This book makes an intriguing but ultimately unconvincing claim that Machiavelli founded modernity by teaching a new kind of eros (sexual desire capable of sublimation). To begin, Machiavelli's personal letters, wherein he ruminated about his amorous affairs, make it quite clear that he failed to climb the “ladder of love (eros)” (31), which, according to Socrates, enables the philosophic few to sublimate their sexual appetite for beautiful bodies into the admiration of beautiful things and, ultimately, knowledge of the idea of beauty. Instead, Machiavelli advised a friend to “‘give full rein’” to Venus on the grounds that “‘whatever pleasure you seize today may not be there for you to seize tomorrow’” (27). According to Patapan, the assumption of contingency that underlies this statement can also be found in I Capitoli, Machiavelli's poems on ingratitude, fortune, ambition, and opportunity, wherein the few attain happiness by a “sort of lawlessness that imitates the randomness of nature” (60).
Patapan's interpretation of Machiavelli's poem The Golden Ass (61–68) reveals it to be a wicked parody of Dante's Divine Comedy, which had given the Platonic ladder a Christian form: Dante's sexual desire for Beatrice yields to spiritual admiration of her chaste beauty, which, in turn, allows him to receive God's grace. In contrast, Machiavelli sings of his seduction by a breezy shepherdess who serves Circe. Whereas Beatrice enabled Dante's soul to ascend through the Heavens, Circe abases human beings by turning them into animals. And, most sardonically, whereas Dante's souls find eternal bliss in union with God, Machiavelli is told by a pig (that speaks with him in a manner reminiscent of Dante's conversations with the souls) that lasting bliss lies in union with mud.
Machiavelli's comedy Clizia can be understood as an “indecent love-education intended to disenchant the ambitious young about the promise of love” (69). Beneath the surface, however, the comedy suggests that familial order rests on a princely figure who appears virtuous but secretly manipulates others. In its hidden depth, finally, the comedy has a “more indecent ambition”: a “critique of the providence and omnipotence of the God of the New Testament, the God of Love” (70). While the claim that Machiavelli repudiated the Christian god can hardly be denied in general, its derivation from Clizia may serve as an example of the far-fetched mode of interpretation that repeatedly occurs in this book. According to Patapan, “Nicomacho's obsessive love elevates [his manservant] Pirro to the status of a son, giving him Nicomacho's inheritance” (69), implying that Nicomacho sacrificed his son's inheritance for the love of a woman. Hence, “Machiavelli implicitly argues that a loving god would not be very different from the patriarch Nicomacho” (70). To enable the reader to follow this interpretive leap, note 47 asks: “Did not God sacrifice his only Son for the love of man?” (77).
In sum, Patapan's exploration of Machiavelli's literary works shows that he limited eros to sexual desire. In contrast, his analysis of Machiavelli's Prince suggests that Machiavelli considered that the many loved their prince out of fear and advised the prince to direct his eros toward domination and glory rather than the love of the many.
Patapan rests his claim to fear-driven love first on Machiavelli's statements that Hannibal's “inhuman cruelty” made him “venerable” among his soldiers and Ferdinand of Aragon's “pious cruelty” gained him the “admiration” of his subjects (91–92). Second, he takes Machiavelli's claim that a “prince should … make himself feared in such a mode that if he does not acquire love, he escapes hatred” to mean that a prince should make himself feared in such a mode that if he does not thereby acquire the love of the many, he escapes hatred (89). This reading appears mistaken. The clause “if he does not acquire love” clearly refers to the preceding paragraph, in which Machiavelli speaks of doing good as the cause of being loved: “[W]hile you do them good they are yours.” Hence, the sentence in question means that a prince should make himself feared in such a mode that if he does not acquire the love of the many because he failed to do them good, he escapes hatred. Accordingly, the prince makes himself loved by doing good, not by causing fear. What is more, Patapan's reduction of the love of the many to fear overlooks Machiavelli's important claim that the “natural prince,” one who rules by hereditary right, “has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it is fitting that he be more loved.” In other words, the many love the more insofar as they fear less.
In a rather astonishing turn, Patapan then argues that Machiavelli's princely few benefit the many with security and prosperity not in order to maintain their rule, as usually understood, but to satisfy their erotic desire to be loved and worshipped by the many (93–95). Since the fickle and ungrateful many repay their princely lovers with rejection, Machiavelli counseled princes to redirect their eros to the pursuit of domination and glory by means of cruelty. Thus, they gain the love of the many through fear and, more important, benefit the community at large by maintaining an order that suppresses “senseless violence and cruelty,” allows for prosperity, and encourages “all forms of learning and advancement” (94). Here the modern state finds its origin: “techniques of terror … securing rule on a scale little imagined” before (150).
Indeed, Machiavelli's princes ultimately come to light as the wise few and Machiavelli as a “Socratic” who defended “love of knowledge” (145). But Machiavelli could not educate the few by a “simple rehabilitation of classical philosophy” (148)—by guiding them up the ladder of eros—because Christianity had in the meantime subordinated reason to faith and corrupted the virtues with otherworldly leisure. All he could do was to instruct the few to use cruelty in order to provide security and prosperity. In truth, Machiavelli's teaching of evil was thus a “generous and humane attempt at untangling philosophy from Christianity,” a “Socratic moderation for a new world” (146).
Machiavelli as the Socrates of the post-Christian age? True, Machiavelli wanted ruthless rulers to put an end to the disorders that he thought had been brought about by the humaneness of Christianity. But where is the direct textual evidence that Machiavelli understood ambition as eros? What about his explicit claim that the few are no better than the many and share the same nature? What about his rejection of ancient writers and contemporary humanists for their subordination of politics to ethics? Would a Socratic really advocate the use of evil means for the sake of such lowly ends as security and prosperity? Or was Socrates a Machiavellian in disguise?
This is a complex and thought-provoking book. But it leaves too many questions unanswered to sustain its Platonic interpretation of Machiavelli's thought.
