Polarized and politicized, the historiography on the Armenian Genocide bears some resemblance to that on the nakba; for many readers, the most important question is often less the quality of the insights and evidence but the extent to which they support—or fail to support—a “side.” Yet, like the historiography on 1948, the literature on the Armenian Genocide has undergone a remarkable transformation in the past two decades. Political liberalization and the development of private universities in Turkey, the constructivist turn in nationalism studies, “postnational” identity politics, and the increasingly comparative and sophisticated nature of genocide studies have all helped to create a context in which scholars specializing in the Ottoman Empire and the Armenian Genocide have rethought the events from 1915 to 1917.
An important part of these transformations was the Workshop on Armenian and Turkish Scholarship (WATS), based at the University of Michigan under the guidance of Fatma Müge Göçek, Gerard Libaridian, and Ronald Grigor Suny. Through a series of conferences and online listserv discussions, WATS created a space in which scholars could work through issues and engage in a civil debate that had seemingly been impossible elsewhere. In a sense, A Question of Genocide represents the fruit of this work, highlighting some of the best new scholarship on the Armenian Genocide.
To the extent that a collected volume can have an overarching theme, A Question of Genocide can be said to center on the idea of “normalizing” the Armenian Genocide. In their introduction to the volume, Göçek and Suny describe the contribution of WATS as facilitating the transformation of “a field that had been fraught with fixed views and marred by unyielding confrontation [into one of] normal scholarly exchange . . . free of partisanship and nationalism” (p. 4). Later in the volume, Donald Bloxham pleas “for the normalization of the study of state-sponsored mass murder, for the recognition that it emerges, like many other governmental policies across a spectrum of regimes, often piecemeal, informed by ideology but according to shifts of circumstances [italics in original]” (p. 260). The contributors to this volume, in contrast to an earlier generation of scholars, fall squarely on the side of contingency rather than inevitability. Virtually every contribution to this volume argues, implicitly or explicitly, for an understanding of the Armenian Genocide as resulting from the interplay of ideological predilections and the specific context of war. Genocide emerged out of a series of decisions, these authors argue, rather than as the inevitable result of a long-standing plan.
In the first section, Göçek provides a thumbnail sketch of the development of a “denialist” state historiography in the Turkish Republic, while Suny offers a very useful and characteristically pugnacious historiography of the Armenian Genocide, which also introduces the overarching theme of contingency that runs through most of the subsequent chapters. Where these two chapters are weakest is in their treatment of serious scholarship that continues to fall, in their terms, within the “old nationalist paradigms.” Although Armenian nationalist historians certainly overstate the ideological cohesiveness and racial obsessions of the Young Turks, it is fair to note that some of the most respected scholars on the Young Turk period, most notably, Şükrü Hanioğlu, tend to do the same. Not all disagreements regarding the Armenian Genocide can be laid at the feet of “nationalist orthodoxies.” Moreover, while I am willing to aver that the Turkish state has been able to buy significant scholarly support in defending what Göçek describes as “the Republican defensive narrative,” the characterization of every scholar, from Bernard Lewis to Roderic Davison, who has rejected framing 1915 as a genocide as simply a tool of the Turkish state seems, at its face, fundamentally unconvincing. Moreover, one might note, some of the scholars noted in the acknowledgements fall squarely into this camp.
The rest of the volume is more directly historical rather than historiographical, with most of the authors stressing the shifting ideological ground of the late Ottoman Empire and the radicalization of the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) after 1913. Taking a long view, Stephan Astourian examines the development of the “Armenian Question” over the 19th century in a larger context of Ottoman transformation, highlighting the competition over land and an increasingly market-oriented agricultural economy as central to intensified interethnic tension and increasingly perilous conditions for Armenians. Hans-Lukas Kieser profiles Dr. Mehmed Reşid, who began his political career criticizing the despotism of Abdülhamit II and arguing for an inclusive Ottoman patriotism and ended it as one of the ardent executors of the Armenian Genocide. Fikret Adanır, through an examination of the military service of non-Muslims between 1908 and 1913, highlights “that the Balkan war of 1912 and 1913 marked the end of Ottomanism as a multicultural project” (p. 124).
For many of these authors, a broader program of what Fuat Dündar has called “demographic engineering” was transformed through the contingency of wartime paranoia into an explicit program of genocide. Donald Bloxham, for example, argues that “there was no a priori blueprint for genocide but rather that it emerged from a series of more limited regional measures” (p. 260) and chronicles an increasingly wholesale project of destruction between November 1914 and April 1915. Fuat Dündar, relying almost exclusively on Ottoman documents, argues much the same, contrasting the selective nature of deportations in February 1915 with the comprehensive approach initiated by June of the same year. On a broader scale, Uğur Üngör represents the genocide as a particularly brutal moment within a longer history of the Ottoman and later the Turkish state's bringing Eastern Anatolia under control through a form of “internal colonization” (p. 301). Through this analysis, he underscores the continuities between the fate of the Armenians and other Eastern Christian populations at the end of empire and the treatment of Kurdish populations in the same region under the Republic. The volume's concluding section, which includes chapters by Üngör and Erik Jan Zürcher, addresses the continuities between the CUP and Kemalist Turkey. A consideration of these continuities is critical for understanding not only the changed nature of the late Ottoman Empire but also the connections in terms of ideology, state practice, and personnel between the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic. These connections are important both because they underline the Young Turk lineage of the Kemalists and because they go a long way to explaining the barriers that have prevented the Turkish Republic from forthrightly examining its Ottoman past. The roots of the modern republic are so intertwined with the Young Turk era that any honest reckoning would require a fundamental reevaluation of Kemalism itself.
At the same time, emphasizing these connections between empire and republic raises a conceptual problem that runs through not only this volume but also much of the historiography of the late Ottoman Empire, namely, the relationship between the Young Turks’ undeniable fascination with European conceptions of race and their commitment to an already extant Ottoman space. That the Armenian Genocide represented a key moment in creating a Turkish/Muslim space in Anatolia is clear. But it is unlikely that any of the perpetrators of the genocide could have envisioned that outcome in 1915. While the growing importance of Turkishness in Young Turk self-conceptions is undeniable, so too is their continued commitment to retaining as much Ottoman territory as possible, as scholars such as Hasan Kayalı have highlighted. The Arab provinces were not lost until the closing days of World War I, and the Ottoman leadership had reasonable expectations of retaining and perhaps even expanding their control in the Arab Middle East until 1917 at least. As many of the authors in this volume note, the Young Turk elite were, first and foremost, committed to the survival of the regime. How do we conceptualize this genocide, and the larger project of demographic engineering in Anatolia that it was a part of, within this imperial context? How do we balance the Young Turks’ obsession with Anatolia and their wider vision of a reinvigorated Ottoman Empire?
While one might have hoped for further consideration of the “grey areas” of our understanding of the Armenian Genocide, this volume remains a uniquely valuable survey of some of the best current scholarship in the field, notable for both its breadth and for the overall quality of the contributions. Although many of the chapters represent larger research projects that have been published elsewhere, the book is particularly well suited for the classroom precisely because it provides a selection of some of the best new research in the field. In a historiography that has too long been shaped by nationalist polemics and pseudoscholarship, this volume stands out not only for its quality scholarship but also for the fundamental renewal of the field that it represents.
