This is a splendid and extremely useful collection of essays. Theologians and analytic philosophers of religion do not, for the most part, see eye to eye. Theologians tend to think of analytic philosophers as ahistorical logic choppers, with a list towards fundamentalism; some analytic philosophers hold similarly uncomplimentary views of theology. This volume is designed to explore this situation and, if possible, rectify it. The main focus is really two-fold: the relation between Anglo-American-style analytic philosophy (in particular philosophy of religion) and contemporary theology, and the question how and whether the methods of analytic philosophy can be useful in theology. There are essays by Oliver Crisp, William J. Abraham, Randal Rauser, John Lamont, Andrew Chignell, Andrew Dole, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas McCall, Thomas Crisp, Michael Sudduth, Michael Murray, Eleonore Stump, Merold Westphal and Sarah Coakley. All are of first-rate quality and some are superb. Michael Rea's ‘Introduction’ – a powerful and searching account of objections to analytic philosophy and hence to the application of analytic methods in theology – is, as they say, worth the price of admission all by itself.
There isn't space to comment on all of the essays, so I'll restrict myself to a few which display common themes, though this will oblige me to pass over several others of great interest.
Analytic philosophers of religion have, over the last quarter century or so, addressed a number of straightforwardly theological topics: divine eternity, divine foreknowledge, divine simplicity, sin, the nature of faith and so on. Theologians, for the most part, don't seem impressed. Why not? Well of course there is disciplinary loyalty or chauvinism. There is also the fact that 50 years ago analytic philosophy displayed a rather fervent hostility to religion; some theologians still think first of A. J. Ayer and logical positivism when they think about analytic philosophy.
A more serious reason would be that many theologians disapprove of the methods employed by analytic philosophers, whether exercised in the area of philosophy or that of theology. Theologians are often receptive to philosophy, but for one reason or another have been much more sympathetic to continental philosophy than to analytic; they find problems with the whole analytic approach to philosophy. Several of the essays address this phenomenon: in particular those by Rea, Dole, Chignell, Stump, Coakley, Westphal and, to some degree, Wolterstorff. Now some of these objections are straightforward, and also not very serious: for example, the claim that analytic philosophers of religion tend to be ahistorical, ignoring the history of theology, whether out of conviction or ignorance. This charge, however, while to at least some degree justified, has nothing to do with analytic philosophy as such; there is no reason why analytic philosophers of religion can't seriously address the history of theology and philosophy, and of course some, for example Nicholas Wolterstorff and William Wainwright, have certainly done so.
A deeper source of tension has to do with Kant, continental philosophy and apophatic theology. Many continental philosophers and many theologians apparently believe that Immanuel Kant has shown that we can't really think or talk about things in themselves, and hence can't really think or talk about God. Many theologians concur, and have therefore retreated from traditional theological concerns to varieties of apophatic theology. Analytic philosophers of religion tend to think Kant's views here are both confused and unsupported. In ‘As Kant has shown . . .’, Andrew Chignell argues that, when it comes to what ‘Kant has shown’, Kant himself, far from having shown it, didn't even endorse it. Nicholas Wolterstorff formerly took Kant to endorse what ‘Kant has shown’ but didn't think Kant had anywhere nearly shown it. (In ‘Is it Possible and Desirable for Theologians to Recover from Kant?’ Wolterstorff took a firm line on Kant, perhaps following in the footsteps of his predecessor T. C. E. Woltersdorf who, in 1791, according to Chignell, barred Kant from further writing on religion.) Here, in ‘How Philosophical Theology Became Possible within the Analytic Tradition of Philosophy’, he now agrees with Chignell on Kant. Kant interpretation, as we all know, is multifarious and kaleidoscopic; but if this more moderate interpretation of Kant became widely accepted, one of the main sources of theological displeasure with analytic theology would dry up.
Three writers – Stump, Westphal and Coakley – express reservations or caveats about the enterprise of analytic theology. Stump suggests that stories, narrative, are often a source of understanding which can't be duplicated in straightforward third-person prose, a source which has been neglected by analytic philosophers. I'm not sure (analytic philosopher that I am) precisely what she means, but my guess is there is an important truth lurking in the neighbourhood. Westphal renews his attack on (endorsing) propositions as presumptuous and maybe even idolatrous. I find this hard to believe, but in any event it is not at all clear that analytic philosophy or theology as such commits one to endorsing propositions (Quine, van Fraassen, Goodman). Coakley believes that analytic philosophers of religion, in their turn towards testimony, trust and credulity, are also turning towards feminism.
There is much else of great interest in the volume, but no space to explore it here. All in all, this is an outstanding and extremely useful set of essays. It is important that theologians and analytic philosophers of religion come to understand each other better, and we owe a debt of gratitude to the editors for conceiving and carrying out this project.
