This book presents a troublesome paradox for this reviewer. Its account of policy change in four countries is a monument to careful scholarship, remarkable both for its depth and width. Many of its acute analytical insights will inform work on policy making, and not just in health care, for years to come. But is the central thesis – the model of policy making that has inspired this intellectually adventurous and stimulating work – persuasive enough? In what follows, I shall argue that – taking the case of the changes in health care policy over six decades in the United Kingdom, one of the four countries studied – there are grounds for scepticism.
The core of this book is the 350 pages of analytic narrative of the development of the health care systems of Canada, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States since 1945. Bookending this narrative (a major achievement in its own right) are sections setting out Tuohy’s theoretical focus and the conclusions she draws from her exploration. The focus is on the moments when windows of opportunity open that allow political actors to deviate from the ‘normal constraints that drive politics along established paths’ and make major changes. The thesis is that major change – defined as changes that are large in scale and rapid in execution – reflect ‘political actors’ strategic assessments of their current and future positions’. If they command a strong legislative majority but are uncertain about their prospects at the next general election, the argument goes, they will go for ‘Big Bang’, comprehensive change to be implemented quickly.
This is, of course, only the most dramatic mode of change. Tuohy offers a four-fold model of change, each reflecting different political circumstances. There is the ‘Blueprint’ mode of change, represented by the Netherlands, where an albeit eroding tradition of power-sharing cooperation and compromise allowed programmatic change to be introduced step by step over time. There is incrementalism (about which Tuohy tends to be rather sniffy, though acknowledging that ‘purposive’, as distinct from opportunistic, incrementalism may not be so very different from the ‘Blueprint’ mode). And finally, there is the ‘Mosaic’ type of change that acknowledges power constraints, involves multiple adjustments to existing institutional arrangements and cautious implementation rather than the drama of the ‘Big Bang’ mode.
Tuohy considers that it is the comparative dimension that provides the best test bed for her thesis. But there is also an argument for homing in on the UK case (England since devolution). For it is the UK which provides the most case studies of change: four as against three for the USA (counting the Clinton failure), two for Canada and one for the Netherlands. This, in itself, seems significant. It underlines the fact that – as recognised by Tuohy – institutional factors are critically important. Governments in the UK with a clear Parliamentary majority (the norm in the 20th century, if no longer so) have few veto points to override. Unlike the USA, the Executive has an automatic legislative majority. Unlike Canada, there are no provinces to placate. Unlike the Netherlands, there is no tradition of seeking consensus. So in the UK, the window of opportunity is swinging open much of the time.
But do we need Tuohy’s second condition for explaining Big Bang changes – i.e. changes that are rapid in execution – which is that politicians fear losing office at the next election? This is surely redundant. Re-election is never guaranteed. The 1945 Labour Government that created the National Health Service – the first Big Bang – ultimately lost office in the 1951 General Election despite getting more votes than Churchill’s resurgent Conservatives. But Labour Ministers did not have second sight. They rushed to create the NHS because of their own deep ideological commitment to their transformative programme and because (as the predecessor Coalition Government had recognised) reform of health care would have to be a priority whichever party was elected in 1945.
The second UK Big Bang example – Mrs. Thatcher’s 1989 introduction of the internal market – raises still more questions about Tuohy’s model for explaining modes of change. Note the date. By then Mrs. Thatcher was serving her third term as Prime Minister and had been in office for 10 years. The window of opportunity was wide open for her during her previous terms of office. She did not take it because of political calculation, the same calculations which made her a reluctant reformer in her third term: the political risks of meddling with a cherished national institution. To explain her eventual decision to take reform of the NHS on board, we have to turn to a different set of factors. The mid-1980s were characterised by dwindling annual increments in public expenditure on the NHS and rising public dissatisfaction with the service. So Mrs. Thatcher faced an unpalatable choice: spending more on the NHS or accepting a politically damaging barrage of criticism. Reforming the NHS was her attempt to solve this dilemma. But if doing nothing entailed high political costs, so did introducing the reforms in the face of a storm of opposition: indeed, Mrs. Thatcher tried to persuade her Secretary of State to delay implementation.
The case of Mrs. Thatcher’s Big Bang therefore suggests that Tuohy’s model of policy change could be strengthened by taking account of the specific circumstances of the policy area under consideration. Could it be that the UK offers more examples of policy change than the other countries not just because the window of the opportunity is open for so much of the time but because of the characteristics of the NHS – a centrally financed service with high political visibility where financial and political costs have to be traded off? It is surely this, as well as the political institutions, that helps to explain the differences between the UK and the other countries studied.
The point is reinforced if we look at the case that is a mirror image of Mrs. Thatcher’s Big Bang: the dog that did not bark. Come the turn of the century, and Tony Blair’s Government was in its triumphant second term. However, there was no Big Bang. The move towards greater choice and competition proceeded incrementally. Tuohy presents this strategy of incrementalism as a ‘puzzle’, the key to which she sees in the well documented rivalry between Blair and his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown. But why assume that, just because the opportunity was there, Big Bang change was the appropriate response? Waiting times were falling; public satisfaction was rising rapidly. Even incremental moves to reinforce market mechanisms risked splitting the Labour Party as the furore over the introduction of Foundation Trusts, noted by Tuohy, had shown. There hardly seems reason to invoke the Blair-Brown feud (real though that was) to explain what seems to have been a rational political strategy of fine tuning.
There is a further argument against assuming that Big Bang change should be taken as the norm when windows of opportunity – as defined by the Government of the day commanding a solid legislative majority – open. The windows are not exclusive to any one policy area. There may therefore be competition between government departments to exploit the opportunity offered. Party ideology, political calculation and personal ambitions will all play a part in determining the outcome of this competition.
The last example of policy change affecting the NHS, the 2012 legislation of the Coalition Government elected in 2010, raises yet other issues. The UK example is offered as an instance of the ‘Mosaic’ strategy in the company of the US Obamacare legislation. The twinning of the two under the same analytic label is jolting. The compromises of the Obamacare legislation were ex ante – a deliberate strategy designed to neutralise potentially hostile interests and mobilise support so as to avoid another Clinton fiasco. The compromises of the 2012 legislation were ex post – the Secretary of State for Health produced what might almost have qualified as a Big Bang reform (largely ignoring earlier negotiations, documented by Tuohy, between the coalition partners) but public and parliamentary opposition forced the Government to accept a series of watering-down changes. And there is a further, perhaps more critical, difference still between these two ‘Mosaic’ case studies. The Obamacare legislation had large implications for public finance and private behaviour. It affected millions of Americans. The same could be said of the creation of the NHS in 1948. In contrast, the Coalition Government’s 2012 legislation had hardly any implications for public finance (apart from the one off costs of the reorganisation involved) and none for private behaviour. Neither did Thatcher’s Big Bang and subsequent policy initiatives. None changed the terms of the relationship between the citizen and health care. Which might be yet another factor in explaining why the UK is so change-prone, while also suggesting that the distributional dimension could usefully be incorporated into the analysis of policy change.
The analysis of the dynamics of policy change is, however, only one part of the story told by Tuohy. She also returns to the themes of her previous book, Accidental Logics, to discuss the impact of the changes. Specifically, she focusses on the balance of influence (as between professionals and private finance) and the instruments of control (as between hierarchy, the market and peer control), as well as analysing the opportunities offered by markets to new entrepreneurs. Although done in summary form, the exercise is done with subtlety and sophistication. Thus in the case of the NHS, she rightly notes that while the role of the State as the direct provider of health care diminished, the role of governmental regulation increased greatly – as in the other countries studied. Acutely, too, she notes the continuing tensions – and therefore likely future policy turbulence – between competition regimes and other policy objectives. Developments since the publication of the book have reinforced this conclusion: as the dominant policy discourse – the ideas guiding policy – has shifted from stressing the role of competition to that of promoting integration so demands for revising the NHS’s legislative framework have increased. So much so that the Prime Minister has invited the NHS to come up with proposals for amending the legislation to allow this to happen.
My doubts about some of Tuohy’s specific arguments and conclusions therefore do not diminish my admiration for an outstanding work of scholarship. No other scholar has tried to master four national accounts of reform over the decades or done so with such analytic sophistication and command of the scholarly literature.
