Edited collections of essays often suffer from a collective problem: the various contributions have little in common. But by focusing on a narrow topic – the Klein-Saks Mission to Chile – this volume provides the reader with a detailed understanding of the topic. In the late 1950s, the Chilean government of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo hired the firm of Klein-Saks to analyse the country's economic situation and to provide advice on how to surmount an acute economic crisis. Adolfo Ibáñez provides an inclusive overview of Chile's infatuation with inflation, a romance that began in the mid-1870s and subsequently blossomed into a long-term relationship that lasted for decades. A combination of the Banco Central and local oligarchs supported an inflationary monetary policy as a means to increase productivity, but erratic copper prices, a declining agricultural sector, the failure of import-substituting industries, lack of access to domestic or international credit, and deficit spending all deepened inflation. Increasingly, various domestic critics – the Banco Central, the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPAL), Jorge Alessandri, the editors of El Mercurio and Eduardo Frei – offered conflicting suggestions as to how to cure these defects and inflation. While these critics advocated no uniform policy, they did concur that only a foreign economic mission, one that had no ties to domestic groups, had the independence to implement reforms. Thus, the Klein-Saks Mission was born.

Juan Eduardo Couyoumdjian, this volume's editor, concentrates on the events of 1950–7. Gabriel González Videla, Jorge Alessandri and Carlos Vial, he notes, saw the need to curb inflation. Unfortunately, many Chileans had become addicted to the reajustes that various competing interest groups demanded in order to protect their purchasing power. Ibáñez, who had promised to make reforms, could not fulfil this promise because his political support, with the exception of the Conservative and Liberal parties, had contracted. The divisive nature of Chile's political parties, and the fact that Ibáñez, known as ‘the mule’, lacked the intellect to forge a solution, forced the president to hire foreign technical experts to provide apolitical advice on how to end the inflation and to suggest reforms.

California-based Sebastián Edwards observed that the Klein-Saks Mission's recommendations were not that radical, but they appealed to the Chilean public precisely because they were not the product of domestic, and therefore partisan, influence. Unfortunately, the attempt to restore financial stability foundered because the Congress would not react in a timely fashion and because the drop in copper prices slashed revenues. Worse, Edwards argues, Ibáñez's erratic personality prevented him from fashioning a sound economic policy, while the various domestic political groups became so focused on protecting their constituents that they could not agree to reduce government subsidies, reform the tax code and curtail the inflationary spiral by ceasing to grant reajustes. When the International Monetary Fund granted Chile funds without requiring any reforms, the Right supported Ibáñez, who seemed paralysed. Unfortunately the Congress lacked the will to implement any meaningful change as long as higher copper prices reduced inflation. Without support from the political system, the Klein-Saks Mission could not push through reforms.

In one sense, Cristián Garay Vera argued, the North American mission was virtually destined to fail because its suggestions managed to antagonise Ibáñez's supporters as well as the Central Unica de Trabajadores (Workers’ United Centre, CUT, a trade union confederation) and the Partido Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Party, PSP). Unrestrained inflation, which precipitated the 1957 riots over the cost of Santiago's public transport, produced martyrs for the Left and grief for Ibáñez. The call for economic reforms became somewhat muted, in part because many claimed that the proposed changes fell disproportionately on the poor while others continued to see inflation as a force for development. It did not matter: the political foes killed the programmes and Klein-Saks went home.

As Rolf Lüders observed, this failure to adopt the mission's recommendation cost Chile dearly. Jorge Alessandri tried to resuscitate the anti-inflationary measures, as did Eduardo Frei. It was not until Chile began sending some of its economists to study at the University of Chicago that change occurred. These individuals, who revamped the study of economics in Chile, also managed to force through the same reforms where Klein-Saks had failed. And, thanks to General Pinochet, the unions lacked the strength to stymie the changes. Eduardo Coouyoumdjian and Cristián Larroulet concur that the 1974 concord between the Catholic University and the University of Chicago provided Chile with a cadre of trained technicians. As they observe, it was a tribute to these men that the Concertación retained the innovations introduced during Pinochet's administration.

This volume is quite excellent; it discusses an often ignored topic while relating it to Chile's political and economic history. Additionally, it provides the reader with valuable statistical data. Clearly, economists and historians would profit from reading this work, which sets the standards for this type of study.