Before I provide the substance of my remarks, I would like to thank two people. The first, Farley Grubb, who convened this session at last year's meetings, so thoroughly summarized the career of Allan Nevins, that I can skip doing so by providing just a reference.1
This JOURNAL 65, no. 2 (2005): 543–44. The only issue in doubt after Grubb's excellent summary is how the given name of Prof. Nevins should be spelled: it appears both as “Allen” (this JOURNAL, volumes 34, 39, and 41 through 55, and in numerous reviews of his books, primarily in early-twentieth-century political science journals, e.g., The American Political Science Review 27 (1933): 274), and as “Allan” (Farley Grubb's summary, The Columbia Encyclopedia entry for Prof. Nevins, and the author's credit for each of his published books and articles). From 1996 (volume 56, no. 4, p. 928) through 2003 (volume 63, no. 4, pp. 1147–48), this JOURNAL took the unconventional compromise approach of using “Allan” when submissions are solicited for the prize competition and “Allen” when the winner of the previous year's prize is announced. In 2004 and 2005, this JOURNAL took a definitive stand—returning to the exclusive use of “Allen,” though this year's on-line call for submissions introduced a new wrinkle, “Alan” (http://www.jstor.org/journals/eha.html). As for 2006, readers will have to wait for the “Editor's Notes” (or, in some years “Editors' Notes”)—as an economic historian, my job it to tell you what has happened, not what has yet to happen.
In economic history, to a greater extent than in other areas of economics, or even in history, our work is shaped by a fundamental tension, a balance we strike in everything we do. The two opposing forces that pull at us could be called generalization and personification: extracting impersonal trends and central tendencies, but remaining aware of the circumstances faced by particular, actual people as economic actors. We have the ability to tell interesting stories with numbers in means and frequencies and regression coefficients, even as we can animate those exercise with the stories and words of specific, historical individuals.
Each of the works in U.S. economic history presented on this panel resolves that fundamental tension in a different way. One hews quite closely to the model of modern labor economics, keeping specific individuals largely anonymous, letting them speak to us through the aggregation of their behaviors and relying on state-of-the-art econometrics and large twentieth-century datasets. It could easily be imagined appearing in The American Economic Review. Another relies on a detailed examination of several thousand lives followed through censuses and city directories and other records that identify individuals by name and occupation and street address, relying on careful choices of comparison groups and clever use of these original sources. It would not be out of place in any recent issue of this JOURNAL. The third is a sweeping historical epic, with a cast of hundreds, battles on a still-contested Western frontier, and a heroic corps of army engineers building roads and forts with picks and shovels as their comrades cut a swath of destruction with muskets and torches across the wooded fields of what is now Ohio. It uses no quantification—not a single table appears in its 247 pages. So enormous is its canvas that this project could not be contained in a mere journal article or even perhaps a standard book-length monograph. It could best be imagined as one of those five-part historical mini-series that network television used to do so well, with Barry Bostwick or Richard Chamberlain as Major General “Mad” Anthony Wayne, and Jonathan Pryce as a scheming agent in Britain's Indian Department. I have yet to uncover the romantic angle.
Such coarse characterizations are not meant to slight these impressive works, but rather to celebrate the diversity of approaches seen in them that economic history embraces. Different questions call for different investigative tools, and in each of the three cases we have seen here, the authors have chosen wisely, with less regard for prevailing methodological fashion than for accurately capturing important and complex historical realities.
Martha Bailey, in three largely separate essays, helps us understand one of the most important trends in the U.S. economy over the twentieth century: the increased participation of women in paid employment outside the home. In the first chapter, she asks how black women fared relative to white women over the 1940s, finding a striking degree of convergence in their experiences. What is somewhat surprising is how little of the change in black and white women's wages is explained by their observed characteristics, though the changes in the differences between them in their observables explain much of the change in the gap between them.
Her analysis prompts a few questions. The first is how were the changes seen among black women shaped by their role in The Great Migration? Black women who have moved South-to-North will show up in Northern cities with less experience than whites or black nonmigrants. The second is whether movement out of the South also impacted the ability of black women to enter nonhousehold services, retailing, and manufacturing, sectors that were often closed to them in the segregated South.
The second and third essays use differences across states in early legal access to contraceptives to explain how women's labor force participation changed, and how those changes affected inequality among men. The first exercise is a real rarity: it is easy to open a new field of research and find a few nuggets of knowledge lying on the ground, but it is much tougher to look through an area already picked over by solid scholars and find important truths lying about waiting to be discovered. This is a genuine contribution. The final essay on the impact of women's labor force participation on men's inequality might benefit from some disaggregation: Chapter 3 shows that “the pill” has its greatest impact in delaying women's entry into childbearing, so it alters the age of women who are entering the labor market alongside men in the 1960s and 1970s. This might change the nature of the substitution and complementarity they represent.
Dhanoos Sutthiphisal's thesis wrestles with a topic of interest to countries across the globe today as they try to lure manufacturing from developed places: can these countries also expect to see the benefits of greater inventive activity as production moves within their borders? Her use of patent records, census manuscripts, and city directories is clever and judicious. But the conclusions are not heartening to the Mexicos and Bangalores of the world. Her analysis prompts a number of questions.
The correspondence between patents and inventive activity is surely inexact. Especially in the context of relocating a site of production, improvements in process and organization that are difficult to patent may go unobserved. Another concern is that the North/South contrast on which much of the analysis rests may be too stark. A great many things (labor, capital, railroad lines) fail to flow along this axis in the nineteenth century, so perhaps industries that shifted production within the North or within the South would be illuminating as well. And what of other industries such as metals, chemicals, autos, and food processing that by the first quarter of the twentieth century have seen substantial invention and innovation? Within urban areas, are there patterns in how firms and inventors cluster? The database contains actual street addresses for both those who did the inventing and those who used their inventions. Which mattered most in enhancing the volume of inventive activity: proximity to other inventors, proximity to knowledge-generating sources (such as universities), or proximity to sites of production? Finally, what do the inventors themselves have to say? A little more of the “personification” to which I alluded earlier might help us understand why they themselves were located as they were relative to the firms and industries for which they provided innovations.
William Bergmann's thesis tells the story of the role of the U.S. Army (and later the Post Office) in setting the stage for economic growth in the Old Northwest. They did this by settling property rights certainly (at least between the indigenous population and the rapidly arriving white settlers), but they may have done even more in promoting later growth by building roads and forts and making a whole raft of internal improvements more than a decade before Albert Gallatin's much-vaunted program was presented to Congress in 1808. The thesis has semi-obscure battles (how many of us remember the location, let alone the salient details, of the Battle of Fallen Timbers from our hazy recollections of late-eighteenth-century U.S. frontier history?), political backroom dealing, a federal government often not quite sure what it was trying to accomplish, and a charismatic soldier-cum-frontier diplomat who could strategize and improvise on his feet and on the run.
The work reveals not only the role of the government (and two unlikely branches of the government at that) in integrating the Northwest into the young nation's economy, but also the crucial role of farmers and merchants in Upper Canada while the western areas remained contested terrain. The entire thesis is neatly summed up in a two week episode recounted on p. 91. On 28 August 1794, General Wayne's army methodically destroyed the productive capacity of the native population along the Maumee River as it returned to Fort Defiance, “laying waste the Villages and Corn fields for about 50 miles.” On 14 September, Wayne's army made its way west toward the Maimi villages where “After just over two days of hewing a 48 mile road, the Legion arrived unmolested.”
Bergmann's focus on the military and diplomatic aspects of the government's activities in the region leaves unanswered a number of questions. The first that an economist might ask is what was the cost of all this activity? Were the roads built by the military to meet strategic objectives also suitable for civilian purposes once the region had been pacified? How were these roads engineered? When the focus shifts to the role of the Post Office, a natural question is how the road-building criteria differed from those of the military. A more quantitatively inclined reader might want to know whether we can measure the impact of the work of the military (and later the Post Office), and how the effect would compare to that of Gallatin's more famous plan. Finally, given the importance of geography to the story, some maps displaying the specific roads cut and battles fought would have been helpful.
Taken together, the three Nevins Prize finalists show a breadth of approach and a depth of scholarship that bode well for the profession. I look forward to reading the subsequent work of these young scholars and congratulate them on having so clearly shown us the vitality of a field that can embrace work so diverse.
