The Federalist is considered by many constitutional scholars to be the most comprehensive and incisive commentary ever written on the original Constitution. It has been cited by the United States Supreme Court as the definitive authority on the founders’ Constitution in a host of cases dealing with everything from federalism to national security. Yet anyone who has ever read the work knows that The Federalist does not present a systematic account of the constitutional theory underwriting the Constitution of 1787. In addition, many people who are familiar with the 85 papers written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the pseudonym “Publius,” know only bits and pieces of the argument in the work; or they are only familiar with a handful of Federalist numbers, such as Federalist 51 on the separation of powers or Federalist 78 on the federal judiciary.
Harvey Flaumenhaft’s goal in The Framework of the Federalist is to try to remedy these shortcomings. As the subtitle to his book indicates, Flaumenhaft attempts to visualize the structure of the argument in The Federalist. Despite its multiple authorship and the haste with which it was written, it is crucial for the serious reader, Flaumenhaft emphasizes in his brief Forward, to see the argumentation of The Federalist as “an elaborately structured whole.” It is to be able to see that whole that Flaumenhaft writes The Framework. In his words, he presents the reader “a depiction in which the copious items” making up The Federalist’s specific arguments “are spatially arranged to show their complex relations of subordination, coordination, and dependence.” In the pages that follow Flaumenhaft creates a “visual aid” for the reader to see this structure of The Federalist’s argumentation as a whole. (1)
The result is a book that does not resemble your traditional book or your typical interpretation of The Federalist. Rather, The Framework presents a schematic detail of the structure of the main arguments found in The Federalist. These main arguments are broken down into a series of subordinate arguments linked by vertical and horizontal lines on the pages making up the text of the book. The text itself is followed by two appendices offered again as visual aids to the reader. The first of these is a one-page table listing the claimed authorship by Hamilton and Madison of the 85 papers making up The Federalist. The second is a spatially arranged version of the text of the Articles of Confederation that is tendered by Flaumenhaft to make it easier to read that document the Constitution replaced.
Flaumenhaft’s effort in The Framework works quite well but can be a little difficult to follow in places. Flaumenhaft, a longtime faculty member at St John’s College, Annapolis, clearly knows The Federalist well. His schematic presentation of the intricate details that make up the comprehensive constitutional theory Publius presents in The Federalist is elaborate. Like The Federalist itself, Flaumenhaft breaks down his analysis into two principal components. The first examines papers 2 through 36 of The Federalist on the theme of Union. The second examines papers 37 to 85 addressing the plan proposed by the Constitutional Convention. The detailing in both of these sections of The Framework is exquisite.
Most of the pages in The Framework are divided into multiple arguments and then sub-arguments, and at times sub-sub-arguments beyond those. A number of Publius’s replies to critics are often integrated into the schema Flaumenhaft presents. General themes, with the appropriate Federalist numbers listed in square brackets, appear at the top, left hand side of the pages of the book. Then subordinate arguments are arranged below these across the middle of the page, connected to the argument above with vertical lines. Yet further arguments below these extend further down the page to the right, again connected with vertical lines. Federalist numbers associated with these subordinate arguments again appear in square brackets after the text, as they do after replies that are listed. Long arguments are spread over multiple pages in the text. For instance, at page 10 of The Framework the case for union is presented, involving Federalist 3–13. This argument is broken down into “safety,” presented in numbers 3–10, and “wealth,” presented in numbers 11–13. The “expanded detail” of the safety arguments here are presented on the “previous pages,” we are informed at page 10. The wealth arguments in numbers 11–13 are presented at page 10. The details of these arguments are quite intricate. On the “wealth” issue, Flaumenhaft presents a schematic breakdown of the “prosperity of commerce” (number 11) and the “finance of government” (numbers 12–13). Page 10 concludes topic I of The Federalist. At page 11 we are presented with a brief introduction to topics II–IV of the work. This is followed by a schematic review of the argument of The Federalist as a whole, a “reminder” of the place Parts II–IV have in The Federalist as a whole. Page 12 continues the summary of topic II of The Federalist on the “insufficiency of the present confederation,” a review of Federalists 15–22. The remainder of The Framework follows a similar format.
The format works well. Virtually every specific argument in The Federalist is schematically presented. But it is precisely the details of this schema that can at times be a little overwhelming. The print of The Framework is small. The details of the arguments up and down and across the pages can be a little taxing to track. It can also be difficult to follow the elements of the arguments presented over multiple pages. However, if read carefully in conjunction with the actual text of The Federalist, Flaumenhaft’s Framework can be an invaluable aid to understanding Publius’s oeuvre. Flaumenhaft highlights a wealth of details. With Federalist 25, for instance, he discusses the allegations of critics of the Constitution that national defense is entrusted to the federal government rather than to the states and that the federal government can raise standing armies during peacetime. Flaumenhaft highlights that under the Articles of Confederation the states were prohibited “from having warships or troops without the consent of Congress.” (16). When revisiting this theme in Federalist 44, examining “restrictions on the states” the Constitution imposes, he again emphasizes under those “subject to consent of Congress” that “imports & exports” and “war & external agreements” are so subject (25). These details emphasize the contemporaneity of The Federalist. Scholars of Congress and the Presidency today continue to debate the contentious issue of whether the President needs to get the consent of Congress to take the country to war. Yet when considering who needed to get the consent of Congress to “engage in war,” Article 1, Section 10, Clause 3, at issue here, maintained that only the states needed to get such consent, not the President.
There are numerous other intriguing and revealing elements to Flaumenhaft’s Framework, too many to list here. Flaumenhaft has provided students of The Federalist and the American founding more generally a unique and highly instructive guide to Publius’s seminal interpretation of the founders’ Constitution.