In 1965, by a vote of 109 to 0 (with one abstention), the United Nations General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty. In recent years, the General Assembly has consecrated the notion that “sovereignty” entails “responsibility,” notably for the protection of the human rights of citizens. In 2011, the United Nations Security Council invoked the “responsibility to protect” in authorizing measures under Chapter VII in Libya in view of an urgent humanitarian emergency. Moammar Qaddafi was bearing down on his own people, abusing the human rights that were the main justification of Libyan sovereignty in the first place.
Luke Glanville's likeable and well-meant book suggests that it was the Cold War defense of sovereignty, not the international community's more recent moves, that emerges as the outlier in historical perspective. Sovereignty has always been bound up with human rights or some other principles of responsibility to populations, Glanville claims. His book relies on little new evidence and advances few new arguments, at least for professional historians, who will not find the depth of his “new history” impressive. Instead, the book comes from the field of international relations, for whose apparently conventional “Westphalian” narrative Glanville wants to substitute a new potted history.
Glanville starts out by arguing that the founders of the doctrine of sovereignty, Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, hardly wanted to give states carte blanche to terrorize their citizens. The rationale for sovereignty—even that of the Leviathan-state—was natural rights, which became even more important once John Locke introduced consent as the basis of government and the American and French Revolutions grounded sovereignty on “the rights of man.” Glanville is confused about Hobbes, extending the slim reservation he left for individuals to run before the sovereign when pursued, into the far broader claim that “the authority of the sovereign is lost if he is unable to fulfill his end of protecting the safety of the people” (43). Wrong. The authority of the sovereign is never lost, on Hobbes's account, and the sole right that individuals retain is to flee him. Worse, the internal connection of rights and sovereignty that Glanville plausibly identifies says nothing about the authority of outsiders to engage in rescue when sovereigns do not keep their part of the bargain. Locke and later revolutionaries only insisted on the rights of the people to overthrow their sovereign for a new one.
Glanville's book is marred not only by faulty analysis of philosophers and politics, but also by an implicit teleology whereby what Glanville feels ought to be obvious as a matter of principle somehow takes centuries to emerge. Acknowledging that after the French Revolution a liberal nationalism that sought sovereignty for peoples (and protection of individuals only through them) was pitted against monarchs who wanted to keep it for themselves, Glanville writes that no one thought hard enough about what they really believed. “It would become clear,” he writes, “that a conception of popular sovereignty that exalts the nation above the individual is a problematic philosophy that frequently fails to advance or protect individual liberty and equality” (72). However, this begs the question of why it was universally assumed until after decolonization that national emancipation would best guarantee rather than still threaten individual protection. If it is only in our times that the international community became clear enough about sovereignty to insist on its responsibility to protect when states failed, is Glanville not ultimately ratifying the conventional story?
Glanville shines when he acknowledges that the new states of the postcolonial world, having been subject to brutal rule, had very good reason to set up impregnable borders, even as they promised to protect human rights at home. He corrects a kindred account by Christian Reus-Smit that argues that the sovereign right to nonintervention was never “a categorical right with no strings attached” (quoted on 158). As the 1965 Declaration shows, that is exactly what it was, and Glanville accurately concludes that, even if sovereignty is justified as following from individual rights, “the extent to which the sovereign was accountable to international society for the protection of these rights had always been a different question” (158). But Glanville fails to recognize how forceful an objection this rejoinder is to his own account, which is chiefly about the internal legitimacy, and sometimes constraints, which rights provide for sovereignty, and far more rarely about external constraints and remedies (aside from the nineteenth century imperial practice of “humanitarian” intervention).
The West's appeal to the responsibility to protect Libyans from the troops massed at the gates of Ben Ghazi as a warrant for the regime change they actually conducted has threatened and perhaps destroyed the doctrine whose prehistory Glanville set out to write. The Chinese and Russians have not voted to protect Syrian civilians, and the West itself shies away from the once-heralded new doctrine. Rarely has a supposedly long-term history as Glanville offers in this book led to a more evanescent end-point.
