Leibniz on Law and Space

The existing literature on Leibniz extensively treats two distinct fields: (1) his theorization of space and time, especially as it emerges from his correspondence with Samuel Clarke, and (2) his development of the juridical science.Footnote ⁵ Both of these fields are at times connected to his broader philosophical and metaphysical views.Footnote ⁶ However, the connection between Leibniz's view of space and his development of the juridical science remains obscure. This might be partly explained by the absence in the large corpus of Leibniz's writings of any works that connect these two topics expressly and directly. For this reason, it might be legitimately questioned whether the attempt of this article to bridge both fields can ever be true to Leibniz's worldview. Is it not a mere artificial and extraneous endeavor that has no valid basis in the thinking of Leibniz himself? In this regard, it should be recalled that Leibniz worked on many projects throughout his lifetime, and that his ideas on each particular topic evolved over time.Footnote ⁷  Toward the end of his life, he sought to systematize his worldview. Leibniz's Theodicy and in particular The Monadology are particularly important examples of this attempt.Footnote ⁸ Both works represent building blocks toward linking Leibniz's views from ostensibly disparate areas.Footnote ⁹ Therefore, despite the absence of a more explicit direct engagement in Leibniz's writings with the relationship among these three notions, he did envisage a systematic view that harmonizes his conceptualization of law and justice with his conceptualization of space.

This article's argument is of twofold importance to the further development of the idea of spatial justice in contemporary legal thought. First, the contemporary discussions of spatial justice rely, at times substantially, on the idea of relational space. Such prominent geographers such as Henri Lefebvre or David Harvey whose work brought relational space to the forefront of spatial justice acknowledge the importance of Leibniz for their theorization of space. However, all discussions of Leibniz's contributions in this context are limited to general invocations of some of the most widely known Leibniz's opinions on space, mainly as they emerge from the Leibniz–Clarke controversy with some minor additions from The Monadology.Footnote ¹⁰ Scholarly work on spatial justice would benefit tremendously from a more precise and thorough understanding of Leibniz's own views on space, and especially the connections between Leibniz's ideas of space and justice. Second, legal scholars’ explorations of spatial justice neglect Leibniz's foundational role even as they appropriate his idea of relational space.Footnote ¹¹ This is particularly surprising taking into account the recent revival of attention to Leibniz as a legal scholar. Yet as this article argues, revisiting Leibniz's significance to the development of spatial justice is as important for understanding Leibniz's contemporary relevance as it is for refining the scholarly framework of spatial justice.

Because the connections that Leibniz drew among law, justice, and space changed over time, this article takes a chronological approach to his writings.  The first section discusses some examples from Leibniz's earlier writings.  The balance of the article focuses on his mature works, in which his concept of space receives a more detailed and clear articulation.

Leibniz's Early Writings

In his earlier writings, Leibniz expressly articulated strong links between the study of mathematics and his development of juridical science. Some of the mathematical concepts used by Leibniz in this regard have a direct link to spatial concepts and his later more detailed conceptualization of space. Although in his later years Leibniz distanced himself to a certain extent from his earlier efforts at using mathematics in constructing the juridical science, he did not disavow the connections between these two disciplines. Most importantly, the links between the conceptualization of space and the conceptualization of law and justice were always maintained in Leibniz's work. Two examples from Leibniz's work in the early period are particularly important because they reveal links between spatial concepts and Leibniz's articulation of juridical science: his use of combinatorial method and his discussion of cases of simultaneous possession.Footnote ¹²

Leibniz became interested in the combinatorial method at an early stage, at about the same time that he became interested in law, and specifically in the systematization of law and the development of juridical science. Therefore, three of his earlier works on law were completed in the years preceding and following the submission and defense of his Dissertatio de arte combinatoria. Footnote ¹³ In modern-day terms, De arte combinatoria deals with operations of combination and permutation that form part of mathematics. The link to juridical science is visible in Leibniz's effort to reduce complexity, uncertainty, and arbitrariness in law. Leibniz viewed the combinatorial method as an efficient way to discover and order all possible legal cases so that the legislator could regulate every possible arising case, thus reducing the scope for judicial discretion. “For one cannot always wait for the lawmaker when a case arises, and it is prudent to set up the best possible laws without defects, from the first, than to entrust their restriction and correction to fortune; not to mention the fact that in any state whatsoever, the judicial matter is the better treated, the less is left to the decision of the judge.”Footnote ¹⁴

Within Leibniz's work on combinatorial method appears one of the most important notions for Leibniz's spatial analysis as well as for his monadology; namely, the notion of situs (often translated as “situation”). In De arte combinatoria, Leibniz defines situs as follows: “Situs is the location of parts.”Footnote ¹⁵ In this context, situs is also intended in an abstract sense whereby the idea of reciprocal positioning can equally apply to concepts, not only to objects. Logic thereby becomes “topologic” because situation of simple concepts in the sense of their order and nearness becomes important.Footnote ¹⁶ Already here, in relation to the first attempts by Leibniz to systematize law such spatial concepts as distance and position (order of positioning) become central. We can also note that space is considered here by Leibniz from a mathematic-geometric point of view and is closely linked to law in the sense of positive law. The relationship to justice, however, is still quite distant and vague.

A different type of spatial idea is present in Leibniz's discussion of the possibility of simultaneous possession. Here, space is considered not only from a geometric perspective, but also from the perspective of physics.Footnote ¹⁷ The difference in the conceptualization of space in physics and geometry leads to different answers to the question of simultaneous possession. The question of simultaneous possession as discussed by Leibniz is the question of whether two persons can simultaneously have equally strong possession of the same object in its totality. Leibniz considers this question in two different places: in Question IV of his Specimen Footnote ¹⁸ and in paragraph XXV of his Perplexing Cases. Footnote ¹⁹ At the first sight, it might appear that Leibniz provides contradictory responses to the problem of simultaneous possession because in Question IV he denies the possibility of simultaneous possession whereas in paragraph XXV he affirms this possibility. However, the difference in his responses can be explained by the difference in the approach to the underlying concept of space.

In Question IV, Leibniz proceeds from the concept of space as it emerged from his understanding of physics. Leibniz's overall goal in Specimen is to demonstrate the relationship between jurisprudence and philosophy in a broad sense. In different questions he demonstrates this by utilizing different branches of philosophy. In Question IV he demonstrates the link between physics as contemplative philosophy and jurisprudence. When faced with the question of simultaneous possession, Leibniz makes an analogy to the physical characteristics of bodies and the space they occupy. More specifically, he makes an analogy to the question traditionally addressed by physics “whether two bodies can be in the same place.”Footnote ²⁰ In answering this question, he refers to the nature of physical bodies and their properties, which do not allow two bodies to simultaneously occupy the same place.

Leibniz's premises differ when he discusses simultaneous possession in Perplexing Cases. Both Specimen and Perplexing Cases pursue a similar aim; namely, reduction of uncertainty and judicial discretion in law. However, the way to achieve this aim is different in each of the treatises. In paragraph XXV of the Perplexing Cases, Leibniz's answer is not based on physics as part of contemplative philosophy but on logical reasoning that attempts to demonstrate sufficiency of law. More specifically, the sentence “I have discussed these things on the basis of principles of natural law or mere law”Footnote ²¹ indicates that the basis for his conclusion is the idea of justice as reflected in natural law that is underpinned by a different understanding of space distinct from the merely physical view of space in Question IV. Leibniz articulated this distinct view of space only in his later writings.

Moreover, this conceptualization of space is closely linked to his understanding of justice as distinct from, although closely linked to, law. This also implies that that the connective tissue between law and space and justice and space requires scrutiny.  In fact, the nature of the links law entertains with space differed from the links between the notion of justice and the notion of space. This point will be discussed in more detail in the next section in which Leibniz's conceptualization of space is addressed. This articulation of space by Leibniz will then be linked to law and justice through his philosophy and theory of knowledge.

Leibniz's Mature Writings

As discussed, Leibniz did not dedicate any single work to exploring the mutual influences between the conceptualization of space and the conceptualization of law and justice. However, some of his later writings contain passages that are direct statements on this type of link. In order to understand these links as direct, it is necessary to become familiar with Leibniz's terminology and his understanding of several concepts, including those of space, justice, and law. Leibniz's The Monadology is the most important work in this regard because it represents a late summary of his world view linking ostensibly disparate ideas, including space, justice, and law. In subsequent paragraphs I will begin by explaining how Leibniz conceptualized the notion of space, before moving to the most important ideas from The Monadology. The Monadology is the bridge between Leibniz's concepts of space and justice and those of space and law. Leibniz's specific views on law and justice are discussed after the main principles of The Monadology are clarified. Finally, Leibniz's theory of knowledge is also considered, because it is an essential component in fully comprehending links among Leibniz's conceptualizations of space, law, and justice.

In order to understand Leibniz's conceptualization of space, it is important to keep in mind that in his efforts to conceptualize space he focuses on the notions of extension and situation (situs) in addition to the terms “relation” and “point.”  Two examples of Leibniz's discussion of the nature of space are the following: “Space is the locus of all points.”Footnote ²² “[Space] is an order of situations, or an order according to which situations are disposed.”Footnote ²³

From the outset, Leibniz emphasizes that points have no extension, and that in point “nothing but situation can be considered.”Footnote ²⁴ On the other hand, he states that “the basis of space” is “the extended in itself.”Footnote ²⁵  This basis of space is indivisible.Footnote ²⁶ So how does indivisible extension emerge from unextended elements? The key resides in the notion of relation (or order). Relation has to be something different from a simple sum of points (those unextended elements), because however much one adds unextended elements to each other, they will never result in becoming something extended. This is akin to adding zeros: as many zeros as one adds, they will never become anything else but zero. In this regard, Leibniz himself highlighted the distinction between “made” or “composed” and “constituted” of something.Footnote ²⁷ According to Leibniz, space is constituted of points, not made of or composed of them. “Compose something” implies a mechanical addition or assemblage of things (arrange, place in an order), whereas “constitute something” implies more complex interactions that cannot be reduced to an addition of parts (establish, institute).

Another important aspect of this definition and the resulting characteristic of space is Leibniz's vision of the basis of space as something indivisible that nevertheless is constituted of parts. Here the notion that helps in grasping Leibniz's position is that of “the fold.” Gilles Deleuze extensively theorized the notion of “the fold” in relation to Leibniz's philosophy in general and his The Monadology more specifically.Footnote ²⁸ Although Deleuze does not discuss the notion of space in Leibniz explicitly, his framework for understanding monadology is very helpful for connecting the dyad of Leibniz's understanding of space and his articulation of monadology.  Therefore, the concept of “the fold” has the same explanatory force in relation to Leibniz's conceptualization of space as it has in relation to Leibniz's monadology. The best image that illustrates the notion of the fold that in turn clarifies how something can be indivisible but still have parts is invoked by Deleuze with reference to Leibniz as follows: “The division of the continuous must not be taken as of sand dividing into grains, but as that of a sheet of paper or of a tunic in folds, in such a way that an infinite number of folds can be produced, some smaller than others, but without the body ever dissolving into points or minima.”Footnote ²⁹

Vincenzo De Risi's complex analysis identifies Leibniz's most mature and clear definition of space as being “a set of relations between unextended (but situated) elements.”Footnote ³⁰ In understanding this definition it is important to focus on the idea of relations and the fact that according to Leibniz, space is not somehow composed or made of these relations but is the relations or is constituted by them. In his famous correspondence with Clarke, Leibniz highlights this when responding to Clarke's contention that space does not depend on the situation of bodies: “’Tis true, it does not depend on such and such a situation of bodies, but it is that order which renders bodies capable of being situated, and by which they have a situation among themselves when they exist together, as time is that order with respect to their successive position.”Footnote ³¹

In this brief discussion, Leibniz's conceptualization of space emerges as a complex relational notion that unlike the traditional Newtonian absolute, space does not precede bodies or phenomena. The idea of measure in relation to space becomes secondary, whereas “relation” and “situation” emerge as defining elements. Now that Leibniz's concept of space is clear, I will explore essential elements of his broader philosophical views as expressed in The Mondaology.Footnote ³²

The text known today as The Monadology is a summary of several aspects of Leibniz's philosophy united by the notion of a monad as a simple substance. It was not published during Leibniz's lifetime. Nevertheless, it is one of the most widely known of Leibniz's writings, representing a concise but highly complex summary of his philosophy.Footnote ³³ Its importance resides particularly in the articulation of the idea of simple substance (monad), which according to Leibniz is indispensable for a correct understanding of many other areas and “most of the important truths about God, the soul and the nature of body.”Footnote ³⁴  A monad is a simple substance with no parts,Footnote ³⁵ Therefore, it also has no extension similarly to the point.Footnote ³⁶ On the other hand, monads are unsituated contrary to the point.Footnote ³⁷ However, for Leibniz, people perceived phenomena as situated.  Therefore, a very important question that arises is how situation, extension, and space arise from unsituated and unextended substances. The answer lies in the nature of monads and their activity.

Monads’ essential activity consists in perception and constant change in perception.Footnote ³⁸ For Leibniz, perception is a particular type of expression. Leibniz defines expression as the possibility to “pass from a consideration of the relations in the expression to a knowledge of the corresponding properties of the thing expressed” as, for example, in the way that the model of a machine expresses the machine itself, or that speech expresses thoughts.Footnote ³⁹ Perception as a particular type of expression is distinguished by its ability to express multiplicity within unity: many in the one.Footnote ⁴⁰ The content of each monad's perception is the world viewed from its own perspective. Only the perceptual content (perspective) distinguishes monads from each other.Footnote ⁴¹ Each created monad represents the totality of the universe: “each simple substance has relations that express all other monads and as a consequence each monad is a living perpetual mirror of the universe.”Footnote ⁴² The perception of each monad is perspectival. Leibniz compares the perception by each monad of the totality of the universe to a view of the same town from a different perspective: although it may appear as a multitude of different towns to some, in reality, these are just different views of the same town.Footnote ⁴³ A very important term that already appeared in this description of monads’ activity is “relation.” Leibniz emphasizes this relational nature of the activity of monads as follows: “each substance expresses exactly all other substances through relations that it has with them.”Footnote ⁴⁴ Therefore, the activity of monads as perception is at the same time expressive, perspectival, and relational. According to De Risi's very detailed justification that cannot be reproduced in its entirety here, the expressivity of the perception of monads is not simply imaginative, but rather it does have an object; namely, phenomena.Footnote ⁴⁵ These phenomena represent relations between monads and, therefore, monads themselves, because monads consist in representation of relations.Footnote ⁴⁶ When representing these unsituated unextended substances as relations, phenomena do so through situs, through situated relations.Footnote ⁴⁷ Therefore, the activity of monads and therefore of all minds is essentially reduced to the expressive perception, or in other words, to representation of relationships between monads as situations of phenomena.Footnote ⁴⁸

In this context, space emerges not as something given, but as something constructed, something created by the mind. As De Risi writes, “we need to look at things from a radically different perspective–that of denying any (substantial) reality of space, and claiming its phenomenal and ideal nature instead.”Footnote ⁴⁹ This means that space, as far as existing bodies or phenomena are concerned, is real in the sense that relations between bodies/phenomena and their situated character result in space (and time). However, as such space is not possible, there is no empty space as in the Newtonian concept of space: “if there were no creatures, space and time would be only in the ideas of God.”Footnote ⁵⁰ Therefore, space is by its nature imaginary as it always results from monads’ activity of perception.Footnote ⁵¹ However, from the perspective of monadology, the reverse is also true: the activity of monads and, therefore, the resulting perception of phenomena is necessarily spatial. This is further confirmed if the definition of space and the activity of monads as conceptualized by Leibniz are considered side by side: monads’ activity is described as representation of relationships between monads as situations of phenomena; space is defined as a set of relationships between situated elements.  Thus, both space and perception are relational as well as situated, and are therefore perspectival.

Before turning to the significance of these findings to the nature of law and justice, a brief summary of Leibniz's ideas about law and justice is necessary.  Leibniz carefully distinguished in his writings on juridical science the concepts of law as postulated by humans, as laws in the traditional positivist sense from the concept of law as right, and as justice (such as “Gesetz” and “Recht” in German, “loi” and “droit” in French). Most famously he stated: “Le droit ne sauroit ester injuste, c'est une contradiction; mais la loy le peut ester, car c'est la puissance qui donne et maintient la loy; et si cette puissance manque de sagesse ou de bonne volonté, elle peut donner et maintenir de fort mechantes loix.”Footnote ⁵² Although distinguishing these two concepts throughout his career, Leibniz also worked on ways to know justice (the right law) and implement and apply it in positive law. In particular, Leibniz devoted significant effort to elaborating methods of knowing right law (justice) through science and philosophy.Footnote ⁵³ Thus, although recognizing the distinction between law and justice, Leibniz did not separate them.

An important general characteristic of justice and law resulting from justice, and, therefore, of laws that are based on justice, is their universal and all-encompassing character.Footnote ⁵⁴ Law as right, as justice, is not contingent on time, space, or the circumstances of a particular society. However, this does not mean complete uniformity and absence of diversity. To the contrary, through the perspectivism that informs much of Leibniz's philosophy, law emerging from justice is fully respectful of diversity.Footnote ⁵⁵ As will become clear, this way of conceptualizing the relationship between law and justice and their nature is precisely where the impact of the idea of space on law and justice is the strongest.

Leibniz firmly believed that it is possible to discover elements of law, or basic principles to which the complexity of legal rules can be reduced, through a scientific enquiry. According to Leibniz, principles of natural law (justice) are innate ideas, rational truths, or truths of reason that can be discovered by human beings through their thinking capacity.Footnote ⁵⁶ This capacity to know rational, eternal truths is a characteristic of human beings that follows from Leibniz's characterization of monads that constitute human beings. He distinguishes these monads that he calls “minds” from other monads by their capacity to access these innate ideas, which are eternal and necessary truths: “But the knowledge of eternal and necessary truths is what distinguishes us from simple animals.”Footnote ⁵⁷ The link between Leibniz's conceptualization of law and justice and his conceptualization of space emerges precisely at this juncture, from this possibility for monads called “minds” to discover innate ideas that are eternal truths. At the same time, all monads, including minds, have as their essential activity perception; namely, a representation of relationships between monads as situations of phenomena. If these monads whose essential activity is spatial are able to access innate ideas and know principles of justice, then somehow justice should be connected to spatiality. However, the difficult question is precisely: how? How is the spatiality of monadic activity connected to the mind's ability to know justice and to the realization of this knowledge in positive law?  In order to answer this question it becomes necessary to analyze Leibniz's theory of knowledge. If monads that are minds access justice through knowledge because they are endowed with reason, it is necessary to understand how Leibniz conceptualizes the act of knowing by minds, and, more specifically, knowledge's relationship to perception, because the spatiality and space emerges from monads’ essential activity, which is perception.

A preliminary remark needs to be made regarding the existence in Leibniz's works of a full-fledged and independent epistemology or theory of knowledge, especially because these terms are absent from Leibniz's vocabulary and first appear in the nineteenth century.Footnote ⁵⁸ In what follows, I do not intend to provide any additional clarifications regarding the question of theory of knowledge in Leibniz. However, no scholar will deny the fact that in articulating his metaphysical views, Leibniz also discussed the question of how minds as a type of monads arrive at knowledge of innate truths. Although these discussions cannot be found in one single written piece and are not sufficiently detailed and systematic, several scholars have attempted a reconstruction and an interpretation of Leibniz's theory of knowledge.Footnote ⁵⁹ Therefore, it is justified in the framework of this work to speak of at least elements of Leibniz's theory of knowledge, focusing only on the question of how minds discover innate truths and process this knowledge.

First, Leibniz wrote that the perception of mind that leads to thought is a representation accompanied by consciousness or reflection of the percipient.Footnote ⁶⁰ Leibniz calls this reflective expression “thought”: “cette réprésentation est accompagnée de conscience dans l'ame raisonnable, et c'est alors qu'on l'appelle pensée [in the reasonable soul this representation is accompanied by consciousness, and it is then that it is called thought].”Footnote ⁶¹ Another term that he uses to describe this consciousness or “reflexive knowledge of this internal state” is “apperception.”Footnote ⁶² In Leibniz's own writings, the distinction between apperception and thought is not drawn clearly. However, the most logical conclusion that follows from various fragments is that in order for thought to exist, both perception and apperception are necessary.Footnote ⁶³ Because perception is already present in all monads, Leibniz emphasizes apperception as the necessary precondition of thought and knowledge. Therefore, understanding the way that apperception and thought relate to perception and its spatiality becomes central. Here, one point made by Leibniz in his New Essays on Human Understanding is crucial. In this particular paragraph, Philalethes and Theophilus, the two protagonists of the dialogue each representing Locke's and Leibniz's views, discuss understanding in the context of the capacity to distinguish ideas (or discerning) which in turn is part of Book 2 on ideas. Philalethes starts by comparing understanding to a closet shut from light with some little openings left.Footnote ⁶⁴ These openings let in external images. The understanding, according to Philalethes, is possible if these images stay in this dark closet in an orderly fashion allowing their use when needed.Footnote ⁶⁵ Although Theophilus accepts this analogy, he adds significant features to the description of this closet representing understanding. Here is the lengthy but nonetheless important passage:

Two main points emerge from this description of understanding as an activity in the brain: the spatial nature of the understanding itself, and the spatialization of this understanding through perception in monads. Moreover, as discussed in the next section, the analogy of fold and elasticity produces a particular type of spatiality that resonates especially well with contemporary writings on spatial justice and law and geography. Here, the links among justice, law, understanding, and perception need to be strengthened further. As mentioned previously, according to Leibniz, justice and goodness belong to the necessary and eternal truths such as  numbers and proportions.Footnote ⁶⁷ From this follow two consequences: first, the concept of justice is the same everywhere; it is not contingent, changeable, or arbitrary. Second, which is more important for the purposes of the discussion in this section, the knowledge and understanding of justice is accessible to human reason in the same way as truths of mathematics or geometry. Leibniz emphasizes that the word “justice” has “some definition or some intelligible notion.”Footnote ⁶⁸ Therefore, the science of justice belongs to those sciences that Leibniz calls necessary and demonstrative science, which do not depend on facts but rather “give reasons for facts.”Footnote ⁶⁹ Thus, the concept of justice is one of the items of innate knowledge contained in the dark room representing human understanding. From the above-cited quotation it is clear that Leibniz has a spatial vision of the innate knowledge. It is precisely these items of innate knowledge that form folds that diversify human understanding. In addition, these various processes taking place in the brain are represented in the mind (monad) through perception; namely, as relationships between situated phenomena and, therefore, spatially.

The previous analysis demonstrates that justice as a science based on innate, necessary, and eternal truths is spatial in a double sense: first, it is spatial because innate truths form folds and thus spatialize human understanding; second, this already folded nature of justice is then represented in the perception of monads spatially; namely, as relationships between situated phenomena because, as has been demonstrated, perception as the essential activity of monads is characterized by relationality and perspectivism, leading to situatedness and ultimately to spatiality.  However, as was mentioned previously, Leibniz draws a clear distinction between justice and law. Although he does not separate them completely and even worked his whole life on ways to make law more confirming to the precepts of justice, they are still distinct and, therefore, it is not possible to directly deduce spatiality of law from the spatiality of justice, or at least this spatiality comes from a different source and has different consequences.

Leibniz's view of law as positive law, as Gesetz, originates in the fact that man-made law and associated institutions are phenomena that can be observed as facts.  Leibniz places this factual side of studying the science of law in a subordinate position.Footnote ⁷⁰ With regard to facts or phenomena, the spatiality can only emerge from the perception as the essential activity of monads. Although human understanding, even if it is an understanding of facts, requires apperception as self-reflection, it does not lead to the double spatiality characterizing innate truths, because facts are not embedded in the human brain like innate ideas. Therefore, the spatiality of law as positive law is distinct from the spatiality of law as justice. Spatiality of justice as innate truth is more fixed in the sense that it is embedded into the folded nature of human understanding. Although elastic, changing, and moving with folds constantly added, human understanding is a membrane. This provides certain stability of fixity to the spatiality of justice. This initial spatiality of justice as innate truth is only secondarily relativized and perspectivized through the perception of monads (minds). The spatiality of law that is based on fact, not innate truth, is immediately perspectival and relational because it emerges immediately through the perception of monads (minds). Therefore, I can affirm that this view of the spatiality of law supports relativity and thus difference in positive law that remains universal through the perspectival nature of perception. Because this perspectival nature of perception is also a representation of many in the one, the diversity and difference become an integral and constitutive part of the universal. Spatiality underlying the concept of justice is more absolute and fixed. However, it is not rigid and unchangeable, but rather elastic and moving. The relativity of justice is only secondary when it comes to the perception of monads. This relativity of justice is a reflection of various stages and types of human understanding and its perfectibility. To make the difference between the relativity of law and the relativity of justice apparent, we could say that the relativity of law is external, but the relativity of justice is internal to the mind. However, this statement needs to be taken cautiously and only in a figurative sense, because strictly speaking, monads do not have an outside in the sense that they cannot be influenced from the outside.Footnote ⁷¹

If for Leibniz law and justice are necessarily spatial, it is important and even central to the correct understanding of law and justice to study this spatiality in order to understand not only space, but also law and justice, as fully as possible. This in turn could open up new possibilities for imagining law and justice in new contexts, including, for example, at the global level. In addition, Leibniz's thoughts on law and justice demonstrate the importance of a distinct but related analysis of the spatiality of law and the spatiality of justice.  In the next section, I will further reinforce this statement by connecting Leibniz's ideas to a contemporary scholarly discussion of spatial justice. At the same time, this will lead to identification of some gaps and shortcomings in this literature.

Spatial Justice: From Leibniz to the Present

This section compares Leibniz's views on the relationship among space, law, and justice with a contemporary scholarly view of spatial justice offered by Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos. His vision of spatial justice has a stronger and more direct spatial nature than other existing visions of spatial justice, as he argues in his Spatial Justice.Footnote ⁷²

Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos posits the inherent and necessary spatiality of law and justice. Therefore, the summary of his book dedicated to the issue of spatial justice states: “there can be neither law nor justice that are not articulated through and in space.”Footnote ⁷³ Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos defines spatial justice numerous times in his book, purporting to highlight each time a different, new aspect of spatial justice. However, these are not different definitions of different types of spatial justice. These are simply various facets of his conceptualization of a single idea of spatial justice.  For Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, spatial justice relates in the first place to the irreducibility of corporeal existence. More concretely it is “the ultimate expression of one's spatial and legal claim to a unique corporeal position that by necessity excludes all others; spatial justice emerges from the fact that only one body can occupy a specific space at any specific time. In other words, spatial justice is the struggle between bodies to be in a specific space at a specific time.”Footnote ⁷⁴

When Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos contends that bodies “occupy” space or are “in a specific space,” he presupposes that space exists independently of bodies. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos's thought is thereby torn between at least two different understandings of space that permeate his view of spatial justice.Footnote ⁷⁵ One of these views remains underarticulated and rather subconscious, although this view re-emerges from time to time in various statements.

Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos's most articulate discussion of space occurs in relation to law and the idea of lawscape. In all other instances, such spatial notions as property, territory, or assemblage are discussed without articulating a different concept of space. He advances only one conceptualization of space, which is then analyzed from a variety of angles and in a variety of contexts. The conceptualization of space underlying the idea of spatial justice is distinct from the dominant view of space as linear, divisible, and measurable.Footnote ⁷⁶ This conceptualization of space starts from viewing space as a process, both discursive and material.Footnote ⁷⁷ Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos also highlights that “the space of law's spatial turn is non-Euclidean, non-measurable, non-directional, non-unitary, non-linear and non-metaphorical.”Footnote ⁷⁸ Space is described as manifold and labyrinthine.Footnote ⁷⁹ This labyrinthine manifold space displays its inherent ambiguity and uncertainty in contrast to the traditional characteristics of law as predictable and certain.Footnote ⁸⁰ These characteristics of space resonate strongly with Leibniz's conceptualization of space that is also non-Euclidean, and that displaces the primacy of measure and linearity. The notions of manifold and fold in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos's view of space are also central to Leibniz's articulation of the spatiality of innate truths in human understanding.

According to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Western law managed to undo the connection between law and space and present law as an abstract, universal, and closed discipline.Footnote ⁸¹ Moreover, this de-spatialized Western law “in its colonising form, has managed to undo the connection between space and law in other jurisdictions too.”Footnote ⁸²  In this sense, law by presenting itself as a-spatial is then able to pretend that space is something external to it, and to reduce it to distances and measurements.Footnote ⁸³ But “law is immanent to space and space is immanent to law.”Footnote ⁸⁴ Therefore, the description of space as a “whirlwind of bodies generating and becoming space” by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is also, at least partially, a description of law.Footnote ⁸⁵ However, as already mentioned, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos expresses another idea of space in various statements about spatial justice. Although he says that bodies generate and become space, he also states that bodies occupy space, something that Leibniz, at least in his later years, would never affirm, and actually vigorously contested. As highlighted in previous sections, according to Leibniz, space does not exist prior to and independently of bodies, but is “that order which renders bodies capable of being situated.”Footnote ⁸⁶ Saying that bodies occupy space as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos does presupposes that space exists prior to and independently of bodies. Therefore, we can see how Leibniz's late conceptualization of space is more radically postmodern than the idea of space underlying one of the most contemporary articulations of spatial justice, that although subconscious, is still haunted by Cartesian and Newtonian linear, abstract, and pre-existing space.Footnote ⁸⁷ This might be the result of Leibniz's more careful and systematic study of space starting from its geometrical and physical foundations as well as a strong incorporation of metaphysics into his articulation of the nature of space. In contemporary social science, but especially in law, the engagement with geometry and physics is almost inexistent, whereas metaphysical and philosophical underpinnings are usually fragmented, not systematic. It is also true that Leibniz's aims in discussing space, law, and justice are different from those of Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, who has a politically oriented rather than a science-oriented goal. This difference can explain the divergence in approaches as well as the lesser attention given to metaphysical questions in the contemporary context. Nonetheless, Leibniz's example demonstrates the importance of metaphysics in spatial justice.

In Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos's work, law and justice are distinct only to some extent because he emphasizes their interdependence over their distinction. This resembles Leibniz's articulation of the juridical science whereby innate truths of justice discovered using a scientific methodology are then employed to inform the positive law. But Leibniz's view is more nuanced than Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos's. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos emphasizes the similarity or intertwined nature of law and justice in their spatial aspect. Thus, the spatiality of both law and justice is one and the same. For example, very early in his book, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos states: “Law is both logos and nomos, both prohibitor and enabler. The space of law is simultaneously striated and full of prescriptions and smooth open with possibilities.”Footnote ⁸⁸ Later, when speaking about justice he affirms: “[T]he space of justice is located in the fold between smooth and striated, nomad and state, nomos and logos. Justice needs the calculation of the law and the there-inscribed possibility of passing over to the smoothness of nomos.”Footnote ⁸⁹ The underlying concept of space is the same for both law and justice.  Also, the relationship between law and justice is of mutual dependence that somehow is inscribed in their very nature, including their spatiality. This is one of the main differences between Leibniz's conceptualization of space and its relationship to law and justice and the contemporary concept of spatial justice as articulated by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos.

As argued in the previous section, Leibniz views law and justice as distinct. He contended that a conscious and reasoned scientific effort is needed to bring them into harmony. The analysis in the previous section also demonstrated the care with which the spatiality of law and the spatiality of justice can be distinguished in Leibniz's thought.  However, this diverging spatiality of law and justice does not arise from two different conceptualizations of space, but rather from different ways in which law and justice are spatialized. This distinction in turn relates to Leibniz's effort to understand and articulate processes taking place at the cognitive and phenomenal levels both in their interdependency and distinctness.Footnote ⁹⁰ Without separating soul and body, articulating how processes and, therefore, the spatiality of these processes taking place at different levels unfold differently adds an important dimension to the understanding of the relationship between law and justice that is underdeveloped in the contemporary writings on spatial justice.

The materiality of spatial justice is important and even central to the idea of spatial justice as rightly argued by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos. Leibniz in his early writings addressed the links among space, law, and justice in much the same way that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos developed the idea of spatial justice; namely, the (im)possibility of two bodies occupying the same space. However, Leibniz went further, and this allowed him to realize that spatiality can unfold differently and have different effects, depending on the nature of the processes taking place. Using Leibniz's analogy, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos's focus on materiality forces him to return to physics's view of space, and reduces the importance of geometrical space. Put in other words, the conceptualization of space underpinning the idea of spatial justice in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is still haunted by the ways that Leibniz considered space in his Question IV of Specimen. Footnote ⁹¹ This overemphasis on materiality and, therefore, physical space might be necessary for Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos's purposes; namely, properly spatializing justice that so far was only metaphorically or geographically spatialized. However, once this return to spatiality beyond metaphors is achieved successfully, there is a need for a more nuanced and more geometrically and metaphysically grounded conceptualization of spatial justice. As this article has demonstrated, Leibniz's heritage provides significant insights required to bring the discussion of spatial justice in contemporary literature to a new level.