The economic history of Qajar Iran is an underexplored field. In spite of the pioneering work of Ann Lambton and Charles Issawi, as well as of numerous other scholars—Ervand Abrahamian, Abbas Amanat, Ahmad Ashraf, Willem Floor, Farhad Kazemi, Nikki Keddie, Rudi Matthee, and Ahmad Seyf, among others—who have explored various aspects of Qajar Iran's economy since then, much work remains to be done. Among the topics deserving of further study is the role of the Qajar state and its political elites in the economic developments of the 19th century. It thus is pleasing to see the publication of a book on precisely that question.

At the outset, Amirahmadi informs the reader that he intends to bring together “in one comprehensive book, a critical analysis of developments in Iran's social, economic, political, spatial and ideological institutions as well as international relations” during its “formative years (1800s–1920s)” (p. 1). The book's ambition is evident in the central question(s) that lie at its heart: why has “Iran failed to develop economically, become a democracy, and establish a positive relationship with the outside world?” (p. xxi). These questions are undoubtedly on many people's minds and deserve attention. It is also refreshing to see a book on Iranian history eschew a descriptive account and openly adopt an “analytical methodology” (p. 5). Although some may find the use of terms like class and feudalism off putting or see them as vestiges of an earlier, Marxist-influenced era, the author should be commended for actively engaging with these analytic categories.

The book is structured into seven thematic chapters, in addition to an introduction and conclusion, and plots the transition of Iranian society from what the author calls “pseudo-feudalism” to “proto-capitalism.” Three distinct periods are identified in the evolution: the first, from 1796 to 1880, was a period of “capitalist cooperation” and primitive accumulation; this was followed by the second, from 1881 to 1963, by a “transitional capitalist manufacturing period”; and finally, the third period, from 1963 to the present and outside the scope of this book, has been the era of “machine-factory or modern industry” (pp. 3–4). Forty charts and tables provide figures for a variety of economic indicators, including transportation conditions, foreign investment, expenditures, exports, wages, and foreign trade. For a few of these indicators, Amirahmadi finds signs of progress during the 19th century: the population increased, transportation improved, surplus agriculture (in the form of cash crops) emerged, and simple capitalist manufacturing developed. At the same time, however, inflation rose, trade deficits spiked, and European powers imposed damaging treaties on Iran.

Ultimately, the book argues, the emergence of an underdeveloped proto-capitalism in Iran, defined by a failure to transition to productive capitalism and to industrialize, was due to an “alliance between the cash-hungry feudal ruling class and the foreign powers” (p. 234). The author further divides the ruling class into two categories—the “dependent” and the “national”—and argues that the former, more reactionary, group overpowered the latter to take the accumulating capital made possible by high prices, low wages, and the formation of a commodity market to shift investment to foreign trade, cash crop production, and real estate (pp. 180–81). This shift, coupled with the deleterious effect of the violent and “peaceful” penetration of Iran by European powers, led to disastrous results for the economy. Amirahmadi pushes the argument of the “control of Iran by apparently ‘peaceful’ means” further than most, by including “trade, treaties,” “establishment of consulates,” “freemasonry,” and “religious missionaries” as additional means of “domination” (pp. 137–38), leaving one to wonder whether all foreign interest in Iran should be viewed as control.

Much of the value of the book lies in its scope and in its use of quantitative data to support its argument. In that sense, it should serve as inspiration for other studies of Iran's economic history during the 19th century. Nevertheless, this strength also proves one of the book's primary weaknesses. The evidence deployed to prove its argument—including the empirical data—relies on outdated traditional and biased sources. Consider, for example, the author's discussion of Iran's political system and civil society (Chapters 5 and 6, respectively). Instead of providing an analysis of Qajar politics, ideological debates, and intellectual and religious movements based on the wealth of published and unpublished Persian-language primary sources that have increasingly been made available to historians, the author relies heavily on the well-known accounts of European observers like Percy Sykes, George Curzon, and E.G. Browne. Amirahmadi has missed an opportunity, because unlike historians of earlier time periods who bemoan the dearth of available sources, historians of Qajar Iran are fortunate to have an abundance of underutilized—even unused—primary material, some of which is being published in Iran. Critical and relevant secondary studies on the Qajar period, including those by Abbas Amanat, Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Arash Khazeni, Vanessa Martin, and Christoph Werner, to name a few—as well as comparative cases from other regions—are not discussed and situated against this book, and in some cases are omitted from the citations and bibliography.

A more fundamental problem with the book, however, lies in the framing of the book's central problematic: “endeavor[ing] to shed light on the reasons why an ‘Islamic Revolution’ could have happened in twentieth-century Iran” (p. xxi). The author writes that “[f]ailure of the nascent bourgeoisie to industrialize the economy … re-empowered the unique Iranian feudalism, leading to the establishment of a dictatorship in place of absolutism” and therefore “Iran failed to develop economically, become a democracy and establish a beneficial relationship with the outside world” (p. 6). The suggestion seems to be that economics determine political outcomes, that industrialization leads to democracy, which in turn leads to open engagement with the international community. One however need only look at the history of the Soviet Union or 20th-century China to conclude that industrialization is no guarantee for the emergence of democracy. There are also any number of countries whose political systems are far from democratic but who nevertheless have amicable relations with the international community. It is not at all evident how or even if those two variables are linked either. But even if the author did not intend to suggest a causal progression from industrialization to democracy, and eventually to open relations in the international realm, the principal argument of economic superstructures determining politics asks to be re-evaluated in light of much recent scholarship on the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution and “the great divergence.” Works by scholars such as Daron Acemoglu, Douglass North, Steven Pincus, Kenneth Pomeranz, James Robinson, R. Bin Wong, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, for example, point to the content of political and ideological debates, to policies pursued, to the forms of institutions created, and to environmental conditions as the most important factors in stimulating economic innovation and growth or, conversely, stagnation. That is to say, the growing scholarly consensus suggests that political choices determine economic outcomes. Why then Amirahmadi's insistence on the converse, especially given that his own analysis of the 19th century suggests his belief in historical contingency and agency? In other words, why is the root cause of Iran's contemporary predicament the economic outcome of Iran's 19th century—and not, for example, the political economy of 20th-century Pahlavi Iran or the Islamic Republic? This is never made clear.

Although the analytical frame of this book leaves many questions unanswered, its attempts at empirical economic history are laudable and worthy of attention. The book will hopefully draw greater attention to Iran's political economy during the 19th century and inspire others to examine this understudied topic.