In 2 Henry VI, one of Shakespeare’s first plays, the rabble-rouser Jack Cade proposes that ‘There shall be no money, all shall eat and drink on my score, and I will apparel them all in one livery, that they may agree like brothers and worship me their lord’. In this new brotherhood of men, all will be equal under Cade as Brother No. 1, precursor of Orwell’s chief pig Napoleon. Dick the butcher replies to Cade’s clarion call with ‘The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers’, to which Cade retorts ‘Nay, that I mean to do’. This is undoubtedly the most quoted exchange about lawyers in all of Shakespeare. Whether Dick really means to kill all lawyers or whether this is a bait for Cade is not entirely clear, since Dick has repeatedly punctured Cade’s pretensions to legitimacy in this scene.
A society without law is unthinkable to Shakespeare. That much is made clear by the emphatic rejection of Falstaff in favour of the Lord Chief Justice in 2 Henry IV, much though a social order without lawyers and lawyers’ fees may be a universally cherished utopian prospect. Moreover, and prominent among ‘the whips and scorns of time’ from which Hamlet yearns to escape in his soliloquy ‘To be or not to be’, there is ‘the law’s delay’. Later in the play, still harping on lawyers, Hamlet comments with a measure of schadenfreude on one of the skulls thrown up by the gravedigger: ‘There’s another. Why, may not that be the skull of a lawyer? Where be his quiddities now, his quillities, his cases, his tenures, and his tricks? Why does he suffer this mad knave now to knock him about the sconce with a dirty shovel, and will not tell him of his action of battery?’
Clearly Shakespeare’s view of the law was philosophically divided at best, even if in life he did not hesitate to use lawyers to recover debts, draft indentures and write out his will. His Stratford solicitor, one Francis Collins, was left the impressive sum of £13 6s 8d by Shakespeare, one of the largest bequests in the entire testament, suggesting that Collins was a trusted friend. It so happens that records have survived for the Consistory Court that sat in Stratford-upon-Avon during part of Shakespeare’s life in the town. This document, popularly known as the ‘Bawdy Court’ register, is mined by Jonathan Bate in his contribution to this collection of essays, the proceedings of an international conference on Shakespeare and the law hosted by the School of Law at the University of Warwick in 2007.
The Bawdy Court affords an intimate, domestic view of local law-in-action. Fines are imposed for a series of offences ranging from failure to attend church on time to a refusal to receive the Eucharist, a mystifying trespass committed by Shakespeare’s own daughter Susanna in 1606, a potentially dangerous act for her and her entire family because she could be suspected of aligning herself with the recusant faction in the town. Most of the offences in the Bawdy Court register are minor and occasionally colourful: women are reprimanded or fined for calling one another ‘maggoty whore’, ‘pocky lousy hedge whore’ or ‘scurvy fart arse quean’, while libellous gossip and charges of adultery also feature. If the records of the church court do not tell us much about the law as such, they do, however, illustrate the extent to which ‘competing legal jurisdictions’ (Bate p. 42) governed the life of Shakespeare’s own backyard, while also incidentally providing an invaluable account of the language used in the town, a far cry from the genteel idiom of its official documents. Still in the context of the topic of ‘Shakespeare, Money and the Law of Contract’, Germaine Greer, fresh from her study of Mrs Shakespeare’s life, considers legal issues that may, or may not, illuminate Shakespeare’s study of marriage, dowry and inheritance in plays such as The Taming of the Shrew, A Midsummer Night’s Dream and Much Ado about Nothing. In the end Greer refrains from using hypotheses about the real lives of Shakespeare and his wider family (parents, brothers, sister and daughters) to explain such contractual arrangements in the plays. Acres of imaginative space after all divide the seemingly immutable patriarchal ‘law of Athens’, upheld by Theseus at the start of the Dream, and the multiple puzzles and unknowns surrounding various Shakespeare marriages.
Such is Shakespeare’s interest in the law in his plays that some of his biographers have wondered whether he might not have been articled in a lawyer’s office in his youth. The law as a concept looms large in his metaphors and similes while also occupying a core topical position in a number of plays. Not all of these are represented here. One that is though – it is accorded an entire section to itself – is The Merchant of Venice, appropriately so considering the rich suggestiveness of that play and its unique position in a post-Holocaust world. Here law and anti-Semitism collide, and what should be the glue that binds society together is used to undermine a legal contract in the service of a broader agenda that has long been suspected to be anti-Semitic. The play remains one of the most controversial texts in the Shakespeare canon, even more so than the Shrew, and continues to cause ripples, in contemporary Britain as well as in other countries. In ‘Shylock in Transylvania: Anti-Semitism and the Law in East Central Europe’, István Pogány revisits the contentious role of the play in the course of the latter half of the twentieth century, studying ways in which its themes converge with anxieties over World War II collaboration and collective guilt.
It is precisely because Shylock is humanised as father and widower that Shakespeare’s play, known at first as The Jew of Venice, continues to cause such angst, unlike the drama which lies behind it, Marlowe’s darkly comic farce The Jew of Malta. The defeat by law of the Jewish legal literalist (‘A Daniel come to judgement’, he exclaims, and ‘I crave the law’) is meant to show him justly hoist with his own petard. Shylock desires the letter of the law until it is turned against him when Portia notes that his bond does not grant him a drop of Antonio’s blood. Equivocation by Portia or just plain old-fashioned and binding literalism? Or instead demonstrating that law can be twisted to suit any end, that far from being the jewel in the crown of a civilised society, law is frequently the fig leaf that legitimates oppression? This point is made here under the topical heading of ‘Violence, the State and the Citizen’, a section that deals, among others, with the ritual, symbolic nature of Elizabethan punishments for treason.
Shakespeare certainly engaged with his own time, most daringly perhaps in his regicide play Macbeth, written after the 1606 Gunpowder executions and using equivocation as an engine of the plot. Shakespeare knew, of course, that equivocation was the Jesuits’ favourite evasion strategy: their conscience and faith forbade them to lie in court while at the same time they could not tell the truth either, for fear of betraying their comrades and the people who were hiding them. The most infamous equivocator of the day had been Robert Southwell. While Shakespeare does not directly allude to Southwell in Macbeth, he does refer to Southwell’s friend and superior, Father Henry Garnett, when the Porter in Macbeth welcomes to his own ‘Hell Gate’ a ‘farmer, that hang’d himself on th’expectation of plenty’. ‘Farmer’ had been Garnett’s undercover name, the allusion being consolidated by the lines which follow: ‘Faith, here’s an equivocator, that could swear in both the scales against either scale; who committed treason enough for God’s sake, yet could not equivocate to heaven: O! come in, equivocator.’
Macbeth seems to feature in this collection largely because the author of ‘Terrorists and Equivocators’, Ian Ward, proposes to use the play as a platform for engaging with the contemporary political scene and foreign policy. The suppression of the Catholic mission is interpreted as a Stuart ‘War on Terror’. The phrase itself is freely bandied about along with stabs at ‘Bush and Blair’, as though Shakespeare’s play were primarily an illustrative historical document rather than a complex literary work. If historical analogies with recent events must be explored by means of Shakespeare’s plays, then why not use Henry V? It affords the clearest evidence of Shakespeare’s complex, perhaps discomfiting, response to just such a piece of apparently rash military adventurism as the Iraq War. Shakespeare’s grandiloquent, uneasily patriotic, play itself asks the question of the legality of the invasion of France. In response to Henry’s public invitation to the Archbishop of Canterbury to justify the war, ‘May I with right and conscience make this claim’, the latter equivocates about the geographical regions covered by the ancient ‘Salic law’ in order to justify Henry’s spurious demands. What renders the chief prelate’s convoluted (‘as clear as is the summer’s sun’ according to his own lights) and transparently fatuous passage intriguing above all, though, is that his sophistry is copied by Shakespeare almost verbatim from Holinshed’s Chronicles. He added little more than line breaks to it, as if he wished to disown this piece of trite mendacity. On the same topical lines, the night before Agincourt, Michael Williams the Welshman encounters the king in disguise at night and warns him that, if the cause was not right in the first place, ‘the King himself hath a heavy reckoning to make when all those legs and arms and heads chopped off in a battle shall join together at the latter day and cry all “We died at such a place” … Now if these men do not die well it will be a black matter for the King, that led them to it, who to disobey were against all proportion of subjection.’
Henry V is one of the significant absentees from this collection, and so is 2 Henry IV, the play which more than any other engages with the majesty of the law. Few scenes are as striking as the rejection of Falstaff in favour of the Lord Chief Justice, the very same man who had boldly committed a feckless young Hal to prison for striking him. At the news of Bolingbroke’s death, Falstaff exults with ‘the laws of England are at my commandment. Blessed are they that have been my friends, and woe to my Lord Chief Justice’: saturnalian energy and revels on a collision course with the austerity of the Lord Chief Justice, a man unwilling to stoop to Falstaff’s peevish charade when the two antitheses meet in the second scene of the play. More than any other text in the canon, 2 Henry IV suggests that Shakespeare valued law and order above the chaos of Falstaff, even if losing Falstaff comes at a tremendous price. This is spelled out in 1 Henry IV, when a cocky Lord of Misrule tells his boon companion Hal ‘Banish plump Jack and banish all the world’. To which Hal replies ‘I do, I will’.
The absence of 2 Henry IV from this collection suggests that the various contributors were allowed free rein to choose whichever texts they deemed appropriate under the remit of the six overarching topics. Such an eclectic editorial policy inevitably leaves the reader with a somewhat skewed picture of Shakespeare and the law, particularly when texts that are not obviously of primary relevance are granted considerable exposure at the expense of others. Thus, under the heading ‘Shakespeare and the Law of Love’, Daniela Carpi analyses subversions of the law in Romeo and Juliet, focusing on the figure of the Prince, the ultimate court of appeal in lawless Verona (why not include A Midsummer Night’s Dream here, which explicitly pits ancient law and custom against the sexual fantasies and magic of Bottom and Titania?). The audience never discover the Prince’s name, but students of the play know it because in a stage direction Shakespeare calls him ‘Escalus’, a name borrowed from his source in Brooke.
Did Shakespeare deliberately withhold the name to align this ineffectual figure of authority with Machiavelli’s notorious political pragmatist? The legendary Florentine as cartoon villain speaks the prologue to Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta, appearing there as Machevil (i.e. McEvil), his other English nickname being Old Nick (the devil), both products of orthodox Elizabethan propaganda which was resolutely hostile to Il Principe. Carpi argues that the Prince in the play ‘takes on sacred overtones of mercy and forgiveness … These characteristics confer on him an almost metaphysical halo’ (p. 120). She suggests further that the Prince’s words (her use of a capital ‘P’ a gesture perhaps towards Machiavelli) ‘echo the episode of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise’ (p. 124). These are huge claims for a minor, albeit symbolically important, figure in the play. It accords with a wider tendency here to see social and institutional forces working beneath the surface of the play, with Shakespeare fully aware of them and deploying them intentionally. When Carpi notes that the play dramatises a contraposition between equally valid ‘juridical norms and canonical code’ (p. 128) she may well be right about the underlying legal story, yet this is a version of the story of Romeo and Juliet that few audiences and literary students of the play will recognise.
Whatever philosophical debates about authority, law and patriarchy are at issue here, they are marginal to the work’s imaginative impact, its brilliant celebration of trespass, its generous concession of sexual fulfilment to the young lovers (may not this be one of the reasons why Shakespeare marries them off posthaste?), and above all, in this context of canonical law, the repudiation of Christian sanctions against suicide. The Verona of the play is a distinctly Catholic world of friars, monastic cells and confessions, hence one would expect Imogen’s Christian fears in Cymbeline to apply in full force: ‘Against self-slaughter / There is a prohibition so divine / That cravens my weak hand’. Burial at crossroads with stakes thrust through their hearts was the posthumous fate of suicides, decreed by law. Instead, we are left with grieving parents constructing a golden monument to honour their children’s memory and celebrate a new-found peace.
Canonical law and laws generally are frequently flouted by Shakespeare in his plays, perhaps most strikingly in this intense tragedy of young love. Law regulates and restrains, the imagination invariably pulls the other way: Macbeth is a regicide and child-killer, but he speaks some of Shakespeare’s greatest verse; we are with him without therefore approving of him morally. As audiences in the theatre we are always closer to Richard III than Henry VII, Bottom than Theseus, Falstaff than the Lord Chief Justice, Antony and Cleopatra than Octavius Caesar, because drama is ludic, not real life. The law and Shakespeare make uneasy bedfellows as this thought-provoking collection demonstrates time and again.
