Liberalism has been traditionally understood as a political theory of the state constrained by constitutional individual rights and justified by a distinctive political morality. In this book, Jacob Levy rewrites both the history and the normative underpinnings of liberalism to accommodate a more complex account of freedom than the traditional view admits. His forceful revisionist account is organized around two axes. First, Levy broadens the history of liberal political thought, highlighting the importance of sidelined thinkers such as Montesquieu, Constant, and Tocqueville as well as the British pluralism of G. D. H. Cole, Harold Laski, and Lord Acton. Second, Levy provides a new normative grounding for liberal political theory. In his eyes, liberalism is a social theory of political power rather than a rights-based moral doctrine. Both dimensions are highly promising but it is the social theory of power underlying his account of liberal freedom that raises the most interesting questions.
The two axes around which Levy's new account of liberalism is organized—its history and its normativity—are conceptually connected. The reinterpretation of the history of liberal thought is presented as a continuous contest between two normative outlooks of societal patterns, the “rationalist” and the “pluralist” strands. Rationalism, the more widely established strand within liberalism, has emphasized “the use of state power to protect individuals from local group power.” Pluralism, on the other hand, evokes a diverse associational life and the “self-government of a plurality of non-state social groups” (27). Rationalism and pluralism offer competing reasons to curb or empower associations and their individuals. Levy articulates a liberalism in which the main actors are intermediate associations. Liberal freedom becomes mainly about associational freedom.
From the historical point of view, Levy recovers the pluralist line over the rationalist strand, which in his view has received disproportionate attention. Normatively, Levy (a self-confessed pluralist) argues that these two strands remain at loggerheads with each other. In making this claim, he puts forward a revisionist understanding of liberalism. Liberalism becomes a theory of conflict, rather than reconciliation, which puts political and social power (rather than rights) at its core. The relation between state, groups, and individuals cannot be fully grasped without a social theory of power that sustains it. Rights theories alone can capture only insufficiently the power dynamics among them and thus draw the wrong normative conclusions.
On the historical side, Levy brings the Middle Ages back in. This sets him apart from the long-established history of liberalism, which dates to the seventeenth century with Locke and never earlier than Hobbes. But Levy's recovery of the Middle Ages differs as well from other recent attempts to revive that era as part of liberalism's history, such as Larry Siedentop's Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism (Harvard University Press, 2014). Unlike Siedentop, who offers a Christian account of the origins of liberalism starting in the Middle Ages, Levy denies that liberalism as a political ideal emerged before the late eighteenth century. Instead, Levy unearths a liberal prehistory in a social and legal pluralist view called “ancient constitutionalism” (88). The latter refers to the era prior to centralization and absolutism when one found the defense of an “array of intermediate institutions from the Middle Ages against the emerging absolute monarchies of early modernity” (4). Levy provides a fascinating story about how universities, guilds, cities, monastic orders, and the Roman Catholic Church shaped “the birth of intermediacy” (4). Instead of a narrative from the perspective of the liberal state, ancient constitutionalism accounts for the limitation of absolute monarchical power from the standpoint of associational life. Levy's narrative powerfully changes the perspective of liberal theory from a state-centric view to one that is association-centric.
Redefining the history of liberalism as a series of tensions between the rationalist and the pluralist view broadens the philosophical perspective needed to shed light on the current conflicts between the state and intermediary associations. Although liberalism has been overtaken by a rationalist narrative, the genealogy of the life of intermediacy helps to unveil the importance of a sociological and institutional pluralism currently at work behind the idea of associational freedom.
Levy is of course not the first to put groups at the center of liberal theory. Will Kymlicka, most notably, has produced seminal work on the subject, and Chandran Kukathas has given us a parsimonious view about how groups and state should relate in liberal democracies. Levy's critical and paramount contribution lies in seeing intermediary groups as both objects and subjects of (quasi-) political and social power. The main category underlying the group/state relation is not culture (Kymlicka) or rights (Kukathas) but power. Levy offers a much-needed political realist analysis of group behavior and excesses—their organization, incentives, resources, jurisdiction, and rationalities of survival—that amounts to a thorough account of the social (and political) power they wield and withstand.
Armored with an intricate account of social dynamics between states and groups and their relative sources of power, Levy rejects two standard theories about freedom of association for being reductionist. The “pure liberal theory” reduces groups to individuals while “the congruence theory” equates groups with the state. Levy, alternatively, treats groups as groups, a different kind of social being in virtue of the different decision procedures, resources, and role differentiation that they display. Levy endorses some form of Otto von Gierke's doctrine of the “real personality of groups,” that is, that “groups have real existence that the state recognizes but does not create” (244).
A principle undercuts Levy's book, namely, that the exercise of social power always generates a surplus of power. As much as associations hold claims against the state, the internal groups within the associations hold claims against both the state and the association itself. Intermediate associations—purposive groups with a partial mission—stand against the universality of the state. Yet, the wielding of social power within the constraints of an organizational structure produces a surplus of power taken over by sectarian groups within the association itself. Social existence involves necessarily a remnant, an overflow of power. Pluralism—overwhelmingly understood in current debates as a metaethical theory of the character of values—becomes in Levy's work the “source of associational life” (46) and the sociological aftereffect of an account of social power that cannot ever be squared.
Liberalism has been often criticized for indifference to history, blindness to exclusion, rejection of conflict, and occlusion of power. Levy cannot be accused of such shortcomings. But what kind of liberalism is left as a result?
Levy argues that an adequate account of liberal freedom involves an open-ended and clashing interaction between the rationalist and the pluralist views. Yet, this vision of liberal freedom may involve views about power, history, authority, political morality, consent, and reason that could be inimical to the liberal way of theorizing—pluralist and rationalist alike. Levy's social theory of power may not see eye to eye with the liberal political theory that he also wants to endorse.
There are many factors in Levy's analysis of freedom that may weaken its liberal stamp. Levy's way of social theorizing involves a recovery of genealogical history, an abandonment of ideal theory, an account of group domination (not only state repression), a breaking away from theories of rights, an awareness that facts are intertwined with norms, a notion of authority as a source of both consented and nonconsented power, a reluctance to use moral intuitions as a starting point of political reasoning, and a restraint from relying on a single political morality. The point is not only that his reconstructed pluralist liberalism bedevils the universalism, individualism, and moralism of the rationalist strand. Rather, the social theorizing behind his pluralist account of freedom may be at odds with the presumptions of normative liberal thinking—pluralist or rationalist. His liberalism may be both over- and underinclusive. On the one hand, liberalism becomes too capacious, an all-encompassing universe of clashing doctrines. On the other, Levy convincingly defends a conception of social power and politics that may do more than simply broaden the way we do liberal theory. It may undermine the very liberal idea that norms and the individual can stand apart from power at all.
Levy's book is a fascinating account of associational freedom. However, given the social theory on which it stands, it is less clear that it also conforms to the normative requirements of liberalism. The question that remains is, what is left of liberalism once we incorporate a realist social theory of power?
