This book stems from a 2017 Rostock dissertation written under the supervision of Egon Flaig. Its title immediately invites the reader to draw comparisons with L. de Libero's 1992 study Obstruktion: Politische Praktiken im Senat und in der Volksversammlung der ausgehenden römischen Republik (70–49 v. Chr.). While highlighting the usefulness and high quality of de Libero's contribution, reviewers have pointed out several problems with her approach, such as defects of categorisation and a preponderance of typology over historical development. A new take on this theme surely is welcome, and G.'s book fulfils many expectations in this respect.
In the introduction (Chapter 1) G. describes the way in which his work stands out. Thus, to be able to chart the development of obstruction throughout Republican history, G. goes well beyond the period covered by de Libero's book. Rather than identifying the specific obstruction technics in Rome as de Libero has done, G. offers in his Chapter 2 a general taxonomy of obstructions. Four main types (each relying on a different ‘regulating system’) are distinguished: ‘verfahrenstechnische’ (essentially filibuster), ‘amtsgebundene’ (e.g. intercession in Rome), ‘zustimmungsverweigernde’ (refusal to consent in consensual political systems) and ‘sakrale’ (religious). G. also highlights two extreme variants: ‘prinzipielle’ (e.g. the structural minority imposes its political agenda by preventing the discussion of all other issues) and ‘kostenlose’ (when there is a lack of pressure on those who resort to obstruction). G.'s taxonomy is a solid starting point. However, G. draws heavily on non-Roman material, so that the reader may wonder about the extent to which some of the types or their specific characteristics are relevant for republican Rome.
Chapter 3 is central to G.'s argument. First, G. demonstrates the way in which obstruction was prominent before 133 bce as a means to solve conflicts. He then proceeds to explain the reasons for which 133 proved a turning point. In the final section of this chapter G. describes obstruction in the late Republic as part and parcel of its crisis.
The cases selected by G. from the period down to 133 bce are instructive and clearly allow him to argue his point. Up to 133 obstruction – in form of intercession – did not prevent a debate (here, G. refers to C. Meier). On the contrary, it worked as a means to ‘decelerate’ (‘entschleunigen’) decision-making so that a political solution could be found. Intercession also helped to avoid majority voting (such voting is detrimental to the elite's cohesion and to the power of its upper ranks; pp. 123–4). But most importantly, veto-bearers had to justify their intercession (p. 143) and were prepared to concede in the face of strong opposition (pp. 152–3). It is on this basis that G. challenges de Libero's contention that obstruction retained its effectiveness in the last decades of the Republic. I wonder, however, at what cost and within what limits obstruction worked better before 133 bce. Thus, G. investigates the case of P. Cornelius Scipio, who, as consul in 205, asked the Senate to entrust him with the (fateful) command in Africa instead of Sicily. Making use of a threat of tribunician intercession, the Senate was able to avoid this decision. However, Scipio was still given permission to cross over to Africa, even though not allowed to divert the forces from Italy (p. 132). Did this obstruction contribute to a consensus? Apparently, it did. However, the eventual decision is arguably not strikingly different from Scipio's original initiative.
Even if we consider cases such as this exceptional or ambivalent (as they may be indeed), G. points to another important limitation: before 133 bce, obstructions largely concerned the decisions that affected individual members of the elite (‘Personalentscheidungen’) rather than grand issues of importance for larger groups (‘Sachentscheidungen’). In the relatively rare cases of the latter tribunes usually lifted their veto if they perceived strong resistance. They could also ignore it, but then they ran the risk of extreme consequences (pp. 142–4). G.'s observations create the impression that intercession was effective as long as it remained a technical means to pause things for a while or to remedy an obvious miscalculation. At least obstruction in the middle Republic does not look game-changing from this perspective. Did the negative developments that G. diagnoses for the obstruction in the late Republic result from an attempt to make obstruction achieve something that it never did and never could?
Turning to the events of 133 bce, G. asks about the reasons for which obstruction did not produce a ‘positive’ effect in that year (p. 155). The tribune M. Octavius acted as a dependent representative of other actors, as if he were providing auxilium to defend their private interests. These other actors were not directly exposed to the pressure from the majority favouring the initiative. As a result, those staying behind the tribune could not easily be compelled to concede (pp. 171–2).
G. disagrees with de Libero's conclusions about obstruction in the late Republic. Whereas for de Libero even the use of violence to overcome obstruction contributed to stability because those who turned to violence exposed themselves to defeat, G. points to the disruption of political communication caused by categorical obstruction (pp. 215–17). In this connection, G. also considers other types of obstruction: religious (pp. 217–29) and the filibuster in the Senate (pp. 229–34). Following Meier, G. maintains that, in the late Republic, intercession became restrained (‘Relativierung des Intercessionsrechts’). However, some of the constraints G. mentions strongly remind of those that had affected intercession already before 133 bce. Thus, G. often speaks of the balance of forces (‘Kräfteverhältnisse’) and the intensity of political preferences (‘Intensität der Präferenzen’). He does not concentrate on an analysis of what those are, but points out that, in the late Republic, the balance of forces became more about which side was ‘physically stronger’ (p. 203). Yet the fear of violence seemed to affect intercession strongly even before 133 (cf. above on pp. 142–4 and p. 169 n. 272).
In the concluding Chapter 4 G. challenges the recent view that obstruction in the (middle) Republic marked the end of negotiation. An astonishing degree of publicity made intercession an integral part of public debate. The reason for which this ceased to work in the late Republic is, for G., primarily the advent of powerful commanders who offered an alternative career path to ‘their’ tribunes. The nobility, in their turn, preferred preventing any decision as a matter of principle to allowing the likes of Caesar or Pompeius to become even stronger – the logic best demonstrated by Bibulus in 59, with whom G. both begins and completes the book (p. 264). What is striking is that G.'s reference to the impact of powerful imperium-holders hardly applies to the year 133, which otherwise defines G.'s investigation so profoundly.
G.'s discussion is clear; the volume is beautifully produced, with only a few typographical errors (such as ‘Heeresrefom’ on p. 203), which do not hamper the understanding. G. analyses only selected cases in detail, but he relies (see esp. pp. 121–5) on the comprehensive catalogue presented in the tables and graphs at the end of the book. Following the bibliography there are useful indexes of sources, names and subjects.
As hinted above, G.'s analysis may compel some readers to think in a slightly different direction than the one preferred by G. This does not undermine his argument, but rather demonstrates the complexity and importance of G.'s findings. His book enters as a theoretically informed, well-argued and thought-provoking study that invites readers to reconsider not only the phenomenon of obstruction but also a wider range of questions about politics in republican Rome.
