One of the hazards in writing a book that surveys a large number of thinkers is that readers are likely to praise the book in general but take issue with the chapter that treads into their bailiwick. I am no exception as I will focus on Beiner's chapter on Habermas. I conclude, however, with some general observations about Beiner's idea and ideal of political philosophy. I offer this response in the same spirit in which Beiner wrote the book. He tells his reader that to hold back from the very toughest challenge is a form of condescension (xi). So I will not hold back.
There are two dimensions to my criticism of Beiner's reading of and argument with Habermas. And these two divide exactly between “reading of” and “argument with.” That is, I think first that Beiner misreads Habermas. Since there is no space for detailed textual arguments, I rely on some general claims about Habermas interpretation. The second bone of contention is about Beiner's skepticism with regard to thinkers like Habermas and Rawls who try to push political philosophy beyond the great metaphysical debates that have characterized that tradition from Plato until today. I think it is Beiner and not Rawls and Habermas who gives up on political philosophy.
Getting Habermas Right
Beiner's core message is that Habermas's political philosophy is hopelessly utopian (the term “utopian” is used to describe his philosophy almost as much as “jargon”—I object to both descriptions). Beiner writes that Habermas's “vision of society as (potentially) a free intersubjective dialogue” (147) or as “a partnership in public dialogue” (150) is nice but given the reality right in front of our noses is highly unlikely. This skepticism goes double for the political world. It would be nice to imagine Barack Obama and Mitt Romney engaging in a genuine rational discourse for the epistemic and civic edification of citizens, Beiner comments (148), but is this imaginable?
Contrary to Beiner's depiction, Habermas does not envision or suggest that politics could or ought to become one big rational discourse where we solve all our problems through reasonable and respectful deliberation. Not only is Habermas not utopian in this sense, one of the problems many have with Habermas's political philosophy is that it is not normative enough!
Ideals like discourse, dialogue, and the ideal speech situation (ISS) are not ideals to strive for, nor do they offer political blueprints for a future time. They are in a sense behind us as frameworks or idealizations that help us understand certain dimensions of our social or political world. The ISS is not a social ideal. Discourse is not a political ideal. Both are idealization of linguistic theory—what perfect conditions for engaging in justification might look like—and require a lot of mediation to see how they are relevant or play out in politics. Politics and society contain much more than justification even though justification is central to modern ideas of democratic legitimacy.
So it is not so much that we should be striving to get our leaders to act like perfect discursive citizens, it is that we recognize exactly what has gone wrong in many of our public debates only because we have some idealized idea of what a fair, honest, and discursive encounter would entail. The real debate between Habermas and Beiner is not about utopianism but about the nature of political philosophy under the conditions of late modernity.Footnote 1
As Beiner correctly points out, Habermas takes a civilizational perspective as his starting point: Western modernity has left behind the possibility of justifying and understanding our political and legal order by reference to a higher external authority. This loss of foundations opens the door to a new sort of justification. We do not simply replace traditional foundations with equivalent modern ones, as if a principle of utility or Kant's innate right could take on the justificatory function held by God or Nature in the premodern world. Pluralism and differentiation have made this type of justification that seeks a bottom line or a buck stopper that is deeply and widely shared unavailable to us. We are in a postmetaphysical world. Habermas is not saying that modern citizens or philosophers for that matter have all given up on religion or strong metaphysical claims at a subjective level or as comprehensive commitments. He is saying that we (for the most part) have given up on the idea that convergence on one higher metaphysical truth is going to furnish stable and legitimate foundations to political institutions. Beiner misreads both Habermas and Rawls by implying that they are asking us to give up our metaphysical commitments. Both assume that we all have such commitments and the primary task for political philosophy is to navigate that pluralism. This is a different vision of political philosophy than Beiner's and one that I argue is more political than his.
The loss of firm and shared foundations forces us, according to Habermas, to rely more and more on the procedural conditions of justification. The sorts of questions that become important are: What does it mean to justify something? When do we know we have succeeded in justifying something? What are ideal conditions under which to undertake justification? This story about how we meet the challenges of justifying a political order under conditions of modernity allows Habermas to connect questions of legitimacy and normativity to a nonnormative theory of communication and discourse. In Habermas's terminology, discourse is a form of communication concerned solely with justification. Therefore a discourse theory of law and democracy is a theory of law and democracy tied to the procedural conditions of justification that in turn are tied to universal claims about communication as such. The procedural conditions of justification involve freedoms to speak and argue, equal chances to sway interlocutors, and generally conditions that insure only rational persuasion is going on. We counterfactually assume that something like these conditions underwrite scientific discourse. Habermas argues that the same should be true for any attempt to engage in rational justification. These conditions are of course norms but they are not introduced as moral, political, or social norms but rather as procedural rules for the linguistic and epistemic activity of justification as such.
A discourse theory of law and democracy reconstructs the central institutions of liberal democracy in discourse-theoretic terms. Habermas is not saying we need to institute a discursive process of legislation in order to achieve true democratic legitimacy. He is saying that the only way to make sense of the liberal democratic claims to legitimacy is to understand them in discourse-theoretic terms because only discourses of justification can generate validity in a postmetaphysical world. If we look at democracy this way, then our constitutions, rights, and freedoms, our equal opportunities to participate and speak, the fair regulation of the public sphere, and the accountability of our representatives are all to be understood in discourse-theoretic terms, that is, as a legally constituted discursive process of legislation. Thus legitimacy is purely procedural: “The unity of a completely proceduralized reason then retreats into the discursive structure of public communication.”Footnote 2 Many complain that this view of politics appears uninterested in the subjective commitments of citizens and focuses instead on system-level rules and that these rules are really radicalized constitutional safeguards. The “utopia” that Habermas projects is a more perfect constitutionalism in which extensive rights are fully instantiated.Footnote 3
The Real Bone of Contention
This way of reading makes him less utopian but more Rawlsian. Like Rawls, Habermas is concerned about doing political philosophy without metaphysical foundations and in a world characterized by the fact of pluralism. Habermas replaces foundational political philosophy with a procedural picture of liberal democracy where we understand liberal institutions not as instantiating a particular conception of the good but rather as the outcome of a sociological/historical learning process in which we fall back on the problem-solving resources embedded in language and communication.
Beiner argues that political philosophy that tries to escape the tangle of pluralism by epistemic abstinence, as in the case of Rawls, or postmetaphysical proceduralism as in the case of Habermas, is giving up on or, worse, betraying political philosophy's true vocation. This vocation is not to try to avoid the metaphysical battles but join them with gusto and give no quarter.
It is simply not clear to me in Beiner's formulation why political philosophy must be the enterprise he says it is. Beiner's definition of political philosophy as an “epic” enterprise of offering comprehensive, ambitious accounts of the human good is a picture that fits many of the towering figures in our canon. But why should this picture hold us captive? Is there no room for other conceptions of political philosophy? And anyway this conception is strangely and worryingly apolitical for a political philosophy. The image here is of the great minds doing intellectual battle for our edification. Head to head and let the best idea win. We do not want such epic battles in real life so Beiner (a) makes their role primarily one of edification and (b) hives off citizenship in a drastic division of labor between citizens and philosophers. Because of course we do not want citizens engaged in epic battles. (This does not seem so different from Rawls after all.)
Citizens are left to navigate pluralism as best they can. Political philosophy is not there to help but is relegated to a life of intellectual theater where the aesthetic satisfaction of the epic clash of big ideas outweighs the ideal of problem solving in a real political world where the problem is the epic clash of big ideas. Beiner accuses Rawls and Habermas of wishing for the death of political philosophy. This cannot be right. Their brand of political philosophy seeks a way to navigate in a political world that, on the one hand, contains many Beiner-type versions of political philosophy and on the other hand, is committed to fairness and equality.
I find Beiner's view of political philosophy deep, erudite, intriguing, and infused with a lifelong engagement with powerful ideas. My only complaint is with the claim that it is the only or true way to do political philosophy. But Beiner is an excellent and gifted practitioner of this brand of political philosophy so of course he must defend it with gusto and give no quarter. But as a namby-pamby political philosopher, I will say that Beiner's is a true political philosophy even if it is not true.
