A quick look at the international news media clearly reveals the recent dynamism in Turkish foreign policy. This new vigor has been crystallized in Masud Barzani's comments praising Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister and architect of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) foreign policy, in a joint press conference: “What you have achieved in a year could not be made over the past hundred years.” It has become almost an everyday routine to see reports of “historic” moments for Turkish foreign policy—new initiatives, protocols, visits, and doctrines. During the seven years of AKP administration, Turkish foreign policy and domestic politics have gone through a vigorous process of self-reflection and transformation. That process of reflexive rejuvenation brought with it heated debates over whether the general orientation of Turkish foreign policy was also undergoing a radical transformation. To be more specific, it sparked debate over whether Turkey is “changing axis” and turning its face from the “West” to the “East.” Philip H. Gordon and Omer Taspinar's book, Winning Turkey, is a significant and timely contribution to these ongoing debates. Through a historical account of the dynamics and cleavages of Turkish politics, Gordon and Taspinar provide a policy-oriented analysis of the current status of Turkey's relations with the United States and the European Union and also offer a list of recommendations to revive these relations.
Gordon and Taspinar's book rests on the observation that Turkey's partnership with Western countries has faded in recent years. Yet, the authors suggest that contrary to the presuppositions of many, Turkish foreign policy's Western leanings are threatened not by Islamic-oriented political actors but by the secularist and nationalist civil-military bureaucracy and political opposition. Gordon and Taspinar point out the significance of the democratization reforms that the AKP government has energetically introduced to meet E.U. membership criteria, which further civilianized the polity, restored human rights and rule of law, and increased the level of political participation. The principal challenge to the AKP government in carrying out these reforms came from the Kemalist elites who have traditionally been eager to radically “Westernize” the country.
Gordon and Taspinar argue that Turkey need not be lost for the West. However, saving this relationship would require coordinated efforts between the United States, the European Union, and Turkey. The authors suggest that the AKP—a “pro-Western,” “democratic,” and “conservative populist party with Islamic roots”—successfully transformed the Turkish political landscape by realigning domestic political coalitions. Groups that traditionally adopted an anti-Western discourse, they argue, came to lead the political coalition of pro-Western and prodemocratic political groups. In contrast, the long-standing “Westernizing” elites repositioned themselves in opposition to both democratization reforms and pro-E.U. international political alignments.
The central anomaly Gordon and Taspinar lay out is that although the AKP government has been the motor force of the pro-E.U. democracy coalition in Turkey, it has emerged as the political actor that has achieved and sustained much closer relations with the “other axis,” composed of Russia, Iran, Syria, and China—the countries the secular nationalist establishment now wants to turn to for an alliance. Gordon and Taspinar suggest that this fading of Turkey's partnership with the West is due less to the policies of the AKP government than to those of the European Union and the United States regarding Turkey's E.U. membership, the Cyprus issue, the Kurdish question, the Armenian issue, and the Iraq war, which have largely been perceived by the Turkish public as instances of “Western double standards.”
The book includes individual chapters on Turkey's “crisis with the United States,” “Europe's closing door,” and the “Eurasian alternatives” that are open to Turkey. Other chapters provide a brief historical sketch of the changing nature of Kemalist and Islamist political alignments in Turkish politics as it pertains to relations with the West and policy steps that Turkey, Europe, and the United States should take to restore relations among themselves. These measures include promoting a “grand bargain” between Turkey and the Kurds; providing unconditional support for liberal democracy in Turkey, which effectively means overtly opposing any attempt to topple the AKP government through extrapolitical means; renewing and restoring the commitment to Turkey's European Union membership, which creates a crucial incentive structure to foster democratization reforms in domestic politics; promoting a “historic compromise” with Armenia; and finally, promoting a “political settlement” in Cyprus. The last two would resolve fundamental issues that continue to undermine the potential of further cooperation among Turkey and the European Union and United States.
The book also includes a fifteen-page afterword by Soli Ozel. Ozel agrees with Gordon and Taspinar's insights but claims that the very character of Turkey's international relations and the available set of policy options make it impossible to reduce any analysis of Turkish foreign policy to a simple dichotomy of “West” versus “East.” The questions of identity and belonging that structure the political landscape, he argues, run deeper than that. Instead, Ozel suggests seeing AKP foreign policy through the lens of post Cold War strategic disorientation and reorientation among policymakers that “changed the basic parameters of Turkey's relations with the West” (p. 97).
Gordon and Taspinar's book is significant not only because of its case-study analysis of Turkish politics but also because of its broader ramifications for the question of the prospects for democratization in the Muslim world. Although the authors of the book seem to avoid stretching their argument to other contexts, their discussion of the AKP destabilizes the common myths about Islamic-oriented political parties and the fears about ending up in a “one man, one vote, one time” situation if these actors assume power. In that sense, their analysis is also a contribution to the growing literature on “Muslim democracy” and the moderating effects of electoral participation in the Muslim world. While the AKP government demonstrated effective autonomy in its foreign policy, it also exemplified how autonomy did not necessarily entail conflict and discord with the West. This is why Gordon and Taspinar postulate supporting democracy and liberalism as the best way to “anchor Turkey in the West” (p. 67)—which tips the balance of power in favor of the AKP—and why they call on the United States and the European Union to take a more pronounced posture advocating the protection and consolidation of Turkish democracy.
Nonetheless, the policy-oriented character of the book at times compromises democratic concerns for stability. In the policy-recommendation section of their analysis, Gordon and Taspinar seem to be willing to strike a prudent balance between democratic demands and political exigencies, which sometimes means failing to take issue with restrictions on civil liberties. For instance, the authors appear to interpret the AKP government's attempt to lift the ban on headscarves for university students—which the U.S. State Department's Human Rights Report considers a violation of human rights—as an inflammatory move that increases the “tension” between the staunchly secularist establishment and the Islamic-oriented majority. Yet, Gordon and Taspinar's Winning Turkey still remains a substantial contribution to the policy-oriented and academic discussions over the history, identity, and orientation of Turkish foreign policy.
