Carthaginian education in the Hellenistic period: Hannibal’s educational atmosphere

Dodge noted in 1891, ‘we do not know much about the character of Hannibal’s education’, a statement that has stood the test of time and can be extended to the Carthaginian education system.Footnote ³ Nevertheless, the extant sources provide some relevant insights concerning Hannibal’s formative years. On an intellectual level, Cornelius Nepos records that Sosylus, a Greek from the Peloponnese who accompanied Hannibal throughout much of his career and authored a history of his campaigns, also instructed him in the litterae Graecae (Greek literature).Footnote ⁴ This education appears to have exerted a lasting influence: Hannibal could have addressed his troops in Greek and is said to have written several works in the language.Footnote ⁵ These indications have led scholars to conclude that Hannibal’s education was significantly shaped by Greek cultural influence.Footnote ⁶ Such exposure, however, was far from exceptional.Footnote ⁷ The study of Greek language and customs had become widespread among the Carthaginian elite by the third century bc. Members of the nobility had long cultivated Hellenic habits, particularly in the realms of language, philosophy, geography, and history – areas where the use of Greek is often underestimated.Footnote ⁸ The phenomenon is well attested among the Hellenistic African aristocracy. Livy notes that Masinissa’s sons were thoroughly educated in Greek literature, especially his son Mastanabal.Footnote ⁹ Similarly, Diodorus describes Micipsa, another of Masinissa’s sons, as an avid student of Greek, notably philosophy.Footnote ¹⁰ However, the precise means by which Hannibal acquired his knowledge of Greek remain unknown. Contemporary parallels, such as those from Egypt, or more general information, such as the use of Homer to teach Greek across the Mediterranean from the fourth century bc to the sixth century ad, may provide the best approximation to the subject.Footnote ¹¹

According to Cassius Dio, to this learning of the Greek language should be added that of his own language and customsFootnote ¹² . He refers to the common Phoenician learning with specific Carthaginian additions. The identity of Hannibal’s tutor is unknown, though G. C. Picard proposed a learning based on sacred Carthaginian texts.Footnote ¹³ Some scholars argue that the absence of sources does not prove the absence of Carthaginian literature – citing Pliny’s mention of Punic libraries – but the surviving evidence allows only limited conclusions.Footnote ¹⁴ Current knowledge of Carthaginian literature suggests a limited official production.Footnote ¹⁵ Punic learning is attested by the local North-African nobility, who used Punic for official inscriptions and coins.Footnote ¹⁶ It is also likely that Hannibal’s long stays in Spain and Italy led him to learn Latin and Iberian languages.Footnote ¹⁷ The precise age at which his education began is unclear, although Seibert’s estimate of 241 bc, at the age of six, is plausible, since similar examples are found in Demetrius Poliorcetes or Alexander.Footnote ¹⁸

In 237 bc, at the age of nine, Hannibal travelled to Gadir as part of his father’s expedition. While other aristocratic contemporaries – such as Alexander at Mieza or Demetrius at Celaenae – were educated in idyllic royal settings, Hannibal was raised in a privileged military environment. During his early years in Iberia (237–221 bc), he acquired first-hand experience of campaign logistics, field manoeuvres, and the internal organization of military camps. Cassius Dio reports that Hannibal and his brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago, received military training during this period – an account that appears credible, though in practice the younger brothers must have begun somewhat later.Footnote ¹⁹ Further support for this view comes from the example of Masinissa, who, according to Appian, was educated at Carthage around the same time, ‘no doubt fulfilling a dual role as hostage and protégé’.Footnote ²⁰ Masinissa is later attested as playing a key role in the Carthaginian forces under Mago’s command in Spain.Footnote ²¹ Such evidence suggests that Carthaginian aristocratic youth of the Hellenistic period received systematic training in both physical endurance and martial skills. As Polybius notes of Mago, Hannibal’s brother, Hannibal and his siblings engaged in customary educational games of a martial and sporting nature, alongside hunting, horsemanship, and weapons training.Footnote ²² However, there is no evidence of naval instruction, despite Carthage’s longstanding naval tradition – an omission that arguably hindered the Barcids’ later conduct of war.Footnote ²³ This lacuna notwithstanding, evidence such as that of Demetrius, or more speculatively Alexander, further attests to the elite training culture of the time.Footnote ²⁴ It is reasonable to assume that Hannibal and his brothers trained not in isolation but alongside Carthaginian officers, Hamilcar’s tutors, and local aristocratic youths.Footnote ²⁵ Two interpretative strands merit attention at this point.

First, the historiographical dimension: Polybius, Livy, and Cassius Dio all emphasize Hannibal’s early military aptitude and leadership potential.Footnote ²⁶ These portrayals, however, are deeply informed by the Hellenistic topos of the exemplary general. From youth, Hellenistic leaders were expected to fight alongside their men, inspire them in battle, and prove their worth through personal courage and strategic acumen. A stratēgos (‘general’) was required to obtain information from the enemy, observe and react to unfolding events, expose himself to danger, and act decisively in crucial moments. These demands implied a combination of innate qualities: intelligence, discipline, determination, tactical adaptability, bravery, charisma, and political skill.Footnote ²⁷ Nonetheless, this topos was not purely historiographical. In the fourth century bc, the nature of leadership was a central concern in political thought.Footnote ²⁸ Xenophon, whose entire oeuvre engages with the principles of command, offers something akin to a handbook for the ideal general; one capable of leading multi-ethnic armies, dispensing rewards justly, and projecting both physical authority and psychological control.Footnote ²⁹ Although no source confirms that Hannibal read Xenophon or studied the lives of Alexander or Pyrrhus, the influence of this ideal is clearly reflected in his leadership style and military persona.Footnote ³⁰

Secondly, the factual dimension: Hannibal personally cared for his troops, embodied both the physical and psychological ideals of Hellenistic leadership, shared spoils with his men, responded swiftly to intelligence, and effectively commanded a multi-ethnic army without major unrest or desertions.Footnote ³¹ In this sense, he conformed to the Hellenistic military stereotype. Additional aspects – such as the use of propaganda or symbolic imagery – further reinforce this image.Footnote ³² This Hellenization of his conduct reflected broader trends in Carthage during the Hellenistic period, though always shaped by its own cultural framework.Footnote ³³ Having outlined both the topos and Hannibal’s actions, the sources themselves must be considered. Broadly, three types of evidence emerge: implausible anecdotes, such as the claim that Hannibal followed Xenophontic methods of secrecy to avoid Celtic treachery;Footnote ³⁴ exaggerated accounts of his physical and mental prowess;Footnote ³⁵ and more credible examples, such as his emphasis on cavalry and command of multiple languages.Footnote ³⁶ To paraphrase B. Due’s analysis of Alexander and Xenophon: whether Hannibal truly possessed the qualities attributed to him by the sources is, of course, quite another matter.Footnote ³⁷ What emerges, however, is that – genuine or not – these ideals functioned effectively as propaganda, and the sources attest to his success. Either way, his conduct suggests rigorous preparation. Such behaviour would not have been possible without extensive training. That Carthaginian education was shaped by these Hellenistic ideals is further evidenced by Masinissa. He, too, is portrayed with the attributes of an ideal leader – whether real, embellished, or fabricated – and evidently accepted this image.Footnote ³⁸ Notably, Masinissa and his sons adopted the same iconographic and propagandistic models once used by the Barcids.Footnote ³⁹ Thus, Carthaginian education during Hannibal’s time operated within a broader Hellenistic framework of leadership and power.

Another important stage in Hannibal’s formation was his time under Hasdrubal’s command. The only firm detail is that he held a prominent role as a cavalry officer.Footnote ⁴⁰ Masinissa, also a cavalry commander in Spain between 213 and 206 bc, offers a useful parallel.Footnote ⁴¹ This suggests a continued path of elite Carthaginian training. Under Hasdrubal, Hannibal maintained his status as an apprentice to power.Footnote ⁴² His command, though perhaps less intense than Masinissa’s, reflected Hasdrubal’s focus on diplomacy rather than war.Footnote ⁴³ A further issue concerns a chronological discrepancy. Polybius and Nepos report that Hannibal followed Hamilcar at the age of nine, while Livy claims he was summoned by Hasdrubal at twenty-one.Footnote ⁴⁴ Most scholars dismiss Livy’s version as internally inconsistent and chronologically implausible, though a categorical rejection may be unwarranted.Footnote ⁴⁵ Livy’s version rests on Hannibal’s address to the Carthaginian Senate, where he claimed to have spent nearly forty years abroad. This figure is best read as a rhetorical device, probably shaped by Polybius’ narrative aims rather than by strict chronology.Footnote ⁴⁶ As E. Macdonald has shown, communication between Iberia and Carthage remained frequent, and the possibility of a temporary return during this period cannot be excluded.Footnote ⁴⁷ Yet the anecdote remains problematic: it places Hannibal in Carthage in 224 bc, at the age of seventeen – by which time Hasdrubal, not Hamilcar, held command. Such a scenario is difficult to reconcile with the earlier tradition of his long service under Hamilcar. Framed by Hanno’s hostile speech, the episode is more convincingly interpreted as a moralizing fiction, perhaps ultimately derived from Fabius Pictor or another anti-Barcid sourceFootnote ⁴⁸ . The tension thus remains: while communication with Carthage makes a return conceivable, the literary context strongly suggests that Livy’s version is best read as polemical rather than factual.

Finally, there are other, less explicit aspects of Hannibal’s early experience that probably shaped his character. Chief among them is the so-called Third Libyan or ‘Mercenary’ War. Born in 247 bc, Hannibal experienced between the ages of six and nine a city under siege, ravaged by famine, political instability, and extreme violence. These formative experiences probably shaped his psychological outlook, exposing him to the realities of betrayal, survival, and military necessity.Footnote ⁴⁹ He also became aware of the complexities of war and began to understand the dynamics of internal (Hamilcar–Hanno) and external (Carthaginian–Libyan) politics. During these formative years, Hannibal also observed the duplicity of Roman diplomacy. He saw first-hand their disregard for rival powers, exemplified by their initial support for the mercenaries against Carthage.Footnote ⁵⁰ Another example is Rome’s appropriation of Sardinia in 238–237 bc, an act that pro-Roman sources went to great lengths to justify.Footnote ⁵¹ Their persistent diplomatic interference in Hispania further reveals their intention to curtail Carthaginian autonomy.Footnote ⁵²

A third key dimension of Hannibal’s formation was the practical nature of Carthaginian education. Raised in military encampments, he observed first-hand the organization of campaigns, the management of unfamiliar territories, the treatment of troops and mercenaries, the allocation of revenues, and the forging of political alliances. Hannibal’s education was profoundly empirical, grounded in continuous observation and experience.Footnote ⁵³ Though the case of Masinissa is instructive, the Carthaginian context appears even more developed. According to Julian the Apostate, Carthaginian boys were expelled from their homes and forced to survive independently, provided they avoided dishonourable conduct, suggesting a rigorously practical and morally-framed system of instruction.Footnote ⁵⁴ Aristocratic women, too, appear to have received a formal education. Sophonisba, daughter of Hasdrubal Gisco, wife of Masinissa, and contemporary of Hannibal, was reputedly well educated in letters, decorum, and music.Footnote ⁵⁵ Her formation probably began early and served political and marital aims. Comparable practices are attested in the case of Hamilcar’s daughters, indicating that such instruction was widespread among elite Carthaginian families.Footnote ⁵⁶

In conclusion, while the evidence remains fragmentary, several points emerge. The education of Carthaginian youth, particularly its public and political orientation, does not appear to have differed markedly from that of other Hellenistic societies.Footnote ⁵⁷ This is supported by the examples of Hannibal, Masinissa and his sons, the anecdote preserved by Julian the Apostate, and the documented training of aristocratic women. Hannibal was educated in both Greek and Punic, trained in horsemanship and arms, and formed within a cultural framework that emphasized the acquisition, exercise, and symbolic projection of power. His education was thus designed to exploit the real and symbolic sources of power in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, and did not differ substantially from that of figures such as Alexander, Demetrius, or Ptolemy II.

Within this line of argument, the army’s decision to appoint Hannibal demands particular attention. As this analysis has shown, his education, though privileged by his father’s Iberian project, was not exceptional by the standards of Carthaginian aristocracy. Indeed, Hannibal may even have had less direct experience of cavalry command than his Numidian counterpart, and was perhaps even less versed in naval matters. The army’s support may have stemmed from longstanding bonds developed over seventeen years, or from Hannibal’s personal and physical resemblance to Hamilcar, often noted in the sources. However, the choice of Hannibal, made in the wake of Hasdrubal’s unexpected assassination, was neither driven by sentiment nor based on speculative notions of charismatic succession. Rather, it reflected a calculated act of strategic pragmatism. Hannibal was not appointed as an hēgemōn (ἡγϵμών, ‘leader’) by birth, nor should his elevation be read as an instance of the topos of Hellenistic dynastic legitimacy. The decision arose from the institutional identity and agency of the so-called ‘Barcid army’.Footnote ⁵⁸ That the troops selected Hannibal as their commander, to represent and defend their interests in the years ahead, suggests an education already bearing political and military fruit. Nevertheless, the army’s immediate acclamation must be distinguished from the subsequent political ratification in Carthage.

Carthaginian politics at c. 221: Hannibal’s political atmosphere

The succession of three leaders from the same faction – Hamilcar, Hasdrubal, and Hannibal – has led some to propose the existence of monarchical structures in third-century bc Carthage. Two main lines of argument have been advanced in support of this view. The first and oldest concerns the alleged Hellenistic-style kingship exercised by Hasdrubal in Spain.Footnote ⁵⁹ As modern scholarship has observed, however, this interpretation owes more to the rhetorical strategies of Fabius Pictor and Polybius, both intent on distributing responsibility for the Second Punic War between Rome and Carthage, than to any concrete evidence for the establishment of an independent monarchy. Early Roman historians typically blamed the war on the infamous Hasdrubal, while portraying Hamilcar as one of the period’s most virtuous figures.Footnote ⁶⁰ It was the later historiographical tradition that attributed to Hamilcar a lingering resentment towards Rome, allegedly inherited by his successors.Footnote ⁶¹ A second line of argument arises from the broad use of the Greek βασιλϵύς (basileus, ‘king’) and the Latin rex (‘king’), which Greco-Roman authors employed to designate the Punic office of sufetes. This terminology is problematic, however, given the complete absence of any reference to Carthaginian kings in extant Punic sources.Footnote ⁶² The debate thus centres on whether basileus/rex represents a Greco-Roman adaptation of the sufetes, or whether genuine monarchs existed in Carthage. Combining these two strands of argument, several scholars, most notably Beloch, Picard, and Ameling, have suggested the existence of monarchical behaviour within the Barcid family.Footnote ⁶³ In this context, Hannibal’s appointment as general has been interpreted by some as evidence of monarchical tendencies in Carthaginian governance.

Polybius, in the passage cited above, notes that Hannibal’s appointment was ratified unanimously, first by the army and subsequently by the Senate when it assembled. Comparable accounts appear in other ancient sources, suggesting that the process enjoyed broad institutional support.Footnote ⁶⁴ This evidence calls into question any notion of monarchical rule.Footnote ⁶⁵ In this context, several studies have highlighted the considerable powers exercised by Carthaginian generals – including recruitment, diplomacy, political marriage alliances, coinage, and independent military command – powers that closely parallel those of their Roman counterparts. Such authority was exercised within the framework of the Carthaginian republic, while the Barcids offer the most prominent example, they were not unique in this regard. The popular vote that invested Hannibal with command endowed his appointment with full legal legitimacy, anchoring it in civic procedure rather than in any autonomous military power. His elevation must therefore be understood as a product of republican mechanisms rather than dynastic inheritance.Footnote ⁶⁶ With the monarchical hypothesis thus addressed, we may now turn to the internal dynamics of Carthaginian politics.

Carthage was a republic with pronounced aristocratic features. Within this structure, oligarchic elites exercised control over commerce, production, politics, and the military. This concentration of power fostered intense political rivalry, which in turn encouraged military expansionism, as ambitious aristocrats pursued political advancement, the prestige of military success, and the distribution of war spoils.Footnote ⁶⁷ Much has been written about Carthage’s political landscape between 237 and 218 bc. It has been suggested that the Barcids introduced far-reaching changes across the principal state institutions, independently of the monarchical question previously discussed.Footnote ⁶⁸ Owing to their democratic inclinations and broad popular support, the Barcids are often portrayed as politically opposed to the more conservative, oligarchic factions.Footnote ⁶⁹ The longstanding antagonism between Hanno the Great and the Barcid family is sometimes interpreted in terms of divergent policies towards Rome and endemic struggles among the aristocracy.Footnote ⁷⁰ While these interpretations are often compelling and may at times converge, they are not without their limitations. This is due in part to the fragmented nature of the evidence and the complex political dynamics within Carthage at the time. A recent study has characterized Hamilcar as a homo novus (‘new man’) within the Hellenistic political culture of Carthage.Footnote ⁷¹ Nevertheless, his origins remain obscure.Footnote ⁷² Furthermore, the Carthaginian political system was already in decline, a fact that complicates our understanding and is underscored by the failed attempts of Hanno (c. 350 bc) and Bomilcar (308 bc) to establish tyrannies.Footnote ⁷³ What follows, therefore, is a focused analysis of the political climate in Carthage around 221 bc, in keeping with the scope and limitations of this study.

Hamilcar’s political trajectory is outlined by Diodorus, who attributes his popularity to his role in earlier conflicts, particularly the Mercenary War, where he was regarded as a saviour of Carthage.Footnote ⁷⁴ Diodorus further claims that Hamilcar engaged in demagogic tactics, currying favour with the populace and thereby inducing them to entrust him with authority.Footnote ⁷⁵ This portrayal is corroborated by Appian, who reports that Hamilcar distributed the spoils of his Spanish campaigns among the army, the Carthaginian state, and his own political supporters.Footnote ⁷⁶ Whether aimed at consolidating internal loyalties, neutralizing the aristocratic centre, or pre-empting rival factions, the rise of Barcid power was not without its detractors. At this juncture, it is worth recalling Hamilcar’s trial. It was a constitutional practice in Carthage for generals to appear before the Senate upon the conclusion of a campaign; the charges could be serious, with outcomes ranging from censure to execution.Footnote ⁷⁷ The trial remains controversial owing to the fragmentary nature of the sources and the opacity of Carthaginian politics. Polybius provides only a brief and seemingly contradictory account.Footnote ⁷⁸ Appian, or his source, although chronologically confused (placing the event in 237 rather than 241 bc) and overly partisan in blaming the Hannonid faction, nonetheless preserves important procedural details.Footnote ⁷⁹ His account also suggests that Hamilcar had already secured the backing of several leading aristocrats, including Hasdrubal, his former son-in-law and a central figure in Carthaginian politics.Footnote ⁸⁰ Despite rhetorical embellishment, the evidence indicates that Hamilcar remained both popular and politically entrenched, even in the face of institutional scrutiny.Footnote ⁸¹ Following the Mercenary War, the alleged Numidian uprising, the failed trial of Hamilcar, and the resounding success of Barcid policy in Spain, the faction reached its political apogee.Footnote ⁸² Although many aspects of this narrative remain uncertain or distorted, the cumulative evidence points not only to the consolidation of Barcid dominance, but also to the presence of significant political opposition.

The available information on Hasdrubal’s political career is likewise fragmentary. Appian introduces him as one of Carthage’s most prominent and popular nobles – a claim that is often overstatedFootnote ⁸³ . That Hamilcar agreed to the marriage of his daughter to Hasdrubal suggests a certain degree of political standing, and it is plausible that Hasdrubal was involved in Hamilcar’s trial, though this remains speculative. There is no record of Hasdrubal holding military command prior to his intervention in North Africa to suppress a Numidian revolt around 237 bc Footnote ⁸⁴ . He may have been too young to participate meaningfully in the First Punic War, but the means by which he rose to prominence within the Carthaginian dēmos (δῆμος, ‘people’) remain unclear. Gómez de Caso has argued that Hasdrubal led the Barcid faction during Hamilcar’s campaigns in Sicily. Yet it is debatable whether such leadership would have been entrusted to a young man with no known military experience.Footnote ⁸⁵ Moreover, Hamilcar’s political needs arose in 241 bc, and Appian presents Hasdrubal as one of the leading citizens whom Hamilcar successfully won over.Footnote ⁸⁶ His record in Spain, both political and military, remains equally obscure. Nevertheless, despite the paucity of sources, Hasdrubal’s tenure may be characterized as a period of consolidation, advancing Carthaginian economic and territorial interests, as well as the strategic aims of the Barcid faction.Footnote ⁸⁷ A few points may thus be proposed. Hasdrubal was a significant political figure by around 241 bc. His success in suppressing the Numidian uprising strengthened the Barcid position, and he served as Hamilcar’s chief associate in Iberia, making him the natural successor. Yet despite this apparent ascendancy, opposition forces continued to wield considerable influence. As several scholars have noted, Hasdrubal’s journey to Carthage should be understood within the context of republican factional politics.Footnote ⁸⁸ The delicate equilibrium of power he was expected to maintain rested not only on political negotiation, as the sources imply, but also – evidenced by his continued financial distributions to the aristocracy – on a policy of sustained patronage. This approach should be viewed as a continuation of the strategy first developed by Hamilcar.Footnote ⁸⁹

By around 221 bc, political opposition within Carthage persisted. In this context, information concerning the Roman embassy to Carthage in late 220 bc – following its unsuccessful approach to Hannibal – would have been especially valuable. Polybius’ near-total omission of this episode must be understood in light of his stated narrative aims: ‘not only to explain how the war came about, but also to provide his solution to the controversy about who was in the right’.Footnote ⁹⁰ Any reference to internal divisions within Carthaginian politics would have undermined his depiction of national unity at the outbreak of the Second Punic War.Footnote ⁹¹ In fact, the sole detail Polybius provides on Carthage’s internal politics contradicts this portrayal: namely, that Hannibal used the spoils of Saguntum to consolidate domestic support.Footnote ⁹² This does not imply that Polybius was deliberately misleading – he certainly believed in what he wrote. Nevertheless, his omission serves as a cautionary reminder for modern historians regarding the uncritical acceptance of his authority.Footnote ⁹³ Despite Polybius’ silence, his brief allusion to Hannibal’s distribution of booty indicates that consensus within the Carthaginian Senate was far from unanimous.Footnote ⁹⁴ Evidence of political opposition is also found in the accounts of Livy and Appian, although their narratives often portray Hanno’s resistance to the Barcids in exaggerated or stylized terms, including theatrical speeches and implausible reports.Footnote ⁹⁵ These traditions, further developed in the epic poetry of Silius Italicus, suggest that Roman authors were, to some extent, aware of the political atmosphere in Carthage around 221 bc and of the opposition led by Hanno – those whom Polybius refers to as τοὺς δὲ πρώτους ἄνδρας (‘the city’s leading citizens’).Footnote ⁹⁶

This political background invites several observations. Unlike Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, Hannibal was not a prominent figure in Carthaginian politics at the time of his appointment. He lacked experience in both governance and independent command. His service as a cavalry officer under Hasdrubal may even have been perceived as insufficient preparation. This is all the more noteworthy given that his ratification entailed entrusting an inexperienced and relatively unknown individual with the administration of Carthaginian interests in Iberia, by then a territory more extensive than Carthage’s African dominions.Footnote ⁹⁷ On the basis of the extant evidence, the claim of unanimity in the Carthaginian Senate seems to originate with Polybius, and the later tradition does no more than reproduce it. These considerations do not imply that the political atmosphere around 221 bc was explicitly anti-Barcid; nor, however, do they support the notion that the Barcid faction exercised unopposed authority. Hannibal’s appointment must be understood within this dynamic and contested political framework.Footnote ⁹⁸

As previously noted, the Carthaginian oligarchic system fostered a political environment in which aristocratic families played an omnipresent, and at times seemingly omnipotent, role, not unlike similar structures elsewhere in the Mediterranean.Footnote ⁹⁹ The epigraphic record is particularly relevant in this context. High magistracies – civil, military, religious, or commercial – were typically monopolized by a select group of elite lineages.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Among these, the Magonid family stands as a paradigmatic example, dominating Carthaginian politics from the late sixth to the early fourth century bc, and overseeing major campaigns such as the conquests of Sardinia and Sicily.Footnote ¹⁰¹ In similar fashion, the Barcid-led expansion into Iberia was both conceived and executed under dynastic leadership, and must be interpreted in continuity with Carthaginian political tradition.Footnote ¹⁰² This perspective transcends the mere observation that the Barcids held power: it reflects a broader cultural pattern in which elite family interests and public affairs were deeply intertwined. Hannibal’s candidacy as Hasdrubal’s successor was not legitimized through formal legal mechanisms, but rather grounded in cultural expectations shaped by precedent. Aristotle observed that in Carthage, the selection of sufetes and generals was determined not only by merit (aristocratic principles), but also by personal wealth (oligarchic criteria). Even allowing for political change in the third century bc, the continued dominance of certain families conformed to these standards.Footnote ¹⁰³ It is also significant that the surviving sources concerning Hamilcar and Hannibal reinforce this structural reality. In this regard, it is worth recalling that Iberia, highly prized in antiquity for its wealth, had become Carthage’s principal source of revenue between 237 and 218 bc.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ Any disruption to that arrangement would have threatened not only strategic priorities, but the financial interests of the ruling class.

A close examination of Hannibal’s appointment suggests that it would be unwise to attribute it solely to the dominance of the Barcid faction. Their leadership, though real and historically attested, was not unchallenged. Several factors may have influenced the Senate’s decision: first, the cultural tradition in Carthage that bound elite families to the service of the state; second, the considerable political capital accumulated by Hamilcar and Hasdrubal; third, the potential disruption to the Iberian project, which would have endangered not only the state’s strategic interests but also the financial interests of the aristocracy. In addition to these considerations, one must acknowledge the army’s support for Hannibal, the pragmatic value of appointing a commander familiar with the territory and its inhabitants, and even the constitutional legitimacy of such a choice. Taken together, these elements probably reinforced Hannibal’s candidacy over other viable contenders such as Hasdrubal son of Gisco, a leading figure from a prominent neutral lineage, unaffiliated with either the Hannonid or Barcid factions, whom the sources describe as ‘second to none among the Carthaginians’ (οὐδϵνὸς Καρχηδονίων δϵύτϵρος).Footnote ¹⁰⁵