1. Introduction ¹

Russia and Turkey are two neighbouring countries with unique ‘strong state traditions’Reference Heper ^{2 –} Reference Tsygankov ⁴ and historical depth in their regions. Both have traditionally glorified and given great emphasis to the state institution by allotting it a supreme position within the society. Tsardom, the Soviet, and the new Russia experiences for the Russians, and the Seljuk, Ottoman, and Republican Turkey practices for the Turks were of vital importance in their historical transitions. Each of these experiences played a crucial role globally and/or regionally. Consequently, the relations between these two countries have exceptional importance for all the parties involved.

Russia’s and Turkey’s strong state tradition can be considered a reflection of their political cultures because both the Russian and Turkish people have historically given credit to strong and authoritarian leaderships.Reference Steen ^{5 ,} Reference Musil ⁶ The most recent examples of those authoritarian actors are Putin in RussiaReference Kryshtanovskaya and White ⁷ and Erdogan in Turkey.Reference Görener and Ucal ⁸ As the dominant figures of their countries’ politics and decision-making processes, these leaders have been in power for well over a decade. From a Weberian perspective, charismatic authority and contingent legal–rational grounds are among the main factors of their quite stable rules.Reference Ossinovski ^{9 ,} Reference Arklan ¹⁰ Both refer frequently to the glorified past of their societies. They exude great self-confidence and favour rule by power over making concessions to democracy. At least, so their opponents claim. Furthermore, both Putin and Erdogan mobilize their supporters and party members in the same manner, and they exert the sole authority role in their respective parties.

Putin and Erdogan come from two different, and even clashing, world-views. Putin is a Slavist nationalist and religiously Orthodox. Erdogan is an Islamist. These two different, but hegemony-oriented, world-views motivate these figures to have a say in their regions. Further, both Russia and Turkey have a history of trying to exercise greater power at a global and/or regional level. On various occasions, this has led to their locating themselves in opposite camps, as with Syria, the Crimea, the Caucasus, Georgia, Libya, Armenia–Azerbaijan and Cyprus. On the other hand, Turkey, as a NATO member, at least for the present, has a pro-Atlantic perspective. Russia under Putin’s rule strives for Eurasian (re)unification. Putin’s Russia does not want to lose its old allies, yet at the same time it does not hesitate to use hard power and other means to maintain this alliance in its struggle with the West (the US and the EU) over the respective spheres of influence. None of the global powers wanted to harm its relations with Russia by implementing serious sanctions over the Georgian question. However, things seem to have started to change with the Ukrainian question.

The history of the relations between Russia and Turkey records a great number of wars but, at the same time, Russia and Turkey did not hesitate to strengthen their relations after these wars. Trade between the countries increased; therefore, the economy became one of the most important elements of Turkish–Russian relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union, even though they were under the shadows of some political contrasts.

By the end of the Cold War (1947–1991), the Russian people began acquiring some of their experiences with the external world via Turkish society. For example, because of closer commercial relations, people from the former Soviet Republics such as the Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Romania, have their first experiences with capitalism through the Turkish people. To some extent, suitcase trading and white slavery were the two clear shadow sectors of the economic process during the 1990s.Reference Ghazali ¹¹

However, Russia and Turkey have some disagreements regarding various political issues, such as the Chechen question, the Armenia–Azerbaijan dispute, the War on Islamist Terror caused by Wahhabi–Salafi fundamentalism and jihadist groups, and similar issues. Erdogan’s Turkey giving support to Sunni radicalism,Reference Kazim ^{12 , 13} which indirectly creates painful security problems for Russia, and/or Putin’s support to Assad’s regime in Syria, where Erdogan backs opposition groups since 2011, harm these relations, while strengthening the potential of political conflict between the two countries. In addition, of course, the recent crisis in Ukraine, and especially in the Crimea, because of Turkey’s closeness to the Crimean Tartars, can also be added to this list. This last crisis has produced two side effects. On the one hand, it caused tension between the two countries through Russia’s annexation of the Crimea. On the other, the Western alliance applied serious sanctions against Russia due to the same dispute, which made Turkey and some other neighbouring countries potentially more attractive economic stakeholders to compensate for the economic loss by the Russians.

As is seen, Russian–Turkish relations are multidimensional.Reference Kiniklioglu and Morkva ¹⁴ In other words, economic, socio-cultural, military, and political relations have become inevitable in the historical process between the two neighbouring countries. Is it possible to assert, that the economic dimension usually plays a pull factor role, while the political dimension generally plays a push factor role because of the clashing historical missions, identities and views between the two countries? More importantly, which will dominate? To get a clearer picture, all of these dimensions must be examined one by one.

This study is primarily based on a descriptive analysis and a literature review. In the era of globalization, liberalism as an international relations theory could be a more explanatory than theories such as realism and idealism when it comes to understanding Russian–Turkish relations.Reference Dunne, Kurki and Smith ¹⁵ However, it is clear that in the Russian–Turkish relationship, especially because of the dominant perception of international relations in Russian foreign policy, realism (Ref. Reference Dunne, Kurki and Smith15, pp. 59–74) provides a better perspective. Under Putin’s rule, Russia returns to its Cold War era power-seeking attitude,Reference Wallander ¹⁶ depending on a strong military power and, one way or another, ignoring moral behaviour in international relations. For example, Russia does not hesitate to use hard power against some neighbouring countries, annex some parts of other nations, and threaten others by stopping the flow of natural gas in the dead of winter. In this process, Russia considers economic power and resources important factors of political power, and this attitude dominates its foreign policy.

Simultaneously, all these attempts can be considered a challenge to the post-Cold War multipolar global system,Reference Lukyanov ¹⁷ which would be seen as more stable than a bipolar system, especially according to neorealist theories on international relations.Reference Waltz ¹⁸ In this sense, countries such as Turkey face a dilemma in their relations with Russia: is it possible and consistent to form stable relations with a country that is, albeit perhaps indirectly, wanting to revive an unstable global system? And how would relations with Russia affect relations with other countries? In other words, would they do more harm than good? It seems that Turkish policy toward Russia is so caught up in the daily basis of economic opportunities that Turkey is not in a viable position to ask and answer these questions vigorously.

This article tries to identify the correlation, if any, between ‘unavoidable’ economic relations, based mainly on the flow of inevitably required natural resources, and ‘better’ political relations between the two neighbouring countries, Russia and Turkey, which are politically and economically not yet fully liberal democracies and have regarded each other as enemies at various times in the past. To achieve this, this paper adopts a multidisciplinary perspective.

2. Historical, Political, and Military Backgrounds

Relations between Turkey and Russia span more than 500 years. The competition between the Orthodox–Slavic Russian and the Islamic–Turkish Ottoman Empire led to several periods of war.Reference Sezer ¹⁹ This competition started especially after the capture of Constantinople by the Muslim Turks in 1453 and touched upon the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and Central Asia. Both Empires tried to get political clout on the European continent as well as to foster cultural and economic relations with the European powers.Reference Kinross ^{20 ,} Reference Kurat ²¹

A series of bloody and cruel battles between Russia and the Ottoman Empire took place in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries in particular. However, history records approximately 28 different cases of wars, sieges, raids, excursions, and invasions committed by both sides between 1568 and 1918. ²² The conflicts mostly resulted in the progressive decline of the Ottoman Empire, and the gradual south- and south-westward expansion of Russia, taking over control of Ottoman territories.Reference Uzuncarsili ²³

The end of the First World War marked the decline of the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, followed by the establishment of the Soviet Union by Vladimir Ilich Lenin in 1917 and the Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal in 1923. Despite the bloody past of the Empires, during the Turkish Independence War in 1920, and thanks to active cooperation between Lenin and Kemal, many Turkish pilots came to the USSR to be trained by the Soviet Aces Aviation in the Soviet Parachute Centres. In addition, Lenin’s government sent money and weaponry systems to the Turkish troops led by Kemal.

Diplomatic relations between the newly established states were established on 23 July 1923. ²⁴ The Soviet Union was the first country to officially recognize the Turkish Republic. A new period began with a high level of cooperation, in which Lenin and Kemal played critical roles, and Turkish–Russian relations were notably active and positive.Reference Bayur ^{25 ,} Reference Aksin ²⁶ Stalin replaced Lenin in 1924, but there were no significant changes in Russian–Turkish relations until the Second World War.

Soviet–Turkish relations degenerated rapidly during the Second World War, with the Soviet Union accusing Turkey of collaboration with Germany. Although Turkey maintained neutrality until the end of the war, it permitted German merchant ships to sail the Black Sea, selling German strategic raw materials to neighbouring countries. This resulted in an unfolding anti-Turkish policy by the Stalinist state. To justify a war with Turkey, the Soviet Government accused the Turkish Government of meddling in Azerbaijan during the Iran crisis of 1946. Similar accusations emerged at the beginning of Stalin’s repression of Muslims, such as the deportation of the Chechen and Ingush. Finally, Stalin claimed rights on Turkish North-eastern provinces such as Kars and Ardahan, and asked for the right to partial control of the Turkish Straits, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.

However, such pressures from the Soviet Union did not have any specific results and, on the contrary, encouraged pro-Western tendencies in Turkey. This process resulted in Turkey’s membership in NATO in 1952, and the beginning of a Turkish–Western alliance (Ref. Reference Sezer19, p. 61). The Cold War cemented a mutual strategic partnership between Turkey and the US,Reference Gasanli ²⁷ and hostility between Turkey and the USSR.

During the Cold War, although political relations were unfriendly, bilateral economic relations and cooperation were established between Turkey and the USSR at various times. For example, several Turkish Prime Ministers – Menderes in 1957, Demirel in 1965, Ecevit and Demirel during the 1970s, Özal in 1984, again Demirel during the 1990s, and Ecevit again in 2000 – tried to improve relations with the USSR and/or Russia by signing socio-economic agreements, such as the easing in mutual visas, opening up new border gates, constructing natural gas pipelines, and imports of natural gas and helicopters.

However, Turkey’s membership in Western Block organizations such as NATO, and the USSR’s leading position in the Eastern Block, became the main obstacles to the improvement of relations during the Cold War. In this era, hostility was the dominant attitude on both sides, and there were no further relations beyond a few symbolic attempts to improve relations between Soviet Russia and Turkey. The enmity of that era, building on feelings of hostility dating from the time of Empires, remains effective to this day, especially with several nationalist groups in both countries. The nationalist memory, then, affects both Putin’s and Erdogan’s policies.

The collapse of the USSR led to a new era of developing economic relations between Turkey and Russia. In 1992, an agreement was signed under which Russia was supposed to send military technology, equipment and weapons, worth $300 million, to Turkey. There was also interest in cooperation in the areas of space and military-associated satellites.Reference Sahidov ²⁸ Nonetheless, 1992 and 1999 were periods of competition between Russia and Turkey for control in the Caucasus and Central Asia.Reference Menon and Barkey ^{29 –} Reference Cafersoy ³² In this regard, Russia may be said to have won the game, through the rejection of Turkey’s big brother role by the Central Asian Republics themselves.

The US has a long-standing military relationship with Turkey, having provided a huge supply of weapons systems and military training since the second half of the 1940s. The US Department of State’s congressional report noted that 80% of the Turkish Army depended on US-origin equipment, and this situation has given the US some authority and diverse ways to ‘influence’ the Turkish Army on various basic issues.Reference Gabelnick, Hartung and Washburn ³³ Because the Turkish Army has traditionally been the most effective organization within Turkish politics, and because it was treated as identical with the state apparatus historically, the US became indirectly the ‘effective’ power in Turkey via the Turkish Army in 1947. This circumstance, together with Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952, was the main cause of the hostile relations between Soviet Russia and Turkey during the Cold War.Reference Kuniholm ³⁴ In more recent times, the growth of reciprocal relations between the two countries in the military–technical field relied on the economic relationship and the military requirements of both sides rather than on any political intimacy.

Currently, the total population of Russia is about 140 million, but only 55% of them are originally Russian. Of the remaining portion, the group of people of Islamic and/or Turkic origins constitutes the largest group. The original Russian population is decreasing and ageing, while the Muslim population is increasing. Furthermore, the potential of the spread of separatist sentiments among the Muslim and Turkish population, along with their emotional affinity to Turkey, has caused the emergence of some feelings of reservation towards Turkey among the Russian authorities. Turkey’s eternal intrinsic, if not material, support to Islamist and Turkic groups from Russia propped up this reservation. The Islamist past of the Turkish leader Erdogan has clearly led to further suspicion on the Russian side.Reference Germann ³⁵ The potential Turkish support for the fundamentalist Chechen militants has been said to greatly upset Russian officials. Turkey, especially under Erdogan’s Islamist rule, feels close to the Chechen for historical and religious reasons. Many Turkish nationalist and/or religious non-governmental organizations (NGOs) directly or indirectly support Chechen revolts against Russian domination.Reference Germann ³⁵ In fact, the suspicion towards Turkey among the pro-Russian intelligentsia is so deep that after the terrorist attacks that targeted train stations in Volgograd before the start of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games, it was immediately asserted that Turkey was to blame.Reference Watson ³⁶

Moreover, as some information agencies have put it, there is another suspicion that there some Turkish mercenaries joined the war on the side of the Islamist militants supporting the separatist movement in Chechnya, and this because of the similar cultural and religious background of Turks and Chechens. ³⁷ Another factor that makes Turkey an important actor in this military conflict is its geographical position. The country is very close to the hot-spot, and the unstable situations of its neighbours have created political and social concerns for the country. The Caucasian region is very important for both countries, not only for historical and religious reasons but also for the rich natural resources of the Caspian Sea. Thus, the Chechen question remains the most important national security problem for Russia at the moment.

Furthermore, the eternally competing religious and political identities and ideas of Putin and Erdogan could be another source of contradiction and confrontation between the two countries. The Russian leader considers the Western domination in the Eurasian region as the first and most challenging concern for his country. However, Turkey does not share the same apprehensions in this regard. Despite some of Erdogan’s recent contradictory discourses, Turkey has traditionally followed and supported the West, sticking to American-oriented policies and trying to apply them to the region’s political structure. Both leaders came to power in the early 2000s and continue as thus. Unlike most of the political agents in Western democracies, they follow more authoritarian and monistic policies and, therefore, they abide by less democratic but similar manners of governance. Their foreign policies have started to be questioned by the international community and, for these reasons, internal and external opposition against both leaders is increasing. Despite these similarities, they originally came from different and competing ideological backgrounds. Erdogan has an Islamist origin while Putin has an anti-radical Islamist attitude. If they continue to stay in power, the ideological contradictions and incompatible motivations of these leaders will cause other problems between the two political entities.

3. Economic Relations

The origins of the economic relations between Russia and Turkey go back to the fifteenth century when the Russian Tsar Ivan III sent a letter to the Ottoman Sultan Bayazid II with a suggestion to start sea shipping activities between the countries.Reference Ziganshin ³⁸ In the early twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire used to be an important destination for the Russian Empire in terms of foreign trade. This close and efficient trade continued throughout the Soviet era, and is still one of the most important and vital links connecting the two states. Further, the perspective of strong economic cooperation has a positive influence on both sides because geographical proximity makes it profoundly beneficial and efficient.

This long-standing economic relationship has a continuing potential to increase and develop import–export initiatives between the two countries. For example, the commodity circulation of Russia with Turkey between 2008 and 2012 shows this potential. ³⁹ Russia is the first ranking import partner country for Turkey, with the sixth rank position as an export partner. Turkey is the fifth in rank among export partners and the ninth in rank among the import partners of Russia. In particular, from 2011 to 2013, after the global economic and financial crisis, bilateral trade between Russia and Turkey has shown positive dynamics. Bilateral trade amounted to $34 billion by 2012 and this number is expected to increase, according to the leaders of both countries. In a meeting held in St Petersburg, Erdogan said, ‘we have a common goal of reaching trade of $100 billion by 2020.’ ⁴⁰

Natural gas makes up almost half of Russia’s exports to the Turkish Republic, and all energy carriers combined compose more than 70% of Russian exports to Turkey.Reference Kasaev ⁴¹ For example, by the year 2012, Russian Gazprom exported 63% of the required natural gas for Turkey. ⁴² An intergovernmental agreement signed in the late 1990s regulates the transportation of gas from Russia to Turkey, running under the Black Sea through special gas pipelines called the ‘Blue Stream’, and leading to the expansion of the key role of Turkey as a transit country for Russian natural gas to the Near East.Reference Baetov ⁴³ Later on, Russia cancelled the ‘Southern Stream’ project of transferring natural gas through the Ukraine to Europe, and decided to replace it with a new pipeline through Turkey.

In recent years, Russia has delivered petroleum and petroleum products worth approximately $3 billion to Turkey. In 2006, it approved a project for the construction of the Samsun–Ceyhan oil pipeline. ⁴⁴ Another Russian company, Atomstroyexport, is preparing a plan for the construction of the first Turkish nuclear power plant in the area of Akkuyu, Mersin. It is expected to be finished and ready to function by 2023. The construction is planned to cost around $20 billion. ⁴⁵

On the other hand, Russia imports fruit, vegetables, textile products, chemical products, machinery and equipment from Turkey. In 2012, the number of imported products decreased by 3.8% and in total amounted to $1.03 billion. ⁴⁶ Since 1988, Russia has had a strong demand for Turkish construction companies, mostly for the building of residences and infrastructure. The total worth of the finalized projects by Turkish contracting firms in 2012 was more than $26 billion (Ref. Reference Kasaev41, p. 1). Likewise, the total number of Turkish investments by the end of 2012 was $8 billion, ⁴⁶ and hundreds of Turkish organizations with thousands of employees from Turkey, directly or indirectly, had business in Russia. ⁴⁷

4. Socio-cultural Background and Relations

Russian–Turkish socio-cultural relations in the last three decades were partially shaped by agreements signed in 1992 and 1994. ⁵¹ Through diverse sponsorships and the cooperation of some public and private organizations regarding cultural, artistic, and sports activities, as well as display festivals and TV programmes that were held in both countries to introduce Russian and Turkish cultures reciprocally since 2004, the socio-cultural interaction was enhanced by facilitating human circulation between the two countries. ^{52 , 53} Along these lines, both countries have reciprocally provided higher educational opportunities to incoming students.

In social and cultural life, both societies are exchanging many elements, becoming familiar with the traditions and culture of each other. It is seen that this process of socio-cultural rapprochement enhances the number of marriages between Russian and Turkish people. By the year 2007, approximately 18,000 Russian women were married to Turkish men living in Antalya, while in Russia there were around 30,000 married people from Turkey. ⁵⁴

Naturally, there are some similarities as well as differences in the cultures and lifestyles of these two neighbouring societies. While a considerable portion of its people respect the Turkish–Islamic traditions, Turkey is a society that has tried to be modern during the last two centuries. At the time of writing, Turkey has a formally democratic regime and a secular state just as Russia, at least in terms of its Constitution and due to the presence of elections and a parliamentarian system. However, with regard to the substantive practice of a democratic culture, there are some doubtful areas in both societies (Ref. 3).Reference Fish ⁵⁵ In Russia, a considerable number of people, despite the anti-religious restraints of the former Soviet practice, also support traditions, especially Christian traditions.Reference Balzer ⁵⁶ In fact, both societies fall between the West and East, and they and outsiders debate whether Russians and Turks are Westerners or Easterners. It is clear, however, that, although both societies have tried to imitate the Western world and they have turned their faces to Western civilization, they have not been completely accepted by the Westerners.Reference Bova ⁵⁷

Russia and Turkey share a common fate of being the East of the West and the West of the East. It will probably be difficult to guess to what extent these common fates motivate both governments to conduct a socio-cultural rapprochement. Clearly, the fact of clashing Russian and Turkish foreign policy preferences has inhibited the emergence of a political alliance between the countries until now, yet the socio-cultural relations – beyond the political determinations and especially through the help of the ongoing economic exchanges and human circulation – may have the potential to achieve progress at this point. However, it should be kept in mind that the historical contrast between the Slavic–Orthodox Christian and the Turkish–Muslim identities has caused many bloody wars and deep-seated pains in the past, which will still act as a limiting factor here.