In a fragment of Numenius’ dialogue On the Good, one of the speakers comments on the nature of knowledge (fr. 14 des Places = Euseb. Praep. evang. 11.18.15–19):
ὁπόσα δὲ δοθέντα μέτεισι πρὸς τὸν λαμβάνοντα, ἀπελθόντα ἐκ τοῦ δεδωκότος … ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν ἐστι θνητὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ θεῖά ἐστιν οἷα μεταδοθέντα ἐνθένδ’ ἐκεῖθι γεγενημένα ἔνθεν τε οὐκ ἀπελήλυθε κἀκεῖθι γενόμενα τὸν μὲν ὤνησε τὸν δ’ οὐκ ἔβλαψε καὶ προσώνησε τῇ περὶ ὧν ἠπίστατο ἀναμνήσει. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν χρῆμα ἐπιστήμη ἡ καλή, ἧς ὤνατο μὲν ὁ λαβών, οὐκ ἀπολείπεται δ’ αὐτῆς ὁ δεδωκώς. οἷον ἂν ἴδοις ἐξαφθέντα ἀφ’ ἑτέρου λύχνου λύχνον φῶς ἔχοντα, ὃ μὴ τὸν πρότερον ἀφείλατο ἀλλ’ ἢ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ ὕλης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου πῦρ ἐξαφθείσης. τοιοῦτον τὸ χρῆμά ἐστι τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἣ δοθεῖσα καὶ ληφθεῖσα παραμένει μὲν τῷ δεδωκότι, σύνεστι δὲ τῷ λαβόντι ἡ αὐτή. τούτου δὲ τὸ αἴτιον, ὦ ξένε, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπινον, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἕξις τε καὶ οὐσία ἡ ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἡ αὐτή ἐστι παρά τε τῷ δεδωκότι θεῷ καὶ παρὰ τῷ εἰληφότι ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί.
All gifts which, when they have passed to their recipient, are no longer held by the giver … these things are mortal, the concerns of men. Divine are those things which, when they have been given and have passed from one place to another, have not left the original place while they have come to the other. They benefit the recipient without harming the donor. Indeed, they benefit him too by reminding him of things that he knew. This beautiful possession is the beauty of knowledge, by which the recipient benefits while the donor is never without it. It is as one can see with a lamp, which is lit by another and takes light without depriving the original one of it, its matter being lit by its fire. Such a possession is knowledge. When given and received, it remains with the donor while coming at the same time to be with the recipient. The reason for this, stranger, is no human matter. It is because the state and substance which contains knowledge is the same for god who gave it and for you and me, as recipient.Footnote 1
As scholars have noted, Numenius refers here to the concept of ‘undiminished giving’, an idea communicating a non-depleting generosity, which in ancient philosophy is often illustrated by an image of light—most frequently, sunlight, but also occasionally, a portable light source such as a lamp, which we find in Numenius.Footnote 2 It is a familiar image to readers of Plotinus in particular, as the concept of undiminished giving along with concomitant light imagery possesses cardinal significance for the Plotinian ontology.Footnote 3 It also recurs in several other Early Imperial texts, however, where we encounter the same triadic constellation encountered in Numenius, in which the concept of undiminished giving (1) and the image of light (2) are employed to elucidate the nature of knowledge (3).
A few Platonic passages may have inspired the crystallization of the concept of undiminished giving in the form known to us from these texts. Scholars point to Plato’s description of the demiurge in Timaeus 42e, where he is described as having ‘remained in his own proper state’ after issuing orders (ταῦτα διατάξας ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἤθει), as a parallel to the concept of a giver undergoing no alteration or harm as a result of the act of giving.Footnote 4 Two other Platonic passages may also have informed the triadic conceptual constellation mentioned above. The first is in Book 7 of the Republic (518e), where Socrates says that the virtue of reasoning (τοῦ φρονῆσαι) ‘seems to belong above all to something more divine, which never loses its power’ (παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὖσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν).Footnote 5 Although in the Republic this remark occurs in a different context (Socrates argues that reasoning retains its power regardless of one’s moral values and can be directed toward evil), the wording employs language reminiscent of later accounts of knowledge as a form of undiminished giving. Moreover, Socrates’ remark closely follows the allegory of the cave, where the connection between sunlight and knowledge is central. The second relevant passage occurs in the Seventh Epistle, in a well-known passage where the author explains why he did not and could not commit his most important teachings to writing, and compares philosophical understanding to a fire suddenly kindled within the soul (Ep. 7.341c–d οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει).Footnote 6 These passages offer both types of light imagery that are central to the concept of undiminished giving in the epistemological context, namely sunlight and firelight, and establish the notion that thinking, due to its divine nature, possesses unique power and endurance.
While the Platonic passages might have inspired the concept of undiminished giving and its use to illuminate the nature of knowledge, it emerges with clarity only after Plato. It has been speculated that it crystallized among the Stoics, and Posidonius in particular has been proposed as its source.Footnote 7 The earliest clear example in extant literature comes from The Wisdom of Solomon 7.26–9,Footnote 8 where wisdom, σοφία, is considered ‘a reflection of eternal light’, likened to the sun, and described as ‘remaining in herself’ (μένουσα ἐν αὑτῇ) while simultaneously renewing all things and passing ‘into holy souls’ across generations (τὰ πάντα καινίζει καὶ κατὰ γενεὰς εἰς ψυχὰς ὁσίας μεταβαίνουσα).Footnote 9 The phrases μένουσα ἐν αὑτῇ and μεταβαίνουσα capture a sense of enduring stability combined with movement, reminiscent of the paradoxical notion of undiminished giving. An even earlier trace can be detected in Roman literature, in a fragment of a lost tragedy by Ennius, preserved by Cicero in Off. 1.51 (fr. CLXVb Jocelyn): ‘A man who kindly shows the path to someone who is lost lights another’s light, so to speak, from his own. For his own shines no less because he has lit another’s’ (homo, qui erranti comiter monstrat uiam, | quasi lumen de suo lumine accendat, facit. | nihilo minus ipsi lucet, cum illi accenderit).Footnote 10 The passage incorporates the three elements identified above: the concept of undiminished giving, light imagery and their use to clarify the nature of knowledge (showing the way to someone who errs). In contrast to the imagery of the sun, which spontaneously emits light, the image of a person resolutely sharing fire and kindling another’s light emphasizes interpersonal relationships and the transfer of knowledge between individuals. This aspect is further underscored by Cicero’s emphasis that the main and essential connection between human beings ‘consists of reason and speech, which reconcile men to one another, through teaching, learning, communicating, debating and making judgements, and unite them in a kind of natural fellowship’ (Off. 1.50 ratio et oratio, quae docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate). We do not know what author and text provided inspiration for Ennius, but Cicero cites his verses in a passage which draws extensively from Stoicism, particularly Panaetius of Rhodes. This supports the hypothesis of a Stoic origin for the concept of undiminished giving, which is further reinforced by its use by Seneca (Ep. 41.5) and Marcus Aurelius (Med. 8.57).Footnote 11
While these texts provide an important backdrop for Numenius’ discussion of the nature of knowledge in fr. 14, the closest parallel appears in Philo of Alexandria’s De gigantibus, Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Genesis 6.1–4.Footnote 12 At one point, Philo refers to a passage from Numbers (11.16–25) in which God ‘transfers’ the spirit of Moses to the seventy elders. Philo comments (Gig. 25–8):
ἀλλὰ μὴ νομίσῃς οὕτως ἀφαίρεσιν κατὰ ἀποκοπὴν καὶ διάζευξιν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ οἵα γένοιτ᾿ ἂν ἀπὸ πυρός, ὅ, κἂν μυρίας δᾷδας ἐξάψῃ, μένει μήδ᾿ ὁτιοῦν ἐλαττωθὲν ἐν ὁμοίῳ. τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἡ φύσις· τοὺς γὰρ φοιτητὰς καὶ γνωρίμους ἀποφήνασα ἐμπείρους πάντας κατ᾿ οὐδὲν μέρος ἐλαττοῦται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον ἐπιδίδωσιν, ὥσπερ φασὶ τὰς ἀπαντλουμένας πηγάς· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνας λόγος ἔχει τότε μᾶλλον γλυκαίνεσθαι. αἱ γὰρ συνεχεῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους ὁμιλίαι μελέτην καὶ ἄσκησιν ἐμποιοῦσαι ὁλόκληρον τελειότητα ἐργάζονται. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ Μωυσέως πνεῦμα ἤ τινος ἄλλου γενητοῦ τοσούτῳ πλήθει γνωρίμων ἔμελλε διανέμεσθαι, κἂν κατακερματισθὲν εἰς μοίρας τοσαύτας ἐμειοῦτο. νῦν δὲ τὸ ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ πνεῦμά ἐστι τὸ σοφόν, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ ἄτμητον, τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, τὸ ἀστεῖον, τὸ πάντῃ δι᾿ ὅλων ἐκπεπληρωμένον· ὅπερ ὠφελοῦν οὐ βλάπτεται οὐδὲ μεταδοθὲν ἑτέροις οὐδ᾿ αὖ προστεθὲν ἐλαττοῦται τὴν σύνεσιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ σοφίαν.
But think not that this taking of the spirit comes to pass as when men cut away a piece and sever it. Rather it is, as when they take fire from fire, for though the fire should kindle a thousand torches, it is still as it was and is diminished not a whit. Of such a sort also is the nature of knowledge. All those who resort to it and become its disciples, it makes into men of skill, yet no part of it is diminished. Nay, often knowledge improves thereby, just as springs (so they say) when we draw water from them. For when this is done, it is thought that the spring becomes sweeter. So the giving of instruction to others, constantly repeated, entails study and practice to the instructor and thus works the perfect consummation of knowledge. If, then, it were Moses’ own spirit, or the spirit of some other created being, which was according to God’s purpose to be distributed to that great number of disciples, it would indeed be shredded into so many pieces and thus lessened. But as it is, the spirit which is on him is the wise, the divine, the excellent spirit, susceptible of neither severance nor division, diffused in its fullness everywhere and through all things, the spirit which helps, but suffers no hurt, which though it be shared with others or added to others suffers no diminution in understanding and knowledge and wisdom.Footnote 13
The similarities between this passage and Numenius fr. 14 are unmistakable. Like Numenius, Philo combines the idea of undiminished giving with the image of fire contained in and transferred to portable human-made objects (lamps in Numenius, torches in Philo), and applies it to illuminate the nature of knowledge. There is also significant overlap in the phrases used by the two authors, cf. Ph.: ἀπὸ πυρός … δᾷδας ἐξάψῃ ∼ Num.: ἐξαφθέντα … λύχνον … πῦρ ἐξαφθείσης, Ph.: ὅπερ ὠφελοῦν οὐ βλάπτεται οὐδὲ μεταδοθὲν ἑτέροις ∼ Num.: μεταδοθέντα … τὸν μὲν ὤνησε τὸν δ’ οὐκ ἔβλαψε, Ph: τὸ θεῖον ∼ Num.: τὰ δὲ θεῖα, Ph.: τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἡ φύσις ∼ Num.: τοιοῦτον τὸ χρῆμά ἐστι τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. Both passages focus on the nature of knowledge and emphasize that sharing it neither harms the giver (Ph. οὐ βλάπτεται, Num. οὐκ ἔβλαψε) nor takes anything away from him (Ph. οὐδὲν μέρος ἐλαττοῦται, Num. οὐκ ἀπολείπεται δ’ αὐτῆς), but in fact benefits him. Philo asserts that sharing knowledge often leads to its improvement (πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον ἐπιδίδωσιν) and that through sharing it, one progresses towards perfection as it requires continuous study and practice (μελέτην καὶ ἄσκησιν). Numenius implies something similar when he notes that sharing knowledge benefits the giver ‘by reminding him of things that he knew’ (προσώνησε τῇ περὶ ὧν ἠπίστατο ἀναμνήσει). While Philo’s and Numenius’ use of the concept of undiminished giving illustrated by lamp or torch imagery resembles to some extent Ennius’ image mentioned above, they differ in that they encompass both the concept of sharing of knowledge between individuals and the notion of the divine as the ultimate source of knowledge that enables its transmission among people. Knowledge, both authors emphasize, is divine, and it is because of this that it may be shared not only without loss, but with a gain.Footnote 14
These intriguing similarities between the two passages suggest that Philo and Numenius either drew from a common source, which they followed closely, or that Numenius was influenced by Philo. While it is uncertain whether Numenius was familiar with Philo’s works, scholars consider it possible, if not probable, based on other parallels between them.Footnote 15 Philo would certainly have been a good source of allegorical interpretations of the Jewish scriptures, which, according to Origen, Numenius incorporated into his works (fr. 1c des Places), and there is little doubt that De gigantibus, as an allegorical commentary on some lines of Genesis, would be of interest to him. While the resemblance between the two passages does not, by itself, resolve the question, it contributes to the growing body of evidence that may help to establish a more definitive connection between the two thinkers and, consequently, between Philo and Neoplatonism through Numenius.
