This edited volume considers the politics of pension-policy reform using case studies from 16 countries. The editors have three audiences in mind for this comprehensive analysis of the nuances of pension politics in Europe. They believe that it will appeal to those interested in welfare states and institutional change, to students and practitioners of social policy, and to those interested in comparative and European politics. The usefulness for policy makers lies primarily in its concise outline of policy and policy reform since the 1980s, but it is principally an educational text and will be of most use to undergraduate and postgraduate students. The book is a refreshing departure from the ‘finance is everything’ thesis that has tended to dominate the pensions literature. It is also a welcome antidote to unilinear descriptions of a transition from welfare to post-welfare, through its attention to the complexities and intricacies of the pension reform process.

The book covers the 15 ‘old’ European Union member states – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom – plus Switzerland. Each chapter, written by an expert in the area, describes the country's political system according to the ‘veto points and veto players framework’ (outlined below), and then provides a brief historical overview of the pensions system. This is followed by a thorough discussion of the system's structure, presented according to coverage, administration, financing and benefits. Finally, each chapter provides an analysis of the dynamics of pension reform from the 1980s to the present, assessing the way in which policy proposals have been constrained or facilitated by politics. The historical overviews are particularly helpful because they explain the constraints imposed on reform by the structure of the prevailing pension system.

The editors emphasise the influence of political priorities and political feasibility on pensions' policy reform; hence the questions they address are ‘political’ questions. They ask: ‘Does the structure of government affect the dynamics of pension politics? Are some forms of government better than others at grappling with policy problems? Do some policies privilege some interest groups or voters at the expense of others? [and] How have nationally-distinct notions of fairness and justice affected the dynamics of pension politics from the 1980s to the present?’ (pp. 23–4). It is useful to ask these questions, because much analysis of welfare-state change focuses on the ideological work that takes place prior to pension reform, and the implications of that reform. While analyses of these are invaluable, their emphasis is on what happens before and after reform rather than what happens in the process of reform itself.

The editors provide a useful overview of a series of approaches to understanding pension reform and outline what they perceive to be the difficulties faced by these approaches. This is a valuable starting point for students interested in developing an understanding of the field. They are particularly critical of institutionalist approaches to pension reform that emphasise the effects of political institutions on pensions' policy making, which they see as unable to explain adequately the dynamics of the reform process. One approach that attempts to remedy the pitfalls of institutional approaches is ‘veto points and veto players theory’. They argue that through its attempts to predict potential sites of struggle in the reform process, it provides better accounts of the dynamics. The ‘veto points and veto players framework’ sets out to identify the points in the legislative process at which particular parties, groups or individuals have the capacity to block or impede the passage of legislation. This framework is used to structure the book and to develop a rough typology into which the 16 considered countries are placed.

In the process of their study, however, the editors expose some pitfalls of the veto framework. They note that initially they anticipated that the higher the number of veto players and veto points in a country, the greater the number of possible impediments to passing legislation, and the greater the difficulty in introducing far-reaching reform, but that this was not the case. Instead, they found that countries with a greater number of veto points and players had adopted more extensive legislative change, whereas countries with fewer veto points and players had experienced difficulty in introducing sweeping changes. These ‘deviations’ from the veto model can be explained by what the editors call ‘political competition’, that is, the impact of the system of voting, the proximity to election time, and the propensity of politicians to compete for the votes of particular groups of people, on the policy-making process. The editors supplement their veto framework, therefore, with an account of political competition. In sum, this book is likely to become a standard reference for all those interested in pension reform in Europe.