Since the Tiananmen events in 1989, social scientists have been making two related predictions about China: first, the Chinese regime is threatened by imminent collapse, and second, China will soon become democratic. Thus far, both predictions have proved to be wrong. The current regime in China is securely in place, and the system remains authoritarian. In his new book, Wealth into Power: The Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector, Bruce J. Dickson proposes that China's skillful embrace of the private sector is largely responsible for both regime stability and the absence of democratization. Far from being agents of democratization, China's private entrepreneurs have turned out to be staunch supporters of the regime. This finding goes against the received wisdom in political science, which suggests that capitalists would be pro-democratic forces. Not so in China, as Dickson shows.

Several factors help explain why entrepreneurs support the regime. To begin with, the most successful capitalists are members of the Chinese Communist Party. These “red capitalists” are unlikely to rise up against the party, which has made a concerted effort to nurture them and to integrate them within its ranks. In fact, private entrepreneurs actively seek membership in the party and official positions, such as deputy to a people's congress, delegate to a people's political consultative conference, or candidate in village elections. Second, the regime has utilized business associations and party cells within private firms to keep entrepreneurs under tight control. Only associations that are apolitical and loyal to the regime have been allowed to exist. The cumulative effect of these measures is the emergence of capitalists who hold remarkably pro-regime views.

In keeping with the prevailing political climate, Chinese entrepreneurs place a higher value on stability than growth, worry about the social stability implications of competition and growth, and favor a strengthening of the existing political system rather than a movement to a more pluralist environment. During the current Hu-Wen era, private entrepreneurs have lent a hand to the government, engaging in charitable activity aimed at alleviating the inequality that emerged as a result of former leader Jiang Zemin's reckless pursuit of growth. In short, Chinese capitalists have successfully been co-opted by the party and do not thus far present a threat to its stability; instead of being anti-regime elements, they are allies of the state.

Dickson brings a wealth of evidence to support his argument. Most relevant are the results from his surveys of private entrepreneurs and cadres conducted in 1997–99 and 2004–5 in eight counties in Hebei, Hunan, Shandong, and Zhejiang. These original longitudinal data give Dickson the unique ability to track the evolution of entrepreneurs' and cadres' views, as well as to make his argument rigorous and compelling.

Dickson's important work will force scholars who are interested in the larger field of comparative democratization to take seriously the findings of China experts. A central assumption in comparative politics is that there is a link between economic development, the rise of a bourgeoisie, the growth of civil society, and the emergence of democracy. This assumption is based on stylized facts about the developmental trajectories of countries in Western Europe. There is no reason to believe that late developers such as China should or will follow the same path. What Dickson has described as “crony communism” is an entirely different system of relationships between capitalists and the state. In China, the state needs capitalists, because they allow for continued economic growth; the ability of the state to ensure growth is one of the main pillars of regime legitimacy. In turn, capitalists need the state, which makes their very existence as well as their profitable business activities possible.

Crony communism is thus a symbiotic relationship between capitalists and the state in a Leninist system. Though paradoxical in ideological terms, this relationship has proven stable so far. It attests to the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to adapt itself to changing circumstances, and calls into question the causal pathways outlined by general theories of democratization in comparative politics. China provides two correctives to these theories: one is that economic growth may occur in a communist regime without underlying democratization; the second is that economic growth may prove to be a source for the resilience of the authoritarian state rather than a force in undermining its stability.

This book will have to be read by every scholar working on economic reform and regime stability in China, as well as by those outside the China field who are interested in authoritarian resilience and the conditions under which capitalists become pro-democratic forces. The hypotheses presented by Dickson are amenable to cross-national testing, not only in the context of communist states with developmental trajectories similar to that of China (most notably Vietnam and Laos), but also in other late-developing autocracies around the world. This is an important book that puts China on the map of general social science theories.