Over the years, the Liberty Party has received short shrift from American scholars. Histories of abolitionism have tended to focus on William Lloyd Garrison and his followers, partly because of Garrison's undisputed role in reinvigorating American anti-slavery in the early 1830s, and partly because for some (Andrew Delbanco, for instance) Garrison's commitment to immediatism represents a peculiar impulse in American public life that links anti-slavery abolitionists of the mid-nineteenth century to reform movements of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The role of political abolitionists, on the other hand, has tended to be downplayed or else sidelined into the sometimes tragic history of third-party politics in the United States.
In his fascinating new book, Corey M. Brooks sets out to challenge these preconceptions by (re)representing the Liberty Party as a dynamic force in nineteenth-century US politics. Central to his thesis is the notion of the “slave power,” which, as Brooks argues, “saturated” abolitionist publications during the late 1830s. Briefly stated, political abolitionists popularized the view that southern slave interests “distorted” the American two-party system and, with it, American democracy. This belief in the corroding influence of the slave power, in turn, led figures like Gerrit Smith to call out political candidates who were not willing to support the immediate abolition of slavery. But this “interrogatory system” ultimately proved unsuccessful, leading to calls for independent political action. Thus it was that in 1840 political abolitionists launched the Liberty Party, a move that also heralded a split with Garrison and his supporters, who significantly rejected the use of the ballot and dismissed the Constitution as a pro-slavery document.
As Brooks is the first to admit, in electoral terms the Liberty Party was not a great success (in fact, it only attracted seven thousand votes in the 1840 presidential contest). Nevertheless, he argues persuasively that it proved influential at both state and federal level. In a fascinating chapter on political lobbying, Brooks shows how Liberty Party men sought to win over dissident Whigs and use them to introduce or support anti-slavery arguments. John Quincy Adams, in particular, seems to have been only too willing to act as a stalking horse for political abolitionists, using debates over the “gag rule,” for instance, to humiliate his pro-slavery adversaries and provoke fresh controversies. Equally compelling is Brooks's account of the work of Joshua Leavitt, who ran a kind of lobbying service in Washington, DC, even for a time lodging in the same boarding house as a small group of anti-slavery Whig Congressmen, among them Joshua Giddings, William Slade and Seth Gates. Shrewd political strategists, Leavitt and his colleagues proved adept at finding Congressional partners, while at the same time building alliances that proved remarkably enduring.
In these and other ways, political abolitionists succeeded in interjecting slavery into Congressional debates. They also enjoyed some electoral success, particularly at the state level. Brooks makes the telling point that “in five of the seven Vermont gubernatorial elections featuring Liberty candidates, the third party forced the legislature to choose the governor” (91). Political abolitionists made the most of these balance-of-power tactics. Where they were not successful in determining the final outcome of electoral contests, they were able to create “uncomfortable standstills,” sometimes lasting weeks, even months. On this evidence, at least, the Liberty Party was a highly effective political machine and certainly powerful enough to worry anti-slavery Whigs, who were forced in some instances to adopt abolitionist candidates in order to check its influence.
All of this meant that the Liberty Party was ideally placed to exploit the growing sectional crisis of the 1840s and 1850s. As Brooks points out, the Wilmot Proviso of 1846 triggered a heated debate in Congress that gave free expression to anti-slave power rhetoric, even if many Congressmen refuted any suggestion that their opposition to the extension of slavery was connected in any way to abolitionist ideology. By 1848 the two-party system was clearly under increasing pressure. Here again, Brooks stresses the crucial role played by Liberty Party men in brokering the creation of a new anti-slave power coalition, in the shape of the Free Soil Party; in fact, he argues that such initiatives actually pre-dated the Wilmot Proviso. The rest of this history, from the Free Soil Party to the creation of the Republican Party in 1856, will be familiar to specialists. Nevertheless, Brooks is surely right in stressing that that history is inseparable from the history of antebellum abolitionism. What he is arguing for, in other words, is an integrated narrative that locates the emergence of the Republican Party within the context of anti-slave power rhetoric and the unstinting efforts of political abolitionists to divorce the federal government from slavery.
Brooks tells this story with considerable skill and insight. His grasp of organizational issues and Liberty Party discourse is hugely impressive. He has less to say about grassroots politics, however (ideally, one would like to know about the local party committees he mentions, for instance) and largely ignores Liberty Party propaganda – prints, songs, poems. More striking is the lack of any real attention to Garrison and his supporters and how they responded to the challenge posed by political abolitionists. For all that, Books succeeds magnificently in interpreting the Liberty Party for a new generation of scholars, while also helping us to see American abolitionism in a very different light. Coming hard on the heels of Caleb McDaniel's equally impressive book on Garrison and the Garrisonians, Liberty Power brings sharply into focus the need to rethink the boundaries of American anti-slavery. This is political history of a very high order indeed.
