Dennis C. Rasmussen’s beautifully written book is the kind of work that any serious David Hume and Adam Smith scholars might have once or twice dreamed of writing. While there certainly is a significant exception, though in part, of Nicholas Phillipson’s work (2010), on realizing its difficulty, most of them must have given up the idea. This book is indeed an extended sequel to Rasmussen’s previous works (2008 and 2014); however, it sharply stands out from them in two respects. First, its systematic character visibly succeeds in focusing on Hume–Smith relationships; and second, in this book, Rasmussen takes on the formidable challenge of addressing the issue of whether there was either any qualitative difference or similarity between Hume and Smith. Radical differences between Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, treated in Problems and Promise, related to their moral and political attitudes toward modern commercial society were beyond doubt for most readers. The nature of Hume–Smith relationships is far more complex and subtle. The two thinkers undoubtedly shared a set of positive views on the modern civilized society; however, the specific ways in which Hume and Smith supported the same society might have been significantly divergent.
Comprising an introduction, twelve chapters, epilogue, and the appendix to reprint Hume’s My Own Life and Smith’s scandalous Letter to William Strahan, the book covers the period from 1711, when Hume was born, to 1790, when Smith died. Rasmussen closely traces how the two thinkers’ great bond of friendship was gradually fostered around 1750 and finally established at the time of Hume’s death in 1776. The chronological narratives are well organized and based on old and new classic biographical studies and sources by Dugald Stewart, John Rae, Ernest Mossner, Ian Ross, and others, including various sets of correspondence, both published and unpublished, not only between Hume and Smith, but also concerning other important individuals such as Rousseau, Edward Gibbon, Jeremy Bentham, Benjamin Franklin, and Adam Ferguson. Thus, Rasmussen’s exciting storytelling securely gains a high level of historical objectivity.
As Rasmussen argues, Smith’s initial encounter with Hume was when Smith was staying at Balliol College Oxford and was secretly reading A Treatise of Human Nature, which had just been published in 1739–40. This motivated Smith to write his own set of philosophical essays, including the well-known History of Astronomy; although juvenile in origin, it was highly original and was published posthumously as he wished. Hume and Smith’s real “budding friendship” began in Edinburgh when Hume was most productive by composing the Political Discourses and several philosophical works, including the posthumously published Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. This period happily coincided with Smith’s so-called Edinburgh Lectures and his assumption of Glasgow professorship in 1751. Hume’s six-volume History of England was published between 1754 and 1762. Through the volumes, Hume “made the notion of unintended consequences one of his great recurring motifs, much as Smith would do in The Wealth of Nations” (p. 74).
However, the first major event in the Hume–Smith connection was undoubtedly Smith’s publication of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759. Indeed, this was the work in which they engaged in extremely serious philosophical exchanges in a publicized fashion. As Rasmussen believes, regardless of several explicit references to and citations from Hume’s works in the Wealth of Nations, “[yet] compared to The Theory of Moral Sentiments, there are actually fewer passages in The Wealth of Nations in which Smith is clearly developing or contesting his friend’s views” (p. 162). By contrast, The Theory of Moral Sentiments “shows unmistakable signs of Hume’s influence. Strikingly, however, Hume is never mentioned by name anywhere in the text” (p. 87). Rasmussen closely examines how Smith not only succeeded Hume’s moral theories but also innovatively transformed them into his own. Hume’s passive and mechanical “contagion” account of sympathy was changed to Smith’s imaginative “projection” theory. Hume’s utilitarian “general point of view” developed into Smith’s “impartial spectator,” and this served his theory of justice by replacing Hume’s utilitarian justice based on the sympathy with public interest with Smith’s sympathy toward the injured party’s resentment. Rasmussen concludes his comparative arguments on the issue of religion by confirming not only the secular and Humean character of Smith’s views but also his “far more cautious” attitudes toward religion (p. 109).
Rasmussen examines Hume’s responses to The Theory of Moral Sentiments. First, in a letter to Smith, Hume famously referred to his account of sympathy as the “Hinge” of his system. Smith dealt with this promptly in the second edition of The Theory. Second, Rasmussen discusses an anonymous review published in the Critical Review in May 1759, and assumes that it was authored by Hume, referencing the case first presented by David Raynor (Reference Raynor1984) and later evidenced by David Raphael and Tatsuya Sakamoto (1990). Phillipson (Reference Phillipson2010) had already done so, and Rasmussen’s analysis will, it is hoped, finalize the authorship of the anonymous review. On this assumption, as he observes, it is “doubtful” that Hume really believed his critical views had been effectively refuted by Smith’s response.
Following a series of absorbing historical accounts of the Hume–Rousseau affair and Smith’s supportive advice, his long tour in France, and meetings with celebrated French Enlightenment thinkers (chs. 6–8), the book arrives at the climax of the entire volume: the publication of The Wealth of Nations. Readers of the present journal must be most interested in the way in which Rasmussen as a historian of political thought deals with the Hume–Smith interactions in economic theory and thought. As he believes, Hume’s influence on The Wealth “issued more from Hume’s general attitude toward commerce and political economy than from Hume’s specific passages in his writings” (p. 162). Even apart from Smith’s originality of his belief in free trade that was made public as early as in the 1751 Edinburgh Lectures, a year before Hume’s Political Discourses, Rasmussen points out several political and economic issues in which Smith either differed from or took further steps over Hume. These include the negative social consequences (“a massive self-deception”) of the division of labor and free-market competition, Smith’s “unapologetic radical criticism” of established churches, and his theory of rent that caused Hume to write a critical comment in a letter to Smith.
Among many other topics, Rasmussen explores the most fascinating issue of Smith’s reference to Hume as “the only writer” who had discovered the historical causality between commerce and civil liberties during the rise of modern commercial society. As Rasmussen argues, given the similar observations made by other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers of the time, Smith’s eulogy was “perhaps not an entirely fair one” (p. 165). This might be either “a sign of early provenance” of the part, or, on the contrary, considering the priority of the Edinburgh Lectures, “it was possible that it was Hume who drew on Smith here … rather than vice versa” (p. 293). Though Rasmussen admits that it is impossible to resolve the issue completely, I am inclined to hold that Smith’s comment was exactly what he had believed to be true. One problem barely discussed by Rasmussen is Hume’s and Smith’s contrasting views on the quantity theory of money, and their vitally different assessments of the monetary movements, either historical or political, that encourage or disturb the natural order of economic development in real terms. These issues and other specifically economic subjects probably require another book on Hume and Smith by a historian of economic thought in the future.
The remaining chapters focus on Hume’s religious thought and Smith’s apparently wavering but consistently supportive attitudes toward Hume after Hume’s death. Rasmussen wonderfully executes the task with his impartial but impassioned accounts of Smith’s decisive role (“a brave act”) in the posthumous publication of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Finally, Rasmussen suggests that Smith’s dislike of the vanity of Hume’s imposing tomb built on the Calton Hill as he had wished was fully consistent with his own extremely modest grave in the Canongate. The main words in the title of the book, the Infidel and the Professor, represent the depth, complexity, and difficulty of the challenge that the author took on himself. The net result is a great success. The Infidel represents Hume’s controversial position against Christian religion; and the Professor, Smith’s largely conservative status that he enjoyed throughout his life. However, Rasmussen concludes that, notwithstanding the different shades, colors, and nuances of their views on the various questions of modern commercial society, they undoubtedly shared the fundamental values and outlooks on its historical origin, status quo, and future. Readers of various fields of interest will surely enjoy reading this book, and confirm or revise their respective views on the main subject: the friendship between the two great thinkers that certainly was and remains unparalleled in modern intellectual history.
