The no-frills title of Michael Fischbach's impressive book aptly captures its content. Fischbach investigates the large-scale displacement of Jews from the Middle East and North Africa in the twenty years after the Israeli War of Independence, as well as more recent developments, to learn the fate of their individual and communal property. His central question is why international Jewish organizations and the State of Israel, which absorbed the majority of these Mizrahi/Sephardi Jews, have done little to press Jewish property claims against Arab states. The answer, Fishbach argues, is the Israeli policy of “linkage.” Specifically, Israel has portrayed the flight of Jews from the Arab world and Palestinians from their former homes as part of an irreversible population transfer that occurred during and after the 1948 war. Israel's strategy has been to reserve the debt owed to Jews who were displaced from the Arab world for the negotiation of a final peace settlement with the Palestinians. At this time, Israel would argue that Jewish claims should be subtracted from damages owed to Palestinians or that the two cases of dispossession should cancel each other entirely. For their part, international Jewish organizations have generally respected and aided Israel's policy of linkage, rather than undertaking efforts to secure compensation from Arab states for their former Jewish residents.
Although Fischbach generally writes in an engaging style, he occasionally becomes repetitive and employs ineffective literary techniques (including lengthy paragraphs composed exclusively of questions). In his admirable quest for thoroughness, Fischbach sometimes incorporates material he would be well advised to omit. For example, extensive excerpts from letters consisting of arguments between Jewish leaders in Cairo and the New York-based Historical Society of Jews from Egypt over the fate of Jewish communal objects in Egypt draw the reader's attention away from matters of substance and toward petty (if amusing) personality conflicts. In addition, the organization of the book leaves something to be desired. Aside from a short introduction and conclusion, this substantial work consists of three lengthy chapters, which would more effectively present the author's argument if divided into shorter, more manageable units. Jewish Property Claims against Arab Countries is likely to be of interest mostly to scholars of the Arab–Israeli conflict, because the book does not address broader theoretical debates that might attract a wider audience.
The dispersion of Jews from Arab lands was, as Fischbach notes, “a catastrophic denouement for the existence of Jews in the region where they had existed longer than anywhere else on earth” (p. 3). He begins his inquiry into the matter of Jewish property losses by examining why and under what conditions Jews emigrated from the Middle East and North Africa. Fischbach points to the interplay of a number of factors, including European colonialism, which fostered intercommunal tensions, particularly when Europeans bestowed privileges on non-Muslim minorities; the advent of Arab nationalism; and World War II, during which some Arabs sympathized with the Axis powers fighting the British and French. The 1948 war was a major turning point, producing antipathy and anti-Jewish legislation in some Arab states. For some Jews, Zionist sentiment was a strong “pull factor,” and Zionist leaders aimed to convince their coreligionists to join them in building the new Jewish state.
Most important, Fischbach notes that generalizations regarding the circumstances surrounding Jewish emigration are bound to be inadequate, because these varied by country and social class. For example, there was no large-scale dispossession of Jewish property in Yemen, from which Jews had begun migrating to Palestine prior to 1948 largely spurred by messianism. The poverty of most Yemeni Jews meant this community had less property to lose than richer Jewish communities, like those in Iraq and Egypt. In 1950 and 1951, a series of bombings against Jewish targets led the majority of Iraqi Jews to leave for Israel, whereupon the Iraqi government sequestered their property. During the Suez War, Egypt expelled some Jews, ordering them to leave the country within ten days and limiting the amount of cash they could take. For its part, Lebanon never seized Jewish property, and most of the small Jewish community there chose to remain in the country until the Lebanese civil wars in 1958 and from 1975 to 1990. The majority of Morocco's Jews emigrated between 1952 and 1972, and most of them were able to sell their property before leaving. However, the government put a ceiling on the Moroccan currency they could transfer out of the country. Given the significant variation, I would welcome an analysis of why some Arab states took a hard line on Jewish property while others allowed sales and the removal of assets. In each case, Fischbach tries to estimate the value of Jewish property losses, based on registered claims and numbers floated by Jewish groups or Israeli government inquiries. Given the lack of systematic data collection, however, Fischbach indicates that “the total value of these losses can never be established” (p. 265).
Without question, Jewish Property Claims against Arab Countries is a substantial accomplishment, particularly for its mining of primary sources. Fischbach marshals documents from twelve archives in five countries, including the Israel State Archives, the Jordanian National Library and Center for Documents and Documentation, the United Kingdom's National Archives, the United States National Archives and Records Administration, the Alliance Israélite Universelle Library in Paris, the United Nations Secretariat Archives in New York, and the Central Zionist Archives of the World Zionist Organization in Jerusalem. This work is a welcome addition to the literature, especially because much existing documentation of Jewish property claims in the Middle East and North Africa was compiled by researchers with overt political motives (particularly those working with Jewish organizations, sometimes in cooperation with the Israeli government). Fischbach's account is driven more by the historical record than a political agenda, and he takes on the conventional wisdom as appropriate.
As for the question of why Israel and international Jewish organizations have not done more to press Jewish property claims against Arab countries, Fischbach makes a persuasive argument regarding linkage. When peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan provided an opportunity, Israel chose not to press Jewish property claims. Fischbach quotes Israeli representatives and leaders of Jewish organizations candidly admitting that Israel is saving these claims for final-status talks with the Palestinians. The idea of linkage troubles Fischbach for at least two reasons. First, he points to a double standard: Jewish groups and the Israeli government assiduously pushed the German government for reparations to Jewish victims of the Holocaust, while making little effort to get compensation from Arab states for losses suffered by Mizrahi/Sephardi Jews. Although a fair point, it should be tempered by the recognition that Israel pursued its own raison d’état both through its inaction regarding property losses by Jews in the Arab world and by its action to secure reparations for the devastation of European Jewry during World War II. By Fischbach's own account, the vast majority of the settlement ($845 million) resulting from the 1952 final reparations agreement between Israel and West Germany went to Israel—much of it in the form of industrial equipment, trains, ships, and other goods that helped build the Israeli economy. Only $110 million went to Jews outside Israel as reparations. Second, he indicates that linkage is unfair both to Mizrahi/Sephardi Jews and to Palestinian refugees; Jews’ private losses become an Israeli bargaining chip, while Palestinian compensation is unfairly diminished due to the damages Arab states (and not Palestinians) inflicted on former Jewish residents.
One puzzle to which Fischbach points is the question of why so little has been done to assess the preferences of Mizrahi/Sephardi Jews themselves. For example, he laments the absence of any survey or poll to determine how and by whom they want their property losses to be handled. Indeed, one curious question is why major groups that represent Jews from Arab countries, including the World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries and the American Sephardi Federation, have supported linkage. Does this indicate that most Jews of Middle Eastern and North African descent favor linkage? If not, why has there not been more protest against this policy? Healing can only occur, Fischbach argues, when individuals can voice and seek redress for their grievances. For both Palestinians and Jews from Arab states, justice has been slow in coming. For its part, Jewish Property Claims against Arab States makes substantial strides in documenting the circumstances surrounding the loss of Jewish property in the Arab world as well as explaining why there has been little effort to seek compensation.
