What becomes of honor when the idea of equality supplants hierarchy, and self-preservation, rather than ascribed obligation, grounds social norms? How did honor distinctively sustain social standards and bonds such that its demise should be counted a loss? Correspondingly, what might honor, revived and reinterpreted, offer to the contemporary Western world?
These questions motivate Laurie M. Johnson Bagby's interesting inquiry into Hobbes's understandings of honor and their place in intellectual history. Explicating the meaning and import of honor throughout his works, emphasizing changes over time, she compares Hobbes's assessments with ancient and medieval conceptions and probes the relationships between his contexts (personal and political) and developments in his views. Bagby convincingly argues that Hobbes represents a fundamental shift away from honor as a virtue associated with noble breeding, moral rectitude, and chivalry in defensive wars—all of which served one's country—to honor as a vain desire to be esteemed by others, which could breed irresponsible ambitions and social instability. In her analysis, Hobbes did not reject the traditional conception of honor per se, but judged it rare and hence politically impractical in his day. He thus, in his later works, identified it with an undeserved pride and imagined sense of superiority, threats first to equality and then to obedience to the sovereign. In other words, honor, like religious faith, was a force that could overwhelm the fear of death. Given that his commonwealth was based upon this fear, Hobbes sought to denigrate and eliminate honor to secure the conditions conducive to his peace. Self-preservation had to replace aspirations to higher social ideals; a sort of cowardice was elevated above the courage of earlier ages.
One of the strengths of this book is its reach throughout Hobbes's thought. Bagby has admirably scoured his works to offer a comprehensive account of honor, including Hobbes's evaluations of particular persons along with his more theoretical descriptions of this trait. Her method of contrasting each work's discussion of honor with both orthodox conceptions (represented by Aristotle and the medieval author Geoffroi de Charny) and Hobbes's mature—derogatory—depiction is very useful for charting the transformations in his treatment of this idea. At times, however, this approach of situating a passage pertaining to honor between two ideals seems to confine the analysis somewhat. The dichotomy between traditional and modern could mute interpretations of honor that suggest qualities associated with neither type. While Bagby soundly demonstrates her thesis that Hobbes is the turning point stated in the title, one wonders if the ways in which he grappled with honor before he made this transition could be cast in different terms. Did he formulate alternatives that might help us to think beyond standard connotations of honor? What range of resources regarding honor could he offer to us today?
These questions about possible variations in the meaning of honor pertain to Bagby's broader purpose: to challenge us to consider what our individualistic, egalitarian culture has lost that medieval honor offered, namely, loyal obligations to others, especially the vulnerable, and commitments to the common welfare. Bagby compellingly asks whether the rational self-interest and fear of death that Hobbes bequeathed to us suffice as a source of social obligation. If nothing is worth dying for, how can the state expect the military service that it may need to survive (a vexing problem for Hobbes, as she carefully explains)? Would an ethic of honor be more effective than theories of equality to combat the continued abuse of women and children? Why should we care for those in need owing to natural or social inequalities if self-preservation is our sole goal? Does Hobbes, one might add, offer any basis for a meaningful life, which the convictions and codes of conduct identified with honor once provided?
Although Bagby raises such questions to inspire reflection and further research, and understandably cannot address them exhaustively in this book, many readers will wish that she had adumbrated her thoughts on the potential contemporary significance of honor more fully. Three themes come to mind. First, Bagby rightly reminds us that liberalism seems ill suited to respond to the natural inequalities correlated with age and gender. The manliness associated with honor, she suggests through her questions, could replace male aggression with male responsibility. “[W]ould obligating men because they are men to be restrained at least with regard to physical strength and aggression with women and children motivate more of them to conform to certain desirable standards of conduct?” (138, emphasis in the original). The introduction to the book begins with a discussion of recent works on masculinity, so the idea of gendered norms is not incidental but underlies the study as a whole. The subjects of natural inequalities and gender, however, brought to mind the ethic of care. If our concern is a sense of responsibility and care for the vulnerable, then women's work and values too should be considered a resource. How masculine honor and care could both compensate for inequalities in terms of need would be interesting to explore.
Secondly, are we as basely self-interested and bereft of higher callings as Hobbes would have us think? Chivalry and valor are certainly not watchwords today, but many profess principles or beliefs as constitutive ideals. Many are willing to sacrifice for causes, perhaps even die for them. Such commitments may, as the Hobbes in this study reminds us, generate self-righteousness or test our willingness to obey the law. But the idea that medieval honor may in some respects seem appealing depends in part on the premise that nothing has taken its place. Like them or not, modern notions of human dignity and rights are moral tenets that restrain mere self-interest and may compete with self-preservation, as honor did in earlier times. Considering honor in tandem with these ideals would be important for one assessing its potential value for our age.
Finally, Bagby, recognizing both that liberalism has some assets and that we cannot erase the effects of centuries, wonders whether we may, contrary to Hobbes's conclusion, have both honor and peace. “If there is something valuable about the love of honor, both personal and national, that we would like to keep despite the success of the Enlightenment liberal ideas nascent in Hobbes's thought, then we will have to engage in the hard work of reexamining these ideas, for truth and usefulness, to see whether they deserve to be critiqued, modified, or amended” (149). Given her insightful inquiry into honor in Hobbes, I wish that she had expressed her vision of honor's “truth and usefulness.” How would she adapt or transform the traditional conception of honor for our time? How might we synthesize the merits of honor and modern norms? What interpretations of honor are possible and desirable, beyond the definitions set down by de Charny or the later Hobbes?
As intended, Bagby has inspired questions about the potential for honor in our culture. I hope that her work initiates research along the lines that she suggests. Hobbes, in her informative analysis, offers a helpful perspective for our deliberations.
