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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 September 2004
This is a very interesting book, and an important book for anyone interested in the macroeconomic history of the United States in the twentieth century. Robert Gordon is an empirical macroeconomist with historical interests, and this collection of his papers informs the reader both about the progress of the economy and the history of ideas. The average economic historian, however, will find some of Gordon's econometrics hard going, so I will provide here an historian's guide to the book. My task is made easier because I can recommend that readers turn first to Robert Solow's elegant foreword and then to Gordon's clear introductions to the four groups of articles. These nontechnical pages give a very good idea of the contents of the book, allowing the reader to find easily the articles of interest to him or her. I will indicate a few relatively nontechnical papers that should interest economic historians.
Gordon is a Keynesian, and the articles here concern classic Keynesian questions: business cycles and unemployment, inflation and price determination. When Gordon discusses productivity change, it is within this Keynesian framework as modified by Solow, not in the currently fashionable growth-theoretic mode. This orientation energizes the volume as Gordon pronounces deviant theories moribund and provides a common orientation to the several papers.
The first set of papers analyzes productivity growth in the United States. Gordon argues that the productivity burst in the middle of the century was the unique result of a small set of innovations, starting with electricity and the internal-combustion engine. In his graphic term: “One Big Wave.” Gordon here anticipated the comparable work of Moses Abramovitz and Paul David (“American Macroeconomic Growth in the Era of Knowledge-Based Progress: A Long-Run Interpretation.” The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. Edited by Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000: III, 1–92) and the more specific work of Alex Field (“The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century.” American Economic Review 93 [September 2003]: 1399–413). Gordon's work is distinguished by his careful attention to the data and by his argument that recent advances in productivity, although highly touted elsewhere, do not hold a candle to the One Big Wave. The tsunami will not come again soon, if Gordon is correct. Read chapter 2 for more details.
The second set of papers is intellectual history. Gordon recounts the rise and fall of real-business-cycle theory, also known as neo-classical or “fresh-water” macroeconomics. He states forcefully that the neo-classical view of the Great Depression is arrant nonsense, that real business cycles cannot be found even in smaller fluctuations, and that no sensible person can entertain these ideas today. This body of theory arose in the 1970s to explain the simultaneous rise in prices and unemployment, but it was a failed project. Read chapter 7 for entertaining details.
The third group of papers returns from intellectual to actual history, constructing a basically Keynesian view of the economy where both supply and demand shocks matter. This was done in the context of the Philips Curve, but it has outlasted the usefulness of that construct. Gordon argues that it does not help to understand the movements of the economy to analyze separately labor and product markets. He argues instead for a “triangle model” of inflation where prices and wages are determined by demand, supply, and inertia. Read chapter 13 for more details.
The final set of papers employs this general model to explain recent history. Gordon argues that the peak of inflation and unemployment in the 1970s and the valley of those variables in the 1990s have a unitary explanation. Both demand and supply shocks were unfavorable in the 1970s and favorable in the 1990s. We suffered from oil shocks in the earlier period and demand management that attempted to contain the resulting inflation. The fall in computer prices and the cessation of inflation in health-care costs allowed demand to expand in the later period without setting off inflation. Inertia smoothed the economy and drew out the effects of these varying shocks. The incorporation of the 1990s into a more general model circles back to the first set of papers where Gordon argues that the past few years have not given rise either to a reprise of the rapid advances of a half-century ago or to a new economy of endless possibilities. Read chapter 17 for more details.