Smaldino claims that “The idea that the structured organization of differentiated individuals influences the behavior of human groups is not new” (sect. 8, para. 1) in areas such as cultural anthropology and organizational psychology, but “In discussions of cultural evolution, … group organization is often ignored” (sect. 8, para. 1). There are certainly examples to the contrary. For example, my work on group evolutionary strategies (MacDonald Reference MacDonald1994) discusses several ways that groups are able to structure themselves aimed ultimately at attaining evolutionary goals:
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Structuring separation from other groups (e.g., by enforcing endogamy, prohibitions on social intercourse with out-groups, dietary laws).
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Structuring within-group altruism and penalizing free riders (e.g., by ostracism of the offending person and the person's family). Smaldino points out that organized groups need not be egalitarian; this is certainly true in the case of traditional Jewish groups. Nevertheless, despite a great deal of differentiation and lack of egalitarianism, there was a strong safety net and pressure on wealthy Jews to contribute to communal charity, and as a rule wealthy Jews patronized other Jews by employing them in their economic enterprises. Economic differentiation within the community was taken for granted, but competition among Jews was closely regulated: Although there was competition among Jews in selling goods within the Jewish community, Jewish communities acted to prevent Jews from, for example, infringing on monopolies held by other Jews in goods and services for non-Jews.
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Structuring socialization for in-group loyalty and facilitating the ability to fill particular economic niches (e.g., by supporting high-investment parenting, education, and intellectual ability). Traditional Jewish society was highly competitive, resulting in differentiation among individuals in occupation and social status. For example, men competed to develop a reputation in a socially created reward system in which successful scholars were rewarded with good marriages, business opportunities, and ultimately, higher fertility.
Because he uses an inadequate psychology of groups, Smaldino's explanations for how groups come to be organized fall short. Human groups are able to structure themselves as described above because of explicit processing (MacDonald Reference MacDonald2009; Reference MacDonald2010). Explicit processing is the opposite of implicit (reflexive, modular) processing. It is conscious, controllable, effortful, relatively slow, and involves serial processing of relatively small amounts of information. Explicit processing is involved in creating hypothetical scenarios and in planning for future contingencies (e.g., by groups). As discussed in the rest of the target article, explicit processing enables control of group members, enables ideologies that rationalize group aims and relationships among group members, and enables the ability to track the reputation of group members (e.g., free riders).
Like several other theorists of cultural evolution (e.g., Boyd and Richerson who are cited throughout the target article), Smaldino relies on social learning theory for developing a psychology of cultural evolution and group structuring. The entire emphasis is on cultural transmission, not on how culture is created, for example, by leaders or by discussion among group members. Thus, Smaldino emphasizes leadership as an explanation for group organization but fails to discuss explicit processing necessary for leaders to be able to make plans for the future by using means-end reasoning in the service of attaining ideal goal states (e.g., the creation of blueprints for utopian societies such as Brook Farm in 1840s Massachusetts); there are many important historical groups (e.g., Calvinists) where leaders created ideologies that rationalized group structure (e.g., egalitarian or hierarchical) and group regulation (how to deal with free riders or the less talented) (see MacDonald Reference MacDonald2009; Reference MacDonald2010).
Explicit processing gives rise to the possibility of characteristically human social controls (e.g., bureaucracies, legal systems) and ideologies (e.g., religions, Marxism) that are able to regulate behavior within a particular historical context. Social controls and supporting ideologies enable group selection between human groups because they are able to enforce discipline within groups, punish defectors, encourage patriotism and obedience to group aims, produce significant levels of altruism, and regulate variation in reproductive success (MacDonald Reference MacDonald1994).
Explicitly held beliefs are able to exert a top-down control function over behavior and over evolved predispositions; they are able to exert this control independently of external controls (e.g., punishment) (MacDonald Reference MacDonald2008). For example, a person may refrain from engaging in a particular behavior to which he is predisposed as a result of evolved modules (e.g., various forms of aggression [Buss & Shackelford Reference Buss and Shackelford1997]), and he may do so because he believes that he would be sent to prison (based on explicit knowledge of the legal system) or because he believes that he will be punished for it in an afterlife (i.e., as a result of a personally held ideology).
Like social controls, the imposition of ideology may be the result of conflict within societies. As in the case of social controls and also because ideologies are so often intricately bound up with social controls, evolutionary theory is unable to predict which ideology will prevail in a particular society. Ideologies may be egalitarian or anti-egalitarian. They may promote the deregulation of human behavior, or they may rationalize strong social controls on behavior.
Explicit processing is also critical for maintaining group structures because it allows explicit appraisals of others' reputations made possible by human language, representational ability, and long-term memory (MacDonald Reference MacDonald2008). Indeed, the lack of these abilities in animals goes a long way toward explaining why highly structured groups are a rarity in animals and quite possibly nonexistent. Recent models of cooperation show that altruistic cooperation can evolve if people have access to explicit information on others' histories of interaction in cooperative situations (e.g., Semmann et al. Reference Semmann, Krambeck and Milinski2005; Smith Reference Smith2005).
Finally, Smaldino's explanation of group structures in terms of “repeated assembly” is opaque without an illustration from an actually existing human group. Repeated assembly appears to be an attempt to avoid the literature on behavior genetics relevant to the division of labor. Smaldino notes that “The repeated assembly view as applied to individual development stands in counterpoint to the view that contributions from genotype (“nature”) and environment (“nurture”) may be viewed additively or, at best, as interacting in fairly simple ways” (sect. 5.3, para. 1).Thus, Smaldino excludes by fiat the behavior genetic literature on active, passive, and evocative genotype-environment correlations that (in addition to ideologies and social controls as discussed above) would be obvious candidates for developing a theory of division of labor (LaFreniere & MacDonald Reference LaFreniere and MacDonald2013; Plomin & Daniels Reference Plomin and Daniels1987; Plomin et al. Reference Plomin, DeFries and McLearn2008).
Smaldino claims that “The idea that the structured organization of differentiated individuals influences the behavior of human groups is not new” (sect. 8, para. 1) in areas such as cultural anthropology and organizational psychology, but “In discussions of cultural evolution, … group organization is often ignored” (sect. 8, para. 1). There are certainly examples to the contrary. For example, my work on group evolutionary strategies (MacDonald Reference MacDonald1994) discusses several ways that groups are able to structure themselves aimed ultimately at attaining evolutionary goals:
Structuring separation from other groups (e.g., by enforcing endogamy, prohibitions on social intercourse with out-groups, dietary laws).
Structuring within-group altruism and penalizing free riders (e.g., by ostracism of the offending person and the person's family). Smaldino points out that organized groups need not be egalitarian; this is certainly true in the case of traditional Jewish groups. Nevertheless, despite a great deal of differentiation and lack of egalitarianism, there was a strong safety net and pressure on wealthy Jews to contribute to communal charity, and as a rule wealthy Jews patronized other Jews by employing them in their economic enterprises. Economic differentiation within the community was taken for granted, but competition among Jews was closely regulated: Although there was competition among Jews in selling goods within the Jewish community, Jewish communities acted to prevent Jews from, for example, infringing on monopolies held by other Jews in goods and services for non-Jews.
Structuring socialization for in-group loyalty and facilitating the ability to fill particular economic niches (e.g., by supporting high-investment parenting, education, and intellectual ability). Traditional Jewish society was highly competitive, resulting in differentiation among individuals in occupation and social status. For example, men competed to develop a reputation in a socially created reward system in which successful scholars were rewarded with good marriages, business opportunities, and ultimately, higher fertility.
Because he uses an inadequate psychology of groups, Smaldino's explanations for how groups come to be organized fall short. Human groups are able to structure themselves as described above because of explicit processing (MacDonald Reference MacDonald2009; Reference MacDonald2010). Explicit processing is the opposite of implicit (reflexive, modular) processing. It is conscious, controllable, effortful, relatively slow, and involves serial processing of relatively small amounts of information. Explicit processing is involved in creating hypothetical scenarios and in planning for future contingencies (e.g., by groups). As discussed in the rest of the target article, explicit processing enables control of group members, enables ideologies that rationalize group aims and relationships among group members, and enables the ability to track the reputation of group members (e.g., free riders).
Like several other theorists of cultural evolution (e.g., Boyd and Richerson who are cited throughout the target article), Smaldino relies on social learning theory for developing a psychology of cultural evolution and group structuring. The entire emphasis is on cultural transmission, not on how culture is created, for example, by leaders or by discussion among group members. Thus, Smaldino emphasizes leadership as an explanation for group organization but fails to discuss explicit processing necessary for leaders to be able to make plans for the future by using means-end reasoning in the service of attaining ideal goal states (e.g., the creation of blueprints for utopian societies such as Brook Farm in 1840s Massachusetts); there are many important historical groups (e.g., Calvinists) where leaders created ideologies that rationalized group structure (e.g., egalitarian or hierarchical) and group regulation (how to deal with free riders or the less talented) (see MacDonald Reference MacDonald2009; Reference MacDonald2010).
Explicit processing gives rise to the possibility of characteristically human social controls (e.g., bureaucracies, legal systems) and ideologies (e.g., religions, Marxism) that are able to regulate behavior within a particular historical context. Social controls and supporting ideologies enable group selection between human groups because they are able to enforce discipline within groups, punish defectors, encourage patriotism and obedience to group aims, produce significant levels of altruism, and regulate variation in reproductive success (MacDonald Reference MacDonald1994).
Explicitly held beliefs are able to exert a top-down control function over behavior and over evolved predispositions; they are able to exert this control independently of external controls (e.g., punishment) (MacDonald Reference MacDonald2008). For example, a person may refrain from engaging in a particular behavior to which he is predisposed as a result of evolved modules (e.g., various forms of aggression [Buss & Shackelford Reference Buss and Shackelford1997]), and he may do so because he believes that he would be sent to prison (based on explicit knowledge of the legal system) or because he believes that he will be punished for it in an afterlife (i.e., as a result of a personally held ideology).
Like social controls, the imposition of ideology may be the result of conflict within societies. As in the case of social controls and also because ideologies are so often intricately bound up with social controls, evolutionary theory is unable to predict which ideology will prevail in a particular society. Ideologies may be egalitarian or anti-egalitarian. They may promote the deregulation of human behavior, or they may rationalize strong social controls on behavior.
Explicit processing is also critical for maintaining group structures because it allows explicit appraisals of others' reputations made possible by human language, representational ability, and long-term memory (MacDonald Reference MacDonald2008). Indeed, the lack of these abilities in animals goes a long way toward explaining why highly structured groups are a rarity in animals and quite possibly nonexistent. Recent models of cooperation show that altruistic cooperation can evolve if people have access to explicit information on others' histories of interaction in cooperative situations (e.g., Semmann et al. Reference Semmann, Krambeck and Milinski2005; Smith Reference Smith2005).
Finally, Smaldino's explanation of group structures in terms of “repeated assembly” is opaque without an illustration from an actually existing human group. Repeated assembly appears to be an attempt to avoid the literature on behavior genetics relevant to the division of labor. Smaldino notes that “The repeated assembly view as applied to individual development stands in counterpoint to the view that contributions from genotype (“nature”) and environment (“nurture”) may be viewed additively or, at best, as interacting in fairly simple ways” (sect. 5.3, para. 1).Thus, Smaldino excludes by fiat the behavior genetic literature on active, passive, and evocative genotype-environment correlations that (in addition to ideologies and social controls as discussed above) would be obvious candidates for developing a theory of division of labor (LaFreniere & MacDonald Reference LaFreniere and MacDonald2013; Plomin & Daniels Reference Plomin and Daniels1987; Plomin et al. Reference Plomin, DeFries and McLearn2008).