except insofar as this can be sustainably managed within existing dimensions of human development. Humans do not have a right to expand over the entire globe—unlimited mobility is not a basic universal right. Rather, we must respect the sovereignty of those who already occupy the remaining wilderness, and learn to live smarter and better on the sites we already occupy.
The reality is that terrestrial cosmopolitanism is not an animal-friendly approach.Footnote 13 For humans and animals to flourish, we need to recognize rights to place, and in our view, models of liberal nationhood are a good starting point for theorizing such rights to place.
Of course, liberal-democratic nation-states have been full of injustices. The national(ist) dimension of liberal nation-states has been detrimental to indigenous peoples and to ethnic and national minorities. But, we would argue—and indeed have argued elsewhere—that these injustices can be remedied through new forms of plural citizenship that offer revised terms of federation and membership.Footnote 14 And we would argue the same in relation to animals. Historically, liberal-democratic nation-states have been brutal exploiters of both wild and domesticated animals. But we argue that this injustice can be remedied through new forms of animal sovereignty for wilderness animals, and co-citizenship for DAs.
It’s also true, as Wadiwel notes, that this framework of bounded citizenship inevitably puts some people into positions of vulnerability, including those who do not fit neatly into the boxes of sovereignty or citizenship, those who are moving between societies, or who settle but are unable or unwilling to integrate into the existing society. This is true both of humans and animals. These liminal denizens are vulnerable to being stigmatized and oppressed.
But we would disagree that the mere fact of differential status is itself proof of injustice, and it would be a Pyrrhic victory to solve this problem through terrestrial cosmopolitanism. We need our categories to be responsive to the needs of individuals, rather than cleaving to some desire for uniformity or parsimony. We argue that the distinctive or differential status of liminal denizens, in both the human and animal case, can be a response to their own subjective good. And so when Wadiwel asks why squirrels (or the Amish) are not accorded citizenship, our answer is that they do not want it: they prefer a looser relationship of tolerant co-existence rather than an intimate scheme of cooperation that requires much more regulation based on shared norms.
In fact, it is not quite accurate to say, as Wadiwel does, that denizens are “not offered citizenship rights, nor sovereign rights”. Our model contemplates the possibility for individual animals or communities to shift categories, including the possibility that denizens can become citizens (or that DA co-citizens can become denizens). Our argument is that, for most liminal and wild animals, it is not in their interests to become our co-citizens, given all that citizenship entails (such as, regulation of reproduction, cessation of predation, adoption of civil norms, etc.). The categories of co-citizen, denizen or member of a sovereign nation are not identities which we humans unilaterally and permanently assign to animals based on their species nature or territorial location. They are categories that are intended to be responsive to the moral interests of animals in their various relations to human communities, and are intended to capture certain generalizations regarding these interests. In general, we argue, liminal animals are better served by denizenship status (in which we have fewer duties towards them, and they have fewer duties towards us) than citizenship status. But this doesn’t rule out the possibility that in individual cases (e.g., a liminal animal who has been injured, or has formed a close relationship with humans), citizenship status would be preferable; and in such cases the individual should indeed be recognized as a co-citizen.
Our account of denizen status may open the door to the danger of stigmatization, or second class status for liminal animals, but as far as we can tell, Wadiwel doesn’t actually make clear what is the substantive injustice our model imposes on, say, squirrels (or the Amish). He simply denounces the very idea of “differential rights” as forcing individuals into different boxes. But our view is that undifferentiated status is its own “neat box”, and one that is less, not more, responsive to the diverse interests of individuals.
So that is the first part of our reply: We hope to have provided at least a partial defense for the two key starting points of our approach—first, that we need a political theory of animal rights that acknowledges, rather than evades, the exercise of power, and second, that theories of liberal-democratic nationhood provide a relevant baseline for thinking about justice for animals, both because liberal democratic nationhood constitutes the existing framework within which billions of animals are in fact governed, and because animals, like humans, have important interests in bounded community and a right to place.
Reproduction
We now turn to a narrower issue which arose in all of the commentaries, one which is central to the challenge of forging a new ethical and political relationship with non-humans. This is the issue of population management, particularly in relation to DAs, and even more specifically in relation to cats.
To address this issue, a bit of context is required. The goal of Zoopolis is to build a group-differentiated, or relational, theory of animal rights which is consistent with, and upholds, the commitment to basic rights and protections for all individual beings. It is a theory, in other words, which recognizes each animal—human or other—as a unique locus of subjectivity and value—a clearest-selvèd spark, in Hopkins words. As Christiane Bailey puts it: “an animal is not merely alive, but has a life.” Not just existing, not merely surviving—but every one a conscious agent, a distinct personality with a unique biography.
The challenge is to uphold this vision, while recognizing that as individuals we thrive in communities of interdependent relationships. Co-citizenship is a primary instance of such a community, in which we balance respect and concern for individuals with recognition that as members of a shared society or a shared cooperative scheme, we must all adapt our behaviour to ensure that society is a place where all can flourish. In the previous section of this reply, we defended our political theory approach by emphasizing the inevitability of power and the need to hold its exercise accountable, but we want now to emphasize how much this in turn is rooted not simply in facts about physical proximity or scarce resources, but more fundamentally in the fact that both DAs and humans are social species, who therefore flourish (or not) in virtue of the nature of our social relations, which in turn rest upon fundamental social norms of trust, cooperation, communication, reciprocity, and participation.Footnote 15
We are individual selves moving along unique life paths, but we do so as fully embedded social beings. And this social dimension, for all social species, involves regulation: mechanisms for internal self-control and/or external sanctions. To repeat, this is true for social species in general, not just humans. And so, when we think about DAs, we should not start with an implicit assumption that living with humans in a multi-species society requires socialization and regulation of behaviour that would be absent if they lived only amongst themselves in a single-species society. There is no escaping normative society. And so it is not a criticism of a society to say, ‘look, this society is policing individuals and regulating social interaction.’ Criticism needs to take the form of saying, ‘look, the way this society polices individuals and regulates social interaction is inferior to other options—it’s less fair, less compassionate, or less conducive to flourishing.’ As Bailey notes, we need to get away from a “simplistic dichotomy between non-interference/domination.”
So, there is no society without socialization/regulation, and we believe that our citizenship model provides an effective framework for thinking about how to ensure that the shared norms of a mixed human-DA society are responsive to the interests of all members, and enable all to flourish together. (At any rate, we think it’s the best available framework.) Many readers are understandably suspicious that this citizenship framework will simply become an excuse to maintain human domination over animals, and so look for evidence in our book that, when push comes to shove, we subordinate animal interests to human convenience, that we police and regulate DAs in ways we would not permit for humans. And, virtually without exception, critics think they find this evidence in one passage of the book—namely, our discussion of cats, and in particular our discussion of the regulation of cats’ reproduction and predatory behaviour.
We will address that passage momentarily, but let us first emphasize that we discuss many different DAs in Zoopolis—dogs, horses, pigs, donkeys, cows, sheep, chickens, hens—and many different dimensions of their subjective good, in matters of work, space and mobility, health care, protection, friendships and sociability. So far as we can tell, there are few objections to our proposals on most of these issues, for most DAs. So even if it were true (as we will dispute momentarily) that our framework fails with respect to cats and reproduction, we might still think it broadly successful, especially given that (as we argue at length) existing alternative accounts of our obligations to DAs fail across multiple interests for most animals. Here again, it’s difficult to judge how severe this criticism is with without knowing what the alternatives are.
Having said that, we’re unwilling to concede that our story fails even in relation to cats and reproduction. The domestic cat is a highly social species. It’s true they are solitary when hunting, but they are very much a social species. Feral cats form large colonies, with hierarchical structures, complex social rules involving mating, grooming, food sharing and so on. Cats, as Clare Palmer notes, reproduce at a rapid rate, and do not internally regulate their reproduction. Their population is regulated by external factors such as food supply, environmental conditions, physical risks, and so on. They are an extremely flexible and successful species. Recent (albeit contested) research indicates a devastating impact of free-roaming domestic cats on wild animal populations of birds, as well as on small mammals such as voles and chipmunks. Indeed many consider cats the ultimate invasive species (besides humans!).
Palmer is also quite right that cats pose a huge challenge to the citizenship framework for domesticated animals. But we would add (and we suspect that she would agree) that they pose a huge challenge for any framework. So, once again, we must keep in mind that we are comparing better and worse options for dealing with genuine difficulties. What is the best way of organizing society that respects the rights and ensures the flourishing of individual cats, in a way which does not sacrifice the interests and flourishing of others?
We acknowledge in Zoopolis that it is very hard to achieve this in the case of cats. As part of a co-citizenship arrangement, we would have to regulate cats’ diet, mobility and reproduction. To allow our cat co-citizens unlimited reproduction would pose an unsustainable burden on the scheme of social cooperation, and to allow our cat co-citizens unlimited mobility would make us responsible for lethal threats to liminal and wild animals. We believe it might be possible to regulate cats in the required ways without compromising their basic rights and interests—i.e., that we can ensure sufficient mobility without given them free access to the outdoors; that we can accommodate their predatory instincts without allowing them to hunt other animals; that we can meet their nutritional needs without killing animals to feed them; and that we can ensure their lives are filled with love and pleasure while nevertheless restricting their sex and reproductive lives. This is a very tall order. It relies on a great deal of human ingenuity—like the design of outdoor cat habitats and other mechanisms for creating sufficient mobility; the creation of palatable and nutritionally complete foods, and of toys and games and environments which satisfy hunting instincts; and the formation of loving social communities which compensate for limited opportunities to bear and raise offspring.
This looks like a pretty procrustean bed, but it’s important to remember that all of this restriction and policing is part of a larger context that allows cats many possibilities for flourishing that are unavailable except in the context of a mixed community with humans. This includes access to human technology and creativity not just in terms of food, shelter, health care, and protection from violence, but also extensive opportunities for love and companionship, for recreation, and enjoyable experiences and sensations. It also includes the opportunity to be socialized into a multispecies community including dogs and other animals and the way this expands opportunities for agency and flourishing. (In Zoopolis we discuss some of the fascinating recent research on multi-species households and the ways that cats and dogs learn to play together across the species gap.)
Given these very complex trade-offs, it is premature to make definitive pronouncements about whether co-citizenship in a mixed society is the best option for cats, and whether it is the option they would choose if they were able to explore other options. We simply don’t have enough information to make such judgements. The way forward, as in our relations with all DAs, is in a spirit of great humility, and provisional exploration as we learn more from, and about, cats.
The question of sex and reproduction is particularly challenging. It seems reasonable to assume that cats have an interest in sex, mating, and caring for young, and that there are feelings of pleasure and love associated with these activities. But how significant are these interests, and what trade-offs do they involve? For example, the sexual act for female cats is thought to be quite painful, because the male cat’s penis has spines which rake the female’s vagina in order to stimulate ovulation. Maybe it’s good, maybe it’s not! There is a lot of violence in feral cat colonies around sexual competition, and sex hormones also seem to be central to control of territory and the competitive violence associated with that. If controlling cats’ sexuality reduces this violence and pain, and if alternative opportunities for love and pleasure in their lives can be provided, might this not promote their basic interests?Footnote 16
But this is only the first step in the analysis—i.e., identifying what are cats’ basic interests in sex and reproduction. The next step is to ask how these interests (in sexual pleasure, love, raising young) relate to cats’ interests more generally, including their interests in being part of a mixed society with the inevitable accommodations that requires.
Palmer suggests that, on our citizenship theory, regulating cats’ sex lives should count clearly as a violation of their reproductive rights, and a denial of the citizenship rights we extend to humans. Similarly, Wadiwel worries that, in endorsing the regulation of cat reproduction, we are tacitly accepting that “species difference justifies differential logics and uses of violence in the name of population control.” But in fact we do not accept that either cats or humans have inherent or unlimited rights to reproduction. Our starting point, rather, is that because humans have powerful interests in sex, reproduction and parenting, interference in these activities must meet a very high threshold of justification. But there are many cases where this threshold is met, and where we do regulate these activities. In some cases, regulation is to prevent harm to others: this is why we criminalize non-consensual sex, sex with children, and sex without disclosure of HIV positive status. This also underlies the enforcing of norms of child-raising. In other cases, we regulate for paternalistic reasons; for example, we carry out sterilizations and adopt many other strategies (such as sex segregation) to limit reproductive options of those unable to regulate these decisions in their own best interests.Footnote 17
In Zoopolis we also affirm the potential legitimacy of more general restrictions on human reproduction. At present, humans have sustained an exploding population in large part by seizing territory that (on our view) rightly belongs to wild animals. This would be prohibited in our account, and humans would need to regulate reproduction to live within our means. It is time for us to recognize that our interests in procreation, if unregulated, threaten to destabilize the flourishing of society at a more general level. So in the human case, we start from a presumption that there are important interests in sex and reproduction, but these are legitimately regulated for reasons of paternalism, to protect harm or violence to others, and to protect the general sustainability of society.
We apply the same basic logic to the case of cats. Regulation of sex and reproduction must meet a very high bar of justification, but there are valid justifications relating to harm to others, paternalism, and the sustainability of society. The relevant context includes a) our best understanding of what interests in sex and reproduction are actually at stake for a particular individual cat; b) the trade-offs between these interests and other interests of the individual; and c) the capacity of the individual to self-regulate. We are applying the same logic to humans and cats, although relevant differences in interests and capacities may result in different policies.
Regarding paternalistic intervention, the evidence is that cats are unable to self-regulate reproduction in light of their own interests as individuals and as members of a sustainable mixed society. A cat cannot make a meaningful choice between Life A, in which her sex life is regulated by humans on their continuously revisable best understanding of her interests as part of a co-citizenship framework, and Life B, in which humans leave her be as part of a feral cat society, with its own norms, and where sex involves significant violence, and birthrates are controlled through starvation, exposure, violence and natural hazards. Since cats cannot make this choice on their own, we need to do our best to understand how these options would affect the subjective experience and subjective good of cats.
Recall the argument we made earlier that there is no society without norms and without regulation either internal or external. So the choice for cats isn’t between freedom, on the one hand, and human domination, on the other. It’s between two kinds of life, with different possibilities for flourishing and subjective wellbeing. We can only make this assessment by responding to what cats can indicate to us about their subjective wellbeing, enabling their meaningful agency insofar as they have it, by doing our best to understand and contextualize the ‘big picture’ of their interests—and then deciding accordingly. Yes, we are the deciders. There is no world in which we do not make decisions for cats—either to let them fend for themselves as feral colonies, or to include them as part of a citizenship arrangement, or various possibilities in between. But all involve us making decisions which affect us, the cats, and a lot of other individual beings as well. We don’t do this because we arrogate to ourselves a pre-political entitlement to dominion over cats. There’s no sovereign right involved. But there are relations of asymmetrical power and dependence, and better and worse ways of holding them accountable.
Conclusion
So far, we have tried to show that liberal citizenship theory offers some important—and perhaps surprising—resources for thinking about just relations with animals. But in conclusion, we’d like to briefly return to one of the central concerns of Janara’s commentary. Janara raises the question of whether the fundamental framework of a liberal citizenship model—premised on a commitment to cherish individuals within liberal democratic political communities where all are co-creators of a cooperative social scheme in which all might flourish—is simply inadequate, and perhaps counterproductive, in the face of the enormous ecological challenges that face us.
It has been a long and obviously unfinished battle in human history to insist on the dignity of every individual, and the need for a protective zone of rights around individual freedom, autonomy and flourishing. Janara’s commentary asks whether we really should be trying to extend this zone of protection to all commoners of the commons, or whether it represents a misguided form of individualism that has driven us to the brink of destruction. Perhaps we need to re-think our basic politics in more collective terms, rather than extending to animals the status of ‘subjects’.
Janara suggests that this excessive individualism is tied to the imperialist drive to “make live” homo sapiens. We torture and kill animals, we steal their land and their subsistence, we destroy our collective environment, all in the name of valuing individual humans, and creating ever more of them to value. By extending to animals this valuation as subjects, she worries, we add “animals into a category that modern Euro-American humans invented for themselves”, when instead we all need to be reconceived in more collectivist and interdependent terms.
We agree that human greed for life and resources, justified on the basis of human exceptionalism and expansionism, has driven us to the brink. However, we see this destructive drive as quite different from, and indeed directly in conflict with, ideas concerning the unique dignity and flourishing of individual subjects. Concern for the dignity and flourishing of individuals is incoherent if it is premised on destroying the dignity and flourishing of others. And the forces of global capitalism and human expansionism run amok over the rights of individuals, human and non-human. When we argue in Zoopolis for the extension of basic rights and citizenship rights to animals, we are not arguing for an extension of a (non-existent) right to pillage the Earth, to participate in global capitalism, and to trample all others in the name of individual survival or collective proliferation; we are arguing for the extension of an idea of individual value which is only coherent in the context of respect for others and a flourishing community.Footnote 18
Consider, again, the question of reproduction. Humans are rapidly expanding to take over the entire planet, crowding out most other life forms besides our own or those we find functionally useful. This constant increase in the numbers of humans does nothing, by itself, to improve the dignity of individual lives. Indeed, when women achieve a certain level of dignified existence—health, education, the means to make a living—birthrates plummet, and the wellbeing of existing children improves. There is no relationship between cherishing individual subjects and a drive to “make live” more of them. Similarly, the multiplication of animal lives in industrial farms is precisely the result of ignoring the dignity of individual lives, not a corollary of individualism.
So there is nothing inherent in the idea of recognizing and protecting the dignity of individual subjects which leads us to expansionist models of population and economic growth, resource extraction, and environmental destruction. Nor is there anything inherent in the idea of cherishing individual subjects which is incompatible with recognizing that we are formed by, and flourish as, interdependent members of social and ecological communities.
Existing approaches to the question of the ‘carrying capacity’ of the Earth completely ignore non-human Earthlings, except insofar as they instrumentally serve human interests. Depending on the calculus, we are said to have passed, or to be approaching, carrying capacity. Our argument in Zoopolis is that these calculations are grossly distorted. If we understand carrying capacity as sustainable numbers and practices that recognize the fundamental rights of all Earthlings to life, liberty, and the opportunity for individual and communal flourishing, then we long ago exceeded carrying capacity. Human population expansion, resource use, and colonization of animal habitat (quite apart from direct violence towards individual animals), represent a colossal infringement of the individual and collective rights of animals and animal communities.
We share Janara’s dismay at the overwhelming destruction of the commons, the relentless increase in human population, and the uncontrollable appetites of global capitalism, but the culprit here is human greed, folly and arrogance—not the idea of the dignity of the individual subject. We don’t need a “horizontalizing effect on our view of all matter” to save us from destruction. Janara is right that we are interdependent Earthlings of the commons, but as conscious subjects, human and non-human animals are crucially vulnerable in ways that plants, minerals, ecologies and zoonoses are not. We are not just “overlapping materialities” and ecologically interdependent beings, we are also socially interdependent beings. That is the space where justice arises, and why we must maintain our commitment to recognizing and cherishing unique and precious subjects.
Acknowledgements:
We are very grateful to Chlöe Taylor and Rob Nichols for organizing the CPA/CPSA panel which produced this exchange. Thank you to Christiane Bailey for her excellent overview of Zoopolis, and to Laura Janara, Clare Palmer, and Dinesh Wadiwel for their thoughtful engagements with our project, and for gently nudging us to take our analysis further, and deeper.
