For Israel-watchers, the collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process raises important questions about what had been a significant factor in the political landscape: that is, the role and fate of the Israeli peace movement. Samy Cohen's readable volume provides a solid description of the movement's rise, fall, and reshaping. The book will be of interest to those who seek an overview of the last few decades of the activities of the Israeli left. Less valuable are its conceptual contributions.

The conceptual confusion comes near the beginning. Cohen lays out a series of possible reasons to explain the decline of the Israeli peace movement: the influx of Russian immigration; the violence of the second Intifada; and Ehud Barak's claim that there is “no partner” for peace. Cohen goes on to say that his book “offers a different explanation” (p. 6). So far, so good. But on the next page, Cohen states that his favored explanation for the fall of the peace movement is indeed, the Israeli belief in the no-partner thesis. “The feeling of fear inspired by the Palestinians and the lack of confidence in the ‘other’ that a great majority of Israelis refuse to consider a ‘partner for peace,’” Cohen writes, “weigh far more heavily than any sociological variable” (p. 7).

Perhaps he wants to emphasize psychological factors rather than sociological (by which he means demographic/ethnic) factors. If so, the book requires a robust psychological model—and there are many to choose from—to anchor the argument. But none is forthcoming. Similarly, if it truly is “fear” that Cohen means to point to, rather than any rhetorical use of the “no partner” phrase that is so often used by elites, then the book requires a serious engagement with the emotions literature, particularly around fear. And so, when Cohen states, on page 129, that the Israeli public is “waiting for a partner that will guarantee it peace,” we need to know whether this belief is a function of elite rhetoric, or whether government officials are simply responding to societal beliefs.

Some of the most valuable insights are ones that could have served as a more consistent conceptual hook—such as Cohen's observation that Peace Now, probably the most well-known of the Israeli peace groups, was hampered by tying its fortunes too closely to a political party—in this case, Labor (p. 46; p. 165). Cohen points to another important dynamic—that Peace Now was sidelined by the government as Oslo was unfolding. It may be true that the peace movement was publicly marginalized. But more of a concerted attempt to trace the effect that the movement may have had in shifting public opinion would help ground the book in a more powerful analytical narrative.

Other claims need to be clarified and defended, such as Cohen's statement on page 78 that “Zionism was now a more divisive than unifying force.” Given the strength of the Zionist consensus in Israeli society and politics, especially within the Jewish majority, this claim sounds odd. Similarly, Cohen's statement on page 159 that the “peace movement promised peace but failed to deliver it” implies a certain amount of agency that is more typically attributed to government officials. Protest movements can't “promise” anything; they can push for outcomes to the best of their ability. (This may be a function of awkward translation, since the book was originally published in French.) He is on firmer ground when he goes on, in pages 160 and 161, to discuss the way that the peace movement succeeded in laying some groundwork for peace.

Another claim that requires defense—or perhaps correction—is the claim that the embrace of more hawkish policies in Israel means that the “arguments of the New Historians such as Benny Morris and Ilan Pappé…have been relegated to the margins of public debate” (p. 170). But as observers of the region must know, in a policy sense Benny Morris has emerged as no dove. In an interview in Haaretz, Morris has described himself as having “tended rightward in the political context.” Morris adds that “there will not be peace…mainly because the Palestinians cling to their desire to have control of the whole Land of Israel and to eradicate Zionism.” (Ofer Aderet, “‘‘Israel Will Decline, and Jews Will Be a Persecuted Minority. Those Who Can Will Flee to America,’” Haaretz (22 January 2019)

The book makes two additional sets of observations that are important to consider. First, Cohen suggests that rather than viewing society as having moved to the “right,” it's more accurate to say that the “left” has simply shrunk in favor of a rising “center.” However, the fact that Israeli teens, when surveyed, have indicated that they prefer Israel to be “Jewish” rather than “democratic” suggests that there may in fact be a more pointed rightward shift occurring (p. 186).

Second, the book makes a valuable contribution when laying out the range of reconciliation NGOs, such as Combatants for Peace, and Parents Circle-Families Forum, and in discussing the kind of work that reconciliation does—and can do—in sowing seeds of peace. There are important questions raised here about co-existence versus separation; about continuing to use military force versus adopting outright military refusal; and about the issues around normalization, which is to say engaging in dialogue-style activities without necessarily agreeing on particular fundamental policy issues, such as the question of refugee return or where the scope of the occupation is: is it restricted to the territories Israel acquired in 1967, or should the results of 1948 be included? As Cohen shows, participants in these reconciliation groups do not all agree, and that, perhaps, is the most important reason to continue this kind of work, however much the parliamentary fortunes of the Israeli left have fallen.