What is it to be the type of self that is reading these words at this moment? In other words, what is it to be a human self? Is selfhood simply given (something that we must simply accept) or do we have the capacity to shape ourselves? Anthony Rudd has written a highly accessible, lucid, and engaging book that situates him in the heart of contemporary studies of selfhood. Immersing himself in an intimate conversation with recent and contemporary philosophers, Rudd explores the nature of selfhood through a Kierkegaardian lens, ultimately arriving at the conclusion that the self is a being that has the capacity to shape itself by sculpting its immanent character. However, he illustrates that this self-shaping can only be performed in a meaningful way if there are objective values towards which one can orient him- or herself. Although there are other contemporary philosophers who have argued this position, they have done so from within an Aristotelian tradition, which Rudd demonstrates to be largely insufficient. Rudd argues that a proper understanding of the self as self-constituted requires a Platonic, rather than Aristotelian, teleological understanding of the self and the good. Thus, although Rudd maintains a Kierkegaardian understanding of selfhood, he seeks to demonstrate that such a conception is, in fact, a Platonic one too.
Some recent thinkers, such as Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, have argued that the self is created through a conscious willing of some desires while rejecting others. However, others have argued that personhood is something that is just given and that the idea of the self as self-constituted is incoherent and paradoxical. Rudd’s own view is that both of these theories get something right about the nature of selfhood. He argues that if we are to have an adequate understanding of what it is to be a self, we must find a way to maintain both views. Drawing on a Kierkegaardian understanding of self, Rudd suggests that we can justify both these notions of the self by recognising them to be in a creative tension whereby the self is “constantly negotiating the limits of what it can and cannot alter” (P. 43). To be sure, the affirmation of a creative tension between the self as given and the self as created is not unique to Rudd. Others too, such as Christine Korsgaard and Philippa Foot, have argued in favour of such a solution. But Rudd demonstrates that all hitherto attempts at a synthesis have been unsuccessful. Such attempts have unwittingly resulted in either an overemphasis of the self as given or created. It is Rudd’s project, throughout this book, to establish a successful way in which we can make sense of this tension in our understanding of the self.
What is particularly unique about Rudd’s solution to this issue is his intelligent and controversial revival of a platonic teleological conception of the self, which he illustrates to be compatible with a Kierkegaardian understanding of selfhood. Rudd agrees with Frankfurt and Korsgaard that the self is a being that shapes itself by consciously evaluating his or her desires, and subsequently willing those desires that he or she values most. However, he suggests that the self can only do this in a non-arbitrary way if it is directed toward some objective good. That is, he suggests, there must be some values that are valuable in and of themselves. He argues that if this were not the case then our everyday evaluative practices would be reduced to absurdity. Thus Rudd concludes that, “To be a person is to be able to evaluate in accordance with objective values” (P. 98). Although the ontological need for objective values is Rudd’s core argument, he is more broadly interested in how this need fits into a series of ideas concerning the self which he refers to as the NEST (Narrative, Evaluative, Self-Constitution and Teleology) theory. An important aspect to this theory is the idea that the self is formed by the narrative or story that it tells of itself. Here Rudd delivers an interesting and insightful analysis of how the self understands and lives his or her existence as a unifying meaningful phenomenon.
As Rudd recognizes, the mere mentioning of a revival of Platonism will surely be off-putting to some. Thus, he is conscious to write in a way that is sympathetic to the skeptic. Rudd does not commit himself to defending all aspects of Platonism; rather, he is specifically concerned with the Platonic notion of value realism. And arguing for (Platonic) value realism does not, according to Rudd, commit him to defending, for example, a theory of the forms. But even if one is unconvinced by Rudd’s arguments for value realism, I think there is much to be gained from reading this book for (at least) two reasons. First, it raises important issues with contemporary understandings of the self which cannot simply be disregarded. Second, Rudd makes a strong case for value realism as a psychological necessity (even though Rudd wants to extend this to an ontological necessity). He effectively demonstrates that, as evaluative beings, we must, at the very least, believe that our values can be more or less correct. He illustrates that if we truly believed that no objective values existed then we would be forced to view our values as meaningless, and thus our existence as evaluative beings, as absurd. So, at the very least, Rudd succeeds at demonstrating that, as evaluative beings, we must have the illusion of objective values. Thus, I do not think that the success of this book can be determined simply by whether one was convinced by Rudd’s arguments for an ontological necessity of a Platonic notion of objective values. Anyone who has an interest in existential psychology, narratology, or contemporary philosophy of the self would have much to gain from the rich discussion that Rudd offers throughout this intelligent and engaging book.
